Assembly of Western European Union Proceedings, Twenty-fifth Ordinary Session, Second Part. Volume IV: Minutes, Official report of debates. Paris, December 1979 by unknown
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
PROCEEDINGS 
TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION 
SECOND PART 
December 1979 
IV 
Minutes 
Official Report of Debates 
WEU 
PARIS 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
43, avenue du President Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16- Tel. 723.54.32 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
PROCEEDINGS 
TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION 
SECOND PART 
December 1979 
IV 
Minutes 
Official Report of Debates 
WEU 
PARIS 

The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes : 
Volume III : Assembly Documents. 
Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, 
General Index. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
List of Representatives and Substitutes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings : 
Eighth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Text adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Ninth Sitting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Texts adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Tenth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Eleventh Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Texts adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Twelfth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Text adopted 
Thirteenth Sitting 
Text adopted 
Fourteenth Sitting 
Texts adopted 
Official Report of Debates: 
39 
41 
45 
46 
49 
Eighth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Ninth Sitting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
Tenth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
Eleventh Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
Twelfth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 
Thirteenth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 
Fourteenth Sitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 
IJST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY 
BELGIUM MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre UDF' 
LEMAIRE Mcwcel ONIP 
Representatives LEMOINE Georgu Socialist 
MAL VY Martin Socialist 
MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo Socialist MENARD JacqUSB Ind. Rep. 
BONNEL Raoul PVV MEROIER Jean Dem. Left 
HANIN Charles Soc. Chr. VISSE Ren6 Oommunist 
MANGELSCHOTS Jan Socialist WARGNIES Olaude Oommunist 
PEETERS Renaat Soc. Chr. 
TANGHE Francis Soc. Chr. 
van WATERSCHOOT John Soc. Chr. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Subatitutu 
MM. BRASSEUR Guy F'DF' 
DEJ ARDIN Olaude Socialist Representativee 
LAGNEAU Andr6 PRL 
LAMBIOTTE Fortune Socialist Mr. AHRENS Karl SPD 
MIOHEL J011eph Soc. Ohr. Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte SPD 
V AN DER ELST F'ranB VolkBUnie MM. ENDERS Wendelin SPD 
VERLEYSEN William Soc. Ohr. EVERS Hans CDU/CSU 
FLAMIG Gerhard SPD 
GESSNER Manfred-Achim SPD 
HANDLOS Franz CDU/CSU 
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe CDU/CSU 
FRANCE President of the Assembly 
KITTELMANN Peter CDU/CSU 
Repreeentativee LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans CDU/CSU 
MARQUARDT Werner SPD 
MM. BIZET Emile RPR (App.) MENDE Erich CDU/CSU 
BOUCHENY Serge Communist MILZ Peter CDU/CSU 
BRUGNON Maurice Socialist 1\fOLLER Giinther CDU/CSU 
CARO Jean-Marie UDF PA WELCZYK Alfons SPD 
DEPIETRI cesar Communist REDDEMANN Gerhard CDU/CSU 
DESCHAMPS Bernard Communist SCHMIDT Hermann SPD 
FERRETTI Henri UDF VOHRER Manfred FDP 
GRUSSENMEYER Fran9ois RPR 
JAGER Rene UCDP 
JEAMBRUN Pierre Dem. Left 
PERIDIER Jean Socialist Sabatitutu 
PERONNET Gabriel UDF (App.) 
PETIT Camille RPR MM. ALBER Siegbert ODU/OSU 
PIGNION Lucien Socialist AMREHN F'ranz ODUfOSU 
SCHLEITER Fran9ois Ind. Rep. BARDENS HanB SPD 
SENES Gilbert Socialist BOHM Wiljried ODUJOSU 
TALON Bernard RPR BtJOHNER Peter SPD 
V ALLEIX Jean RPR HOLTZ Uwe SPD 
KLEPSOH Egon ODUfOSU 
Subatitutu LEMMRIOH Karl Heinz ODUfOSU 
LENZER Ohristian ODUfOSU 
MM. BAUMEL Jacquu RPR MATTIOK Kurt SPD 
BEOHTER Jean-Pierre RPR SOHAUBLE Woljgang ODUfOSU 
BELIN Gilbert Socialist SOHEF'F'LER Hermann SPD 
BERRIER Noel Socialist SOHMIDT HanBheinrich F'DP 
BOZZI Jean RPR SOHULTE Manjred SPD 
OOUDERO Pierre UDF' SPIES von BtJLLESHEIM ODUfOSU 
DELEHEDDE Andr6 Socialist Adolj 
DRUON Maurice RPR UEBERHORST Reinhard SPD 
JUNG Louis UODP WITTMAN F'ritz ODUfOSU 
KOEHL Emile UDF' ZEBISOH F'ranz JoBej SPD 
8 
LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ITALY NETHERLANDS 
Representatives Representatives 
MM. ARFE Gaetano Socialist MM. CORNELISSEN Pam CDA 
BERNINI Bruno Communist van EUJLST Johan CDA de KOSTER Hans Liberal 
BOLDRINI Arrigo Communist SCHOLTEN Jan Nico CDA 
BONALUMI Gilberto Chr. Dem. STOFFELEN Pieter Labour 
CALAMANDREI Franco Communist TUMMERS Nicolas Labour 
CORALLO Salvatore Communist VOOGD Johan Labour 
DE POI Alfredo Chr. Dem. 
FOSSON Pietro Val d'Aosta Substitutes Union 
GONELLA Guido Chr. Dem. MM. van den BERGH Haf'1'11 Labour 
MAGGIONI Desiderio Chr. Dem. KONINGS Martin Labour 
MINNOCCI Gia.cinto Socialist LAMBERTS J. H. Labour 
ORSINI Bruno Chr. Dem. MOMMERSTEEG J08eph CDA 
PECCHIOLI U go Communist PORTHEINE Frederik Liberal 
PECORARO Antonio Chr. Dem. SCHLINGEMANN Johan Liberal 
ROBERTI Giovanni DN Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA CDA 
SARTI Adolfo Chr. Dem. Anne Maria 
SEGRE Sergio Communist 
TREU Rena.to Chr. Dem. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Substitutes 
Representatives 
Mrs. AGNELLI Suaanna Ind. Rep. Mr. Alan BEITH Liberal 
MM. ANTONI Vareae Communist Sir Frederic BENNETT Conservative 
ARIOSTO Egidio PSDI MM. Andrew FAULDS Labour 
A VELLONE Giuaeppe Chr. Dem. Anthony GRANT Conservative 
BORGHI Luigi Chr. Dem. W. Percy GRIEVE Conservative 
CA V ALIERE Stefano Chr. Dem. Peter HARDY Labour 
DEL DUCA Antonio Chr. Dem. Paul HA WKINS Conservative 
Mrs. F ACCIO Adele Radical Lord HUGHES Labour 
MM. GIUST Bruno Chr. Dem. MM. Anthony KERSHA W 
Conservative 
Arthur LEWIS Labour 
MARA V ALLE Fabio Socialist Fred MULLEY Labour 
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Oriatina Communist Cranley ONSLOW Conservative 
MM. PINTO Biagio Republican John PAGE Conservative 
ROMANO Angelo lnd. Left Lord REAY Conservative 
ROSSI Raffaele Communist MM. John ROPER Labour 
RUBBI Antonio Communist Thomas URWIN Labour 
SGHERRI Evariato Communist Kenneth WARREN Conservative 
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko MSI Phillip WHITEHEAD Labour 
URSO Salvatore Chr. Dem. 
Substitutes 
MM. David ATKINSON Conservative 
Gordon BA GIER Labour 
LUXEMBOURG Roberl BANKS Conservative 
Robin COOK Labour 
Thomas COX Labour 
Representatives Jim CRAIGEN Labour 
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS Conservative 
MM. MARGUE Georges Soc. Chr. MM. James HILL 
Conservative 
Toby JESSEL Conservative 
MART Rem~ De m. Mrs. JiU KNIGHT Conservative 
THOSS Maurice Soc. Workers Mr. Michael McGUIRE Labour 
Lord McNAIR Liberal 
Mr. Kevin McNAMARA Labour 
Substitutes Dr. Maurice MILLER Labour 
Lord NORTHFIELD Labour 
MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre Soc. Chr. MM. Du.dley SMITH Conservative 
KRIEPS Robert Soc. Workers Keith ST AINTON Conservative 
MEINTZ Carlo Dem. John WILKINSON Conservative 
9 
1 • 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
EIGHTH SITTING 
Monday, 3rd December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Examination of Credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second 
Part of the Session (Doe. 813). 
5. The balance of force (Vote on the amended draft Recom-
mendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, 
Doe. 809). 
6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
7. Political conditions for European armaments co-opera-
tion (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recom-
mendation, Doe. 819). 
8. Changes in the membership of Committees. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Resumption of the Session and adoption 
of the Minutes 
The President announced the resumption of 
the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly. 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh 
Sitting on Thursday, 21st June 1979, were agreed 
to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Examination of Credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe stating that that 
Assembly had ratified the credentials of Repre-
sentatives and Substitutes whose names were 
published in Notice No. 8. 
In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules 
of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratifica-
tion by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified 
the credentials of : 
- Mr. Lagneau as a Substitute of Belgium in 
place of Mr. Perin ; 
- Mr. Caro as a Representative o:f France in 
place of Mr. Seitlinger. 
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4. Observers 
The President welcomed to the Second Part 
of the Session as parliamentary observers : 
- Mrs. Eide and Mr. Vattekar, members of 
the Norwegian Storting ; 
- Mrs. Lind, member of the Danish Folketing. 
5. Tributes 
The President paid tribute to the late Sir James 
Hutchison, former President of the Assembly, 
and to the late Mr. Chamois, a :former officer 
of the Assembly. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business 
for the Second Part of the Session 
(Doe. 813) 
The President proposed the adoption of the 
draft Order of Business :for the Second Part of 
the Session. 
Mr. Roper proposed that the Report tabled by 
Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on nuclear, biological 
and chemical protection be withdrawn :from the 
draft Order of Business. 
The proposal was agreed to. 
MINUTES 
Speakers : MM. Roper, Talon, Roper, Valleix, 
Roper and the President. 
The Assembly adopted the draft Order of 
Business for the Second Part of the Session as 
amended. 
8. The balance of force 
(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation 
postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doe. 809) 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
Speakers (point of order) :MM. Valleix, Roper, 
Valleix, Antoni and the President. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 336) 1 • 
EIGHTH SITTING 
9. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, addressed the Assembly. 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher replied to questions put 
by MM. Talon, Muller, Valleix and Calamandrei. 
10. Changes in the membership of Committees 
In accordance with Rule 8(3) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly ratified the provisional 
nominations to Committees made by the Presi-
dential Committee and, in accordance with Rule 
39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly 
agreed to the following changes proposed by 
national delegations : 
COMMITTEE ON DEFENOE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS 
Luxembourg : 
United Kingdom : 
Luxembourg : 
Nether lands : 
United Kingdom : 
Members 
Mr. Meintz 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Mulley 
(in place of Mr. Hardy) 
GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
Mr. Thoss 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Voogd 
(in place of Mrs. van den 
Heuvel-de Blank) 
Alternates 
Mr. Glesener 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Hardy 
(in place of Mr. Whitehead) 
Mr. Mart 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Lamberts 
(in place of Mr. Voogd) 
Mr. Whitehead 
(in place of Mr. McNamara) 
Mr. Kershaw 
(vacant seat) 
CoMMITTEE oN SOIENTIFIO, TEOHNOLOGIOAL AND AEROSPACE QuEsTIONs 
Luxembourg : 
Netherlands : 
Luxembourg: 
United Kingdom : 
1. See page 16. 
Mr. Thoss 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Lamberts 
(in place of Mr. Tummers) 
CoMMITTEE oN BuDGETARY AFFAIRs AND ADMINISTRATION 
Mr. Krieps 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Smith 
(in place of Mr. Page) 
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Mr. Mulley 
(in place of Mr. Lewis) 
MINUTES 
Luxembourg: 
United Kingdom: 
Luxembourg : 
Netherlands : 
United Kingdom: 
CoMMITTEE ON RULES OF PB.ooEDURE AND PB.rvrr.EGES 
Members 
Mr. Glesener 
(vacant seat) 
Mrs. Knight 
(in place of Mr. Jessel) 
AUernates 
Mr. Margue 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Cox 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Jessel 
EIGHTH SITTING 
(in place of Mrs. Knight) 
Mr. Wilkinson 
(in place of Mr. Onslow) 
COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS 
Mr. Glesener 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Meintz 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Hill 
(in place of Mr. Kersha.w) 
Mr. Thoss 
(vacant seat) 
Mr. Lamberts 
(in place of Mr. Voogd) 
11. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 
3p.m. 
Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Roper. 
The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m. 
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APPENDIX EIGHTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Lagneau (Bonnel) 
Hanin 
Peeters 
Tanghe 
van Waterschoot 
France 
MM. Druon (Bizet) 
Boucheny 
Lagourgue (Caro) 
Oouderc (Ferretti) 
Bozzi (Grussenmeyer) 
Petit 
Talon 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr. Ahrens 
Mrs. von Bothmer 
MM. Enders 
Alber (Evers) 
FJ.amig 
Gessner 
Lenzer (Handlos) 
MM. 
Italy 
von Hassel 
Kittelmann 
Schiiuble (Lagershausen) 
Marquardt 
Mende 
Wittman (Milz) 
Miiller 
Scheffler (Hermann Schmidt) 
MM. Bemini 
Antoni (Boldrini) 
Oavaliere (Bonalumi) 
Calamandrei 
Corallo 
Borghi (Gonella) 
Del Duca ( Orsini) 
Pecoraro 
Roberti 
Treu 
Luxembourg 
MM. M eintz (Mart) 
Krieps (Thoss) 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
Belgium 
Mr. Mangelschots 
France 
MM. Brugnon 
Depietri 
Deschamps 
Jager 
Jeambrun 
Peridier 
Peronnet 
Pignion 
Schleiter 
Senes 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Pawelczyk 
Reddemann 
Vohrer 
Italy 
MM. Arfe 
De Poi 
Fosson 
Maggioni 
Minnocci 
Pecchioli 
Sarti 
Segre 
Netherlands 
MM. de Koster 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Voogd 
United Kingdom 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
MM. Cook (Faulds) 
Grant 
Grieve 
McGuire (Hardy) 
Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Kershaw 
Lewis 
Mulley 
Onslow 
Page 
Lord Reay 
MM. Roper 
Urwin 
Atkinson (Warren) 
Oraigen (Whitehead) 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Margue 
Netherlands 
MM. Comelissen 
van Hulst 
Scholten 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederie Bennett 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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TEXT ADOPTED EIGHTH SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 336 
on the balance of force 
The Assembly, 
Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely 
differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force; 
Believing that the overall East-West economic and military balance is favourable to the West, 
but that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in several fields on the central front, combined with the Soviet 
military doctrine of "daring thrusts" against NATO forces, can be perceived as a substantial 
threat by the NATO countries ; 
Regretting the slow progress of the MBFR negotiations, and the failure so far to elucidate 
differences in the conflicting assessments of present force levels, but noting with satisfaction that 
there is some advance towards agreement on the concepts of parity and common collective ceilings; 
Believing that European security can be based only on an approximate balance of forces in 
the area, and that security will be enhanced if, once a balance is achieved, the collective ceilings on 
each side are lowered, and associated measures are introduced to increase confidence through improved 
warning and verification facilities, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Urge member governments : 
I. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and 
resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment ; 
2. To concentrate allied defence improvement plans accordingly on maintaining military capabili-
ties required for credible deterrence ; 
3. To pursue vigorously the MBFR negotiations, and encourage the mutual exchange of more 
detailed information, with a view to securing agreement on : 
( i) the assessment of present force levels in the area ; 
(ii) initial reductions designed especially to redress imbalances; 
(iii) the introduction of associated measures to stabilise mutual security by providing better warning 
and verification facilities ; 
4. To examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states 
concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing 
confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent. 
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NINTH SITTING 
Monday, 3rd December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Political conditions for European armaments co-oper-
ation (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 819). 
2. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement 
in Western Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, Doe. 821 and Amendments). 
3. Industrial bases of European security - guidelines 
drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th 
October 1979 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions, Doe. 823). 
4. Political conditions for European armaments co-oper-
ation ; Definition of armaments requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe; Industrial bases of 
European security - guidelines drawn from the sym-
posium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (Votes on 
the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Does. 819, 
821 and Amendments and 823). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in Appendix I. 
Speakers (point of order) : Mr. Roper, the 
President and Mr. Grieve. 
3. Political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 819) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rappor-
teur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Antoni and Cavaliere. 
Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur, and Mrs. 
von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied 
to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
4. Definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 821 and Amendments) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Meintz, Rapporteur. 
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The previous question was moved by Mr. Druon 
under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, Docu-
ment 826. 
Speakers : MM. Druon and Roper. 
The previous question was negatived. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Bernini, Mulley, Boucheny and 
Bozzi. 
Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Baumel and Jung. 
Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
5. Industrial bases of European security -
guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, Doe. 828) 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by MM. Valleix and Onslow, Rapporteurs. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, 
replied to the speaker. 
The Debate was closed. 
Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
MINUTES 
6. Political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation 
Definition of armaments requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe 
Industrial bases of European security 
guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
(Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft 
Order, Does. 819, 821 and Amendments and 823) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 819. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to. 
{This Recommendation will be published as No. 
337) 1 • 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation in Document 821. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was :tabled by Mr. 
Mulley and others : 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "under the aegis of the indus-
trial policy of the European Community". 
Speakers : MM. Mulley, Cavaliere and Meintz. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Baumel: 
2. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, leave out "endorsed" and insert 
"examined". 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Baumel: 
1. See page 21. 
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NINTH SITTING 
3. In paragraph 2 {b), leave out "an Alliance-
wide market for defence equipment" and insert 
"a market for defence equipment in the frame-
work of WEU". 
Speaker : Mr. Meintz. 
Amendment 2 was agreed to. 
Amendment 3 was negatived. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation in Document 
821. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) 
by 44 votes to 6 with 0 abstentions. (This Recom-
mendation will be published as No. 338) 1• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Order in Document 821. 
The draft Order was agreed to. (This Order 
will be published as No. 52) '2• 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation in Document 823. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to. 
(This Recommendation will be published as No. 
339) 3• 
7. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 4th 
December, a't 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m. 
1. See page 22. 
2. See page 23. 
3. See page 24. 
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APPENDIX I 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Bonnel 
Hanin 
Lambiotte (Mangelschots) 
Peeters 
Tanghe 
van Waterschoot 
France 
MM. Baumel (Bizet) 
Boucheny 
Lagourgue (Caro) 
Bozzi (Grussenmeyer) 
Druon (Jager) 
Jung (Jeambrun) 
Talon 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Mr. Ahrens 
Mrs. von Bothmer 
Mr. Enders 
MM. Flamig 
Gessner 
Lenzer (Handlos) 
von Hassel 
Kittelmann 
Schiiuble (Lagershausen) 
Marquardt 
Mende 
W ittman (Milz) 
Muller 
Luxembourg 
MM. Meintz (Mart) 
Thoss 
Netherlands 
MM. Sto:ffelen 
Tummers 
Voogd 
Scheffler (Hermann Schmidt) United Kingdom 
Vohrer Sir Frederic Bennett 
Italy 
MM. Bernini 
Antoni (Boldrini) 
Oavaliere (Bonalumi) 
Calamandrei 
Corallo 
Borghi (Gonella) 
Minnocci 
Del Duca (Orsini) 
Pecoraro 
Roberti 
Treu 
MM. Oraigen (Faulds) 
Grant 
Grieve 
Bagier (Hardy) 
Stainton (Hawkins) 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Kershaw 
Lewis 
Mulley 
Onslow 
Page 
Jessel (Lord Reay) 
Roper 
Mc(}uire (Urwin) 
Warren 
Cook (Whitehead) 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
France Federal Republic of Germany Luxembourg 
MM. Evers Mr. Margue 
MM. Brugnon Pawelczyk 
Depietri Reddemann 
Deschamps Netherlands 
Ferretti Italy MM. Cornelissen 
Peridier MM. Arfe van Hulst 
Peronnet De Poi de Koster Scholten 
Petit Fosson 
Pignion Maggioni Pecchioli United Kingdom Schleiter Sarti 
Senes Segre Mr. Beith 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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APPENDIX II 
Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the definition of armaments 
requirements and procurement in Western Europe (Doe. 821) 1 : 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
Noes 
Abstentions 
MM. Van der Elst (Adriaensens) 
Ahrens 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Oavaliere (Bonalumi) 
Bonnel 
Mrs. von Bothmer 
MM. Enders 
Oraigen (Faulds) 
Flamig 
Gessner 
Borghi (Gonella) 
Grant 
Grieve 
Hanin 
Bagier (Hardy) 
Ayes: 
Mr. Stainton (Hawkins) 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Jung (Jeambrun) 
Kershaw 
Kittelmann 
Schiiuble (Lagershausen) 
Lewis 
Lambiotte (Mangelschots) 
Marquardt 
Meintz (Mart) 
Mende 
Wittman (Milz) 
Minnocci 
Mulley 
Onslow 
Noes: 
MM. Boucheny 
Lagourgue (Caro) 
Bozzi (Grussenmeyer) 
Druon (Jager) 
Pecoraro 
Valleix 
MM. Page 
Peeters 
6 
0 
J essel (Lord Reay) 
Roberti 
Roper 
Scheffler (Hermann Schmidt) 
Stoffelen 
Tanghe 
Treu 
Tummers 
Vohrer 
Warren 
van Waterschoot 
Cook (Whitehead) 
I. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED NINTH SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 337 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
The Assembly, 
Noting with interest the work of the symposium on a European armaments policy held in 
Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979; 
Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a pragmatic approach is 
likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future ; 
Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own secu-
rity, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons ; 
Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal 
interests in the various member countries; 
Thanking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles 
to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee 
in accordance with a wish often expressed by the Assembly ; 
Recalling its Recommendation 335 ; 
Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331 
and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only Euro-
pean assembly with defence responsibilities, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the produc-
tion of armaments ; 
2. Examine, inter alia on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what 
means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific 
responsibilities of each institution : 
(a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on Euro-
pean supply and demand in the field of armaments ; 
(b) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall finan-
cial, technical, economic and social repercussions ; 
(c) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European 
states; 
(d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments; 
(e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries; 
(/) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments ; 
3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to 
facilitate this work; 
4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommenda-
tions 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it under-
took to do in its reply to Recommendation 298. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 338 
on the definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
NINTH SITTING 
Stressing the important role it can play in ellBuring parliamentary supervision at European 
level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ; 
Coll8idering the proceedings of the recent symposium on a European armaments policy, and 
in particular its Working Group I ; 
Expressing its thanks to all authors of papers and Rapporteurs who contributed to its success, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European 
armaments industry through the creation of permanent international coll8ortia in Europe leading 
eventually to fully European corporatiollB for the production of the more sophisticated defence 
equipment ; 
2. (a) To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment 
projects duly examined by the IEPG ; 
(b) To foster creation of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependence upon exports 
to third countries can be reduced ; 
3. (a) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national 
and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to 
them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and completed by 
the Conference of National Armaments Directors; 
(b) To request the Chairman of Panel I to communicate these schedules to the Committee on 
Defence QuestiollB and Armaments of the WEU Assembly. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
ORDER 52 
on the definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
NINTH SITTING 
Stressing the important rMe it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European 
level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ; 
Recalling the provisions of its Resolution 15 ; 
lNSTRUOTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to invite members of the par-
liamentary defence committees of the IEPG countries to an annual joint meeting to discuss future 
national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 339 
on the industrial bases of European security -
guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
NINTH SITTING 
Considering that only governments can give the necessary impetus to joint European arma-
ments production and procurement ; 
Regretting the failure in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s to agree on a joint concept for a 
European battle tank ; 
Aware of the risk that if discussions on the future combat aircraft are too protracted, Euro-
pean nations might be forced, for reasons of a credible defence, to buy a ready-made American 
aircraft such as the Northrop F-18L; 
Considering the serious crisis in the European ship-building industries and the possible tech-
nological decline as a result ; 
Welcoming the achievements of existing co-operation in the manufacture of missiles; 
Aware that in tele-infopnatics - telecommunications, computers, advanced components and 
data banks - European industry is largely being outsold by the Americans and Japanese; 
Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with defence and armaments respon-
sibilities, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNoiL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To promote a continuous dialogue between their commanders-in-chief, lower echelon commanders, 
armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to the indepen-
dent European programme group insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance ; 
2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the 1990s; 
3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, 
to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further 
development of the British Harrier ; 
4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchange-
able components and to promote containerisation ; 
5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation 
by ordering several versions of the same type of missile ; 
6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint 
integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed ; 
7. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated 
circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems ; 
8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, parti-
cularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new 
ones. 
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TENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 4th December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle 
East on Western European security (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, Doe. 820 and Amendments). 
2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von HasBel, Preaident of the AsBembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees 
In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
nominations to Committees proposed by the 
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany : 
- Mr. Buchner as an alternate member of the 
General Affairs Committee in place of 
Mr. Schwencke; 
-Mr. Scheffler as a titular member of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. 
Schwencke; 
- Mr. FUimig as an alternate member of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Schef-
fler; 
- Mr. Schulte as an alternate member of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration in place of Mr. Schwencke. 
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 820 and 
Amendments) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rappor-
teur. 
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The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Grant and Corallo. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic 
Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addres-
sed the Assembly. 
Mr. Bernard-Reymond replied to questions put 
by MM. Jung, Boucheny, Deschamps, Valleix, 
Roper, Banks and van Waterschoot. 
6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee, Doe. 820 and Amendments) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers : MM. MUller, Deschamps, Dr. Miller, 
MM. Cavaliere, Jessel and Voogd. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
7. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day 
at3 p.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m. 
APPENDIX TENTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. Adria.ensens 
Bonnel 
Hanin 
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MM. Enders 
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von Hassel 
Kittelmann 
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W ittman (Milz) 
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Tummers 
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Italy 
MM. Oavaliere (Bonalumi) 
Calamandrei 
Corallo 
Borghi (Gonella) 
Minnocci 
Del Duca (Orsini) 
Pecoraro 
Roberti 
Treu 
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MM. McGuire (Faulds) 
Grant 
Grieve 
Hardy 
Hill (Hawkins) 
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Jessel (Lord Reay) 
Roper 
Urwin 
Banks (Warren) 
Miller (Whitehead) 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
France Federal Republic of Germany MM. Pecchioli 
MM. Ahrens Sarti 
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I. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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ELEVENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 4th December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1980 (Doe. 815, Adden-
dum and Amendment) ; Accounts of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1978- The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve 
the final accounts (Doe. 814 and Addendum) (Presen-
tation of and Debate on the Reporta of the Committee on 
Budgetary Ajjaira and Administration and Votes on the 
draft texts, Does. 815, Addendum and Amendment and 
814 and Addendum). 
2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of 
WEU for the financial year 1979 (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Ajjairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opi-
nion and draft Recommendation, Doe. 824). 
3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle 
East on Western European security (Resumed Debate 
on the Report of the Genera}, Ajjaira Committee and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 820 and Amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Stotfelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. Change in the membership of a Committee 
In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the follow-
ing nomination to a Committee proposed by the 
Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany : 
- Mr. Kittelmann as an alternate member of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration in place of Mr. Reddemann. 
4. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1980 
(Doe. 815, Addendum and Amendment) 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 -
The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve 
the final accounts 
(Doe. 814 and Addendum) 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and Votes on the draft texts, Does. 815, Addendum 
and Amendment and 814 and Addendum) 
The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration were presented by 
Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker : Mr. Roper. 
Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied 
to the speaker. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
budget. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Alber: 
Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1980 
Initial Amended 
Details estimate estimate for 1980 for 1980 
F F 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ............. - _ .... - .. _ ..... _ ..... 5,799,000 5,799,000 
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ........ _ .... 1,682,000 1,682,000 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ 367,000 339,000 
Head IV : General administrative costs ..... _ ...................... 1,358,000 1,358,000 
Head V : Other expenditure ..................................... 947,000 947,000 
Head VI : Pensions ............ _ ........... _ ................. _ ... 91,000 91,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .................... 10,244,000 10,216,000 
ToTAL RECEIPTS ........................ 406,000 406,000 
NET TOTAL ..... - ....................... 9,838,000 9,810,000 
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MINUTES 
Speaker : Mr. Alber. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
The draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1980 in Document 815 and Addendum, as 
amended, was agreed to unanimously. 
The Motion to approve the final accounts of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1978 in Docu-
ment 814 and Addendum was agreed to unani-
mously. 
S. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 824) 
The Report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by 
Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Warren and Adriaensens. 
Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Opinion and draft Recommendation. 
The draft Opinion was agreed to unanimously. 
(This Opinion will be published as No. 26) 1 • 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 340) !!. 
6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 820 and Amendments) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speaker: Mr. Gessner. 
Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers : MM. Beith, V alleix, Urwin Wilkin-
son and McGuire. ' 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, and Mrs. 
von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, replied 
to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
1. See page 32. 
2. See page 33. 
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ELEVENTH SITTING 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Mr. 
Cavaliere and others: 
17. After the third paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph 
as follows: 
"Concerned that by taking and detaining 
employees of the United States Embassy, in 
violation of all principles of international law, 
Iran may endanger world peace;". 
Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the pre-
amble to the draft recommendation and insert : 
"Welcoming the Camp David agreements as a 
major step towards overall peace;". 
Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out "and militate 
against the underlying causes of the conflict". 
Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Mr. 
Cavaliere and others: 
16. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add a new para-
graph as follows : 
"Wishing the PLO to recognise Israel's right 
to the existence and security of a free and 
independent state and to stop its acts of terror-
ism, failing which it is not possible for it to 
take part in negotiations ;". 
Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett 
and Mr. Urwin. 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
3. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation. 
Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
MINUTES 
4. Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation. 
Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. 
Urwin and others: 
11. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcom-
ing" and insert "Noting". 
Speakers: Mr. Urwin and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amended (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Roper 
and others: 
8. At the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft 
recommendation proper, add : 
"Either directly or where more appropriate 
indirectly through the participation of its 
membership in European political co-operation 
among the Nine,". 
Speakers : Mr. Roper and Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. 
U rwin and others : 
12. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from "and" in line 2 to the end 
of the paragraph and insert "call upon all other 
arms-supplying countries to impose a similar 
moratorium". 
Speakers : Mr. Urwin and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Mr. 
Cavaliere and others : 
18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, add a new paragraph as follows : 
"Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages 
held in the United States Embassy ;". 
Speakers : Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. 
Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recom-
mendation proper. 
Speakers : Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennmt. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 13) was tabled by Mr. 
U rwin and others : 
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13. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft 
recommendation proper and insert : 
"5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately 
to accept the existence of the Palestinian people 
and to renounce its policy of settlements on 
the West Bank and commence negotiations 
with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve 
self-determination, including the inhabitants of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ; 
6. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also 
immediately, 'to declare its acceptance of an 
independent Israeli state within internationally 
agreed and defined borders ; 
7. Ask its members to urge upon both sides 
a total abandonment of all acts of violence, 
which call into question the validity of any 
such declarations." 
Speakers : Mr. Urwin, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Dr. Miller, MM. Roper, Cavaliere, Corallo and 
Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was agreed to, paragraph by 
paragraph. 
An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. 
Corallo: 
9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "valid Palestinian representa-
tives" and insert "the PLO". 
Speakers : Mr. Corallo and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
The Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
7. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "internationally". 
Speaker : Dr. Miller. 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 15) was ,tabled by Mr. 
Cavaliere and others : 
15. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "Ask its members to urge the 
PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to 
declare its acceptance of" and insert "Ask its 
members to insist that the PLO accept" ; renum-
ber paragraph 6 as paragraph 5; and renumber 
paragraph 5 as paragraph 6. 
Speakers : Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Dr. 
Miller: 
MINUTES 
6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "contemporaneously and reci-
procally" and insert "immediately". 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. 
Corallo: 
10. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "terrorist acts of violence which 
call into question the validity of any such declara-
tion" and insert "any acts of war as soon as the 
negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 are 
seriously envisaged". 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett : 
14. At the end of paragraph 7 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add "and meanwhile call upon 
all countries concerned to renounce all acts of 
military violence." 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended 
draft Recommendation. 
Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Corallo, Dr. 
Miller, MM. Lewis, Roper and the President. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 341) 1 • 
1. See page 34. 
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7. The situation in Iran 
(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for 
urgent procedure, Doe. 829) 
In accordance with Rule 43(3) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider 
the request for urgent procedure on the Motion 
for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Valleix and 
others. 
Speakers (point of order) :MM. Roper, Urwin, 
Roper, the President ; Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. 
Grieve, Valleix, Roper, Hanin and Valleix. 
Urgent procedure was agreed to unanimously. 
The Motion for a Recommendation was referred 
to the General Affairs Committee. 
Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Valleix. 
8. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 
5th December, at 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
OPINION 26 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 
the financial year 1979 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council 
has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
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RECOMMENDATION 340 
on improving the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary 
pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ; 
Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up 
to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions ; 
Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to 
set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations * : 
I. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible ; 
2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations; 
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy 
and in particular : 
- to review the structure of grades ; 
- to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hier-
archy; 
- to study the type and length of contracts ; 
- to co-ordinate staff rules; 
- to review the indemnity foc loss of job ; 
- to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another ; 
- to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals ; 
11. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may 
take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation. 
* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA. 
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TEXTS ADOI'TED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMEND A DON 341 
on the impact of the evolving situation in the 
Near and Middle East on Western European security 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
Considering that the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East is essential for Western 
Europe's security and economic prosperity; 
Regretting that Soviet intervention in Mghanistan, far from establishing internal peace, political 
stability and a resumption of economic activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and 
religious strife and created yet another difficult refugee problem ; 
Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has further 
delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity ; 
Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation 
of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace; 
Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, 
have so far provided no solution to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine 
question; 
Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer 
them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and militate against the underlying 
causes of the conflict ; 
Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein 
in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace; 
Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only 
makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem; 
Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a single voice on Middle 
Eastern matters on several occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979 in the United Nations 
General Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its member-
ship in European political co-operation among the Nine, ensure that consultation between its mem-
bers is extended to cover matters relating to Mghanistan and Iran; 
2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internal strife and armed 
repression continue in that country and call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a 
similar moratorium ; 
3. Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy; 
4. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and call for a 
clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242; 
5. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agree-
ment on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements; 
6. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people 
and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid 
Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip ; 
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7. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an inde-
pendent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ; 
8. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which 
call into question the validity of any such declarations ; 
9. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote a. broader-based conference 
than Camp David including representation from all the countries directly involved in the Palestinian 
dispute. 
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Wednesday, 5th December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. The situation in Iran (Pre8entation of and Debate on the 
Of'al Reporl of the General Affairs Committee and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 830). 
2. New weapons and defence strategy (Pre8entation of and 
Debate on the Reporl of the Committee on Defence Quea-
tiona and Armaments and Vote8 on the draft Recommen-
dations, Doe. 827 and Amendment). 
3. SALT 11 and its implications for European security 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Reporl of the Com-
mittee on Defence Queationa and Armaments, Doe. 816, 
Addendum and Amendment). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in Appendix I. 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees 
In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following 
nominations to Committees proposed by the Bel-
gian Delegation : 
- Mr. Lagneau as a titular member of the 
General Affairs Committee in place of 
Mr. Perin; 
- Mr. Lagneau as an alternate member of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri-
vileges in place of Mr. Perin. 
4. Change in the Orders of the Day 
The President advised the Assembly that 
consideration of the draft Recommendation on 
the situation in Iran would take place when the 
General Affairs Committee had completed its 
study of the matter. 
5. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 827 and Amendment) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
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Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. van 
den Bergh, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Pecchioli, Mulley, Cook, van 
den Bergh, Vattekar (Observer from Norway) 
and Mrs. Eide (Observer from Norway) ; (point 
of order) : MM. Grieve, Roper, Deschamps, Mrs. 
von Bothmer, MM. Lewis~ Roper and Mrs. von 
Bothmer ; Mr. Roberti. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
6. The situation in Iran 
(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of 
the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 830) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Grieve, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers : MM. Valleix, Grieve, Lewis, Grieve 
and Valleix. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation. 
A manuscript amendment was tabled by Mr. 
Boucheny: 
At the beginning of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, add a new paragraph as fol-
lows: 
"Understanding the legitimate wish of the 
Iranian people to punish the Shah's criminal 
activities ;". 
Speakers: MM. Boucheny, Jung and Grieve. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
A manuscript amendment was tabled by Mr. 
Calamandrei : 
MINUTES 
After the second paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph 
as follows: 
"Recognising the right of the Iranian people 
to advance, in full independence and demo-
cracy, along the path opened by the overthrow 
of the tyranny of the Shah ; ". 
Speakers : MM. Calamandrei and Grieve. 
The amendment was negatived. 
A manuscript Amendment was tabled by 
Mr. Corallo : 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after "determine" insert "political". 
Speakers : MM. Corallo and Grieve. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation. 
Speaker : Mr. Stainton. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to on 
a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 46 votes 
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to 2 with 4 abstentions. (This Recommendation 
will be published as No. 342) 1 • 
Speaker (explanation of vote) :Mr. Pecchioli. 
7. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 827) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers : Lord Reay, MM. Boucheny and 
Gessner. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
8. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day 
at3 p.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m. 
1. See page 39. 
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APPENDIX II 
Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the situation in Iran (Doe. 830) 1 : 
Ayes ..................................................... 46 
Noes 
Abstentions 
Mr. Adriaensens 
Lord MeNair (Beith) 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Baumel (Bizet) 
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Grieve 
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Page 
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2 
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1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 342 
on the situation in Iran 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes 
an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance 
of peace; 
Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United 
States in the emergency thus created; 
Considering the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in 
Iran could entail for European security ; 
Noting that the heads of state and government of the member states, meeting in Dublin in 
the framework of the European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a statement concerning 
the situation in Iran, 
REOOMMENDS TO THE COUNOIL 
1. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Assembly's 
support for the European Council's declaration ; 
2. That consultations should take place either within the framework of the WEU Council or, 
where more appropriate, through the participation of its members in European political co-operation 
among the Nine to determine action on this problem. 
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Wednesday, 5th December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. New weapons and defence strategy (Resumed Debate on 
the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and VoteB on the draft RecommendationB, 
Doe. 827 and Amendment). 
2. SALT ll and its implications for European security 
(Preaentation of and Debate on the Report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on 
the draft ReBOlution, Doe. 816, Addendum and Amend-
ment). 
S. Arctic technology (Preaentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
AeroBpace Questions, Doe. 822 and Amendments). 
4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the ABBembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes 
on the draft Recommendations, Doe. 827 and 
Amendment) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers: Mr. Tummers, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Pecoraro and Baumel. 
Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur, and Mr. 
Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the first 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Cook: 
1. In draft recommendation I, leave out sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the 
draft recommendation proper and insert : 
2" 
"(a) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree 
to an immediate eighteen months' mora-
torium on the deployment of further SS-
20 missiles ; 
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(b) in the event of the Soviet Union agreeing 
to such a moratorium, by postponing for 
its duration the decision on procurement 
of the 572 medium-range weapons which 
NATO plans to deploy in Europ'e ; 
, (c) by seeking within that period agreement 
on significant reductions in present num-
bers of Soviet medium-range nuclear 
weapons; 
(d) by deciding forthwith to investigate 
seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-
month moratorium and in the light of the 
military and political situation which will 
then prevail, the need to procure and 
station a number of medium-range 
nuclear weapons which NATO intends to 
deploy in Europe;". 
Speaker: Mr. Cook. 
A manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 was 
tabled by Mr. Pecchioli : 
In paragraph (a) of Amendment 1, before 
"deployment", add "construction and". 
In paragraph (b) of Amendment 1, line 3, 
after "on" insert "construction and". 
Speaker : Mr. Pecchioli. 
Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
Speakers : MM. Roper, Cook, Roper and van 
den Bergh. 
The manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 
was negatived. 
Amendment 1 was negatived. 
Speakers (point of order) : MM. van den Bergh, 
Stoffelen, Boucheny and van den Bergh. 
MINUTES 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the first 
draft Recommendation. 
In the absence of a quorum, the vote was post-
poned until the next Sitting. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the second 
draft Recommendation. 
Speaker (poinJt of order) : Sir Frederic Bennett. 
In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the vote was postponed until the next 
Sitting. 
4. SALT 11 and its impUcations for European 
security 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doe. 816, Addendum 
and Amendment) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. 
Cook, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker : Mr. Calamandrei. 
Mr. Cook, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chair-
man of the Committee, replied to the speaker. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Resolution. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Lord 
McNair: 
1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out "Calls 
upon the Senate of the United States To" and 
insert "Expresses the hope that the Senate of the 
United States Will". 
Speakers: Lord McNair and Mr. Cook. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
Speakers (point of order) : Sir Frederic 
Bennett, MM. Roper and Cook. 
In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the vote was postponed until the next 
Sitting. 
5. Arctic technology 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
Doe. 822 and Amendments) 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, ~apporteur. 
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6. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council 
Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
addressed the Assembly. 
Mr. Thorn replied to questions put by MM. 
Stoffelen, Konings, Roper, Lambiotte and Treu. 
7. Arctic technology 
(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on 
the draft Recommendation, Doe. 822 and 
Amendments) 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Vattekar (Observer from Nor-
way), Hardy and Enders. 
Mr. Spies von Billlesheim, Rapporteur, and 
Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied 
to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "for a wide-ranging programme 
of collaboration in "\Vestern Europe". 
Speakers : MM. Hardy and Spies von Biilles-
heim. 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "for example in the building 
of ice-breakers". 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
3. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, leave out "to draw up mutually-
acceptable administrative and industrial guide-
lines for such collaboration in order". 
Speakers : MM. Hardy and Spies von Biilles-
heim. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
MINUTES 
4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert : 
",(b) to welcome and support the draft con-
vention on the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources;". 
Speakers : MM. Hardy and Spies von Biilles-
heim; (point of order) :Mr. Roper; Mr. Warren. 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. 
Hardy: 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"(b) to welcome and support the draft con-
vention on the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources ;". 
Speaker : Mr. Spies von Biillesheim. 
The manuscript Amendment was agreed to. 
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Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Warren. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation 
will be published as No. 343) 1 • 
8. Personal statement 
Mr. Roper made a personal statement. 
Speaker (point of order) : Mr. Warren. 
9. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 6th 
December, at 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m. 
1. See page 45. 
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RECOMMENDATION 343 
on Arctic technology 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the peoples of the world are justified in exammmg the use of the earth's 
natural resources with due regard for the political, technological, economic and ecological implications ; 
Aware that decisions on exploration and exploitation can be taken only after solutions have 
been found to human and technological problems in the polar regions ; 
Conscious of the sustained efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field 
compared to the lack of progress by the Western European countries in spite of their early start 
and wide experience of polar technology in the past ; 
Aware that the WEU member countries have already worked with the Soviet Union and 
the United States in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and on certain specified subjects, and 
would welcome help and assistance from these countries and closer liaison in this field of activity 
between the USSR, the United States and the WEU member countries; 
Considering that several European countries and industries, working in collaboration, have 
gained vast experience of various aspects of offshore technology ; 
Considering the Antarctic Treaty to be an excellent example of an actively applied treaty for 
ensuring and verifying a weapons-free area and therefore of major significance for WEU member 
countries; 
Considering the present state of the Law of the Sea Conference and its possible conclusion 
in the early 1980s, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. Draw the attention of member governments to the need for a wide-ranging programme of 
collaboration in Western Europe for the development of Arctic technology; 
2. Invite member governments: 
(a) to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions; 
(b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine 
living resources ; 
(c) to make every effort to ensure that the content of the Antarctic Treaty is not changed, 
distorted or prematurely terminated at the Law of the Sea Conference, thus preserving 
an important treaty which ensures and allows verification of a weapons-free area ; 
(d) to adopt a. common position at meetings of Antarctic Treaty member states dealing with 
the exploration for and exploitation of mineral and fish resources. 
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FOURTEENTH SITTL~G 
Thursday, 6th December 1979 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. New weapons and defence strategy; SALT II and its 
implications for European security ( Votee on the draft 
Recommendations and amended drajt Reaolution, Does. 
827 and 816). 
2. Brazilian·European collaborative ventures and the con-
sequences for Europe (Presentation of and Debate on 
the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Queetions and Vote on the draft Recom-
mendation, Doe. 817 and Amendments). 
3. Relations with Parliaments (Preeentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments, Doe. 818). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
Tke Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are given 
in the Appendix. 
3. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doe. 827) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the first 
draft Recommendation. 
Speaker : Mr. Deschamps. 
In the absence of a quorum, the vote was post-
poned until the next Session. 
In the absence of a quorum, the vote on the 
second draft Recommendation was postponed 
until the next Session. 
4. SALT 11 and its impUcations for European 
security 
(Vote on the amended draft Resolution, Doe. 816) 
The Assembly proceeded .to vote on the 
amended draft Resolution. 
Speakers : Mr. Deschamps and the President. 
The amended draft Resolution was agreed to. 
(This Resolution will be published as No. 64) 1 • 
1. See page 49. 
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5. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
CommiUee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 817 and Amendments) 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was pre-
sented by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, FUimig (in 
place of Mr. Scheffler) and Cornelissen, Rappor-
teurs. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Valleix. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft 
Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Cornelissen : 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, a:llter "emphasis" add "on safeguards 
against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and". 
Speakers : MM. Cornelissen and Valleix. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. 
Cornelissen : 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "and military". 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. 
Cornelissen : 
In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "civil and military". 
MINUTES 
The manuscript Amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
Speaker : Mr. Deschamps. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to. (This Recommendation will be pub-
lished as No. 344) 1 • 
Speaker : Mr. Valleix. 
6. Relations with Parliaments 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doe. 818) 
The Report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments was preseiJJted. by Mr. De Poi, 
Rapporteur. 
1. See page 50. 
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The Debate was opened. 
Speaker : Mr. Roper. 
FOURTEENTH SITTING 
Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly took note of the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
Speakers (points of order) : Mr. Roper, the 
President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper. 
7. Close of the Session 
The President declared the Twenty-Fifth 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed. 
The Sitting was closed at 11.50 a.m. 
APPENDIX FOURTEENTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1 : 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Lambiotte (Mangelschots) 
France 
MM. Brugnon 
Deschamps 
Jager 
Schleiter 
Senes 
Talon 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Ahrens 
Fliimig 
Wittman (Handlos) 
MM. von Hassel 
Kittelmann 
Mende 
Miiller 
aly 
MM. De Poi 
Del Duca (Orsini) 
Pecoraro 
Roberti 
Giust (Sarti) 
Treu 
Luxembourg 
MM. Glesener (Margue) 
Mart 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence : 
Belgium Federal Republic of Germany 
Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Bonnel 
Hanin MM. Enders 
Peeters Evers Gessner Tang he Lagershausen 
van Waterschoot Marquardt 
Mi1z 
France 
Pawelczyk 
Reddemann 
Schmidt, Hermann 
MM. Bizet Vohrer 
Boucheny 
Caro Italy Depietri 
Ferretti MM. Arfe 
Grussenmeyer Be mini 
Jeambrun Boldrini 
Peridier Bonalumi 
Peronnet Cala.mandrei 
Petit Cora.llo 
Pignion Fosson 
Netherlands 
MM. Comelissen 
Tummers 
Lamberts (Voogd) 
United Kingdom 
Lord MeN air (Beith) 
MM. Hill (Sir Frederic Bennett) 
Cook (Faulds) 
Hardy 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Kershaw 
Lewis 
Mulley 
Smith (Page) 
Lord Reay 
MM. Roper 
Urwin 
Warren 
Cox (Whitehead) 
MM. Gonella 
Maggioni 
Minnocci 
Pecchioli 
Segre 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Thoss 
Netherlands 
MM. van Hulst 
de Koster 
Scholten 
Stoffelen 
United Kingdom 
MM. Grant 
Grieve 
Hawkins 
Onslow 
. 1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in i~ics, the names of the latter being given 
m brackets. 
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RESOLUTION M 
on SALT 11 and its implications for European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Conscious of its authority under the Brussels Treaty as the only European parliamentary assembly 
with statutory responsibility in matters of defence ; 
(ii) Having considered the SALT II texts, and the accompanying agreed statements and common 
understandings, and the evidence given by the United States Administration to the Senate committees ; 
(iii) Noting that the agreements cannot affect the British and French nuclear forces, both of which 
make a meaningful contribution to the allied nuclear deterrent, and that the agreements impose no 
restrictions on mutual assistance in the production of nuclear weapons between the United States and 
its allies; 
(iv) Regretting that it has not proved possible in the framework of SALT II to agree on significant 
mutual reductions of strategic offensive arms of all types ; 
(v) Believing however that the broad parity in all categories of strategic offensive arms which SALT II 
seeks to bring about will increase the stability of mutual deterrence and cannot provide any unilateral 
advantage for the Soviet Union ; 
(vi) Concluding therefore that the SALT Il agreements should enhance the security of Europe and 
the Atlantic Alliance and will not in any way diminish the credibility of the United States strategic 
deterrent; 
(vii) Reserving for further consideration in a future report its position on SALT Ill, 
INSTRUOTS ITS PREsiDENT 
To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to the President and all members of the United States Senate; 
EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Will approve the ratification without amendment of the treaty on the limitation of offensive arms 
signed in Vienna on 18th June 1979. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 344 
on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
FOURTEENTH SITTING 
Considering the wishes expreSBed by the Brazilian Senate and Government officials to strengthen 
scientific and technological co-operation between Brazil and the countries of Western Europe; 
Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology can but be beneficial 
for both Brazil and the countries of Western Europe and will help to advance their political and economic 
positions; 
Aware that in recent years Brazil has advanced more quickly than some Western European coun-
tries in finding alternative energy resources ; 
Impressed by the progress of technical development plans in Brazil concerning meteorology and 
communications ; 
Conscious of the mutual advantages of collaboration between Brazil and Western Europe in: 
(a) nuclear research and development; 
(b) alternative energy resources; 
(c) space research and development; 
(d) aircraft development, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNciL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To improve European co-ordination in respect of existing nuclear research and development pro-
grammes in Brazil, with special emphasis on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and on security and safety problems ; 
2. To co-operate with the Brazilian Government on alternative energy resources ; 
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to develop closer relations with Brazil with a view to 
concluding a co-operation agreement with particular regard to the joint use of launch and tracking faci-
lities and the development of remote sensing and direct television satellites ; 
4. To encourage industrial collaboration with Brazil in developing its next generation of aircraft ; 
5. To increase exchanges of experts with Brazil in the field of research and the application of technology. 
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OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
EIGHTH SITTING 
Monday, 3rd December 1979 
SUJIIMARY 
1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Examination of Credentials. 
4. Observers. 
5. Tributes. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second 
Part of the Session (Doe. 813). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Talon, Mr. 
Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, the President. 
8. The balance of force (Vote on the amended draft Recom· 
mendaeion postponed from the First Pari of the Session, 
Doe. 809). 
Speakers (point of order): The President, Mr. Valleix, 
Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Antoni, the President. 
9. Address by Mrs. Hamm·Briicher, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Speakers: The President, Mrs. Hamm·Briicher (M in· 
iBter of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany). 
Replies by Mrs. Hamm.Bf"Ucher eo questions put by: 
Mr. Talon, Mr. Muller, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Calamandrei. 
10. Changes in the membership of Committees. 
11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Roper. 
The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. witk Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Resumption of the Session and adoption 
of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
I declare resumed the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 21st 
June 1979, at the conclusion of the Seventh 
Sitting. 
In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh 
Sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments L 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the 
Substitutes attending this Sitting which have 
been notified to the President will be published 
with the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings 1• 
3. Examination of Credentials 
The PRESIDENT.- The Orders of the Day 
now provide for the examination of credentials 
of the new Representatives and Substitutes whose 
names were published in Notice No. 8. 
1. See page 15. 
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The credentials of all but Mr. Lagneau, a 
Belgian Substitute, and Mr. Caro, a French 
Representative, were ratified by the Parliament-
ary Assembly of the Council of Europe or its 
Standing Committee on 3rd October and 22nd 
November 1979. These credentials were attested, 
in accordance with paragraph 1 of Rule 6 of the 
Rules of Procedure of our Assembly, by a state-
ment of ratification communicated to me by the 
President of the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
In the case of Mr. Lagneau and Mr. Caro it 
falls to our Assembly to ratify their credentials 
in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 6 of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
Their credentials have not been contested and 
have been certified in the usual form. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, these credentials 
can be ratified without prior examination by the 
Credentials Committee. 
Is there any opposition to the ratification of 
these credentials L 
Their credentials are agreed to, subject to 
subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Consequently, Mr. Lagneau, as a Substitute of 
Belgium, and Mr. Caro, as a Representative of 
France, are authorised to take their places in the 
Assembly of Western European Union. 
I offer our new colleagues a warm welcome. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
4. Observers 
The PRESIDENT. - I also extend a very 
warm welcome to the parliamentary observers 
who are doing us the honour of participating in 
our discussions - Mr. Vattekar and Mrs. Eide, 
members of the Norwegian Storting; and Mrs. 
Lind, member of the Danish Folketing and for-
merly Minister of Justice. 
Welcome to the .Assembly. 
5. Tributes 
The PRESIDENT.- It was with great regret 
that we learned of the death at 85 years of age 
of Sir James Hutchison, a former President of 
our Assembly. (The Representatives rose) Sir 
James was only the second of our Presidents, 
serving as such from 1957 to 1959. As the 
Assembly will appreciate, these were formative 
years for us, and Sir James's presidency was an 
important factor in the development and growing 
influence of the Assembly of Western European 
Union. 
The President of any parliamentary assembly 
has to be firm but fair ; he has to see that the 
rules are implemented but in such a way that 
they are not burdensome ; he has to ensure that 
business is carried through but without abusing 
the rights of minorities. Sir J ames exemplified 
these qualities, and the Assembly prospered under 
his efficient leadership. Although we must 
remember Sir James Hutchison for his presi-
dency, we should not overlook his chairmanship 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments. This Committee is, of course, central 
to our work and Sir James was a valued Chair-
man. 
His work in our Assembly, devoted as it was 
to the defence of a free and united Europe, is one 
of a piece with his distinguished war service in 
two world wars. He worked closely with the 
French resistance forces in the second world war 
and received a Croix de Guerre for his wartime 
exploits. He was also made a Chevalier of the 
Legion of Honour. 
We mourn a very distinguished European and, 
on behalf of the .Assembly, I wish to convey our 
sympathy to his family and also to our British 
colleagues. 
It is with regret that I have also to inform the 
Assembly of the death last September of one 
of our colleagues, Mr. Henri Chamois. Since the 
Assembly was created, he had been in charge of 
the French sittings office. An extremely cultured 
man, he was fully acquainted with procedural 
matters and devoted to duty, and played a very 
effective role in the organisation and conduct of 
our sessions. 
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In matters of procedure, the Presidential Com-
mittee paid the closest attention to his views. 
Although already in failing health, at our session 
last June he made his full contribution to the 
limit of his strength. 
On behalf of the Assembly, I pay a final 
tribute to his memory. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Ladies and 
Gentlemen, Western European Union came into 
being twenty-five years ago with the signing of 
the Paris Agreements and in June 1980 its 
Assembly will be celebrating a quarter of a 
century of political activity. These anniversaries 
should encourage us to assess the progress that 
has been made and to consider how our future 
security can be ensured in a constantly changing 
world. 
If we compare the problems to be faced today 
with those which the signing of the Paris Agree-
ments endeavoured to solve, we see that the prob-
lems which were then of concern to us are still 
there, while many others have been added. The 
facts that are with us today as then are the 
division of Germany and of Europe, the rapid 
growth in the Soviet military effort and the 
Soviet Union's exploitation of the disturbances 
which recur throughout the world in order to 
extend its influence. 
In short, the factors of tension which produced 
the Brussels Treaty Organisation and the Atlantic 
Pact and led to the signing of the modified 
Brussels Treaty are still present, but the back-
ground against which the West is striving to 
meet the challenges facing it has been changed 
to its disadvantage. We must therefore assume 
the task of doing everything that is in our power 
to ensure freedom in the world and must over-
look nothing that is necessary for the solidity of 
our organisation. Although there is no doubt that 
the tide is running against us, there is unfortun-
ately no reason for us to relax the efforts we are 
making to safeguard our organisation. 
First, from a military standpoint, the West has 
lost much of its relative superiority in recent 
years. The Soviet Union has not only achieved 
strategic balance, it has succeeded in tipping it in 
its favour. Soviet superiority in conventional 
weapons is steadily increasing; its missile poten-
tial has also grown ; there is no longer a balance. 
Furthermore, other centres of power have emer-
ged which are, in turn, taking part in the arma-
ments race. It is just when the spread of techno-
logy, the systematic exploitation of all sources of 
raw materials and the development and increase 
of trade are tending to unify the world by making 
the remotest countries participate in the splend-
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ours and the miseries of industrial society, just 
when all cities are beginning to look alike and 
their inhabitants are dressing and feeding in the 
same manner, that the world is falling apart 
politically. Both the new states which have come 
into being after the second world war, as a 
result of decolonisation and the age-old states that 
have only recently sloughed off their archaic 
form, are now asserting a sovereignty which is 
bringing them into opposition with their neigh-
bours or with rival ethnic groups while they 
invoke - often with violence - a language or a 
religion in order to affirm their personality. 
Because the world is at one and the same time 
interdependent and divided, any local conflict 
has repercussions throughout the international 
community. The effort made since the last war to 
maintain peace must therefore assume forms 
adapted to the new circumstances. 
The concept of detente plays a leading role in 
the settlement of world problems. Unfortunately, 
we risk making it the basic principle of all 
considerations without knowing what conditions 
must be established if detente is not to be an 
empty word. This concept can be based only on 
a position of force and unity. We can ensure the 
effectiveness of detente only from a position of 
force which guarantees our security, for any 
weakness would expose us to a threat whose effect 
would be to increase tension. Furthermore, con-
cessions over disarmament inevitably lead to a 
further worsening of the imbalance and hence to 
fewer possibilities of detente. Accordingly the 
SALT 11 agreements, which give a sort of formal 
status to the strategic balance, can be an element 
of detente and consequently meet Europe's inter-
ests only to the extent that they guarantee deter-
rence and eliminate all risk of a covert production 
of armaments that could upset the balance of 
terror. 
Europe must be protected against any attempt 
at blackmail. The nuclear forces of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France give 
these three countries guarantees in this respect, 
and are therefore a constraint placed on the 
Soviet Union and a help for Europe. 
A divided country, split in two by the frontier 
between the two Europes, Germany has entered 
into specific commitments. These commitments 
are a highly significant part of detente. We shall 
respect these commitments, but Germany too is 
entitled to security. 
It well knows that in the long run a successful 
policy of detente might lead Europe towards 
a peace which would pave the way to a settle-
ment between the two parts of Germany. But 
once again Germany, which places so much hope 
in detente, cannot play with the security which 
is a condition of detente. 
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(The President continued in English) 
The policy of detente depends on a return to 
the previous strategic balance which has been 
t~pped in favour of the Soviet Union in many 
fields and above all that of medium-range nuclear 
weapons. This problem is being followed with 
vigilance by the member countries of the NATO 
integrated organisation. Moreover, from my coun-
try's point of view, standing on the line dividing 
Europe, the modernisation of theatre nuclear 
weapons must be considered as the only way of 
avoiding unacceptable political pressure. 
Finally, the effectiveness of deterrence means 
having enough conventional forces equipped with 
the most modern weapons to be able to parry a 
surprise attack and avoid any loss of ground. 
This problem, to which should be added that of 
research and the European armaments policy, was 
fully discussed six weeks ago at the symposium 
which our Assembly organised in Brussels last 
October to commemorate the twenty-fifth anni-
versary of the Brussels Treaty. 
There have inevitably been some differences of 
opinion over the aims and means of such a policy. 
Nevertheless, the merits of having a large number 
of permanent production groups have been recog-
nised. At the present time, there are no more 
realistic means - and it is a continuing concern 
of this Assembly - to allow European countries 
with limited resources to play a part in the 
development of new technologies and to meet the 
cost of development and producing new weapons. 
Another idea was put forward which I feel 
should be investigated : that of European prefer-
ence. I know that some may advocate low-cost 
purchases from the United States, and such an 
attitude, with an eye to saving money, certainly 
does not further the cause of European prefer-
ence, which I am not alone in advocating. If we 
adopt the same position here as at the Brussels 
symposium, it is not in a spirit of anti-Ameri-
canism but merely in the hope of ensuring the 
survival of European armaments industries and 
hence millions of jobs in the armaments industry 
and among suppliers. The United States, for its 
part, wishes, for perfectly valid security reasons 
to produce practically all its armaments require~ 
ments on home territory. We, for our part, are 
urging our countries to bear in mind the need 
t? main~ai~ a sound industrial basis in Europe, 
smce this IS one of the fundamental conditions 
of our security. However, it must also be borne in 
mind that the arms market is not a normal one, 
open to unfettered competition, but that govern-
ment influence and the weight of political argu-
ments must be decisive wherever European pre-
ference leads to the adoption of broader positions. 
European preference would mean not only that 
countries participating in a common programme 
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tVould procure the equipment thus produced but 
that third countries would bear in mind the inter-
est for Europe as a whole of procuring, whenever 
possible, an item of equipment produced in 
Europe, whether such arms or equipment were 
P.roduced by several states co-operatively or by a 
smgle country. In the latter case, European pref-
erence may foster some form of specialisation by 
allowing certain countries to continue producing 
armaments traditionally produced by them and, 
in exchange, to purchase weapons produced by 
other European countries. 
One further remark. We know that the Soviet 
Union exploits local conflicts in order to weaken 
the West's security. In the main, it tries to shake 
the foundations of Europe, the most exposed part 
of the world. It is a kind of indirect strategy. By 
holding up Europe's supplies of raw materials, 
and particularly energy resources, it is, in fact, 
jeopardising its growth, thus increasing unem-
ployment and inflation. This procedure under-
mines our economic strength and therefore inevi-
tably our social order and, in the long run, our 
defence capability. 
As the world's leading importer and exporter, 
the European Economic Community is particu-
larly exposed to this kind of threat. The United 
States is less affected because its national 
resources are greater and its supplies safer, and 
the dollar's leading role as an exchange and 
reserve currency guarantees an import capacity 
without the worries our countries may feel 
regarding deficits in their balance of trade. 
Japan, too, representing the great industrial 
power of Asia, whose products are hard to com-
pete with and whose currency is constantly being 
revalued, seems sheltered from this indirect 
strategy. Europe, on the other hand, is particu-
larly exposed and is, unfortunately, a centre of 
interest for the other side ; for the East, our loss 
is its gain. 
The harm caused to our freedom amounts to an 
extension and a consolidation of regions where 
freedom is no more. Let us, in our debates, be 
guided by the fundamental idea of freedom in the 
future as in the past twenty-five years. 
A strong Europe, capable of demonstrating that 
it can guarantee peace, will be in the best position 
to help solve the enormous problems which prevail 
in the third world. A Europe deprived of its 
freedom could no longer freely assist other 
countries. 
(The President continued in German) 
(Translation). - In addition to these problems 
of freedom and security, and indeed closely linked 
with them, there is a subject of absolutely out-
standing importance, the subject of energy. There 
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are many recipes for the solution of this complex 
problem, many of them mere pipe-dreams but 
most of them bitterly serious. Unfortunately, how-
ever, many unpalatable proposals are shelved in 
the hope that the problems will somehow solve 
themselves. How they will do so is left to the 
Almighty. In many cases people lack the courage 
to propose what is required and to push through 
what is recognised as necessary. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we have got to find a 
common energy policy. That will unquestionably 
mean that the great powers will have to restrict 
their imports. It will also mean that new sources 
of energy can be used, that in addition to eco-
nomising on energy and developing new tech-
nologies we will be forced to take our decisions 
on nuclear energy not, as before, with an eye on 
the man with a vote but in the light of what has 
to be done. All democratic parties will have to 
participate in this long-standing task. 
This also calls for maintenance by the western 
world of solidarity in the Middle East, an area 
of such importance for the security of Europe. 
By taking members of the American Embassy 
staff in Tehran as hostages, and by bombing and 
setting fire to diplomatic representations in other 
Islamic countries, irresponsible agitators have 
broken international laws and flouted the most 
basic rules of international coexistence. 
Freedom in Iran is non-existent. What is hap-
pening there is a mockery of human rights. The 
taking of hostages in the diplomatic offices of the 
United States is a cynical attack on the leading 
power of the free world. We Europeans take it 
as a matter of course that the United States 
should protect us ; but what is going on in the 
world surely compels us in Europe to ask our-
selves whether we can evade taking a share of 
the political responsibility and fail to give our 
moral support. 
The solidarity of the free world is the sole 
factor guaranteeing that we shall remain free. 
I am not defending the earlier regime that 
undoubtedly made serious mistakes. But I do 
raise my voice against a system that lives on 
vengeance and disregards the human rights that 
all of us in this Assembly believe in. We raise 
our voice against a regime that shows no sign of 
appreciating international needs and practice, 
that will lead to the ruin of its own country, and 
in doing so will constitute a severe threat to the 
balance of the world. 
By their seizure of hostages in Tehran, irres-
ponsible agitators have acted in defiance of inter-
national law and disregarded the simplest rules 
of international life. It is not enough for Europe 
simply to proclaim its disapproval. It must be 
capable of coming to the assistance of American 
diplomacy in a situation which calls not only for 
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firmness but also for perspicacity and foresight 
if the lives of the hostages are to be saved. 
Our European identity and the solidarity of 
the West in all fields of diplomacy, industry, 
trade and finance must be brought into play. It 
is not just the maintenance of our standard of 
living and of our civilisation that are at stake, 
but our very survival. 
When we consider how weighty these problems 
are, the current squabbles between Europeans 
concerning lamb and langoustines and the finan-
cial contributions made by one member state or 
another strike one as curious. So too does the 
controversy over the respective competences of 
the Assemblies of the Communities and of 
Western European Union. 
The members of our Assembly, who are dele-
gated from amongst the members of the national 
parliaments, approve the credits for national 
defence. They are therefore in a position to nego-
tiate with the governments which defend the 
prerogatives of national independence. When 
however preserving these responsibilities in the 
military sphere begins to take on a dangerous 
character, our Assembly must really set itself the 
urgent task of sharing its concern over security 
in Europe with all those who have some measure 
of influence on the fate of our continent. 
In this Assembly we have frequently stressed 
that security involves all aspects of a nation's 
life. The social climate, urban planning, economic 
prosperity and the level of a country's morals 
all have repercussions on our defence capability. 
It is therefore desirable that our concern in these 
spheres should be made known and that it shall 
not be governments alone which take decisions, 
but that all parliamentary bodies which carry 
weight in these spheres should play a part. 
I would like in conclusion to make two further 
points. 
First, in connection with the responsibilities I 
have just mentioned, I initiated in the European 
Parliament a debate in which warning voices 
were raised, saying that it is this Assembly and 
this Assembly alone which is competent for 
defence and security. I think I have made it 
sufficiently clear that that is my view as well. 
Second, we in this Assembly have discussed 
whether it would not be possible to interpret the 
Brussels Treaty in such a way that not all 
members of the Assembly of Western European 
Union need also be members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
quite other tasks. Why is consideration not being 
given to the idea of delegating to our Assembly 
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a few members from amongst the national quotas 
in the directly-elected members of the European 
Parliament 1 They are just as much elected by 
the people as you and I. We would then have the 
best guarantee that our Assembly would not have 
its tasks disputed. The directly-elected European 
parliamentarians with their wide-ranging poli-
tical interests would deal in Strasbourg with 
everything that came within their competence, 
while the few who are delegated to sit here in 
Paris will join us in coping with the tasks arising 
from the modified Brussels Treaty, tasks for 
which you and I were sent here. Why not look at 
this idea, calmly and objectively Y 
I wish the Assembly success with its work in 
this session. (Applause) 
7. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for 
the Second Part of the Session 
(Doe. 818) 
The PRESIDENT.- The Orders of the Day 
provide for the adoption of the draft Order of 
Business for this part of the session. 
The draft Order of Business is given in Docu-
ment 813 dated 23rd November 1979. 
Is there any opposition to the draft Order of 
Business as proposed ? 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- Mr Chair-
man, I should like to make a request for the 
withdrawal of one item from the draft Order of 
Business, namely, the first item of business on 
Wednesday, 5th December, the report on nuclear, 
biological and chemical protection, which should 
have been tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
I must apologise to the Assembly but, in spite of 
the best efforts of Mr. Banks and the Committee, 
it has not been possible for this report to be 
completed in time for consideration at this part-
session. I would therefore ask whether that item 
could be '\\ithdrawn from the draft Order of 
Business for this session and tabled in the draft 
Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-
sixth ordinary session. 
Secondly, I ask whether you would clarify the 
Order of Business for this morning and this after-
noon. As you will see, Order No. 6 for this 
morning is Mr. van Waterschoot's report, fol-
lowed by debate. This afternoon we have Mr. 
Meintz's report, followed by debate, and Mr. 
Onslow's and Mr. Valleix's report, followed by 
debate. It was my understanding that those three 
reports were going to provide the basis for a 
common debate. Am I right, therefore, in assum-
ing that the word "debate" after Mr. van Water-
schoot's report should not appear and that the 
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debate will take place on all three reports after 
the presentation of all three ? That, I believe, was 
the intention of the Presidential Committee when 
it considered the matter. 
rrhe PRESIDENT. - You have made the 
following proposals, Mr. Roper. The first is to 
withdraw the report of Mr. Banks and to place it 
on the agenda for June next year. 
What is the opinion of the Assembly L 
The Chairman proposes to withdraw it. We 
normally acquiesce and, in my view, it must be 
on the agenda in June next year. 
Is that agreed L 
That is agreed to. 
The second proposal concerns Item 6 on the 
Orders of the Day, the report tabled by Mr. van 
Waterschoot. It is proposed to debate it together 
with the report to be tabled by Mr. Meintz. I must 
point out that it is a question only of the pre-
sentation of the report. There is a mistake in the 
Orders of the Day. No vote is proposed. 
I gather that you wish to combine the report 
of Mr. van Waterschoot with that of Mr. Meintz, 
which was set down for this afternoon. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I am 
extremely sorry. I obviously did not make myself 
clear. The three reports by Mr. van Waterschoot, 
Mr. Meintz and Mr. Onslow and Mr. Valleix are 
all reports drawing conclu.sions from the Brussels 
symposium. It had, therefore, been my under-
standing that they would be presented in sequence 
and be followed by a common debate, followed 
in turn, as is shown on the draft Order of 
Business, by a vote on the three recommendations. 
I merely want your confirmation that that is the 
order of business you intend to follow. 
The PRESIDENT.- I have already pointed 
out that there will not be a vote on Mr. van 
W aterschoot's report. If the Assembly agrees, we 
can have a combined debate on all three together, 
with the exception that there will be no vote on 
Mr. van W aterschoot's report. 
Is that agreed L 
That is agreed. 
Mr. TALON (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to refer 
to Rule 32 of our Rules of Procedure in con-
nection with the Order of Business of this session 
and to urge that an end be put to the apparently 
deliberate, conscious and intentional violations of 
our Rules of Procedure, at least where the deli-
berations of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments are concerned. 
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The question that seems to be raised by the 
activities of that Committee is whether we consti-
tute a chamber to record an orthodox view 
emanating from a power outside WEU, or 
whether we are a genuine parliamentary assem-
bly, designed to express the whole spectrum of 
European opinion on the questions with which it 
deals and which are at the heart of our respons-
ibilities. Now, the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments seems to be using our 
Rules of Procedure in such a way that those of 
its members whose opinions do not always agree 
with this orthodox view cannot give proper 
expression to their disagreement and so to be 
turning this Assembly, whatever the views of its 
members, into a mere instrument of propaganda 
for a particular cause. 
Let us look at the facts : at its meeting of 20th 
June, the Presidential Committee adopted an 
Order of Business which included five reports 
from the Defence Committee. On 15th October it 
adopted another, with only four reports. At its 
meeting of 20th November it did not go back on 
that decision. Yet today, we are being presented 
with an Order of Business which has only three 
reports from the Committee, and of these three 
one - Mr. van den Bergh's - has still not been 
distributed to the members of the Assembly while 
another, by Mr. Cook, has been presented in a 
form which apparently requires revision, and 
nobody knows what points will be revised. The 
third report, by Mr. Meintz, was adopted by 
the Committee in oonditions which I think impair 
its validity ; I shall return to this later. As for 
Mr. Banks' report on nuclear, biological and 
chemical protection which was entered on the 
Order of Business of this session a long time ago 
at the request of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, it has never been 
distributed to the members of the Committee, and 
we now hear, at the last minute, that it has never 
existed. 
As a result our Assembly, whose primary 
responsibility is for defence matters, is unable to 
hold the wide-ranging debate on this subject for 
which it was preparing, either because the reports 
entered in its Order of Business have not been 
drafted, or because the Committee concerned has 
not adopted them in accordance with an approved 
procedure. 
You are well aware that to hold serious debates 
on questions such as those dealt with by the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
means that we have to gather information, to 
reflect and to study, and this cannot be done in a 
matter of hours. The reports must therefore be 
distributed to the members of the Assembly suf-
ficiently long before our sessions to avoid im-
portant recommendations being adopted, if one 
may call it that, by small minorities because of 
the large number of abstentions. A recent case in 
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point is Mr. Critchley's report on the standardisa-
tion of armaments, which is often used against us 
to suggest that our Assembly voted against its 
own right to exist. Or again, many of us stay 
away for the votes if we have not had time to find 
out exactly to what they commit us, and then we 
no longer have the quorum needed for the 
adoption of our texts. 
That might be tolerable if the Assembly's Com-
mittees were able to play their part, and to 
prepare for our debates properly. However, we 
must admit that that is not always the case with 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments. 
At its meeting of 7th November, the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments adopted 
the report submitted by Mr Meintz and entitled 
"Definition of armaments requirements and pro-
curement in western Europe", although the report 
had not been distributed to its members in 
advance and they therefore did not know exactly 
what the Committee would be discussing. In 
particular they did not know that the recom-
mendation proposed to the Committee would once 
again call upon the institution in which we are 
meeting today to commit hara-kiri for the benefit 
of the European Communities, at least as far as 
the production of armaments is concerned. 
It can be argued that the Rules of Procedure 
do not formally forbid the use of such methods 
and that it was up to the French to be present. 
But surely it cannot be claimed that the use of 
the Rules of Procedure in order to adopt, after 
one reading, a lengthy text which the members 
have not seen in advance, is not a distortion of the 
purpose of those rules. As for the French Delega-
tion, it realises that those who are absent are 
always wrong ; but you know how demanding 
parliamentary life is for people who carry the 
obligations resulting from membership of two 
European assemblies in addition to their local and 
national obligations. Can one blame them for not 
coming in strength to a meeting for which they 
had not received the working documents ? That 
is why I ask myself about the real intentions of 
those who organise such meetings in such condi-
tions and who do all they can to ensure that at 
no point will we really be able to study the docu-
ments on which we are to vote. Surely it is not 
merely coincidence if all the votes directed 
against WEU are held in such unsatisfactory 
conditions~ 
And when the Committee, meeting to discuss 
a disputed text which has not been distributed 
to its members in advance, does not obtain a 
quorum, what does it do ~ It refers, of course, to 
a paragraph in the Rules of Procedure and 
simply decides to make public a text which it did 
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not have the right to adopt. It has just done so 
in the case of the recommendation attached to 
the report by Mr. van den Bergh on new weapons 
and defence strategy. Rule 41, paragraph 10, of 
the Rules of Procedure states: 
"Unless a Committee decides otherwise ... the 
only texts which shall be made public shall 
be the reports that have been agreed to, or 
statements issued on the responsibility of the 
Chairman." 
Surely it is neither sensible nor fair to claim 
that a meeting which is not sufficiently well 
attended to decide a report is well enough 
attended to decide to distribute it. Be that as it 
may, a published document constitutes a "text 
which is to be tabled in the Assembly" within the 
meaning of Rule 41, paragraph 4 (a) of the Rules 
of Procedure, which states that the vote shall be 
taken by roll-call. I think I may say without fear 
of contradiction that no roll-call was taken in 
this case. Is this not one more example of picking 
out from amongst the procedural rules those 
which will conceal a political manreuvre intended 
to obscure the truth and suggest what is not 
there~ 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- My friend, 
you must keep to the Order of the Day and not 
make a long general speech. Will you please 
conclude? 
Mr. TAI.JON (Prance) (Translation). 
Mr. President, I am referring to the Rules of 
Procedure and not making a general speech. But 
since you ask me to conclude I shall do so, despite 
still having a few comments to make. 
For these various reasons, may I ask you, 
:\fr. President, to ensure that in future our 
Assembly, and in particular its Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, applies its 
Rules of Procedure, less literally perhaps, but 
certainly more strictly. 
For the present, I ask the Assembly to consider 
that Mr. Meintz's report was not adopted by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
in proper form, because it was not distributed 
prior to its adoption, and to refer this report back 
to Committee so that it can be discussed afresh 
before it is submitted to the plenary session for 
which it is entered on the Order of Business. 
Thank you, Mr. President. I am sorry I took 
rather long. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Roper. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I was 
unaware that a statement on the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Al"llaments was to be 
made at this morning's sitting. I would prefer to 
read the text of the intervention and reply to it 
later. If I have your permission, Mr. President, 
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perhaps I may deal with one of the reports. May 
I assure you that I have checked on the points 
that were made, as they were made, and I do not 
believe that any of the Rules of Procedure of this 
Assembly were broken ? 
To make one point, the reason it was not 
possible for my Committee to adopt the report 
of Mr. van den Bergh on 7th November or 21st 
November was that, due to the French air traffic 
controllers' strike, we had difficulty in getting 
a quorum in Paris. Nonetheless, we felt that, 
because of the importance of Mr. van den Bergh's 
recommendation once it had been agreed, we 
should make use of the provisions in the rules, so 
that members would have it in advance. 
The only other point to which I would refer 
now - and I reserve my right to reply to other 
points later - is that in relation to the debate 
on Mr. Meintz's report. It is not correct to say 
that no member of the French Delegation was 
present. I have consulted the minutes of the 
meeting and I see that there was present a 
member of the French Senate, who voted and 
moved a number of amendments. I hope, there-
fore, that that particular allegation will be forth-
with withdrawn. 
The PRESIDENT.- I must tell the Assembly 
that the Presidential Committee fixes the whole 
Order of Business. That Committee meets regu-
larly and at the last meeting two weeks ago the 
French delegate Mr. Valleix was present. We 
fixed the whole Order of Business and therefore 
I would suppose that this afternoon when the 
Assembly debates the three reports members can 
table a motion sending this report back to the 
Committee. It is left with you. We must now 
continue. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
Mr. VAI,LEIX (France) (Translation).- My 
point is this : I think you have just set out the 
essentials, and that might bring this discussion on 
the Order of Business to a conclusion. As you 
said, the Presidential Committee has reached a 
decision and the Order of Business has been 
proposed to the Assembly in its present form. 
Consequently, I find it hard to understand, from 
the procedural point of view, why we should go 
back on what had been proposed, and proposed, 
I must add, in the absence of our colleague, Mr. 
Roper, who was prevented from attending for 
reasons which I am the first to understand and 
which I am also one of the first to regret, namely, 
transport difficulties. 
That being so, the Order of Business has been 
proposed and I hope that we shall stick to it. 
But from this I draw the following conclusion : 
that the reports should be presented in succession. 
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In this way, Mr. Talon will be able to come back 
to his legitimate observations. 
But I also draw the conclusion that the reports 
should come up separately, seeing that the Rap-
porteurs were not warned that there might be a 
joint debate or a possible plan for a joint vote 
on the substance. Obviously, the subjects of the 
reports are completely different, and this was 
clearly reflected in the Order of Business of the 
Brussels symposium, drawn up by our Assembly 
in such a way that each report might contribute 
information, guidance and a slant peculiar to 
each Committee and to each Rapporteur. 
That is the situation today, and in consequence 
I, for my part, could accept the Order of Business 
only in its original form, as agreed, Mr. President, 
by your Bureau and your Committee, so that I 
in my capacity as Rapporteur, and Mr. Onslow 
likewise, may be enabled to express our views on 
a given report about which the Assembly will also 
come to a given decision ; and I trust that the 
same will apply to the other reports. If this did 
not happen, I wonder how the working methods 
of our Assembly would be judged by outsiders. 
I do not doubt, however, that order and good 
sense will prevail. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Chairman of the 
Committee proposed that the three rreports should 
be debated together, so we shall have the pre-
sentation of three reports followed by a joint 
debate and a separate vote. 
We should now proceed to the next Order of 
the Day. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation) - I 
should like to recall one point from the Rules of 
Procedure. If, in fact, the debate is to be a joint 
one, and consequently a debate held in an 
atmosphere of confusion - we have had some 
recent experiences of this - I cannot, as Rap-
porteur, see the value of making a report and 
that I should regret. Still more important, I can-
not see why the Assembly should in extremis go 
back on its decision solely on the proposal of one 
member, the Chairman of a Committee. Once 
again, I hope that whalt has been agreed collec-
tively amongst us may prevail over what is pro-
posed at the last moment by a single person. But 
you are aware of the conclusions which I, as a 
Rapporteur, should draw from this. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I certainly 
would not wish to cause difficulty this afternoon 
to the Vice-President of the Assembly, the leader 
of a delegation, or the Rapporteur. I spoke on 
this merely because my recollection of the discus-
sion we had in the Presidential Committee, which 
I confirm, was that there should be a joint debate 
on this matter. I hope that that will be for the 
convenience of the Assembly. If it is not, I would 
not wish to embarrass anyone. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
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There are three reports all more or less on the one 
subject. The reports are different and come to 
different conclusions. The proposal was that we 
should debaJte the whole together, to avoid spend-
ing too much time on repetition, so let us take 
them together. 
Mr. Roper is ready to withdraw his proposal. 
It would be easier for us if he withdraws it, then 
we go on, as Mr. Valleix proposed, to the report 
and then the vote, the next report, and then the 
vote. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I am sorry, 
Mr. President, but, with great respect, that would 
be a change in the draft Order of Business, 
because the draft Order of Business is perfectly 
clear that the votes will come only at the end of 
the afternoon. If you look at this afternoon's 
Order of Business, you will see that it says at the 
end "Votes on the draft recommendations". That 
makes it quite clear that Mr. Va.Jleix is proposing 
a change. 
The PRESIDENT. - I am sorry, you are 
right. The procedure will be : first report, debate; 
second report, debate ; third report, debate ; and 
then the vote. 
The amended draft Order of Business for the 
second part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session 
is agreed to. 
8. The balance of force 
(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation post-
poned from the First Part of the Session, Doe. 809) 
The PRESIDENT.- Now we go on with the 
Orders of the Day, which provide now for the 
vote on the draft recommendation in the report 
presented by Mr. Pawelczyk, Document 809, the 
balance of force, on which the Assembly was 
unable to vote last time. This draft recommenda-
tion was amended on 20th June at our Fifth 
Sitting by Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Baumel. 
The text of this amendment has been distributed 
this morning. 
I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation).- As 
the Assembly Will'! unable to reach a decision at 
our last session, it appears to me that, when all 
is said and done, it would be advisable and useful 
- and this is a brief and restrained reaction, 
or rather a :ffinal reaction - to ask that und~r 
Rule 29 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure 
the draft recommendation on the balance of 
force presented on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questiom~ and Armaments be referred 
back to Committee. 
The text of this recommendation is based on 
the analysis of a situation which has now been 
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overtaken by events. Several new factors have 
intervened since it was drafted: the proposal 
made by Mr. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the 
PreSidium of the Supreme Soviet, in his address 
in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 for the uni-
lateral withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet soldiers and 
1,000 Ru!'flian tanks - a proposal which, it is 
true, was coupled with formal warnings as 
disquieting as they were unacceptable ; the pro-
posals made by the allies for the withdrawal of 
1,000 American nuclear warheads, of 13,000 
American soldiers and 30,000 Soviet troops; and 
lastly the general context of the negotiations on 
the modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear 
weapons. 
I wonder whether all these factors do not 
justify a careful re-examination of the present 
situation as regards the balance of force in 
Europe ? Are we to vote on this report Y Would 
the Committee consider it useful to up-date it 
and bring it into line with the present situation, 
or else to take it up again later Y 
Such are the reasons wh[ch lead me to ask you 
whether it would not be advisable to decide on 
reference back to the Committee. But of course I 
leave it to the wisdom of the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Ladies and Gentlemen, 
we cannot debate the whole report by Mr. 
Pawelczyk and the amendments. Now we can 
only vote. If you propose to 13end it back to the 
Committee, we may hear someone in favour of 
having the final vote now. The proposal is to 
send it back to the Committee. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I am 
sorry, Mr. President. I am a little confused, and 
I wonder whether you can assist me. I think that 
Mr. Valleix was basing his motion to refer the 
report back under Rule 29 (5). That applies 
purely to amendments. Now they are under 
debate. It is not dealing with the reference baek 
of the whole of a text. As Mr. Baumel's amend-
ment, to which you have referred, has already 
been adopted, it is not possible to refer back 
Mr. Baumel's amendment to my Committee. Mr. 
Valleix would, therefore, have to find, I think, 
a procedural motion somewhere else. I think that 
it is not Rule 29 (5) that he can use if he wishes 
to refer back the whole of this report to my 
Committee. 
The PRESIDENT.- There is no doubt that 
before the final vote takes place someone can 
propose to send the whole back to the Committee. 
Then we must first decide on this proposal. 
I call Mr. V.alleix. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, as you have realmed, I have no 
intention of starting a quarrel over procedure. 
Mr. Roper may be right : Rule 32 of our Rules 
of Procedure may be more appropriate, and it 
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is always helpful to the Assembly and to myself 
if we try and interpret our Rules of Procedure 
more correctly. 
That being so, the object of my remarks was 
to bring into our discussions a livelier awareness 
of the very important new developments which 
have occurred during the paat six months. I do 
not know how the .Assembly wants to decide the 
matter, but if, in the final analysis, it appeared 
that the Committee considered it advisable, given 
the important changes that have occurred in the 
world situation, to take up again the report which 
Mr. Pawelczyk was to present today from a 
different angle then my remarb would not have 
been in vain. 
For I hope, as I have said before, that our deci-
sions will be aligned alS closely as p<>S!!ible on 
the situation as dt is today. In other words, I 
am even prepared not to ask for a vote on my 
proposal for a reference back to Committee. 
The PRESIDENT.- The final remark was, 
perhaps, "I do not ask for a vote to send it back". 
Then we vote on the text as a whole 
Let us take Document 809. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommenda-
tion in the document I have mentioned. 
If there are no objections to it and no ah$ten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a roll-call vote. 
Are there any objections L 
Are there any abstentions L 
I think that we must vote by roll-eaU because 
I counted six abstentions. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - We 
are not raising points of order, Mr. President 
only stating our abstention on the vote, mainl; 
baaed on the fact that we were unable to attend 
the proceedings of the Assembly in June and 
take part in the discussion on this matter. 
The PRESIDENT.- I am in a predicament. 
We have done it this way several times, but I 
have been asked to watch the Rules of Procedure. 
If you agree we can try to follow what we have 
done on former occasions, when there is no roll-
call. We have no objections, without the absten-
tions, and therefore the draft recommendation is 
agreed to. I do not see objections to it. 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted 1• 
1. See page 16. 
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9. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
THE PRESIDENT.- We shall now hear an 
address by the Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Mrs. Hamm-Briicher. 
Madam Min~ter, I am sorry, this morning at 
11.45 we should have had the privilege of listen-
ing to your address to the Assembly, but, because 
of our business, we are late. Our business was 
very tough. 
I beg to welcome you and to ask you whethe1 
you would take the floor to address the Assembly. 
Mrs. HAMM-BROCHER (Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). -You of course, Mr. 
President, know quite well, as a parliamentarian, 
that in a plenary assembly it is not always 
possible to observe the time-table to the minute. 
Forty years ago, Mr. President, the attack by 
Hitler's Germany on Poland started the second 
world war, which laid Europe waste - and 
not only Europe - and brought untold suffering 
to many peoples. From the endeavour to repair 
the destruction caused by the war, and to create 
all the conditions needed if the recurrence of 
such a catastrophe was to be obviated, sprang -
20, 25 and 30 years ago now - the major treaties 
and alliances and the common institutions, 
amongst them Western European Union, whose 
anniversaries we are celebrating this year. On 
23rd October of this year the Permanent Council 
celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Brussels 
Treaty, which paved the way for the Federal 
Republic of Germany to co-operate in the com-
mon task of defence and, just over half a year 
later, enabled it to accede to the North Atlantic 
defence community. 
Mr. President, a quarter of a century later we 
are facing a world-wide crisis in economic growth 
and in development and crises in the Near and 
Middle East, in southern Africa and South-East 
Asia. We are obliged to live with a rising tide of 
violence and terror and to witness the appalling 
suffering of starving people and refugees. 
On the other hand, successes have been scored 
in the effort$ to guide the East-West conflict 
which overshadowed world policy during th~ 
first two decades after the end of the second 
world war, along the lines of a peaceful and 
controlled state of rivalry between countries with 
different social orders. This policy of detente 
designed to preserve peace, has acquired parti~ 
cular importance as a stabilising :factor in the 
context of the world crises to which I have juF:t 
referred. We in the heart of Europe can perform 
the tasks incumbent on us under the policy of 
alliance and detente only 1£ we act together with 
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our allies and partners in the European Com-
munity and the Atlantic Alliance. 
While the phMe of the cold war was 
characterised by confrontation without dialogue, 
the discussion between East and West hM now 
become an established part of foreign policy. By 
definition, any dialogue comprises opposing posi-
tions. But it is entirely in line with our liberal 
w~tern thinking that we see in this a challenge 
to intensification of the dialogue. In any case, 
there is no reMonable alternative to the dialogue 
of detente. 
This policy of detente is being pursued under 
the conditions specific to the EMt-West rela-
tionship. They include the contrasts in the value-
concepts prevailing in the several countries, the 
fundamental differences in the political and 
social syste!I$, and differences in political 
interests which have to be seen against the back-
ground of the existing political and military 
potentials. It would be fooling ourselves to believe 
that any change can be brought about in this 
situation in the short term. 
As long as these contrasts continue to exist, 
the dialogue of detente will continue to be 
dependent on an important prerequisite - the 
maintenance of equal ll!ilitary security for both 
sides. If this condition is no longer met, there 
will be the danger of a reciprocal effect : where 
an imbalance of military potentials creates an 
unstable situation, this will lead to a keener sense 
of being particularly threatened. The execution 
of common political tasks i:;l impeded, the 
readiness to co-operate inhibited. This danger can 
be avoided by negotiations on stabilising equal 
military security at, we hope, an eventually lower 
level. I shall come back to this, Mr. President, 
in connection with the top!ical question of the 
USSR's medium-range miEfsile potential. 
The quality of the policy of detente pursued 
so far will be shown in no small degree by the 
extent to which the confidence one is trying to 
establish can be used to help forward the policy 
of armaments control. The building of confidence 
is particularly important in the field of military 
security. 
The Federal Government regards the con-
fidence-building measures of the final act of the 
CSCE M -an exceptionally important step 
towards meeting this requirement. Concrete 
proposals for extending the scope and deepening 
the content of the confidence-building measures 
have been tabled. The next follow-up conference, 
to be held in Madrid in 1980, offers a chance 
to continue the work of confidence-building both 
in individual practical measures and in an 
intensification of the general East-West dialogue. 
The French proposal for a conference on 
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disarmament in Europe can make a particularly 
substantial contribution to progress in this field, 
especially in the diirection of extending the 
application of the confidence-building measures 
to the whole of Europe. 
The Federal Government attaches great im-
portance to the joint German-Soviet declaration 
of 6th May 1978 made on the occasion of the 
visit of General Secretary Brezhnev. In this 
declaration the two sides regard it as important 
that no one should try to acquire military 
superiority and that approximate equality and 
parity should be sufficient to safeguard their 
own defence. At the same time agreement on 
further steps in the field of disarmament and 
armaments control should be expedited, so that 
the process of detente should not be impeded by 
developments in the military sphere. The recent 
visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to Bonn gave 
both sides an opportunity to reaffirm the prin-
ciples of this German-Soviet declaration of 1978. 
The Federal Government has from the outset 
regarded the policy of detente as a policy for 
people. The East-West dialogue must not confine 
i1:$lf to the international handling of crises, but 
must lead to pra01J:ical improvements for ordinary 
men and women. The Moscow and Warsaw 
treaties and the treaties between the two German 
states have contributed to a development which 
has made Europe somewhat more open. The 
final act of the CSCE at Helsinki is also a 
milestone in this development. The citizens of 
Western and Eastern Europe are coming closer 
to each other again not only in the reuniting of 
families and through travel, but also through 
econonric, scientific, technical and cultural inter-
change. This is the tangible stuff of the policy 
of detente, and for us Germans it holds a ~pecial 
interest. 
The policy of detente could be a success for 
the countries of the West only because they have 
developed joint positions and harmonised their 
views closely at every stage. The work of political 
consultation in NATO has been given fresh 
impetus. European political co-operation has 
developed through the CSCE. Consultation on 
the further steps in the CSCE process is still 
today one of the most active components in this 
co-operation. 
The relationship between the two states in 
Germany exerts an essential influence on the 
whole fabric of detente in Europe. Unless 
progress is made in the relations between the 
two parts of Germany on the basis of the basic 
treaty of 8th November 1972, it is difficult to 
conceive of any deepen~ng of the procel!fl of 
detente in Europe. Anyone who wants detente 
and co-operation in Europe must also want 
detente and co-operation between the two states 
in Germany. Both German states bear a very 
special responsibility in this respect. 
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We are glad to see that, after the cooling of 
relations brought about by the measures which 
the German Democratic Republic took in the 
first half of the year against correspondents 
from other countries, and the stiffer penalties 
it imposed on its own citizens for contacts with 
the western world, there are now signs of a more 
positive trend. But a great deal of further effort 
will be required before the objeclive of good 
neighbourly relations written into the basic 
treaty is attained in the ~nterests of the ordinary 
people of Germany. 
The aim of the foreign policy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany is to work toward$ a state 
of peace in Europe in which the German people 
can regain their unity by a free act of self-
determination. 
I cannot talk about detente without mentioning 
Berlin, Mr. President. We can today note with 
satisfaction that the position in and around 
Berlin is on the whole stable. An untroubled 
atmosphere in Berlin is an essential element of 
detente, security and co-operation in Europe and 
at the same time a basis for the viability of that 
city. May I also mention in this connection that 
the heads of state of the three western powers 
have, by their visits to Berlin, made a profession 
of faith in that city, and thereby helped to 
improve its prospects for the future. 
The four-power agreement of 3rd September 
1971 did not solve the Berlin question itself. All 
attempts by the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic to push through, by a 
restrictive 11nterpretation or the dissemination of 
false versions of the agreement, political positions 
for which the Russians had been unable to gain 
acceptance in the four-power agreement, were 
thwarted by the firm attitude of the three allied 
powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In this connection I should like to draw attention 
in parMcular to the London statement by the 
four heads of state or government of 9th May 
1977 and to the Tokyo 8ta!tement by the four 
foreign ministers of 29th June of this year. In 
these the three powers confirmed yet again that 
they will continue to reject any attempt to call in 
question the rights and responsibilities which 
France, the United States, the United Kingdom 
and the SoV'iet Union still have in respect of 
Germany as a whole and of all four sectors of 
Berlin. 
Now, Mr. President, to turn to a question of 
great topical interest. We are all witnessing R 
heated debate on the build-up of Soviet missiles 
in Europe and ·the western response to this. This 
is raising, on the threshold of the 1980s, together 
with the many other uncertainties about the 
coming decade, the question of the future 
stability of our security. For the Federal 
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Republic of Germany, as for its allies, the basis 
of our security is beyond all doubt : the Atlantic 
Alliance is and remains its sheet-anchor. This 
Alliance, based on a lasting community of inter-
ests and values, has in the thirty years of its 
existence again and again furnished impressive 
proof of its vitality, adaptability and capacity 
for safeguarding peace. This experience justifies 
our confidence that the Alliance will, even in 
the face of fresh challenges and in a changing 
strategic environment, preserve the security of 
its members no less fully than in the pa~t. 
Because of two concurrent developments the 
Alliance finds that its basic strategic position 
has changed. By bringing into service a new 
generation of weapons the Soviet Union has very 
recently been further increasing its superiority 
in respect of continental strategic weapoll$ both 
in quantity and above all in quality. At the same 
time it has caught up with the United States in 
its intercollltinental strateglic capability. The 
parity reached between the two leading nuclear 
powers on this central strategic plane is to be 
stabilised by SALT 11. We regard the SALT II 
agreement signed in Vienna on 18th June by 
President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev 
as an imporitant step towards the creation of 
a more stable overall balance of force between 
East and West. Balance is the decisive principle 
on which all our efforts in connection with arma-
ments control and disarmament should be based. 
Our interest in balance in Europe, which is 
inseparable from overall stability and overall 
balance, explains the Federal Government"s 
support of SALT 11. The continuation of the 
SALT process is in itself a stabilising factor. 
SALT 11 has furthermore not only set limits to 
further nuclear arming by the great powers but 
in addition constitutes in treaty form a confir-
mation and a concrete expression of the prin-
ciples of equality and parity which inform 
armaments control and which will be of vital 
importance for the future. 
Mr. President, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many welcomes the readiness of the United 
States further to intensify the SALT consulta-
tions within the Alliance. It regards the elabora-
tion by the special group of a proposal on arma-
ments control for decision by the Alliance in 
December as an important step in developing an 
Allia:nce position. But the formalisation of a state 
of equality and parity at the level of strategic 
intercontinental systems accentuates disparities 
at lower levels. There is now the danger that 
developments in areas not covered by SALT II 
will give rise to instabilities which in turn will 
destabilise the overall balance. Here I am think-
ing first and foremost of the growth in Soviet 
potential rin extremely up-to-date medium-range 
weapons, which is a threat to the Alliance in 
Europe and one to which the Alliance has no 
equivalent response. Soviet potential in these 
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weapons confronts the Alliance with a security 
problem of the first order. · 
The Federal Government therefore welcomes 
the fact that, in accordance with the Alliance's 
dual aim of displaying a defensive capability and 
a readiness for detente, the appointment of the 
high-level group and the special group has made 
it possible to elaborate, in intensive deliberations, 
proposals which will form the basis of the deci-
sions to be taken by the Alliance on 12th Decem-
ber. 
The Federal Republic, too, has been guided, 
in its thorough examination of the need for 
NATO to catch up in the field of medium-range 
weapons, by the principle that defence and 
deterrence capabililties must be maintained. 
NATO, then, is not trying to have exactly the 
same number of meuium-range syste~ as the 
Soviet Un~on. The purpose of the planned 
modernisation of NATO's potential is rather to 
create the conditions that will be necessary if it 
is to continue to rely on its strategy of flexible 
response. But this strat,egy will continue to be 
credible only if the Atlantic Alliance remains 
capable of deliberate, controlled escalation in 
respoDJ!Ie to an attack by the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries and thUJS able to deter them from attacking. 
A further increase in the Soviet Union's nuclear 
medium-range superiority might lead the Soviet 
Union to imagine that [t could threaten or even 
carry out limited attacks on NATO Europe. To 
prevent the emergence of such a unilateral threat 
potential on the Soviet side, NATO will have to 
modernise its medium-range potential so as to 
prevent the development of a gap in its panoply 
of weapons for escalation and deterrence. Mr. 
Genscher, the Federal Minister for Fored.gn 
Mfairs, stated the problem neatly when he "'aid 
- and I quote : 
"The problem is not that the West is arming 
to catch up, but that the East has got ahead." 
Together with our allies we regard armaments 
control as an integral part of the Alliance's 
efforts to ensure the undiminished security of 
its members and to make the strategic situation 
between East and West more stable, predictable 
and controllable. It is agreed that in future 
SALT negotiations priority shall, in conformity 
with the principle of equality and equal security, 
be given to agreeing on limits for land-based 
Soviet and American medium-range systems. 
Whether and how far this is feasible will be 
shown by the continuation of the SALT process. 
At this stage, however, it would be a mistake 
to postpone the necessary decisions in the field 
of defence, decisions without which our arma-
ments control proposal would lack credibility. 
Of course, decisions and developments in the 
field of defence and decisions and developments 
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in armaments control exert a reciprocal influence 
on each other. On the relationship between these 
two areas, Federal Chancellor Schmidt said on 
4th July 1979 before the German Bundestag-
and I quote: 
"The extent to which it will be possible to limit 
concrete me~ures for catchlng up in arma-
ments in response to the build-up that has been 
going on for years in the Warsaw Pact depends 
on the degree of success achieved in placing 
effective limits on the continental strategic 
systems of East and West in armaments 
control negotiations, such as SALT Ill." 
The readiness of the Soviet Union, emphasised 
several times by General Secretary Brezhnev, to 
include medium-range systems in the SALT Ill 
negotiations, is welcomed by the Federal Govern-
ment. It is of the opinion that what matters 
now is to convert into action the political will, 
stressed by both sides, to work via armaments 
control towards a more stable balance. The 
Alliance ri.s prepared to take the Soviet Union 
at its word when it BaY"' that it is prepared to 
allow itself to be guided, in the forthcoming 
negotiations, by the principle of equality and 
equal security. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have 
today had the honour of addressing this Assembly 
for the fourth time on matters of foreign policy 
as seen from Germany. I should like to take this 
opportunity of stressing once more how greatly 
my government values and how necessary it con-
sidens the work of this Assembly, and in parti-
cular the dialogue which takes place here between 
the governments and parliamentarians from the 
member states of WEU. These are an expression 
of the trust and co-operation that exist between 
the Council and the Assembly. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Madam 
Minister, for addressing the Assembly. I am sure 
we all followed carefully what you said and we 
are extremely thankful to you for placing this 
Assembly in the position in which we would want 
it to be seen, that is, as an important Assembly. 
You have said that your government looks upon 
this as an important Assembly and we thank you 
very much, mainly for your final remarks vis-?t-
vis the Assembly. 
Madam Minister has agreed to answer ques-
tions which representatives may like to put to 
her for a period of ten minutes. At present I 
have questions listed for Mr. Talon, Mr. Muller 
and Mr. Valleix. Does anyone else wish to put a 
question? ... 
I call Mr. Talon. 
Mr. TALON (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, a major debate was recently held in 
France on the extent to which a Franco-German 
entente could serve IUl a driving force for Euro-
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pean defence. In view of the latest German white 
paper on defence, could Mrs. Hamm-Briicher 
indicate the German Government'S position on 
this point? 
The PRESIDENT.- Madam Minister, do you 
wish to reply to the questions together, or singly ? 
Mrs. HAMM-BR"OCHER (Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of tke Federal Republic of 
Germany). - Togelther. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Muller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - In connection with the debate 
in NATO on closing the armaments gap and 
improving the missiles balance in Europe, the 
Soviet Union has recently invoked the mutual 
ll$Sistanee pact of April 1948 between Finland 
and the Soviet Union and pointed out that use 
might be made o£ the clause which allows the 
Soviet Union to undertake joint defensive efforts 
with Finland "if the security of the SoV'iet Union 
were to be threatened". What is the Minister of 
State's view on thiJS statement by the Soviet 
Union, in the context of the current debate ? 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Miillel'. 
I call Mr. V alleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I would just like to ask Mrs. 
Ham.m-Briicher one question, at the risk of bei.ng 
indiscreet, for it is perhaps a rather delicate 
subject. 
Does !She think that the possible implementation 
of the proposal to modernise NATO's theatre 
weapons might lead to difficulties in the rela-
tions between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and certain Eastern European states ? 
How does the Federal Government intend to 
reconcile the perhaps contradictory requirements 
of security for Germany - which we fu1ly 
understand . - and the development of its rela-
tions with Eastern Europe ? 
The PRESIDENT. - I now call Mr. Cala-
mandrei. 
Mr. CALAMANDREI (Italy) (Translation). 
- May I ask the Minister whether in what she 
said about the matter to which I refer, and more 
generally the Federal German Government's posi-
tion regarding it, ratification by the United 
States is regarded as a precondition, in that final 
decisions are being t·aken at the Atlantic Council 
in mid-December concerning production and 
deployment of the new nuclear weapons ? 
The PRESIDENT. -Thank you, Mr. Cala-
mandrei. 
Are there any more questions ?... 
3 
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Madam Minister, will you please reply ? 
Mrs. HAMM-BR"OCHER (Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of tke Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, I 
should like to begin with :the last question, the 
one from Mr. Calamandrei. 
The Federal Republic does not consider that 
the ratification of SALT II in any way prejudges 
the decisions NATO is to take in December. 
In reply to the question put by Mr. Valleix, I 
would like to say that the problems involved in 
the coming NATO decisions are of course already 
being discussed with our E-astern European 
opposite numbers. We hope that the proposals 
and negotiations for further measures of control 
and disarmament - of our East European part-
ners as of ourselves - will not hamper us in 
our intention to push ahead with the process of 
detente and with confidence-building measures 
in Europe, and that it will be possible to maintain 
bilateral relations, which are on the whole 
developing favourably. 
In reply to the question from Mr. Talon -
it was, I think, a question about Franco-German 
co-operation in defence matters - I would like 
to say that NATO, as Mr. Talon knoWIS, is a 
collective alliance. There is no place within it 
for ~ecial relationships. This holds good, in 
particular, for nuclear defence. 
To Mr. Muller's question on the Soviet-Finnish 
pact of assistance I can at the moment give no 
official answer, for as far as I know the Federal 
Government has not adopted any particular posi-
tion on this. But I will be glad to send him a 
written all9Wer. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you again, 
Madam Minmter, for coming to the Assembly to 
address us and for replying to questions. Thank 
you so much. We hope to see you again on the 
next occasion. 
10. Changes in the membership of Committees 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the appointment of members of Commit-
tees. Since the last part-session the Presidential 
Committee has, on a provisional bams, nominated 
members to fill Committee p'l:aoo;! which ha;-e 
become vacant. These provisional nominations, 
which are published in an Addendum to Notice 
No. 8, are now submitted to the Assembly for 
ratification, in 'accordance with Rule 8 (3) of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
Are there any objections to these nomina-
tions L 
The provisional nominations are ratified. 
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In addition, the Assembly mW~t decide on pro-
posals for changes in Committee membership 
which have been put forward by certain national 
delegatiom;;. These have also been published in 
the Addendum to Notice No. 8. These proposed 
changes are submitted to the Assembly under the 
terms of Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure. 
Are there any objections to the candidatures 
submitted t .. 
The candidatures for Committees are ratified. 
11. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of 
the Day: 
1. Political conditions for European arma-
ments co-operation (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Document 819). 
2. Definition of armaments requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, Document 821 and Amendments). 
3. Industrial bases of European security -
guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17:th October 1979 (Pre-
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sentation of and Debate on the Report of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, Document 823). 
4. Political conditions for European arma-
ments co-operation ; Definition of arma-
ments requirements and procurement in 
Western Europe ; Industrial bases of Euro-
pean security- guidelines drawn from the 
symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 
1979 (Votes on the draft Recommendations 
and draft Order, Documents 819, 821 and 
Amendments and 823). 
Are there any objections ~ ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- Mr. Presi-
dent, I believe that, following an intervention 
made by Mr. Urwin at the last part-~:~ession on the 
rights of substitutes, there has been an attempt 
to clarify this matter and that certain guidance 
has been given by the Office of the Clerk on the 
:interpretation of Rules 7 and 37. I should like to 
write to you, Sir, about this in order to clarify 
the matter, but I am raising this matter as a 
matter of order on the earliest possible occasion 
in order to tell you that the guidance which has 
been given does not seem to me to be in keeping 
with the rule~:~ as I read them. 
The PRESIDENT.- I intend to take up the 
matter at the opening of the 3 o'clock sitting. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.) 
NINTH SITTING 
Monday, 3rd December 1979 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
Speakers (point of order): Mr. Roper, the President, 
Mr. Grieve. 
S. Political conditions for European armaments co-
operation (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of 
the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 819). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. van Waterschoot (Rap-
porteur), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. van Waterschoot 
(Rapporteur), Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman of the 
Committee). 
4. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement 
in Western Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Doe. 821 and Amendments). • 
Speakers : The President, Mr. Meintz (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Druon, Mr. Roper, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Mulley, Mr. 
Boucheny, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Jung, Mr. 
Meintz (Rapporteur). 
5. Industrial bases of European security - guidelines 
drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th 
October 1979 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions, Doe. 823). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Onslow (Rapporteur), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Warren 
(Chairman of the Committee). 
6. Political conditions for European armaments co-
operation; Definition of armaments requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe ; Industrial bases of 
European security - guidelines drawn from the 
symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 (Votes 
on the draft Recommendations and draft Order, Does. 
819, 821 and Amendments and 823). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mulley, Mr. Cavaliere, 
Mr. Meintz. 
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT.- In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distrlibuted. 
Are there any comments L 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT.- The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President. You have just told us, 
Mr. President, that the names of those substitutes 
communicated to you under Rule 7 will be 
printed in the minutes of the Assembly. May I 
therefore aSsume that those substitutes will hold 
the votes of the full members whom they are 
1. See page 19. 
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replaci.ng for the whole of this afternoon's sit-
ting Y That would be my interpretation of Rules 
7 and 37 of the Rules of Procedure of our Assem-
bly. . 
The PRESIDENT. - I regret, Mr. Roper, 
that you took the floor before I reached my 
announcement. I tried to tell you but I was 
interrupted by the point of order. It is your 
right to interrupt me. I was about to tell the 
house that at the end of the morning sitting I 
announced that, at the opening of this sitting, 
I would make known my views on this problem 
to the whole Assembly. In the meantime, I 
received a letter from Mr. Roper. It is not in 
accordance with my view. 
I have decided that the whO'le matter shall be 
discussed in the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure this afternoon. I beg to ask the Chalirman, 
or, if he is not present, the Vice-Chairman, to 
convene the Committee this afternoon at five 
o'clock in order not to interrupt proceedings of 
the Assembly by discussing Rules of Procedure. 
Mr. Chairman, are you ready to convene the 
Committee at five o'clock this afternoon Y 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - By all 
means, yes, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT.- By all means. I am glad 
to hear that. At :ffive o'clock this afternoon this 
problem will be discussed in the Committee and, 
in due course, a report made to the house. 
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3. Political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 819) 
The PRESIDENT.- The Orders of the Day 
now provide for the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
on politic,al conditiom;~ for European armaments 
co-operation, Document 819. 
I call Mr. van W aterschoot, Rapporteur of the 
Committee, to present the report. 
Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (Belgium) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, Mr. Amb~dor, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, when it met in June 1979 
this Assembly adopted a recommendation on the 
political conditions for European co-operation on 
armaments. The report, presented by the General 
Affairs Committee of our Assembly, was meant 
to prepare the ground for the symposium held in 
Bru~ls in October last. Today we have to ask 
oul"Selves whether the recommendation of June 
1979 is still fully valid following the symposium, 
or whether the General AffaJirs Committee needs 
to make additions or alterations to the recom-
mendation. 
To make it possible to aJlSwer thls question, a 
fresh report on this subject is now being 
submitted to the Assembly, designed to put 
before you the concluSions from the Brussels 
sy-mposium that relate to the area covered by the 
General Affairs Committee. It has seemed to your 
Rapporteur and to the General Affairs Commit-
tee that the recommendation adopted in June 
still has all its force today in December. Then 
we shall, during the examination, also be looking 
at comments that have been intspired by the reply 
from the WEU Council of Ministers to this 
Assembly's recommendation of last June. 
First I want, however, to say something about 
the r€SUlts of the Brussels symposium in the area 
that is of more particu'lar interest to us and 
which was dealt with in the June recommenda-
tion. The fact that the General Affairs Commit-
tee is not making any fundamental chan~ in the 
recommendation from last June does not mean 
that the symposium in Brussels served no useful 
purpose in charting the political conditions for 
armaments co-operation. What the symposium 
has done is to lead our Committee to pinpoint 
a number of specific areas in which it will be 
possible to take concrete initiatives, rather than 
to prompt any basic re-examination of the Com-
mittee's overall v!:iews. This is why this report 
is a short one. It is also why your Rapporteur 
thought it necessary to add an appendix to the 
report in which Professor Schmidt, who was 
Rapporteur of Working Group II during the 
Brussels symposium, draws with a great deal of 
competence and authority the conclusions that 
flow from the discussions in Working Group II. 
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I would like to underlline the gist of his conclu-
sions. Mr. Schmidt says that it is unJimaginable 
that one cou1ld within the foreseeable future 
arrive at an overall organisation of European 
armaments production, let alone a common 
organisation for arms production. He stresses the 
conflicting interests that dlivide our countries. 
Thiis state of affairs comes from the differing 
nature of their arms factories, and from the 
difference in the relative importance that arms 
production has for the European and the various 
national economies. The Belgian Prime M1nister, 
too, pointed to this conflict of interests during 
his opening speech at the Bru~ls symposium 
on 15th October. These are facts that are every 
bit as worthy of respect as the classic Lord 
Mayor. We may deplore th€Se facts, but we have 
no right to shirk them if we want to be realistic 
in what we do. 
This is why the recommendation now being put 
before you in the new report from the General 
Affairs Committee is a modest one. The Com-
mittee discussed the recommendation for a very 
long time ; it was united on the essence of the 
recommendation, but there was a great deal. of 
detailed argument when tit came to the actual 
woros and phrases to be used in the recom-
mendation. I think I might usefully deal with 
these words and phrases in a moment, in the 
French language. 
The main thrust of the recommendation lies in 
its paragraph 2. The Committee and its Rappor-
teur have here based themselves particularly on 
statements that were made during the symposium, 
especially the two major statements which gave 
very precise indications as to the steps that can 
be taken to bring about more permanent co-
operation on armaments production in Europe. 
First and foremost, there was the important 
briefing on the juridical aspects of weapons 
procurement, given by Mr. Plantey. The 
preamble to the draft recommendation con-
sequently expresses our appreciation of the fact 
that the Council of Ministers authorised Mr. 
Plantey, who is head of the international secre-
tariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, 
to make this important statement. The second 
important speech was made by Professor Green-
wood of Aberdeen University who, speaking with 
great authority, dealt particularly with the 
essential economic and socia;l d!imensions of co-
operaHon in arms production. 
(The speaker continued in French) 
(Translation). - I shall now continue in 
F~nch, my main aim being to clarify the ter-
minology used in the recommendation. In fact, 
as I said, paragraph 2 really cons1Jitutes the 
backbone of the recommendation and does not 
take up any position in the institutional quarrels 
which at times divide European opinion on this 
subject. 
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Paragraph 2 is based on the idea that several 
organisations e:lcist whose work is directed 
towards the joint production of armaments, that 
each of them has powers and responsibilities 
peculiar to it and that it has not seemed desir-
able, in the present circumstances, to disregard 
these realities, either by proposing the establish-
ment of new institutions or by seeking to bring 
together in a single organisation elements which 
circumstances have allocated to different bodies. 
The enquiry currently being condructed by the 
Standing Armaments Committee shou:ld enable 
the Council to collect the information needed if 
it is to allocate these tasks among the different 
institutions in a coherent manner, whereas the 
parsimony with which it deigns to inform the 
Assembly on the results of this enquiry scarcely 
allow us to express an informed opinion. 
Any discussion on policy which was not based 
on such information would, it seems to me, 
present more disadvantages than advantages. 
Accordingly, the General Affairs Committee 
requests that needs be met in tenns of activities 
and not in terms of institutions, because the 
Brussels symposium has enabled it to see that 
they were either not being met or were being met 
inadequately. 
The first of these needs is to establish a sort 
of European armaments market which, it has 
been found, doos not at present exist. In order 
to do so, both those who can supply armaments 
and those who are in need of them should have 
available all requisite information on the supply 
of and demand for armaments in Europe. 
If the term "organisation" has been used in 
paragraph 2 (a), that is not only in order to 
follow the terminology advocated by Professor 
Greenwood, but also because the task of collect-
ing this information could scarcely be performed 
by an intergovernmental orgarusation. Indeed, 
only governments are in a position to provide the 
necessary information concerning demand and, 
in many cases, concernimg supply. But it is 
hardly thinkable that they would give it to an 
office that was not under their control. It should 
be noted that, in its reply to Recommendation 
329, the Council suggests that this task might be 
entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee, 
the SAC. 
In the case of paragraph 2 (b), however, the 
term "body" has been used to describe the organ 
which should be made responsible for analysing 
choices of armaments programmes and their 
overall repercussions. The need for an analysis of 
this kind was also forcibly stressed by Professor 
Greenwood, and on this point I can only refer 
you to his important paper. 
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Here again it was he who chose the term 
"body" to indicate that it might cover either a 
pr.ilvate institution, remunerated on the basis of 
a certain number of specific tasks, or a standing 
inter-state organ. Its purpose would be to provide 
all the information which possible purchasers of 
armaments might require on the implications of 
the choices they 1inevitably have to make and 
which they a:ll too frequently have to make with 
only a partial and imperfect knowledge of the 
repercussions their decisions may have not only 
in the financial but a:lso in the technical, econo-
mic and social fields. 
Sub-paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of this para-
graph 2 - the essential paragraph lin the recom-
mendation - deal with the leg:i$lation which 
shouLd be promulgated to facilitate both the 
joint production of armaments and trade in the 
armaments field between member countries of 
WEU. 
The question immediately arises of who should 
initiate this legislation. At present, it is obviously 
the responslibility of states. It is possible, and 
doubtless desirable, that one day a truly Euro-
pean body of l1aw may be introduced in this 
sphere. If, however, the WEU Council could 
contribute to promoting co-ordination of national 
bodies of law, 1it would already be achieving 
considerable progress in comparison with the 
slituation described by Mr. Plantey in his paper. 
The General Affairs Committee has noted 
three specific fields in which it seemed necessary 
to promote such co-ordination, namely customs 
legislation, legislation concerning the status of 
firms and legislation concerning transfers of 
technology. 
In the realm of cust01Il8 legislation - taking 
into account the fact that the Treaty of Rome 
leaves the member states of the European Econo-
mic Community free to decide their own customs 
measures in the armaments field - acU; should 
be promulgated which would facilitate to the 
fullest extent possible the transfer of armaments 
among member states. 
What is needed, then, is action to fill by 
agreement among the European governments 
any gaps which the Treaty of Rome may show 
in this field. 
The second point lis the status of fi1'!llfl. 
In his paper, Mr. Plantey highlights the fact 
that when a particular firm is established for 
the joint production of one type of weapon, it 
finds that it has to comply with the laws of the 
country in which its head of:ffice is located. That 
makes it, as it were, a national company of that 
country, even if its object is to produce European 
armaments. 
The creation of a special European J!ltatus for 
firms engaged in the joint production of arma-
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ments might really bring us an effectJive step 
forward in the development of joint production. 
Our third point is this : we know the dif-
ficulties fooed by those concerned with transfers 
of technology between industries producing 
armaments. Here, too, concerted ootion to 
promote further developments in national legisla-
tion facilitating such transfers should make 
pOBSible some development of joint European 
firms in this field. 
Mr. President, I am trying to be brief and to 
conclude my remarks. I would further point out 
that sub-paragraph (f) did not form the subject 
of a paper at the Brussels symposium. It was the 
Committee which insisted - and your Rapporteur 
was happy to go along with this viewpoint -
that the Council also be asked to ensure the co-
ordination of the legislative and executive 
measures adopted by each of our countries to 
prevent any illicit production of and traffic in 
armaments in Western Europe, with all the 
consequences that this entails. 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the recommendation 
are in the nature of reactions to the replies given 
by the Council to our earlier recommendations 
and dn particular to the recommendations put 
forward last June. 
In fact, they concern problems involved in the 
activities of the WEU Council and its sub-
ordinate organs. For one thing, it is apparent 
that both the SAC and the independent European 
programme group - IEPG - are having to 
contend with difficulties caused by the inertia -
I would not venture to ~Y the bad will - shown 
by national administrations when these bodies 
attempt to collect the information they require 
if they are to accomplish the task entrusted to 
them by the governments of our countries. That 
is the point covered in paragraph 3 of the 
recommendation, which advocates greater co-
operation in this field. 
For again and again things happen as though 
the very governments which are on the one hand 
launching this or that drive to develop European 
co-operation are at the same time letting their 
administrations place administmtive obstacles in 
the path leading to that co-operation. Where co-
operation is concerned, the fact that one govern-
ment department has taken an initiative while 
~nother is responsible for following it through 
1s generajlly enough to induce a sort of paralysis. 
It is through the WEU Council that we as 
members of the Assembly can address ourselves 
collectively to our countries' governments, but 
they alone are able to take the necessary 
measures, each in so far as it is concerned to 
ensure that the policies they produce shall have 
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greater coherence and shall lead on to the co-
operation which they recognise, in principle, to 
be nece$ary. 
And I now come to the fourth and last para-
graph. It comments on the replies made by the 
Council to the recommendations adopted by our 
Assembly last June. It seems to us that in con-
nection with the replies to Recommendations 
330, 331 and 335 certain comments are called for. 
Moreover, we should associate with these the 
reply to Recommendation 325, which reached us 
too late for us to be able to take it into account 
in the report presented l~U~t June. 
In its reply to Recommendation 298, the 
Council, having regard to the fact that a number 
of activities connected with the exercise of its 
powers and responsibilities had been entrusted 
to other organisations, undertook to inform the 
Assembly about the entire area of competence 
of WEU in whatever framework it might be 
exercised. 
Well, here we have the Council, in its reply 
to Recommendation 331, stating - and I quote 
- that it would be difficult for the Council to 
inform the Assembly about the activities of the 
independent European programme group, whose 
membership was different from that of WEU 
with which it, the IEPG, had no organisationai 
links. And, as you are aware, this independent 
European programme group includes all the 
European countries belonging to the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
. We may wonder, Ladies and Gentlemen, what 
lS meant by this absence of organisational links· 
for in its reply to an earlier recommendation: 
Recommendation 297, the Council informed the 
Assembly that - and I quote its actual words -
"the Standing Armaments Committee should 
receive and use certain data which the· IEPG 
had already produced and WIU! willing to supply". 
Accordingly, links do exist and, in particular 
information is exchanged between the IEPG 
and the SAC - the SA:C being a subordinate 
organ of the Council. The question arises : are 
these links organisational Y The term is far from 
clear. Are there organisational links between the 
WEU Council and NATO 7 Between the Council 
and the European Community Y Or again, 
between the Council and the United Nations? 
Yet the Council has always considered that it 
was among its respolUiibilities to inform the 
Assembly of the decisions taken in NATO in 
political consultations among the Nine, o~ at 
consultations among the delegations of WEU 
~ember countries to the United Nations. Why 
1s a procedure of this kind impossible within the 
framework of the IEPG ? 
The General Affairs Committee prop<>Sel!l for 
your consideration both in the preamble and in 
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the operative paragraphs of the recommendation 
a sufficiently lengthy development of this point. 
And it has made a point of conveying to the 
Council in particularly strong terms its rejection 
of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 331. 
In fact, it is the very powers and responsibil-
ities of our Assembly which are here at issue, 
although the Council has on many occasions 
recognised that it was the only European assem-
bly competent in the defence field. 
Its powers and responsibilities are being 
challenged by this refusal to provide us with 
information on a body which at present l!l{lems -
if I am to believe the reply given to Recommend-
ation 329 to which I referred earlier - to be 
looked on by the governments of our countries 
as the main instrument of European armaments 
policy. 
It is therefore the actual status of our .Assem-
bly and hence the direct implementation of the 
modified Brussels Treaty which the Council is 
conteiSting, and the General Affairs Committee 
has been at pains to make abundantly clear its 
very firm rejection of thel*l texts. The Com-
mittee hopes that our Assembly will follow its 
lead on this point. 
Let us bring this matter to a close, Ladies 
and Gentlemen. As you will have observed, the 
present report has sought to soothe susceptibi-
lities and avoid issues which might divide us. 
This is not because your Rapporteur or the Com-
mittee shrink from political discussions, but 
because it seemed to him that, in the practical 
and concrete fields where immediate progress 
was possible, it was desirable to find the broadest 
possible majority. 
He therefore hopes to rally this broad majority 
- perhaps a virtually unanimous one - so that 
the Assembly may lend its full weight to pro-
posals which are based on the opinions of the 
leading experts and which will perhaps be auch 
as to ensure modest but solidly-based progress 
in European co-operation in the armaments field 
and, at the same time, to prove that WEU is not 
a nonentity, as European public and political 
opinion too often believes, either consciously or 
unconsciously. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. van 
W aterschoot. 
I now open the debate. 
I have three names on the list of speakers. I 
start with Mr. Antoni. He will be followed by 
Mr. Buchner and then by Mr. Cavaliere. 
I now call Mr. Antoni. 
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Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Rappor-
teur, as he has confirmed this afternoon, while 
noting with interest the work of the symposium 
on a European armaments policy held in Brussels 
from 15th to 17th October 1979, considers it to 
have provided further details and clarification 
on the guidelines laid down in Recommendation 
335 adopted by our Assembly at its June session 
- which, having undergone no change, are 
accordingly substantially corroborated. 
While gladly acknowledging that the Rappor-
teur has sought to take the most objective possible 
view of the work of the Brussels symposium, we 
nonetheless consider it calls for one or two 
explanations and additions that we deem easen-
tial for the sake of clarity. 
In our view the importance of the Brussels 
symposium was that it pointed out the existing 
possibilities for a joint armaments policy. But 
it also underscored the persistent limitations of a 
highly differentiated situation, and the weighty · 
problems to be overcome in consequence. Actually 
the symposium brought to light conflicting, often 
very different, individual viewpoints that have 
not yet been entirely reconciled, and therefore 
subsist. Significant in this respect are certain 
points recognised by the Rapporteur, and also 
figuring prominently in this afternoon's report. 
The underlying problem remains, what kind 
of co-operation should be adopted, by what means 
should it be achieved : the experts' majority view 
was that only a pragmatic approach to the 
problems in the next few yeal'151 can lead to 
progress. Europe is increasingly called upon to 
assume responsibility for its own defence, 
especially in conventional armaments. Let me 
turn finally to this latter remark, which in our 
opinion largely covers the central political issue 
of the matter we are discussing. 
I emphasise straight away that the draft 
recommendation, having asserted the need for 
arms collaboration to be extended to the pro-
duction phase, calls for measures to overcome the 
existing constraints on the specific legislation 
of the international organisations, in customs 
legislation and technological exchanges among 
the European industries. We would immediately 
stress the importance of European armaments co-
operation, not only with a view to lower costs 
but also to Europe's greater competitiveness and 
self-reliance. 
Secondly, we hold that co-operation between 
the European countries and industries ought to 
be placed on an equal footing, starting from 
research and planning right through to pro-
duction. The latter cannot be confined to the 
user phase, of purchases and sales among 
producer countries and those who are necessarily 
only customers. 
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Turning more specifically to the draft recom-
mendation, with particular reference to the 
hypothesis of an organisation responsible for 
gathering and circulating all necessary informa-
tion on European supply and demand in the field 
of armaments, and that of a body - group or 
organisation, 11$ the Rapporteur said just now -
responsible for analysing choices of armaments 
programmes, we take the view that we should 
enhance the role of the IEPG in relation to the 
Conference of National Armaments Directors -
CNAD - and the European defence industrial 
group- EDIG- if necessary by strengthening 
the political responsibility of the IEPG itself, by 
upgrwding its present status from under-secretary 
to ministerial level. At the same time, in our 
estimation, the relationship between the IEPG 
and the EDIG ought to be more clearly defined 
and institutionalised, to make the latter a con-
sultative body on technical matters leaving the 
options referred to decision by parliaments and 
governments entirely within the purview of the 
IEPG. 
European co-operation postulates multiple 
choices by individual countries ; it rejects the 
idea of a static situation and monopoly in 
research and advanced studies. This means 
promoting whatever agreements will allow more 
advanced forms of general enlargement for joint 
purposes. 
From this requirement - this is our second 
point - there stems the enhanced importance 
of the rOle of national parliaments and WEU 
itself as a European body concerned with 
defence matters, inasmuch 11$ choices of European 
preference ought to be assigned to and safe-
guarded by Europe's political will. 
This is another important matter not in our 
view sufficiently brought out by the report and 
draft recommendation. 
Yet genuine co-operation is still a long way 
off, as the deliberations and conelusions of the 
Brussels symposium prove, and the various 
stances taken by our own Assembly, most recently 
in the debate on parliaments and defence pro-
curement, Document 807 of 20th June 1979. The 
reason why we decry such limitation is that we 
fail to see how, otherwise, any genuine steps 
forward can in fact be taken towards the desired 
European co-operation. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we wish 
lastly to supplement our appraisal by a more 
comprehensive overview in which we believe the 
matters we are discussing faH into place. In our 
view, problems of European co-operation in 
armaments are to be set in the framework of a 
policy for peace and detente, and therefore cut-
backs in military procurement, and control and 
a gradual balanced reduction of all armament.<~. 
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Other voices than our own have in the past 
been raised in this Assembly to declare that the 
first need is to make Europe a great civilised 
power. Today, in a situation increasingly fraught 
with tensions and perils, we raise the cry once 
more. It is indeed a highly civilised and positive 
step to fight for stability and security in a 
context of development, co-operation and detente, 
and to address ourselves to placing impediments 
in the path of a worsening of existing 111trains and 
stresses. The need is, more than ever before, to 
harmonise all the forces making for peace. It is 
the only way to secure for mankind, together 
with peace, enormous resources to be dedicated 
to progress, co-operation and the development of 
our peoples. What is wanted is a large measure 
of international collaboration and co-operation 
whereby military outlaJ711 can be controlled and 
kept within the needful limits of security and 
defence. Today's chief need - both in the 
alliances, WEU itself and our Assembly - is, we 
believe, for such a choice, whereby Europe will 
be able to exert itself efficaciously and strive 
towards peace and detente. 
We realise it is no easy path, but we have to 
look to it whenever, as now, we have to face the 
problems of weaponry and arms co-operation. 
Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. ·Cavaliere. 
Mr. CA V ALIERE (Italy) (Translation). --
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I rise to 
speak for a brief moment, taking as my text 
what Mr. Antoni was saying at the end of his 
speech to the effect that whatever can be done 
in the matter of European armaments co-opera-
tion should be aimed at securing detente and 
peace, not to say, plainly, a basis for effective 
action. However, this is in my opinion the poli-
tical line that the free countries of Europe have 
alwaJ711 pursued, and that WEU, as, after all, 
the sole European body competent to deal with 
defence matters, is still pursuing. The ends of 
peace and detente will ensue whenever we are 
in a position to defend ourselves, whenever, that 
is, we are able to deter other countries or alliances 
from aggressing us. This is precisely what we 
are after, and very specific argument~!! on the 
subject will be heard at the present session. 
At such a delicate stage in our history, at a 
time when there are so many stresses, new as 
well as old, abroad in the world, when to motives 
of political contestation are added motives of 
fanaticism which kindle highly dangerous fires 
and involve even greater precaution on the part 
of Europe, the problem of our own defence, and 
hence of a defence capability of our own, is 
posed in categorical terms: especially as we have 
borne in on us, day by day, the growing difficul-
ties of our United States ally to whom we ought 
to confirm our solidarity and friendship at this 
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time, and reiterate our interest in seeing that 
this, our friend, does not stay isolated but can 
be more vividly aware of the feeling of friendship 
and willingne~ to co-operate which we are ready, 
not to say obligated, to evince at such a time. 
Europe is and should be concerned to give itself 
the necessary tools to satisfy this imperious 
demand of defence of its own existence as a 
collection of free countries. If this be true, I 
would think that seeking out the conditions for 
European co-operation in armamenU; is becoming 
increasingly urgent. Hence we should esch~w all 
egotism. 
Mr. Gazzo aptly pointed out at the Brussels 
symposium that legal questions, or tariffs, 
constitute no real obstacles to reaching an under-
standing on the topic of collaboration in Euro-
pean armaments policy ; but the real problem, the 
real obstacle is one of economics, prec$ely 
stemming from certain countries' selfishness. In 
terms of armaments, or arms manufacture, there 
are in fact countries having substantial interests 
that still remain oblivious to the necessity, or at 
any rate advisability, of holding these in check 
in order to abolish a serious impediment to 
achievement of the desired ends. Already in 
.Tune when we turned our minds to the very same 
problem, we were compelled to criticise with 
bitterness the attempt by, or rather action on the 
part of, a certain country, notwithstanding its 
membership of WEU, to prevent the questio"!l 
of an arms policy from being discussed by the 
EEC although it does have the necessary powers 
for doing so : such action was, in sum, directed 
at Europe itself, at making the allied countries, 
with joint interests, incapable of fulfilling this 
essential function of theirs. 
Not wishing to overrun the time I have set 
myself, I conclude by saying that all the prompt-
ings of the draft recommendation are absolutely 
worthy of our support. We have here an altoge-
ther commendable recommendation which offends 
nobody's susceptibilities. However, I still feel 
some bitterness at the inability, the unwillingness, 
to pursue the objective mentioned. I trust it will 
not be too long before every one of us realises 
the necessity of also forging a European policy 
on co-operation in armaments. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - The list of speakers is 
closed. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ? 
Mr. van W ATERSCHOOT (Belgium) (Trans-
lation). - I would thank our colleagues for the 
constructive nature of their remarks on the sug-
gestions contained in the preamble and in the 
operative paragraphs of the recommendation 
submitted to you. 
3. 
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With regard to Mr. Antoni's fil'J!t remark, I 
would observe that the aim of the recommenda-
tion is both modest and realistic. For that reason, 
we did not wish to incorporate very specific 
institutional suggestions, thus leaving some room 
for choice and even for suggestions in a form 
sufficiently concrete to allow us to move forward 
along the path of co-operation. 
As for hi$ second remark, to the effect that the 
role of WEU has not been sufficiently stressed, 
I should like all the same to point out that para-
graphs 3 and 4 express an energetic attitude, put 
in very clear terms, to certain replies from the 
Council which have given rise to censure, without 
however departing from the language which 
courtesy demands. 
With regard to Mr. Antoni's third remark on 
the policy of detente and the context of disarma-
ment, it has my full approval. I would nonetheless 
point out that in the preamble to its report 
presented last June the General Affairs Com-
mittee as a whole stressed the basic importance 
of these efforts and of the will to achieve detente 
and reciprocal step-by-step disarmament. 
I would also thank Mr. Cavaliere for his cons-
tructive remarks. I think we must recogni,se how 
completely right he is : in the final analysis, there 
must be a political will. Nevertheless, the Com-
mittee considered that at this juncture it was 
preferable to help create this will by talring 
modest but realistic steps rather than by putting 
forward spectacular suggestions and recom-
mendations which would ,inevitably weaken that 
political will. 
The PRESIDENT.- Does the Chairman wish 
to speak~ 
Mrs. von Bothmer. 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) Translation).- Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, on behalf of the Committee I 
should like to recall briefly how pleased we were 
that the Assembly planned to have a working 
group for the Brussels symposium to concern 
itself primarily with the political implications of 
the subject discussed at the symposium. It became 
very clear to us that this must on no account be 
overlooked : for keenness to produce armaments 
and to arm is one thing, but placing this in the 
political context of Europe and demonstrating 
that it will do no harm to our states and peoples 
is another. 
We had to look at the legislation - as you 
will see when you look at our recommendation -
and we had to consider the information policy 
that must accompany this. It seemed to us extre-
mely important - and this, too, was included 
in the recommendation by the Rapporteur -
that information shall be passed on, that there 
will be a centre where people with a practical 
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interest ,in this matter can obtain information. 
The object of the whole exercise is to put an end 
to the confusion which still exists despite all our 
protestations, with a view to finding a reasonable 
common denominator. 
To manage this within the framework of l'!ociaJ, 
economic, legal and human requirements seems 
to me to be the quintessence of what we have 
endeavoured to put before you. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Madam 
Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. 
4. Definition of armaments requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 821 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT.- We now turn to the next 
Order of the Day, the presentation of and debate 
on the report on the definition of armaments 
requirements and procurement in Western 
Europe, Document 821 and Amendments. 
In a moment I shall call Mr. Meintz to present 
the report, but I have had notice of a previous 
question that Mr. Druon proposes to move. Since 
this previous question seeks to eliminate debate 
on the first paragraph of the operative text of 
the draft recommendation contained in Document 
821, it must be taken before any debate would 
normally take place. However, in order to have 
the report and draft recommendation formally 
before the Assembly, I now first call Mr. Meintz 
to present his report. I shall then call Mr. Druon 
to move his motion. The Assembly will have to 
decide on Mr. Druon's previous question and we 
shall proceed from there. I call Mr. Meintz to 
present his report. 
Mr. MEINTZ (Luxembourg) (Tralll'!lation).-
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, of the thrE'e 
reports from the Brussels symposium, I have the 
honour to present the report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
The theme of Working Group I, which was 
the Committee's, was the definition of armaments 
requirements and procurement in Western 
Europe. It was presented in six very important 
papers, three by government representatives, 
Mr. Trevor Knapp, Ingenieur-General Cauchie 
and Mr. Walsh, and three by representatives of 
the armaments industry, Mr. Stefanini, Mr. 
Chevalier and Mr. Striegel. I thank them most 
sincerely for their contribution to the symposium; 
their papers provoked a really lively debate. 
It was a very substantial debate, which made 
it no easy task for General Freytag von Loring-
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hoven's summary of proceedings appended to my 
report. 
The task was even more difficult for your 
Committee and Rapporteur because it was left 
to them to draw the political conclusions of the 
debate- which was extremely wide-ranging and 
raised a great many issues. A choice had to be 
made. From the purely political point of view 
there were three major themes. The Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments took these 
one by one in the three paragraphs of its recom-
mendation. And contrary to what my friend, the 
Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, 
Mr. van W aterschoot, has just said, our Com-
mittee did take a position on all three, which has 
created some stir in the Assembly. 
The first paragraph of our recommendation 
deals with two- and three-way co-operation, and 
permanent consortia in Europe. Everybody here 
knows that the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments has always advocated joint arma-
ments production in Europe. Now, the political 
question is how to organise the market and pro-
duction. 
For a majority of those attending the sympo-
sium and of the Committee, the preferred formula 
was joint production of a particular weapons 
system by two or three countries through an 
international consortium of the member countriE's' 
national firms. The days of competitive develop-
ment of rival military projects by two countries 
are over, certainly as far as the heaviest-cost 
projects are concerned. 
The Committee considered that the only means 
of maintaining a viable European armaments 
indlll'!try was through the creation of multi-
national European consortia ; which in fact 
already exist for some programmes, such as the 
Hot, Milan and Roland missiles. But such con-
sortia must operate under a concerted action 
programme. 
That is why I, with the support of a majority 
of the Committee, harked back to paragraph 2 
of Recommendation 325 adopted here on 22nd 
N ovem:ber 1978, calling for the restructuring of 
the European armaments industry under the 
aegis of the European Economic Community. 
I said it was a majority opinion, for a minority 
in the Committee of cour,se wanted to delete the 
reference to the European Community - and 
tabled amendments to this effect - notably on 
grounds of the latter's powers. Those in favour 
of deletion relied on three main arguments. 
They argued, first, that the European Eco-
nomic Community has no effective industrial 
policy ; second, that it does not have the neces-
sary technical knowledge to restructure the arma-
ments industry ; third, that given its special 
position, the armaments industry ought not to be 
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regarded in the same way as otherB; all, of course, 
in the context of the argument of no powers in 
this field. 
But given the real situation of that industry 
in Europe and all the major economic and social 
problems involved, referring also to the vote in 
this Assembly on Mr. Critchley's report of 22nd 
November 1978 and to your introductory address, 
Mr. President, at the Bru&,"!els symposium, there 
was nevertheless a majority for retaining the 
reference to the European Communities in the 
draft recommendation. 
Indeed, Ladies and Gentlemen, this can easily 
be turned into a contest, a competition between 
institutions. But in Europe's current economic 
situation the armaments industry is an important 
factor and, whether you like it or not, the Euro-
pean Community - precisely by extension of the 
treaty - cannot in the long run behave as ii 
there is no I'!Uch thing. 
The second paragraph of our recommendation 
concerns what we call European preference, and 
exports to third countries. The two topics were 
discussed at length. 
Mainly following Ingenieur•General Cauchie's 
report, European preference was defined as fol-
lows : where a bi- or trilateral project has been 
planned and is entering the production phase, 
other European NATO countries should be ex-
pected to give it preference for their future arms 
requirements - preference, that m, over a pos-
sible alternative United States product. 
The argument of European preference of 
course started a debate on a number of closely-
related themes, in particular that of free compe-
tition, possible price differences and the possible 
need of trade-offs. 
The Committee reached the following conclu-
sion. ·where a bi- or trilateral project has been 
approved by the IEPG it should be arranged for 
the remaining IEPG countries to give it prefer-
ence when it reaches the production phase. But 
to offset thm, the production of components or 
sub-assemblies should be shared among countries 
having appropriate experience and capability; 
or else, aid should be given to other sections of 
the armaments industry as in the case of manu-
facture of conventional ammunition in Turkey. 
During discussion on that same paragraph of 
our recommendation we ah;o touched on exports 
to third countries not members of the Alliance. 
The principal countries producing sophisti-
cated weapons systems claim, rightly in many 
cases, that the procurement requirements of a 
limited number of interested countries do not 
provide an adequate economic base for produc-
tion, so that they ,are compelled to export a 
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number of such weapons to third countries, which 
can obviously create political and legal problems 
in the co-operation agreement. 
Some countries make their participation in a 
multilateral project conditional upon freedom to 
export without their partners' consent. Other 
potential participants may make agreement 
between all participants on exports to third 
countries a necessary condition for their own 
participation. 
The Committee concludes that the answer 
surely lies in stronger European preference as 
just explained, and in the development of the 
two-way street with the United States so that the 
market available for the initial products of such 
a joint project answers the requirements of the 
Alliance as a whole. In these circumstances the 
economic necessity of exports to third count:r~ies 
becomes less. 
The third paragraph of our recommendation 
concerns parliamentary control. Here I can be 
very brief, bec-ause the Committee is merely 
reiterating what it has been saying for years, 
namely that national parliaments or the appro-
priate committees must be given full and timely 
information on defence equipment requirements 
and research and development projects both in 
their own and allied countries. Hence it formu-
lates two proposals and a separate draft order. 
The first proposal asks the Chairman of Panel 
I of the IEPG .to convey to our Committee the 
equipment replacement schedules prepared by 
Panel I and completed by the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors. 
The second proposal is for the organisation of 
annual meetings with the Chairmen of the 
national parliamentary defence committees of the 
WEU countries and designated members, in order 
to review the progress of the work mentioned in 
the IEPG and in the Conference of Nation9.1 
Armaments Directors. 
Thirdly, the Committee proposes, as it is entit-
led to do by Resolution 15 adopted in 1959, to 
invite to its meetings, as observers having the 
right to speak, members of the parliamentary 
defence committeees of the European NATO 
countries. 
In conclusion, and not to go into too great 
detail on points that may be raised during the 
rest of the debate, may I reply to a few that were 
raised this morning on points of order. 
The Brussels symposium ended in mid-October 
and the meeting of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was held early in 
November immediately after the All Hallows and 
All Souls holidays. This gave us a fortnight to 
draft the report in, have it translated and ensure 
that it was ready for the Committee meeting. If 
the point of order raised this morning had been 
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raised in the same terms in my national parlia-
ment, I would certainly have ~!$ked to speak on 
my own behalf. For it was stated, not just by 
innuendo but straight out, that this haste had 
certainly been a ploy to put across somebody or 
other's particular opinion. 
I protest, for it was not the Rapporteur who 
was in a hurry- he would have been glad to 
have had more time to draft his report ; nor was 
there any covert intention to deceive any member 
of the Committee. Nothing of the kind. Every 
word of the report was written with utter sin-
cerity. Anyone can make counter-proposals or 
table amendment:B. The recommendation wa::~ duly 
adopted by 11 votes to 2 with one abstention. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have 
no more to add to this statement except that we 
went to a lot of trouble to present you today 
with a report and that I will be happy if it is 
adopted by the same majority as it was in Com-
mittee. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Rappor-
teur. 
As I told you earlier, Mr. Druon has moved 
a previous question under Rule 32 of the Rules 
of Procedure. This has been circulated as Docu-
ment 826. Under Rule 32, a repl'el!lentative has 
a prior right to speak if he asks leave to move 
the previous question or a dilatory motion, and 
I shall therefore call Mr. Druon now. 
Before he speaks, I remind the Assembly that, 
under Rule 32 (3), the following only shall bP. 
heard : the proposer of the motion, one speaker 
against the motion and the Rapporteur and the 
Chairman of any Committee concerned. I further 
remind the Assembly that, under Rule 31 (7) of 
the Rules of Procedure, no representative may 
speak for more than five minutes. Th~ includes 
the representative who moves the motion. 
I call Mr. Druon. 
Mr. DRUON (France) (Translation). 
Mr. President I did indeed move the previous 
question on the draft recommendation now tabled 
under Rule 32 of our Assembly's Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we are asked to urge 
the governments of the WEU member states to 
encourage the restructuring of the European 
armaments industry under the ae~ of the Euro-
pean Economic Community and it:B industrial 
policy. 
For this reason alone, the draft recommenda-
tion is in flagrant contradiction with the two 
treaties establishing the EEC and WEU. 
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It is contrary to Article 223 of the Treaty of 
Rome which prov,ides that : 
"Any member state may take whatever 
measures it considers necessary for the pro-
tection of the e~ential interests of its security 
and which are connected with the production 
of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material." 
The draft also conflicts with the Brussels 
Treaty which reserves to WEU the right to 
examine and adopt at European level joint 
measures to enable the member states to afford 
assistance to each other in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining 
international peace and ~Security and in resisting 
any policy of aggression. 
Lastly, this text generates a serious legal un-
certainty in that it calls into question the inter-
national order on which the construction of 
Europe is based. 
To set about restructuring the armaments 
industries and defining their workload within 
the framework of the EEC would be letting the 
latter concern itself with defence matters, which 
are not within its competence. For armaments 
industries are not mainly swayed by economic 
considerations and calculations ; they follow 
strategic and tactical orientations which are the 
very substance of government defence policies. 
The definition, production and procurement of 
weapons are inherently linked to defence options. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, if strategy commands 
armaments policy, I am astonished that such a 
ba::~ic and time-honoured principle should quite 
recently have been flouted in the European 
Parliament in an oral question, one of the authors 
of which was, regrettably, our President with 
whom I have the honour to sit in Strasbourg. 
Let me remind you that it asked the Commissio.1 
of the European Communities to engage in pre-
liminary conversations with NATO and the 
responsible services of the member states in 
drafting joint armaments procurement program-
mes, inviting, in other word~:'!, the Brussels Com-
mission to go over the heads of both governments 
and WEU. 
So we must not reduce this debate, as the Rap-
porteur has just said, to a mere matter of inter-
institutional competition. It is a question of 
definition, and of division of basic responsibil-
itie~S, and I am astounded that this principle 
should be flouted here, in the WEU Assembly, 
whose raison d'etre is defence matters. 
The draft recommendation is contrary to 
principles. It also conflicts with the facts. Need 
I remind you that the EEC member states each 
have their own defence constraints. The United 
Kingdom and France have nuclear weapolllS, each 
with a system of its own ; the Federal Republic 
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of Germany is committed to observe precise 
limitations; Ireland does not belong to any 
military organisation ; Denmark is part of a 
denuclearised zone. How then can one fail to 
understand ... 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. 
Druon, will you please conclude. 
Mr. DRUON (France) (Translation). 
Mr. President, the matter is serious enough for 
you to grant me a couple of minutes longer. 
The very fact of taking a ~tance, even under 
cover of industrial or technological operations, 
in favour of joint military programmes, outside 
any legal framework laid down in the treaties 
puts the entire European legal order at risk. It 
is an attitude I consider unwise. It would impair 
the chances of a proper development of co-
operation between states. The proposal before 
us can only sow discord among Europeans. 
If we really wish to examine the merits, we 
must frankly propose modify;ing the treaties. If 
we want WEU to be towed along in the wake of 
the Brussels Commission like an empty barge, 
let us say so, and we'll see what happens ! 
Today, the interest of Europe commands the 
rationalisation and ordering of what already 
exists and not upsetting the legal applecart. 
I could say a great deal more on the subject, 
Mr. President, but I am cutting it short. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you, by adopting 
this previous question, to decide that there are 
other things to debate besides paragraph 1 of 
the recommendation which I therefore move we 
should separate from the text as a whole. 
(Applause )i 
The PRESIDENT. - I now call on one 
speaker against. There is no representative on 
the list. 
Then I call the Chairman. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I shall try 
to compensate for the seven minutes taken by 
the last speaker by speaking for only three 
minutes. As I believe is well known both in the 
Committee and in the Assembly, I have opposed 
the intervention by the European Communities 
into defence matters. None the less, in spite of 
that view, which I still hold, I believe that it 
would be a great mistake today for us to adopt 
Mr. Druon's motion and prevent this Assembly's 
debating the subject openly and properly. There 
is an amendment by Mr. Mulley which will 
permit such a debate later this afternoon. 
In spite of what was said by Mr. Druon, we 
have already seen that Western European Union 
has accepted that it has no monopoly in this 
matter of considering armaments procurement. 
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We have seen the development of not only the 
CNAD but the IEPG and we have seen other 
methods of co-operation. Therefore, I do not 
believe that this Assembly should accept Mr. 
Druon's motion. 
In particular, I draw attention to the fact 
that, in spite of my having voted against it, the 
Assembly has already adopted Resolution 325 on 
a European armaments policy which makes 
precise reference to these facts. That has been 
made even more clear because the Council of 
WEU, in responding to that particular motion, 
said that the .Nrsembly's suggestion that it should 
be involved would imply a wide interpretation 
of the application of the Treaty of Rome and 
such interpretation had already been opposed by 
a number of governments ; but the Council did 
not say that it was wrong for this Assembly to 
raise the subject. 
For that reason, although I happen to disagree 
with the involvement of the Communities in this 
matter, I believe that it would be totally wrong 
for the Assembly to accept Mr. Druon's motion. 
I hope that it is rejected. I hope that we can 
continue to debate and will then accept Mr. Mul-
ley's amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Assembly will now 
vote on Mr. Druon's previous question, not on 
Mr. Mulley's amendment. That means that there 
is no discussion and later we will not adopt para-
graph 1 of the draft recommendation. The rest 
is debatable. I believe I have made the position 
clear. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
The previotts question is negatived. 
We now go on with the general debate. 
I shall call first Mr. Bernini. He will be fol-
lowed by Mr. Mulley and then by Mr. Boucheny 
and "Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation). --
Mr. President, while I appreciate Mr. Meintz's 
report and its abundant information on the 
Brussels symposium, and am agreeable to the 
draft order, I cannot subscribe to the draft 
recommendation. There are some points on which 
my Italian communist colleagues and myself 
dissent from it. 
First, albeit for different reasons from those 
Mr. Druon expressed just now, we disagree that 
"defence procurement policies and the restruc-
turing of the European armaments industrv 
should be placed under the aegis of the Europeail. 
Community". 
Any such course goes far beyond the material 
necessity upheld in Brussels of a co-ordinated 
production by military and civilian manu-
facturers. As a fact, placing arms procurement 
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policy, an essential aspect of defence policy, 
under the aegis of the Community is tantamount 
to vesting it in the latter ; and circumventing in 
this way, by means of the "restructuring of the 
armaments industry and the creation of Euro-
pean consortia", the obligations of control and 
limitation of armaments which the Brussels 
Treaty lays on the Federal Republic of Germany 
and all the countries of Europe. 
Now, we have said it before and will go on 
saying it, not only is all thh! contrary to the 
treaties establishing the Community, but it also 
gives more power to the elbows of the forces 
determined, as we have again experienced this 
week, to press for the creation of a new military 
bloc in Europe ; and it is therefore bound, as the 
recent debate in the European Parliament goes 
to show, to arouse opposition, disputes in the 
Community and suspicions outside, notwith-
standing the urgency, more than ever before, to 
reduce the causes of tension and mistrust, and 
allow detente and the spirit of collaboration to 
prevail in Europe and the world at large. 
We therefore believe that such a course will not 
facilitate, but create new obstacles to, the policy 
of European co-operation, a risk also highlighted 
by the Brussels symposium. It was no mere 
chance that the report on the matter was not 
debated and that clamorous voices should be 
raised to proclaim the inescapable duties laid 
upon WEU, as the sole European Assembly 
responsible for defence matters, with respect to 
a policy of arms procurement and co-operation. 
It is very odd that WEU should itself issue a 
directive effectively relinquishing its own institu-
tional tasks. 
Secondly, we have reservations on the role to 
be assigned to "permanent international con-
sortia" as a means of eventually achieving "fully 
European arms corporations". 
Now, experience has demonstrated the potential 
value of such consortia, especially in the produc-
tion of certain weapon systems. But owing to 
the varying degrees of technological development 
and production capacity in European industry 
and differences in arms procurement practices, 
such permanent bodies and in particular fully 
European corporations, might favour and privi-
lege the strongest European industrial groups 
and countries, thus helping to widen differences, 
accentuate development imbalances, and so 
ending by hindering instead of promoting co-
operation and European preference in arms 
procurement. 
Hence, a policy of European co-operation might 
truly be advanced, as in our view the Brussels 
symposium did go to show, provided account be 
taken of these inter-country differences in the 
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level of technological capability, and production 
capacity of their industries, and that the prin-
ciples of parity of esteem and mutual interest for 
all European countries be upheld : provided, that 
is, the greatest number of countries have a stake 
in co-oneration from the most advanced forms of 
plannir;g and eo-production to manufacture of 
systems components. In this way, we believe, we 
may effectively help to give Europe more say in 
the growth of a transatlantic market and the 
process of replacement of NATO armaments; and 
by the same token enhance its capability of inter-
national initiative for the control and limitation 
of the trade in armaments, whose growth daily 
adds to the threats that hang over security and 
peace, in Europe and world-wide. Well now, the 
draft recommendation bears no trace of all this 
although it did figure in the proceedings at Brus-
sels. 
r .. astly, and our remark is equally applicable 
to the proceedings of the Brussels symposium as 
a whole, the absence in the reference to a Euro-
pean policy of military equipment procurement 
of any steps towards weapons reductions and 
disarmament is in our opinion a serious lacuna. 
The requirement of steadfastly pursuing such 
a course is particularly urgent today by reason 
of the status and size of weaponry, the growing 
threat arising from their destructive potential 
and the enormous and increasingly exorbitant 
financial resources absorbed by them ; we are 
daily witnesses of the rising tension thus created 
and the way in which world development prob-
lems are rendered more difficult and dramatic. 
Standardisation and interoperability, and 
European co-operation in achieving them, of 
which we are in favour, are truly called for by a 
material process determined by the evolving 
international military relations and the increasing 
role to be played by Europe in NATO to forward 
its own interests and security. But achieving 
these ends should in no way help to trigger off 
a new rearmaments race, but on the contrary 
form one aspect of an endeavour to maintain 
existing equilibria at gradually lower levels of 
armament. 
To this end we attach importance to : first, the 
instruction to hold joint meetings between our 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
and national parliamentary defence committees ; 
second, the role of guidance and supervision that 
should be played by national parliaments in thp 
process of arms procurement as urged by the 
Brussels symposium. 
I say this not only to ensure greater awareness 
of the work of the IEPG and facilitate choices 
and preferences in European co-operation, but 
also in order that options for the replacement of 
NATO's military equipment may be harmonised 
with the endeavour to secure a favourable out-
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come in the Vienna negotiations and agreements 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact for a 
balanced reduction of armaments and for dis-
armament, in response to the crying need for 
cutting back military expenditure and releasing 
growing resources to overcome the problems of 
the underdevelopment of whole regions which 
are, as we realise more clearly day by day, 
inseparable from those of European and world 
security and peace. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. Mulley. 
Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom).- First, Mr. 
President, perhaps I may express my pleasure at 
being back in this chamber as a member after an 
absence of eighteen years - not least because 
this is the only European parliamentary assembly 
with competence and responsibility in defence 
matters. It is, perhaps, a commentary on the 
subject that we are now discussing that I well 
recall - as I expect you do, Mr. President -
that it was on our agenda twenty years ago. I 
think that we can say that progress has been 
extremely disappointing. It is a very important 
subject and I believe .that the Assembly is abso-
lutely right to continue to press its views. 
I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Presi-
dent, on the success of the Brussels symposium, 
which gave us the opportunity of discussing these 
issues with distinguished representatives of 
government and industry. I should like also to 
congratulate our Rapporteur, Mr. Meintz, for his 
excellent report and summary of Working 
Group I in Brussels. 
There is no question but that there are political, 
economic and defence advantages in European 
co-operation and collaboration in arms pro-
grammes as long as it is necessary for us to have 
armaments, and it would be quite wrong for 
Europe to allow itself to become merely a sub-
contractor in the armaments industry. 
It seems to me essential that we should retain, 
for technological reasons, a research and develop-
ment capability. 
It is much easier to talk about European arms 
collaboration than to achieve concrete results, 
although, with the bilateral and multilateral 
programmes that have developed, some progress 
has been made. I can assure the Assembly that it 
is not for any lack of political will. As Secretary 
for Defence I not only devoted a lot of time to 
this but participated in regular meetings which 
were started and, I believe, will continue, of the 
British, French and German Ministers. I only 
wish that the independent European programme 
group could also meet at ministerial level, but 
that has not so far proved possible. 
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It would be wrong not to recognise that there 
are real practical problems. We shall not make 
progress unless we understand that. I do not 
believe that fancy formulae or new institutions 
will solve these problems. Responsibility rests 
and must remain with member governments. I 
shall try and set out the problems briefly - ten 
minutes is a long time when one is listening but 
a short time when one is speaking. 
At first, the whole concept has to be long term 
- ten or fifteen years - because it is clear that 
we can get collaboration on new generations of 
weapons that must be European only from the 
beginning, that is, in the research and develop-
ment stage. It is too late once production has 
begun. 
Secondly, there is real difficulty about getting 
agreement among the countries about the military 
requirements for new weapons. Ministers must 
press their chiefs of staff to work more quickly 
on this matter. Since every agreement will be a 
compromise of the desires and aspirations of the 
chiefs, they must make compromises that will 
help the programme without impairing their 
defence capability. 
Thirdly, there is always a time-table problem. 
No country wants new aircraft, new tanks or 
whatever weapons are involved at precisely the 
same time as another. The date of replacement 
and obsolescence tends to be different in every 
case. 
This is coupled with a fourth difficulty, 
namely, the rigidity of defence budgets. Natur-
ally, new defence equipment has to be spread 
over the three services. It is impracticable to get 
a whole lot of new aircraft, ·new tanks and new 
ships all within the same financial period. This 
tends to be different for each country. Some 
compromises, again, need to be made. 
Fifthly, there is always the problem that 
members of parliament are subject to political, 
industrial and trade union pressures to try and 
maximise employment tin the arms industry in 
our own countries. Several colleagues have told 
me from time to time that they are not keen on 
increasing defence expenditure but that if arma-
ments must be bought, they should be bought in 
their constituencies. Despite what we hear, this 
is a powerful lobby with which we have to 
contend. · 
Finally, as the Rapporteur mentioned, there 
is the special problem of sales to third countries. 
I am sorry, Mr. President, if I sound like a fore-
man in a factory who was once described as a 
man with a problem for every solution. I believe 
that we must maintain a momentum and pursue 
the package of proposals that have been drawn 
up in exploring the two-way street policy of the 
United States. I believe that both the present and 
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former United States administrations were 
sincere about this policy. This can best be pursued 
through the existing machinery, namely, the 
IEPG and the Committee of National Armaments 
Directors and not by creating new machinery 
that will probably bring new problems. 
I have one strong reservation about the draft 
recommendation before us. I have tabled an 
amendment to delete the reference : 
"under the aegis of the indlll'!trial policy of the 
European Community". 
I say straight away, Mr. President, that I have 
no objection to EEC involvement in principle. 
In fact, it was that great European, Jean Monnet, 
who persuaded me of the wisdom and enthusiasm 
of the European ideal twenty-seven years ago, 
in 1952 when he had just taken over the presi-
dency of the Coal and Steel Community. I have 
not changed my view since that time. Indeed, I 
believe that we could do with a little more of the 
European ideal today. It seems to me sometimes 
that it has tended to get l~t in the morass of 
current technical arguments. 
I would also not object if the EEC developed 
a genuine industrial policy. It has always been 
a puzzle to me how an association of mainly 
industrial nations comes to spend 90 % of ~ts 
time and 75 % of its money on agriculture. As 
part of an industrial policy, defence equipment 
would play a subsidiary part. I am, however, 
certain that, apart from having plenty of 
problems to deal with now, the Comm~ion does 
not have and cannot have, without a fundamental 
change in its functions, the competence to take 
a special role in arms procurement. 
In particular, it does not have at its disposal 
the technical and military expertise which I 
have tried to show are ei!!Sential prerequisites to 
progress towards co-operative and collaborative 
programmes. Nor does it have the funds. I would 
be strongly opposed to the provision of additional 
funds to the Community for this purpose. I hope, 
therefore, that when the time comes, Mr. Presi-
dent, the Assembly will accept the amendment. I 
shall then be much happier about the draft 
recommendation. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Mulley. 
I committed a crime in not welcoming you after 
so long an absence from this house. You will 
remember it has been eighteen years. Welcome 
again to this house. 
I now call Mr. Boucheny, who will be followed 
by Mr. Baumel and then by Mr. Bozzi. 
Mr. BOUCHENY (France) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the 
current ideological and political campaign to 
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increase the military potential of the NATO 
forces, a prominent place is being given to the 
standardisation of armaments. 
The press is full of speeches about the "Soviet 
threat" and the ensuing need for NATO to 
strengthen itself and drag the world into the 
infernal cycle of over-armament. The question 
may be viewed from two angles : technical and 
economic, as seen by Mr. Davignon at the Brussels 
symposium, and political, as in our Assembly, 
and in particular Mr. Meintz's report. 
I should like to begin with the former, and 
refer to Mr. Davignon's speech in Brussels on 
behalf of the European Commission, which was 
particularly revealing as to the goals set and 
the means employed by the advocates of Euro-
pean integration. 
Under cover of strictly "economist" arguments, 
Mr. Davignon proposes neither more nor less 
than establishing a veritable common market of 
military industries. 
In his view a "situation of considerable crisis" 
is leading citizens to ask for "proof that each 
category of expenditure is being used to the best 
advantage, and that states should optimis~ their 
expenditure". There follows from this a kmd of 
logic which leads quite naturally to the conclusion 
that it is necessary to establish a European 
armaments industry, to the detriment of the 
workers who will be its victims. 
Mr. Davignon notes, moreover, that there is no 
longer an armaments industry confined to one 
exclusive and strictly delimited sector. He says 
"The manufacture of modern or sophisticated 
weapons, is, in the high technology industries, 
closely interlinked with that of goods for 
civilian use". He confirms this by saying : "it 
is therefore no longer the classic $ituation we had 
when there were ordnance factories ; in the major 
industries there are departments working on both 
military and civilian contracts". 
At a time when the French Government and 
Minister Bourges are attacking workers in 
ordnance factories and major French nationalised 
undertakings, the reference to ordnance factories 
is no mere coincidence. The whole capability of 
arms construction must be handed over to big 
capital, whose spokesman Viscount Davignon is. 
By this kind of standardisation of the armaments 
industry, Viscount Davignon is trying to demon-
strate the tie-up between major civil manufac-
turers and the armaments industry. At the very 
same time, moreover, the Rapporteur has been 
indulging in the same exercise. 
As big capital sees it, such standardisation is 
not simply one element in the economy ; big 
capital is to be given access to the enormous 
wealth created by armaments and, if possible, at 
the risk of endangering peace, increasing military 
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manufactures and speeding up international 
concentration in this sector. 
Then in the report by Mr. Meintz, political 
problems are dealt with much more directly. He 
as]q;; for "the creation of permanent international 
consortia in Europe" to be encouraged, which 
will require greater mobility of labour, at any 
rate of tradesmen and skilled workers. 
Hence, voices are being raised by the 
champions of European integration, calling for 
restructuring of the European armaments induq... 
try under the aegis of the European Community 
whose purpose is to wreck the national economy 
and France'~ defence, and bring the workers to 
heel. 
National defence requirements would be 
dictated by outsiders. The fate of our firms and 
our workers' place of employment would be 
decided by them too. This is unacceptable, and 
we opp~e it with all our might. 
Voices are being raised - and you, Mr. Presi-
dent, I regret to say have echoed them - to 
settle this problem politically by advocating that 
part of the representatives of the Communities, 
and not of the European Parliament in Stras-
bourg, should be directly eo-opted into WEU, 
which would in this way be turned into a sort of 
shamefully illegal defence committee of the 
assembly of the European Communities, thus 
fulfilling the hopes of those who would like a 
reh$h of the European Defence Community 
which, I remind you, was rejected by the Euro-
pean peoples. 
There is a great danger of seeing French high 
technology, the ordnance factories and nationa-
lised industries sacrificed at European level. All 
goes to show clearly that we have entered into 
an active phase of European integration, where 
results will be the closure of a large number of 
French firms, and unemployment for the tech-
nicians, workers and engineers of the nationalised 
industries and arsenals. It is a concerted plan, 
being implemented stage by stage, but it is 
running up against the national will of the 
workers, determined to defend our essential 
defence capability. 
Our anxiety is well-founded as is our fighting 
spirit, knowing that the French Government has 
in its recent statements come out in favour of 
armaments standardisation, and that Mr. Bourges, 
the French Defence Minister, only recently 
defended the government's policy on armaments 
standardisation in parliamentary debates in the 
National Assembly and Senate. 
Moreover, the attributes of the French speakers 
go to prove it ; and we are entitled to ask : were 
they speaking on behalf of the government 1 But 
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we shall have an opportunity of putting this 
question to the French Minister tomorrow. 
Armaments firms, as advocated in the report, 
i.e. of European· dimensions, would constitute a 
pressure group on defence policy and at the same 
time a grave danger for the peace and security 
of the workers. And we should note that the 
pressures to exacerbate tension in Europe 
through the introduction of Pershing II and 
Cruise missiles prove how real the danger is. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope that you will 
follow me in asking Mr. Bozzi to speak first. He 
wants to speak to the vote, but as he is the Vice-
Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure, which is to meet at 5 p.m., I hope that 
you will agree that he will speak first. Then we 
shall close the general debate with Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BOZZI (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I am indeed grateful to you for 
facilitating the task of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure, which is going to meet in a moment. 
And I will match your gesture by being brief. 
For four reasons which I shall state without 
comment, the Joint Democrat Group over which 
I have the honour to preside will vote against the 
report by our honourable friend, Mr. Meintz. 
However highly we may esteem the quality of the 
paper, we cannot approve its conclusions. 
For one thing, the Meintz report proposes 
conferring upon the EEC competence in defence 
matte~. We Gaullists have already had occasion 
to denounce this flagrant violation of the Treaty 
of Rome. On the other hand, the report is 
strangely silent about the specific powers of our 
own Assembly, which would however be the ideal 
forum, and one designated by the treaties, for 
co-operation in armaments, which we are far 
from rejecting as bluntly as our French col-
league, Mr. Boucheny, has just done. 
Secondly, the Meintz report calls for a lowering 
of tariffs behind which the armaments industries 
which Europe needs and, may I add, the Atlantic 
Alliance also needs, are going to develop. 
Now, we should not go about it differently jf 
we deliberately wanted to risk creating ~ 
veritable monopoly for the United States, which 
has the means to develop on a world scale, at 
any rate on a broadly European scale, a tech-
nology in some cases more advanced than our 
own. We should thus end by allowing a take-
over by the United States, our American allies, 
of all our armaments industries. They are our 
allies, and we acknowledge them as such, but w·~ 
refuse their right to take over the whole of our 
armaments industries. 
Similarly, and for the same underlying reasons, 
we oppose the third proposal in the Meintz report 
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which envisages the formation of permanent 
multinational consortia which would very quickly 
become veritable states within a state, would 
acquire formidable power and behave like supra-
national bodies, to which we are absolutely 
opposed and this won't be the last time you hear 
us say so. 
Lastly, the Meintz report seems to us to 
condemn ill-consideredly any policy of arms 
exports to countries not members of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
What, I ask you, would then become of the 
armaments industry of our friend and ally, 
Britain ~ What would become of the French 
armaments industry - and as Rapporteur for 
the land forces in the French national defence 
budget I know what I am talking about - if our 
British neighbour and ally and we ourselves had 
no possibility of arms sales that would enable us 
in a large measure to amortise our own arma-
men~ and defence efforts ? 
For all these reasons, we shall vote against the 
Meintz report. 
(Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. Baumel and he will be followed 
by Mr. Jung. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - I 
shall add very briefly a few arguments to those 
already expounded by the French colleagues who 
have preceded me. I shall not revert to the 
arguments developed by Mr. Druon concerning 
the absolute illegality of any attempt by the 
European Community to intervene in the defini-
tion of arms production and procurement. The 
EEC has no competence for defence, and the 
proposal is in absolute contradiction to the two 
founding treaties of the Community and WED. 
For these reasons, I am astonished that in this 
very forum a number of WEU members and the 
Bureau of the Assembly should be ready to put 
to the vote a text fundamentally at variance with 
what actually established WEU. 
I shall not add any argument to that advanced 
by Mr. Bozzi concerning the associated problems 
of eo-production of war materials. I would simply 
recall that Mr. Meintz's report, aside from the 
criticisms already expressed, still carries a few 
lingering ambiguities about his proposals in the 
industrial area. 
He advocates giving the IEPG the role of 
endorsing - I underline the word - European 
projects for defence equipment. Now anyone who 
is at all well informed - and I believe there are 
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some in this Assembly - knows that the IEPG 
prepares decisions, but has no decision-making 
powers of its own. Consequently, endorsement js 
in any case ruled out. It can consider projects 
but certainly not endorse them. It is above all 
for WEU, the institution in which the European 
countries are able to take decisions of common 
interest among themselves, to allow such an 
operation and take decisions. 
Lastly, the Rapporteur's proposal to create a 
market for defence equipment covering the whole 
Alliance perfectly conveys the real underlying 
significance of the text. In such a concept, there 
would no longer be any European solidarity 
worthy of the name and the European countries 
would be unable to protect their military indus-
trial potential, i.e. in actual fact their advanced 
technology, by raising customs tariffs to offset 
inequalities across the Atlantic. In the event of 
a unification of the Atlantic armaments market, 
we should witness a division of work that would 
inevitably relegate the European industries to 
the role of subcontractors and purveyors of low 
technology equipment of little added value. 
All these trends would be pernicious to Europe. 
They would weaken it in competition with 
American industry and technology and would be 
divisive. There would be an artificial opposition 
between states exporters of military equipment 
and those which are not, member states of the 
integrated military set-up and those which have 
kept full control over their own means of secu-
rity, states specialising in a given form of mili-
tary production and those covering a more 
complete industrial spectrum. 
In the final analysis, the effect of Mr. Meintz's 
report would be to rob Europe of its ability to 
secure its own defence. It is therefore a divisive 
and weakening factor not only in Western 
Europe but, I am bound to say, in the Atlantic 
Alliance too. 
It would therefore be regrettable if the WEU 
Assembly were to fall in with it. In any case, 
some of the Prench delegates among us will 
oppose, it, as you have just heard from the lips 
of Mr. Bozzi. 
The PRESIDENT (Tra!$lation). - I call 
Mr. Jung. 
Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation).- I will be 
very short. I am one of the French Committee 
members who voted for the report by Mr. Meintz, 
which I commend for its excellence. I am indeed 
surprised by what I have heard today. 
First of all, the criticisms about what happened 
in Committee : many members did come to Paris 
and, if some of my compatriots were unable to, 
they had good reasons for it and it is not the 
Committee's, or WED's, arrangements that 
deserve to be criticised. 
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What is more, I honestly believe that the Com-
mittee's favourable vote in no way threatened the 
immediate future of Europe. We were, on the 
contrary, convinced of the necessity of some long-
term programming. I have heard many 
complaints from members of France's general 
staff about the non-standardisation of arma-
ments. And one of the most constructive aspects 
of the report was that it tried to promote a 
number of ideas which are not, contrary to what 
was said by one of the previous speakers - I 
apologise for contradicting him - pernicious to 
Europe. I am convinced that they are favourable 
to Europe for, to judge by our discussions here, 
one has the impression that there is no realisation 
of the world situation in which we are. Consider. 
ing the imminent dangers that threaten us from 
all sides, it is in our interests to bring together 
the free countries of Europe. I do not believe 
that we are endangering the livelihood of French 
workers in any way whatsoever. And let me tell 
some of our honourable friends that they would 
do well to look at what is happening in other 
countries outside the Community, to see which 
way the wind blows. 
In any case, I cannot say that the Committee 
did not discuss the problem, and I am very 
disappointed that some of those who should have 
been there were unable to attend, because that is 
when some good work could have been done. I 
myself shall be voting for Mr. Meintz's report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate is closed. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Mr. MEINTZ (Luxembourg) (Translation). -
I was extremely surprised by the unanimous 
onslaught- with the exception of Mr. Jung-
on a report that was quite difficult to prepare, 
the debates at the Brussels symposium having 
been difficult too ! 
My rirst attendance at a debate of the WED 
Assembly has indeed taught me that no creden<>e 
should be given to votes in WED. Nearly all the 
attacks have been directed against this text on 
the grounds that we have exceeded our rights 
under our constitution. Now, all I did was to copy 
a text adopted by the Assembly on 22nd Novem-
ber 1978. I would invite everybody to reread it : 
paragraph 2 recommends that the Council should 
call for the restructuring 'Of the European arma-
ments industry under the aegis of the European 
Community, relying on its responsibility ,in the 
fields of industrial and customs policy and 
research. 
If therefore quoting a WED text, voted by the 
Assembly, infringes the Assembly's principles 
and rights, I shall take care in future not to 
reread any of the texts it adopts. 
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Some speakers have explained their attacks, 
and I thank Mr. Mulley for stating the reasons 
for his opposition but beg to disagree. 
I believe in fact that if all mattel"S of defence 
policy come within our purview, we have to 
define it at ground level and in the political, 
economic and social context of Europe. It must 
be translated into real terms, and we need this 
industry which -whether you like it or not - is 
an obvious part of the economic context with 
which the EEC Commission will also have to 
contend. 
I believe that, instead of finding fault with it, 
we should have every interest in upholding our 
own competence by defining policy and joining 
forces with any other institutions likely to be 
charged with subsequently putting it into effect. 
And I thank Mr. Jung for having somewhat 
supported this view. 
I regret to have to tell Mr. Mulley and others 
that, for the reasons I stated just now and have 
now repeated, I cannot agree to Amendment 1, 
especially as it has already been voted on in 
Committee. It i.s now for the Assembly to decide. 
With regard to the amendments tabled by 
Mr. Baumel, I had entirely failed to grasp the 
implications of paragraph 2 in the recommenda-
tion when I spoke of bilateral or multilateral 
European defence equipment projects duly 
endorsed bv the IEPG. I meant "endorsed" in 
the sense that the projects were submitted to 
governments. I entirely agree to the amendment 
for leaving out "endorsed" and inserting 
"examined". It is in my view a terminological 
point, but Mr. Baumel is right : it is more than 
that, it is substantive ; so I agree to his amend-
ment. 
On the other hand, I disagree with Amendment 
3, because it would curb the real gist of our 
proposal for creating a much wider market. 
This will certainly not be a divisive factor ; it 
is quite simply a question of co-operation in 
NATO, to enable a bigger armaments market, 
which would in the long run bring with it a fall 
in armaments exports. 
I am not opposed to armaments exports, but 
it is one of the conclusions of the Brussels 
symposium that these exports create political 
problems. We only have to open the newspaper 
or listen to what is being said in parliament : 
al'Illaments exports to third countries cause 
controversy. But industrialists say : "What are 
we t'O do if we cannot export 1" 
Consequently, we propose a market encompas-
sing the whole of the Alliance, which is why I 
cannot agree to Amendment 3. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate on Document 821 is concluded and the 
vote will be taken at the end of the sitting, after 
discussion of the third report. 
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5. Industrial bases of European security -
guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions, Doe. 823) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next 
Order of the Day is the presentation of and 
debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions on the industrial bases of European security 
- guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979, Document 823. 
I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). 
Ladies and Gentlemen, whether it be the interests 
of the Atlantic Alliance, or Europe too with all 
its weight of history and its historic responsibil-
ities, or Europe in its specific strategic character, 
we owe it to ourselves to secure a defence power-
ful enough to be credible. 
Mr. Onslow will doubtless place more emphasis 
on the topical aspects which I briefly touched 
on this morning in another context, and will 
show you how much the international balance or 
rather imbalance has been developing over the 
past few months : Mr. Brezhnev's statements and 
warnings coi1$titute as many new facts which can 
hardly be ignored. 
On the part of the report that concerns me, I 
shall be referring more especially to the technical 
aspects, though I conclude on a somewhat poli-
tical note. 
I already had the honour to present to you at 
the last session a report on the industrial bases 
of European security. The accompanying recom-
mendation said the report was to be considered 
as a preparatory paper for the Brussels 
symposium. 
We had hoped that the Council's reply could be 
conveyed to us before the proceedings of the 
symposium. Unfortunately, this was not done, 
since the Council's reply did not reach the Office 
of the Clerk of the Assembly until 23rd Novem-
ber. In that connection, Mr. President, I should 
like to point out to the eminent representatives 
of the Council how difficult it is to work ;in such 
conditions. We should like replies to Assembly 
recommendations to be supplied in future in time 
for the Assembly and above all its Committees 
to take the Council's replies or conclusions into 
account where follow-up action is announced and 
planned. In this particular case, the reply to 
Recommendation 332 is entirely instructive. I 
therefore hope, Mr. President, that procedures 
can be improved upon. 
The introduction to the report singles out the 
main guidelines for the discussions at Brussels. 
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It was no easy matter: discussions of a highly 
technical nature are not always easily translated 
into political conclusions. 
The report deals with six specific subjects 
concerning future weapons. 
So far as the future tank is concerned, the 
main question will be a decision either to use 
light tanks supported by helicopters, which 
involves commissioning armoured helicopters like 
those already used by the Americans in Vietnam, 
or the deployment of increasingly sophisticated 
heavy tanks. The Committee has proposed that 
we should initiate straight away a discussion and 
study on this point. Apparently not all experts 
are of the same opinion on the choice to be made. 
In the case of the combat aircraft for the 1990s 
our forces will clearly require a new ground 
attack aircraft for the battlefield area. Such an 
aircraft should have a short landing and perhaps 
even a vertical take-off capacity. At the Brussels 
symposium, attention was chiefly focused on this 
requirement. As pointed out in the report, it will 
be necessary to reconcile often conflicting 
requirements, e.g. those of the British and the 
German air forces. 
In the production of new types of aircraft, 
lasting co-operation amongst our countries is seen 
as an inescapable need ; and governments will 
have to promote the formation of permanent 
groupl'!, so as to provide long-term guarantees to 
convince the participants of the profitability o-f 
their investments. But once again the decision is 
primarily a matter for governments. 
For the tactical missiles to equip our forces 
after 1990 the authorities will have to lay down 
interoperability standards such as will be increas-
ingly necessary in aerospace. Governments' wil-
lingness to carry things through to a successful 
conclusion is of course a prerequisite. Quite apart 
from interoperahility, intra-European co-opera-
tion raises problems that are difficult to resolve 
in the case of tactical missile~'!. Indeed, with 
these very sophisticated systems, it is hard 
to achieve a satisfactory distribution of self-
contained components whose production would 
be shared by the individual participants. Such 
co-operation would involve a readiness of each 
country to I'IPecialise in a particular area. That, 
as you are aware, always means a difficult 
choice, since it may be considered to involve 
the risk of a certain loss of independence in 
national productions - hard to accept in the 
current situation in Europe. 
Shipbuilding- a topic on which Mr. Onslow 
will have something to say - raises one of the 
most important problems to be resolved, especially 
everything to do with the modernisation o-f 
industries. You know what difficulties Europe 
is having to contend with, to produce at a 
competitive price to enable it to survive. Exam-
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pies have proved that solutions do exist. I 
mention the minesweeper jointly built in French 
and Netherlands shipyards. Further experiments 
on such lines ought not to come up against 
too many obstacles, and is a sine qua non for 
the survival of our naval shipyar($. 
To raise quality standards, some standardis-
ation in unit components, modules and greawr 
containerisation must be encouraged. 
With conditions as they are at present in the 
shipbuilding industry, it will be very difficult 
to persuade the responsible author1ties, but we 
have ·already seen in some countries that artificial 
support for an ailing industry is liable to cause 
a decline and not an increase in production 
capacity and product quality, so that the choice 
is a necessary one. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, in the report of 21st 
May which I submitted to you and you approved, 
I gave a list of the fifteen technologies in 
which the situation in Europe may be considered 
critical. Among these are : computer networks, 
major computer systems and electronic com-
munications. In all these areas, European indus-
try is still too weak and is in danger of losing 
its competitiveness in respect of ,Japan and the 
United States. 
It is clearly unacceptable for Europe to remain 
dependent on imported computer components for 
its military electronic communications hardware. 
The Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions has instructed one of 
its members to carry out a study on the techno-
logy of military telecommunications. The report 
will be presented to our Assembly next June. 
Europe owes it to itself, I insist, to win back 
the initiative in this respect at whatever cost. 
This is the very special significance of paragraph 
7 in the recommendation. 
It is unfortunate that the Unidata consortium, 
comprising Philips, Siemens and CII, is not 
being reactivated in one form or another, or at 
all concretely. As I said at Brussels, WEU has 
a decisive role to play in this respect ; this 
hol($ true from the technological standpoint, 
and is fundamental from the military one as well. 
Only when Europe proves itself capable of pro-
ducing all the equipment necessary to its secu-
rity can its will to defend itself, and its fitness to 
be a full-time partner of the United States, 
become credible. 
The European countries have specific arma-
ments requirements not always compatible, as 
you are aware, with those of our great American 
allies. 
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I should also like to dwell upon Europe's 
successes in space. The launching of Ariane in 
less than a fortnight will demonstrate Europe's 
capability, for it does not seem likely that we 
should run into any snags on that score. What 
is important is that you should always remain 
convinced that co-operation is developing very 
actively in this area and that European produc-
tion is winning ground. You know how full the 
order books of the European Space Agency are. 
In conclusion, I shall mention the political 
aspect. 
At the Brussels symposium we listened to 
Viscount Davignon, the Commissioner responsible 
for industrial affairs in the Commission of the 
European Communities. 
I shall not go back over all that was said 
this afternoon and should remain basic in our 
mutual relations, since we conduct our proceed-
ings and fulfil our responsibilities within the 
framework of treaties that are perfectly clear. 
Mr. Davignon himself stressed that the EEC's 
industrial capacities were not far short of those 
of the United States in the armaments field. 
It is an irrefutable observation, but it is not 
accompanied by an analysis of the European 
armaments industry. 
What I want to emphasise, Ladies and Gentle-
men, is that, on any assumption, defence being 
of course dependent on the competence of states, 
armaments themselves depend on whatever 
defence policy is followed. Hence it is for WEU 
to pinpoint, for the benefit of our governments, 
individually and collectively, the defence options 
frequently referred to this afternoon. 
I remind you that the EEC has no remit or 
competence for dealing with defence and arma-
ments. On the other hand, it would be self-
evidently desirable - and why should our db-
logue not become complementary Y - for the 
European Communities to set about forming a 
genuine industrial common market, which nobody 
would be against. But in default of such an 
industrial common market, let everyone look 
after his own estate and not trespass on anyone 
else's. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, had I been the sole 
Rapporteur, maybe I should have laid down some 
guidelines, if not different, at any rate some-
what qualified and, in certain cases, more precise. 
But the report of which I am co-author with 
Mr. Onslow is the fruit both of putting two 
heads together, and of work done in Committee. 
The proposed recommendation we are sub-
mitting to you and which, it is my duty to 
insist, reminds us in the preamble that WEU 
alone is competent in military matters, empha-
sises the main orientations our governments will 
be taking - at any rate we hope so - in 
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order to ensure that genuine technological co-
operation may be pushed as far as possible in 
the military area. 
Once again, my political and technological 
conclusion is the extraordinary development of 
micro-processor and data-proce~ing techniques, 
and a reminder that we should urge our govern-
ments to move in that direction, for otherwise 
Europe's defence capabilities are liable to be 
very quickly and fundamentally discredited. 
Lastly, with regard to the wish to see the 
European structures develop - and why not 
through a consortium ? - we must qualify this 
with two comments : yes, provided the states 
retain their powers of decision-making ; yes, 
provided the structures, private or otherwise, 
do not arrogate to themselves such a power of 
control or guidance as to go beyond the bounds 
of the right of decision-making in matters of 
states' defence. 
Subject to these remarks, Ladies and Gentle-
men, I trust our Assembly will vote in favour 
of this report, so that we may, together with 
the other Committees, continue to influence our 
governments and, in the name of WEU as a 
whole, labour for the defence of Europe. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. V alleix. 
I call Mr. Onslow, the Committee's eo-
Rapporteur. 
Mr. ONSLOW (United Kingdom). -Mr. Presi-
dent, my colleague, Mr. Valleix, has rightly 
reminded the Assembly that two Rapporteurs 
producing one report is not necessarily the easiest 
way for either of us to proceed. I hope that 
nothing that I say will necessarily be attributed 
to him, in the same way as I am sure that he 
understands that his point of view and mine are 
inevitably bound to differ. 
Perhaps I may attempt to add one or two com-
ments to what Mr. Valleix has said in so ably 
introducing the report. First, in a sense, the 
problem faced by the whole of the B~els sym-
posium was that of indentifying correctly the task 
that was before us. When you come to consider 
this report, I think that it must be right for you 
to ask yourselves how one defines European 
security, because unless we can formulate an 
agreement among ourselves about the nature of 
the threats that we face, it becomes rather dif-
ficult to be precise about the necessary industrial 
base. 
Therefore, in a sense, my remarks are more 
directed towards identifying the strategic defene.e 
procurement requirements of Europe than to 
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dwelling on any one or other of the various 
topics that we studied in Brussels. I am bound 
to say, however, having listened to di)roussion 
on the future tank with increasing scepticism 
when we were told that it would be two-gun 
and turretless - which does not accord with 
my own remote experience with that branch of 
military activity - that I was driven to ask 
myself why the Americans should make tanks, 
anyway, because unless we suppose that there 
will be some cataclysm that will promote a tank 
war in the continental United States, there is 
no strategic industrial requirement for the Ame-
ricans to make tanks for themselves. This is 
a point that we might have discussed more profit-
ably four or five years ago and so avoided some 
of the conclusions to which European nations 
have now come. I make it to underline what we 
are talking about when we refer to indll$trial 
bases. One of the industrial capabilities that 
Europe has to retain if it is to defend itself 
against foreseeable threats is the vertical take-off 
ability encompassed in the British Harrier. That 
is why I am particularly glad to see mention of 
that capability in the recommendation before the 
Assembly. 
In one respect at least we may have been 
guilty, in writing our report, of looking ~o far 
into the future that we lost sight of the immediate 
prospects. It would be wrong for you to conclude 
from what we have put before you that there 
is nothing going on that can encourage us. On 
the contrary, I have made wme researches into 
British industry. I have learned that work is 
taking place on a third-generation anti-tank 
guided weapon system and that the collaboration 
for the replacement for Swingfire, Hot and 
Milan is taking place between British Aerospace, 
in the United Kingdom, Aerospatiale in France, 
and Messe~chmitt-Bolkow-Blohm in Germany. In 
the area of medium-range surface-to-air missiles 
another collaborative study is in train between 
British Aerospace, Thompson CSF in France and 
MBB in Germany. The same is true in other 
important areas where one can foresee developing 
defence requirements. 
All these, I have to say, are still feasibility 
studies. Defence industries do not live on feasi-
bility studies alone. It is vital that we resolve 
to pursue these joint collaborative ventures to 
the point where European governments under-
write them by procurement decisions. 
I hope that it will not be long before we see 
decisions of that kind coming through. They are 
really the only effective European commitment 
to joint defence - a decision by the major 
industrial powers in the European Community 
and in the defence community to combine to share 
out work among themselves and other European 
nations to meet the defence needs that Europe 
can identify. 
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If that is to be done successfully, we need 
two things. We need total commitment of all 
European nations to work together to this end. 
There is no room for a soft option decision. 
The decision to produce weapons that Europe col-
lectively needs for its own defence has to be 
one to which all European nations are totally 
committed. 
The second point I would make is that it needs 
understanding on the part of our American allies. 
If a situation arises, either by accident or by 
design, in which Europe finds itself forced to 
rely on European purchases of American defenre 
systems, the commitment of our electorates to 
their own defence will become correspondingly 
less. There will be no jobs, no involvement and 
no technological challenge left to us. It will 
all have gone across the Atlantic. "\Ve must not 
allow that to happen. 
For the success of the pol,icies we have been 
trying to diBcuss today it is essential that we 
commit ourselves and that our American friends 
understand and seek to encourage Europe to act 
as a full and equal partner in the procurement 
of its own defence needs. If we do not achieve 
that, not only will our industry suffer, but so 
will our ability to defend ourselves. (Applaus/3) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
I have one further name on the l~t of speaker'3. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). --
Mr. President, in my maiden speech to this 
Assembly, I wish to address my brief remarks 
to recommendation 3 in this report, which invites 
member governments : 
"To bring to a successful conclusion without 
delay discussions on the successor, for the 
1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F 
Phantom of the Federal German air force and 
the further development of the British Har-
rier." 
In my judgment, there is no issue of greater 
importance to the future of the European arma-
ments industry than the development of a new 
combat aircraft. I welcome very much therefore 
the attention which your Rapporteurs have drawn 
to this important matter. I congratulate thel'l 
particularly on emphasising the crucial strategic 
context in which this v;ital procurement decision 
will have to be taken. In this regard, I ask 
you to turn to paragraph 13 in which our Rap-
porteur~ emphasise that : 
"The local imbalance of ground forces can 
only be balanced by air power with its flexi-
87 
NINTH SITTING 
bility and quick reaction capability in space 
and time." 
I am convinced, Mr. President, that air power 
is likely to be a vital determinant in the outcome 
of any battle in Central Europe. 
The only really effective means that the sev-
erely outnumbered forces of .the Western Alliance 
will have to counter the overwhelming strength 
of the armoured formations of the Warsaw Pact 
will be air power. We can presume, I believe, 
that the Warsaw Pact will choose the time and 
the place of aggression if it seeks to pursue its 
political policies by offensive military action. Air 
power alone enables the commanders of the 
Western Alliance to put countervailing forces at 
the critical spot. This is amo a facet of our 
Rapporteurs' report. 
For air power to be effective as a counter-
weight to armour, air superiority over the battle-
field will be absolutely essential. We must there-
fore ensure, Mr. President, that in looking at 
this crucial procurement decision a new tactical 
aircraft has a formidable air combat capability. 
It will also have an offensive support capability, 
as our Rapporteurs imply in paragraph 14. In 
the air environment of Western Europe, which 
will be extremely hazardous to say the least, 
and taking account of the weather that prevails 
over Western Europe, the new combat fighter 
must liave a degree of all-weather capability 
and navigational attack systems which in an 
offensive support role will enable the aircraft 
to make single pass attacks from very low alti-
tude. It will therefore need to be a multi-role 
aeroplane. Both operational requirements - the 
British and the German - contain valid ele-
ments. 
I well understand the German emphasis on 
air combat and, in view of the need to ensure that 
as much of our air forces as possible remains 
intact on the ground after the fimt strikes, it 
is necessary that V /STOL, as Mr. Onslow 
reminded us, be incorporated in any design. 
So both operational requirements have vali-
dity. But we cannot expect any such aircraft 
to be cheap and it will need to be effective 
against potential opposition well into the next 
century. Therefore, I say that neither the F-16 
nor even the F-18L, which is mentioned in this 
report, meets the requirements. What is required 
is a new aircraft with the very latest technology. 
But to develop and to build industrially such 
an aeroplane use should be made of consortia 
which have experience of constructing multi-role 
aeroplanes. The classic one that comes to my 
mind, as it did to the minds of the Rapporteurs 
in paragraph 17, is the Panavia consortium, 
which has built so effectively the Tornado air-
craft in both the interdiction role and currently 
also the air defence role. 
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If it is to be a genuinely European aeroplane, 
as we all wish it to be, our Rapporteum arc 
right to remind us that in June this year this 
Assembly accepted Recommendation 332, which 
said that the next generation of fighter aircraft 
should be a promotion of co-operation between 
existing management consortia producing the 
Jaguar and the Tornado, that is, Sepecat and 
Panavia. Sepecat is a fairly ad hoc industrial 
organisation, with co-operation between, initially, 
Breguet and BAC and, latterly, between Avions 
Marcel Dassault and BAC, whereas Panavia is 
a fully institutionalised, trinational collaborative 
company. For such a truly European fighter 
to be successful, it will be necessary for less 
emphasis to be placed on purely national projects 
than on getting the design for the new fighter 
ri:ght. That is the important thing. 
In my concluding remarks I would just say 
that in our rightful ambition to develop the best 
possible air combat and offensive support aero-
plane for the European air forces for the last 
decade of this century we should not lose .sight 
of the great potential for the development of the 
existing national projects of the air forces of 
France and the United Kingdom. The Jaguar 
still has considerable development potential, par-
ticularly if the Adour engines are fully uprated 
and if the air-to-air capability of the aircraft 
in self-defence, which has already been developed 
for the international variant of the aeroplane 
with the Magic missile, is utilised. 
As for the Harrier, studies are at present 
in train to see whether a new wing would greatly 
augment the performance of the aeroplane. That 
aeroplane would be the Mark 5 ; and, as we 
know, McDonnell Douglas has flown a prototype 
A V-8B with a composite wing, which also offers 
great potential for the future, and perhaps even 
for the two-way street. So there is a great poten-
tial for both aeroplanes for a considerable time 
to come. 
Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that in the fluid state of any battlefield in 
\Vestern Europe we would wish to throw every 
aeroplane we have into the· battle against the 
armoured formations that would face us. It does 
not make sense necessarily, as Admiral Lygo 
suggested in his remarks, to throw an £8 million 
aircraft against a relatively minor military 
objective. Therefore, it is right that the Luft-
waffe should have the Alpha-Jet for a number 
of its close support roles, and I suggest that it 
is equally right for the Royal Air Force to deploy 
its Hawk aircraft, which are currently used for 
training, more and more in an offensive support 
role. With those remarks, I should like very much 
to support the excellent report of our colleagues. 
(Applause) 
88 
NINTH SITTING 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you very much, 
Mr. Wilkinson. 
The general debate is now closed. 
Mr. Warren wishes to speak now. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom).- The two 
Rapporteurs clearly demonstrated the value of 
bringing together two minds on a single complex 
subject, and it was fascinating to see the way in 
which their different approaches identified a 
common strategic concern on which they could 
readily agree. Mr. Valleix rightly spoke of the 
need that we have to recognise the threat from 
the Soviet Union, and his desire to nominate 
critical industrial areas where European competi-
tiveness is essential is well worth while. 
The industry in Europe has courage, but should 
have more courage to believe that it can sell 
armaments in competition to the United States 
of America. But at the same time, in our desire 
to establish European strength, we must never 
forget that the Americans are our partners in 
defence and that without the Americans the 
Russian threat would now have been a reality 
in the streets of Paris and the other capitals of 
the \V estern European nations. 
Repeatedly in recent years we have demon-
strated from the industrial bases of Europe that 
in competition with the United States we are as 
good as the American industrial bases. The Airbus 
shows that, the Roland missile shows that and 
even Scotch whisky shows that. 
With the right product sold in the right place 
at the right price at the right time, there is no 
problem when one is trying to sell against the 
Americans. 
But in his contribution, Mr. Onslow ideptified 
the need that we have in the armaments industry 
to use the relevant industrial resources that we 
have in Europe to provide sources for armaments 
on which we can base European strategy. I agree 
wholeheartedly with him that the procedure for 
the acquisition of equipment of all kinds needs 
considerable improvement in the defence minis-
tries of the Western European Union nations. 
Those ministries need to define the kind of 
products which are essential to meet the threat 
facing us across the iron curtain. Too often we 
make fantasies about the kind of war that we 
would fight, with no concern as to the kind of 
equipment facing us as the threat. 
Mr. Wilkinson, whose maiden speech we 
heartily applaud this afternoon - likewise, his 
appointment today as a parliamentary private 
secretary in the British Government - gave a 
fascinating contribution, based on his experience 
as a one-time Royal Air Force fighter pilot and 
as a man who has worked in the aerospace indus-
try. He clearly identified for us the reality of 
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the overwhelming forces that the Warsaw Pact 
can deploy at any time against us, at a time and 
a place of its own choosing, and it was right for 
him to show that the only flexible response that 
we have is the manoeuvrability of air power. 
In conclusion, I just wonder, at the end of a 
short debate such as this, which has summed up 
an enormous amount of work by the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, whether our spoken words will be 
heard outside this parliamentary chamber. Few 
of the people of Western Europe recognise the 
danger at the gates. Many want to look away 
from the forces now massed against us. I think 
that none will thank us if our voice is not heard 
across Europe and the world. 
(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
6. Political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation 
Definition of armaments requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe 
Industrial bases of European security 
- guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
(Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft 
Order, Does. 819, 821 and Amendments and 823) 
The PRESIDENT. -We shall now vote on 
the three draft recommendations and amend-
ments. 
We shall take first Document 819, the report 
by Mr. van Waterschoot, and vote on the draft 
recommendation in this document. 
No amendments have been tabled. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees we can save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections Y ••• 
Are there any abstentions Y ••• 
The draft recommendation is adopted 1• 
Before we vote on the draft recommendation 
in Document 821, we must dispose of the amend-
ments tabled by Mr. Mulley and by Mr. Baumel. 
1. See page 21. 
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We shall take Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. 
Mulley and others : 
I. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "under the aegis of the indus-
trial policy of the European Community". 
Do you wish to move this, Mr. Mulley ~ You 
referred to it when speaking earlier ~ 
Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom).- I should 
like to move the amendment in my name and 
those of others. I am opposed to the Community's 
involvement, because I do not think it has the 
competence, either technical or military, essential 
to the formulation of a sensible arms procurement 
policy. 
Nor has it the necessary funds, since to fund 
this would require a great deal of money which 
I frankly would be opposed to paying. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Mulley. 
Does anyone wish to speak on this amend-
ment 1 ... 
Mr. CAVAI.1IERE (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I am opposed to the amendment 
because, unless we want to remain purely acade-
mic and confine ourselves to flat declarations, 
we are looking for a body that will translate 
into concrete action our wishes and recommenda-
tions. I think that the only body of this kind 
we can have for the time being is the European 
Community. That is why I am voting against 
the proposed amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Cavaliere. 
What is the opinion of the Committee 1 
Mr. MEINTZ (Luxembourg) (Translation).-
Mr. President, I am not going to revert to what 
I said just now about the amendment. As Rap-
porteur, I am of course opposed to it for, as I 
told you, I quoted verbatim the text of Recom-
mendation 325 of 22nd November 1978, which 
the Committee approved by a majority. 
I therefore ask the Assembly to vote against 
the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Meintz. 
I shall now put the amendment to the vote by 
sitting and standing. 
(A vote was tken taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We now come to Amendments 2 and 3 tabled 
by Mr. Baumel. They read as follows : 
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2. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, leave out "endorsed" and insert 
"examined". 
3. In paragraph 2 (b) leave out "an Alliance-
wide market for defence equipment" and insert 
"a market for defence equipment in the frame-
work of WEU". 
Do you wish to move this amendment, Mr. 
Baumel Y ... 
Does anyone wish to speak on the amend-
ment? ... 
What is the opinion of the Committee ? 
Mr. MEINTZ (Luxembourg) (Translation).-
The Committee has accepted Amendment 2 but 
not Amendment 3. 
The PRESIDENT.- Then we must vote on 
the amendments separately. The opinion of the 
Committee is that we say "Yes" to No. 2 and 
"No" to No. 3. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously. 
We now come to Amendment 3 by Mr. Baumel. 
The Committee says "No". 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
'Ne now come to the vote on the draft recom-
mendation in Document 821, as amended. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections ? ... 
I hear quite a lot of "Noes". We must therefore 
take a vote by roll-call. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of 
Mr. VaUeix. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to vote ? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is a follows ~ : 
1. See page 20. 
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Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . 50 
Ayes ........................ 44 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted 1 • 
The Assembly will now vote on the draft order 
in Document 821. 
No amendments have been tabled. 
The vote will be taken by sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
The draft order is adopted 2• 
The Assembly will now vote on the draft recom-
mendation in Document 823. 
No amendments have been tabled. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the AssembLy agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections ? .. . 
Are there any abstentions? .. . 
The draft recommendation is adopted 3 • 
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow 
morning, Tuesday 4th December, at 10 a.m. with 
the following Orders of the Day : 
1. Impact of the evolving situation in the 
Near and Middle East on Western Euro-
pean security (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, Document 820 and Amendments). 
2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic. 
Are there any objections ? ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak ? ... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.) 
1. See page 22. 
2. See page 23. 
3. See page 24. 
TENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 4th December 1979 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
8. Change in the membership of Committees. 
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle 
East on Western European security (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee, Doe. 820 and Amendments). 
Speakers : The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (Rap-
porteur), Mr. Grant, Mr. Cora.llo. 
5. Address by Mr. Bema.rd-Reymond, Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bernard-Reymond 
(Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic). 
Replies by Mr. Bemard-Reymond to questions put by: 
Mr. Jung, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Valleix, 
Mr. Roper, Mr. Banks, Mr. van Waterschoot. 
6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle 
East on Western European security (Resumed Debate 
on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 820 
and Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Muller, Mr. Deschamps, 
Dr. Miller, Mr. CavaJiere, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Voogd. 
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with 
Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes 
of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments t.. 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT.- The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings 1• 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees 
The PRESIDENT.- Ladies and Gentlemen, 
the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many has proposed various changes in its mem-
bership of Committees. These changes are set out 
in Notice No. 10. 
Are there any objections to these changes L 
They are approved. 
1. See page 26. 
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4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee, Doe. 820 and 
Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. -The first Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on the 
impact of the evolving situation in the Near and 
Middle East on Western European security, 
Document 820 and Amendments. 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, to 
present the report. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- Mr. President and colleagues, when I was 
first invited by the General Affairs Committee 
to prepare a report on the Middle East situation 
not purely as a political one, it was rather dif-
ferent from the Council of Europe's work in 
this context, but, since we are a defence and 
security Assembly, my purpose was to set out 
the picture throughout the Middle East and to 
evaluate the possible or probable consequences 
which could very seriously affect not only the 
political but the economic security of Europe. 
As I speak today, of course, the situation is 
worse than it was when I began to undertake 
this task back in July. However, when I was 
invited to prepare this report, I must confess, 
looking back, that although I found it a stimulat-
ing task, it has certainly been one of the most 
exacting that I have ever undertaken, because 
the more one looks at the problems of that 
part of the world, the more deep-rooted they 
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appear and the more difficult it is to tie all the 
loose ends together and to get an objective pic-
ture. 
At this stage I must emphasise that I realised 
from the beginning that in regard to at least 
one part of the report, that of the Arab-Israeli 
confrontation dispute, I would have to be very, 
very careful to pursue my researches and eva-
luate the situation without being subjected to 
pressures by any of the parties concerned and 
without allowing myself to be affected by the 
very strong emotions which for the last few 
months I have found, obviously, to run right 
through this whole situation. 
It seems to me, as someone who seeks to be a 
responsible political figure, that objectivity in 
this report is absolutely basic, not just to its 
chances of being endorsed by this Assembly, but, 
even more important, if it could play any part 
at all, however small, in defusing a situation 
which is growing almost monthly more dange-
rous, both to the political and the economic 
security of the whole western world. 
Since the report is, broadly, in three parts, 
Mr. President, in accord with the mandate given 
to me by the Committtee and by my Chairman, 
I should like to deal with it also in three sections 
in my introductory remarks. I shall begin with 
that of Iran. 
Obviously, since I prepared this report, 
although in the explanatory memorandum I have 
made perfectly clear our abhorrence of the way 
in which, to put it mildly, a revolution has 
turned sour, even I, when I started lto prepare 
the report, could not have contemplated the 
extent of the worsening of lthe situation that 
now threatens the security of a much wider field 
than purely the political and economic stability 
of Europe and, in particular, of the countries for 
which this Assembly is responsible. 
During this debate probably many people will 
want tto raise the particular topic of the un-
lawful detention of the Americans, inside or 
outside their embassy, which has been, in accord-
ance with the unanimous Security Council resolu-
tion, an instance of a total breach of conventions 
stretching back over centuries - that diplomatic 
representation abroad had to be left secure or 
else the whole fabric of international relations 
would be eroded and very dangerous new tensions 
would arise. 
It is worth noting that nOli; even Adolf Hitler 
went as far, during the last war, as interfering 
with the sanctity of diplomatic representation. 
It is a sorry fact that thirty-five years later we 
should have an instance of that kind of inter-
ference, which must be almost unprecedented in 
history. Obviously, we condemn it strongly. 
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However, Mr. Chairman, the Middle East must 
be regarded by your Rapporteur as a whole. 
While many colleagues will wish to express 
themselves strongly, I do nOli; think that this 
report should be turned into an opportunity to 
express our abhorrence of a particularly appall-
ing incident that faces us when we open our 
morning newspapers. I am told, Mr. President, 
although it may not be in your possession, that 
a resolution is now being circulated, signed by 
all the leaders of the national delegations here, 
with many more signatures to come, in which 
we express our abhorrence of what is taking 
place. 
That should not be allowed to become confused 
with the central theme of this report for two 
reasons. It is much too important to be slipped 
in as a kind of sub-clause to show what we 
think about a particular instance. Much more 
preferable, I suggest, would be a united expres-
sion of abhorrence to be issued through the 
appropriate channels. This would be better than 
trying to slip in a resolution or recommendation 
now about a specific incident at a specific time. 
There are other procedures aV'ailable. I am happy 
to leave that matter in the hands of those who 
are more familiar with the procedures than I am. 
When the time for detailed consideration of 
the recommendations arrives, there is a clear 
case, not simply in relation to the issue of the 
hostages, but generally for toughening the para-
graph that I inserted as Rapporteur, and which 
was endorsed by the Committee without qualifi-
cation. It should be toughened up in regard to 
the supply of arms from any source while Iran 
conducts its present policy of terrorism at home 
and abroad. 
I hope, therefore,, that through suggestions 
which I am prepared to accept from any source, 
we shall make stronger a recommendation drafted 
last July in which I expressed the hope that at 
least the member !ttates of WE U would not 
supply arms. I believe that we should go further 
and express our abhorrence of any arms supplied 
from any source to a regime clearly capable, so 
far as one can see, of using them only for internal 
repression at home or adventurism abroad of 
the most deplorable sort. That, Mr. President, 
is enough about Iran. 
I turn next to another of the three items, 
Afghanistan. This is a much more serious situa-
tion than many living in the West currently 
realise. I point to these factors. First, a new 
and appalling element of refugees on a huge 
scale has been caused. The latest figure I have 
received from authoritative sources is that about 
300,000 people have crossed or are trying to 
cross the border into Paki!ttan because of what 
has happened in Afghanistan. 
On human rights grounds alone it is abhorrent 
to me that, at a time when one of the principal 
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problems all over the world is the resettlement 
of refugees, a new element of disaffection, a 
new element of resentment and a new element 
of misery are being introduced gratuitously 
because of the activities of the present govern-
ment, if one can call it that, of Afghanistan, 
sponsored and supported, I regret to say, 
although it has to be stated clearly, by the Soviet 
Union. 
Secondly, it would appear that a determined 
attempt is being made to impose a communist 
government within Afghanistan in gross breach 
of all the Helsinki provisions about non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of another country; 
it would also appear that a deliberate attempt 
is being made to create not only a communist 
state but a communist satellite, able, willing and 
ready to try to carry out ,the further designs of 
the Soviet Government, which go back a long 
time, aimed at the penetration of Pakistan and 
the attainment of a long drellJID of governments 
in Russia, whatever colour shirts they wear and 
whatever colour the flags they wave. 
Once the ability to hold a strong position in 
that part of the world occurs, the fragility of 
states in the Gulf, on which we are largely 
dependent - reverting to the theme of my report 
- for our national security itself, will be under 
threat. The map shows that the chance of the 
collapse of Pakistan and the attainment of this 
Russian aim, to the prejudice of our own eco-
nomic and political security, is serious. I make 
no apology for, and nor did the General Affairs 
Committee make any attempt to inhibit, the 
strongest condemnation of what is going on in 
that part of the world as representing a major 
threat to overall peace and stability, apart from 
the obvious gross breaches of the Helsinki final 
act regarding non-intervention in the affairs of 
another State. 
I turn now to the hottest potato of all, the 
Arab-Israeli dispute. I have been fascinated, 
although sometimes horrified, reading the un-
folding tragedy about how this dispute has arisen 
and been carried on over the years by apparently 
unrelated acts, undertaken by countries and 
strutesmen long since dead who, during the first 
world war, had the aim on the one hand of 
trying to get maximum American support, 
through engendering Jewish and Zionist sup-
port, and, on the other hand, of trying to get the 
maximum support of the Arab world against 
the Ottoman Empire by making promises that 
were clearly incompatible with the realisation 
of the former. 
However, Mr. President, I rapidly came to the 
conclusion that to look back so far, except to 
take note of what took place, was not a very 
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productive, creative or substantive procedure. 
If we are now contemplating what can and 
should and, in the end, must be done, we have 
to take a starting point and not spend our time 
arguing once again about the early seeds of this 
problem, an argument which would never pro-
duce agreement. To ~argue now about the Balfour 
declaration, the McMahon letters, or the Sykes-
Picot agreement would be a wasteful procedure 
for this Assembly. So I want to concentrate my 
introduction on what happened at the end of the 
British mandate in 1947-48 and what followed 
thereafter. It must be in that light, which is 
at least one of realism, that we should approach 
our study of this problem. 
As is set out both in the document which con-
tains actual papers relevant to this whole matter 
and in the body of my report itself, it is abun-
dantly clear that a proceJSS of events was set in 
course by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, lawfully and properly, back in Novem-
ber 1947. One was the creation of Israel, and 
it was at that moment that the state of Israel, 
from a constitutional and legal point of view, 
really came into being. It is no good now, even 
if one wanted to, looking back further than that. 
On the other hand - and this is all too often 
neglected by ,those who have not studied all the 
documentation - the resolution of 1947, which 
said that at the end of the British mandate 
there would be a state of Israel created in what 
had been British mandated Palestine, also said 
that British mandated Palestine would be divided 
into an independent Arab state and an indepen-
dent Israeli state. The material is there for all 
to see. It is very rare that one hears this point 
made, and yet the very act of creation, legally, 
of Israel also legally created an Arab state within 
what had been British Palestine. It really is 
impossible, if one is to be objective and not 
affected by prejudice, to read one bit of the 
United Nations resolution and not the other bit. 
It is largely because so many people, so many 
governments, have refused to face facts and 
realise what that resolution said that we face 
our difficulties of today. 
I do not want ,today to relate the long series 
of actual military conflicts and acts of aggres-
sion. It is not appropriate or helpful here to 
chew over this and say that in one war someone 
was to blame and that in another war someone 
else was to blame. What one has to do is to 
follow through the sequence from a constitutional 
point of view, and I have already mentioned the 
legal birth of two independent states - one 
Arab, one Israeli - back in 194 7 as being the 
first pragmatic milestone along this road. 
However, after the wars developed there was 
a whole series of United Nations resolutions 
applicable in one form or another to what had 
gone on, some outdated by events. But at least 
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one gets a glimmer of hope in the sense that 
most of the pallties accept that in Resolution 242 
there was a genuine attempt by the United 
Nations to restore a situation in which both states 
could live with secure frontiers and with peace, 
by mutual agreement and mutual tolerance. 
Where 'things have gone wrong here is that, 
unfortunately, the parties do not interpret Reso-
lution 242 in the same way. One of the stumbling 
blocks is that everybody says "yes, 242", but 
everybody means something rather different 
when asked what is meant by Resolution 242. 
I have noticed in my work on this subject that 
there is a need now, whatever the outcome, for 
an act of redefinition 'to be undertaken by the 
United Nations Security Council as to what 
they did, and do, mean by Resolution 242, 
because one can get no settlement of a dispute 
in which the parties concerned rely on a United 
Nations resolution to further their case but do 
so only on the basis that ,they understand that 
section in different ways. That is the next mile-
stone along the road that I have outlined. 
I now come to the third in my list of milestones 
and that is the Rabat agreement in Morocco 
when, for the first time, the whole Arab world, 
including King Hussein himself, accepted that 
the future of Palestine was to be a matter for 
the Palestinians themselves to choose and not 
one to be imposed by one party to the dispute 
or the other. You will remember that on that 
occasion, although up till then the West Bank 
had been part of Jordan, the Jordanian delega-
tion and the king himself formally renounced 
the right to settle the future of the West Bank 
and said that it must be a matter for the Pales-
tinians themselves. 
From that moment on an altogether new series 
of events was set in course, because until then 
it had been a matter of argument between other 
sovereign states what should happen and what 
should be the fate of a particular course of action. 
But for the first time it was generally agreed 
that the Palestine question could not be settled 
except by the Palestinians themselves, on a basis 
of self-determination of what they wanted. So 
another milestone was created, going right back 
to 1947 when the future of the then declared 
Arab state was to be a matter for the inhabitants 
of that area to settle for themselves. 
But, of course, it has become much more 
complicated than that, since, because of the 
wars and for other reasons, there has been a 
mass exodus of Palestinians who have since been 
having families, and their families have been 
having families, who are now living outside the 
West Bank and outside the Gaza Strip. Those of 
you who have found time to read the full body 
of the report may have taken note of the fact 
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that of the total population of Jordan at this 
moment one-half are Palestinians deriving from 
the other side of the Jordan river. 
Therefore, in those circumstances, the Govern-
ment of Jordan - I think with considerable 
vision - have treated the refugees well, in the 
sense that they have given them full rights at 
home and, if they wish, a Jordanian passport. 
But they have all been given specific undertakings 
that this does not interfere with their wish, if 
that is what they want, to return to their own 
homeland. There is no attempt here at aggran-
disement by Jordan. They can make a clear 
choice. But it does not even stop at the borders 
of Jordan, nor even at those refugees who have 
gone to Lebanon, to Syria and, just a few, to 
Egypt. 
Because of their longer contact with the 
western world and perhaps because of some 
native qualities of their own, the Palestinians are 
a very highly intelligent and able people. In 
fact, one of the constant impacts that any tour 
of the Middle East makes upon one is the realisa-
tion that the Palestinians have now established 
themselves in situations of considerable influence, 
authority, position and, in some cases, dominance 
right throughout the Arab world down to the 
Gulf States of Kuwait and elsewhere. None of 
those rulers could be secure in his position if 
he did not take account of the fact that there 
are living in his midst large numbers of highly 
intelligent and able people who have a dream 
of a homeland of their own, even if some of them 
may never wish to go there. 
Some of my Jewish friends in America have 
always pointed out to me, with complete under-
standing on my part, their feeling that, although 
they do not necessarily want to go to Israel, 
they want to feel that they have a homeland. This 
has been one of the themes of Jewish people 
throughout the world, even those who live in 
other countries. 
Still they have the wish and the spiritual 
concept of a homeland and, to their credit, they 
are always ready to try to support that concept. 
However, they of all people should understand 
that the Palestinians now feel exa0tly the same. 
It is amazing how many parallels there are 
between the attitudes of those peoples and yet 
they are locked in a dispute as to how this 
important problem should be solved. 
When I was in a refugee camp in Jordan, I 
asked a five year old girl where her home was. 
Not only she had been born in Jordan but her 
parents, yet she still gave her address as a 
village in what had been British Palestine. If 
one visits these refugee establishments - one 
can no longer call them "camps", as far as 
Jordan is concerned ; I did not see the others -
one still sees the UNRW A ration card with a 
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photograph on it. Often it is not used to draw 
food because the people have managed to achieve 
some degree of economic advance. To them it is 
a passport and one of their most precious pos-
sessions which they will produce almost without 
being asked to do so, a passport in some ways 
more valuable than any issued by another govern-
ment may be. To anyone who doubts this I will 
merely say that he should go and see it for 
himself. Whatever his views on the solution of 
the problem, he will find that what I have said 
is quite correct. 
There are only two more milestones that I 
have either the time or the opportunity to men-
tion. Obviously, I must refer to the Oamp David 
agreement. .As I have said in my report, this 
was a major step towards averting the threat of 
a major war in that area for a long time to 
come. The meetings at Oamp David resulted in 
a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, to 
their mutual benefit, and no one, least of all 
your Rapporteur, wishes to detract in any way 
from that aspect of Camp David. We all 
welcomed the end of a military conflict which 
had long threatened. 
To be perfectly frank, however - and I con-
sider that this is increasingly the view of western 
governments as well as of individuals - whilst 
Oamp David represents the attainment of a peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel, it would be 
folly to imagine that it settles in any way the 
other burning issue, the Palestine question. It 
does not. For that there will have to be a 
separate solution which involves going right back 
to 1947 and the right of the Palestinian people 
to express their own wishes about their own 
future. As far as this problem is concerned 
Camp David has actually been counter~ 
productive, because it did not involve the under-
standing - certainly not one viewed in the 
same light by both Egypt and Israel - that the 
Palestine people alone must decide their future 
and not have it negotiated by other powers with 
whom they were not directly involved. 
Another unfortunate result of Camp David 
was that it separated from the rest of the Arab 
world one of the most moderate and sensible 
states and one of the most moderate and sensible 
leaders, Sadat. This has meant that less moderate 
individuals and states in the Arab world have 
gained influence following on the virtual dis-
appearance of the influence of Egypt, the 
largest of all the Arab states. 
The sorriest aspect of Camp David, apart from 
the two observations I have already made is 
that, quite clearly, Egypt and Israel have two 
totally different concepts of the future of 
Palestine. This must be spelt out. The Israeli 
95 
TENTH SITTING 
Government have made it perfectly clear that 
for them there can never be an independent 
Palestinian state as promised in the 1947 United 
Nations resolution, which has never been 
repealed. The Egyptians, on the other hand, say 
that there must ultimately be, however long the 
time scale, an opportunity for the Palestinian 
people on the West Bank to decide what they 
themselves want. It is, therefore, very difficult 
for us to build on Camp David, which one or 
two people have suggested to me, when there is 
not one Camp David but two and possibly three 
when it comes to interpreting what is supposed 
to be done. 
First, just as in the case of Resolution 242, the 
parties have to agree just what Camp David 
meant for the future of the Palestinian people. 
Only then may it be possible to build on it · 
until then it is totally unrealistic to talk about 
building a future Palestinian agreement upon 
!he aooord when the two principal signatories 
mvolved have totally different ideas on what 
the accord is ultimately designed to achieve. All 
this argument about autonomv and the rest of 
it does not in any way overc~me the basic dif-
ference of opinion which exists. 
I went to Jordan at a time when the King was 
in New York making a speech which spelt out 
perfectly clearly the attitude of his government. 
For the first time in an international forum he 
actually said that, as far as Jordan was con-
~erne~~ he wanted the Palestinian people, the 
inhabitants of the area, to have complete self-
determination and the opportunity to express 
their wishes. He made it clear that they could 
opt either for comptete independence, if that 
was their wish, or for some kind of federal 
arrangement with Jordan, if that was their wish, 
or they could opt for some association of a con-
federal nature w.ith Israel, if it was their wish. 
But for the first time, in a speech endorsed by 
everyone - because the Egyptians theinselves 
did not differ in any way from what was said 
- it was stated by the leader of an Arab countrv 
that a solution could be built only by paying 
due attention to the wishes of the inhabitants 
themselves. 
It is only by proceeding in that manner that 
we can see some light at the end of the tunnel b~use it is idle to imagine that this proble~ 
will go away simply because it is ignored. I have 
already mentioned that the Palestinians are no 
longer a small, impoverished people living on 
the West Bank. They are an hifluential and an 
increasingly influential, people stretchi~g right 
through the whole of A:vabia, and this situation 
is n.ot going to change simply by the passage 
of time. 
So what have we to do now? What course 
have we to advocate ? First, I must mention the 
question of the continuation of settlements on 
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the West Bank by the Israeli Government. We 
had the benefit of listening in Strasbourg to 
General Dayan defending staunchly his govern-
ment's policy and being obviously surprised, as 
he made clear, at the lack of appreciation he 
received for the point of view he expounded that 
these settlements should continue. He made other 
points about the future of that land itself. 
There is obviously a difference of opinion 
whether the Camp David agreement on the cessa-
tion of new settlements was to last for three 
months until the peace treaty was signed or to 
go on during the period when the future of the 
Palestinian people was being negotiated. But 
whatever else is happening one of the most 
disturbing factors in that part of the world, 
which makes it difficult for moderate and 
balanced voices to prevail, is .that the settlement 
areas are increasing. I give the Assembly only 
one statistic, for the figures are given in the 
report. At the moment 2 % of the population 
either occupy or have reserved legally 27 % of 
the .total land area of the West Bank. 
You have given me a warning, Mr. President, 
but this is a long and intricate report covering 
three subjects. I have only two other sensitive 
points to mention. The first is a recognition 
that the state of Israel is there but the Palesti-
nians, or the PLO, if that is their body for nego-
tiation, are plainly a major factor. Equally, one 
cannot expect them to negotiate unless the 
Israelis accept the reality of the possibility of a 
state of Palestine, an Arab state, emerging in due 
course of time : recognition has to be a two-way 
project. 
Finally, I appeal here to all sides, Arab, PLO, 
Israel and everyone else, to accept that at this 
time it is grossly irresponsible when we are 
trying to reach some kind of settlement for 
anyone - and I repeat anyone - under what-
ever pretext to indulge in acts of violence, ter-
rorism or military action. This is an appallingly 
difficult situation and only if all sides try to 
act in an objective and practical way can an end 
be achieved. I believe that in this instance a 
united voice from this Assembly, as was expres-
sed by the vote in the General Affairs Com-
mittee, by 16 votes to 0, will send out a message 
of our understanding but also one urging all the 
people concerned to think in terms of a peaceful 
settlement of the problem. But peace, to be 
enduring, has to involve justice. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- I thank the Rapporteur 
for his report. 
The debate is now open. 
I caN first Mr. Grant. He will be followed by 
Mr. Corallo and then by Mr. Muller. 
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Mr. GRANT (United Kingdom). - The 
whole Assembly is indebted to Sir Frederic 
Bennett for the immense diligence with which 
he has tackled one of the most difficult prob-
lems we have to face today. I congratulate him 
also on the effort he has made to be 
scrupulously impartial as between the two sides 
in this appalling situation. I must say that any 
differences I have with him are really more of 
emphasis, because broadly I support the 
principles behind this report, which is dedicated 
to the one thing we all want to see achieved -
peace in the Middle East. 
On the slight differences of emphasis, I want 
to say a word first about the Camp David 
peace treaty. I happen to believe that that was 
one of the most remarkable achievements in the 
war-torn history of the Middle East. I accept 
that there are many matters stiH unresolved. I 
accept that it is narrowly confined to only the 
two countries and I accept that its provisions are 
not applicable to the whole of the Middle East 
and all the nations therein. I accept also that it 
still leaves the Palestine problems unresolved. 
But the fact that Europe played only a passive 
role in this event should not justify our describ-
ing the Camp David treaty as a failure. On the 
contrary, I believe that it was a shining example 
of what can be achieved given good will between 
the two sides who were at each other's throats. 
Who would have thought, for example, only a 
few years ago, when these two nations were locked 
in appalling and bloody battle, that what was 
achieved at Camp David would, in fact, be 
achieved? 
It is arguable, of course, that this should have 
been extended in some way to other nations in 
the Middle East, but I believe that if one had 
sought to broaden the basis of the Camp David 
agreement, to this day we should never have had 
any agreement at all, and it was right to proceed 
as the Americans did in dealing with one basic 
problem at a time. I accept that there can be no 
lasting peace until agreement is reached on the 
Palestine problem and I appreciate the efforts 
made by responsible Arab heads of state, parti-
cularly King Hussein, who has been particularly 
responsible in this regard - as one would 
expect, he being ·an Old Harrovian - but I 
accept also that it is entirely unrealistic to ignore 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation. However, 
we are entitled to ask : "Who are the PLO ?" Are 
they really representative of the people who are 
so much concerned in this problem ? 
They have made attempts recently to present 
a more respectable image to the rest of the world 
and there are naive but honourable people who 
now believe that the PLO is a credible and 
respectable body. But I do not share that view. 
They still have blood on their hands, and until 
the blood is properly wiped away, they cannot 
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be regarded 'as a body with which civilised people 
can properly negotiate. 
Therefore, a precondition to any settlement 
of the Palestinian problem is that the PLO 
should renounce, totally and absolutely, all forms 
of terrorism, and, secondly, that the PLO should 
accept unequivocally the right of Israel to exist. 
These are essential prerequisites. 
In exchange for that, I believe that we are 
entitled to expect, as Sir Frederic wisely said, 
that the Israelis should cease their policy of 
settlements on the West Bank. There is by no 
means unanimity in Israel over this policy, as 
we have seen over the resignation of General 
Dayan and from other observations. These are 
the two essential aspects which both sides must 
accept before there can be a resolution of the 
problem. 
I want to refer briefly to Iran, because this 
question is a new element which has emerged 
in the whole Middle Eastern problem in recent 
months. The activities of the regime in Iran over 
the hostages from the American Embassy are 
not just an affront to civilised modern-world 
nations ; they are an outrage against civilisation 
itself. To kidnap innocent men and women as 
a form of ransom in order to enable the regime 
to wreak bloody revenge upon a former ruler is 
a course of action not justified in the Koran or 
any other religious document. The actions of the 
regime are analogous to those of the hijackers 
whom we have been condemning for so many 
years. They deserve the total condemnation of 
civilised people everywhere. 
The action of the Iranian regime also has grave 
defence implications for the whole of the Middle 
East - another problem added to the existing 
difficulties - and, indeed, it will increase the 
instability among the Gulf states, which I fear 
will lack confidence in the will or the ability of 
the United States to sustain peace, on which they 
have relied for so long. Of course, it is in just 
this state of affairs that the Soviet Union, 
although at present lying passive and watching 
the situation, could be tempted to meddle. 
What is the responsibility for this state of 
affairs in Iran ~ To a great extent - to use an 
English phrase - the United States could be 
said to have been hoisted on its own petard. I 
have never particularly commended the course 
of policy that the United States adopted, going 
back to immediate post-war years, with 
Mr. Mossadegh, and, to some extent the Americans' 
equivocal role over the Suez problem. In recent 
times the Americans have suffered from what I 
call a post-Vietnam depression, which has 
somewhat emasculated them. They have these 
4 
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difficulties, but they nevertheless deserve our 
support. 
But I also attach a great deal of blame for the 
situation in Iran to the left-wing elements in 
many countries which have kept up and devoted 
a great deal of energy to an anti-Shah campaign 
without considering the possible alternatives that 
would result from their actions. In the report my 
colleague, Sir Frederic, quotes very appropriately 
from a British author, Richard Adams. Perhaps 
I could cap that by reminding the Assembly of 
what William Pitt, a former British Prime Min-
ister, said at the time of the French Revolution 
and the reign of terror. He said : "They were 
men extreme in all save humanity, seeking to use 
the cry of liberty for the many to become a 
stalking horse to provide licence for the few". 
This is what has happened in Iran, and those 
who encouraged the elements which overthrew 
the Shah have a heavy responsibility to bear. 
What, therefore, do we do in this situation ~ 
I believe that the important thing is that the 
whole of the West, the whole of WEU, the 
whole of the Community and the Council of 
Europe should remain absolutely united in their 
condemnation of what is happening in Iran. If 
we can do this and show our condemnation in a 
united fashion on this occasion, that, and that 
alone, will make some impact on the appalling 
situation from which the whole world is now 
in danger. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I call Mr. Corallo. 
Mr. CORALLO (Italy) (Translation). --
Mr. President, at time of serious international 
tension such as we are now living through, 
originating in the very same part of the world 
referred to in the draft recommendation we are 
now discussing, a peace initiative by Europe 
would be undoubtedly not only timely but also 
likely to bear fruit, insofar as Europe is able to 
play a positive role in this dire emergency. 
Unfortunately the impression we are being 
given is that the opportunity is being frittered 
away out of pusillanimity and inability to speak 
out what we all think. 
We are, let us be quite clear, fully aware that 
these are ·complex matters which are getting more 
and more involved as each day goes by, and we 
shall not criticise our Rapporteur for failing to 
pluck a final solution out of his top-hat. What 
we do criticise him for is getting himself dug in 
in ambiguous situations, pulling his punches and 
failing to set out in the draft recommendation 
the conclusions that naturally flow from some 
of the apposite remarks in the explanatory 
memorandum. 
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Hence the recommendation remains timorous, 
ambiguous, incapable of giving a guideline 
enabling the member states to take positive 
action in the way of mediation and peace. 
Everybody knows that the Palestinian nation is 
nowadays legitimately and authoritatively 
represented by the PLO. Our Rapporteur knows 
it too, and says so in his explanatory memoran-
dum. But paragraph 5 of the recommendation 
speaks of negotiations with "valid Palestinian 
representatives" not otherwise identified except 
that the existence of the PLO is referred to 
in paragraph 6 in connection with the cessation 
of terrorist acts. There cannot be, Sir Frederic, 
any valid peace agreements in the Middle East 
that do not also involve the responsibilities of the 
PLO. The most glaring example, as our Rap-
porteur rightly says, is the Camp David agree-
ments. But is it possible to appeal to one of the 
parties fundamentally involved while using a 
circumlocution to avoid legitimating his right to 
sit at the negotiating table ? Can we be listened 
to by the Palestinian nation if we confuse ter-
rorist acts by the extremist fringe alien to the 
PLO with warlike acts conducted by the latter 
on Israeli or Israeli-occupied territory ? If the 
aim of the countries we represent is to seek a fair 
and lasting peace, we have to appreciate fully the 
motivations of the contending parties and not 
distort the nature of political and military action 
by the Palestinians. Nor can we simply speak of 
Israel's right to be an independent state with 
clearly defined frontiers, and then skip airily 
over the Palestinians' right to their own home-
land, state, territory and equally well-defined 
frontiers. It is just silly to offer the Palestinian 
people, waging a patriotic war, recognition of its 
own existence : no need to recognise what is 
obvious. The Palestinian nation knows that it 
exists and does not need us to tell it so. 
We can ask the PLO to put an end to warlike 
acts, to abandon the hope of the political solution 
it seeks - a single Palestinian state, national and 
non-religious; we can ask them to accept the 
state of Israel and merely discuss its boundaries ; 
but what can we ask it to forgo in exchange ? 
Recognition of the PLO's right to take part in 
any negotiation, a Palestinian state and defini-
tion of its frontiers - these are questions that 
cannot be denied if we want to secure genuine 
and lasting peace. In the contrary case, our coun-
tries will not be listened to, nor be able to play 
any positive role. 
I also believe that we should recast the section 
of the recommendation devoted to the Iranian 
question, which sounds superficial and hollow in 
the light of the latest developments. Above all 
I beg the Rapporteur to acknowledge that to 
mention in the same paragraph Iran and 
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Afghanistan is an unforgivable howler for 
anyone who has pretentious to dealing with 
foreign policy. But that is not the point : it is 
more serious, one that if we face up to it, cannot 
be easily got round. The world looks on these 
days with tremendous apprehension at what is 
going on in Tehran, and we are all aware that 
a situation has arisen that might have tragic 
consequences of incalculable magnitude. I shall 
certainly not seek to diminish the gravity of the 
Iranians' gesture. It will be more and more 
difficult to safeguard world peace if every 
agreement, every standard of international law 
is openly flouted. It will be difficult in future 
to prevent every country from trying to take the 
law into its own hands by unacceptable methods. 
Nevertheless I am bound to say that if we wish 
to understand what is happening in Iran we 
must have the courage to ask ourselves how so 
much hatred and fanaticism, which every passing 
day proves to be more blimpish than religious, 
can have been stored up. 
To be sure, by your leave, Mr. Rapporteur, it 
is not by raking over the happenings of the third 
and fourth centuries A.D. that we shall uncover 
the roots of that hatred, but rather by pondering 
the more recent fate of Dr. Mossadegh, say, and 
what he represents ; how he was humiliated and 
trampled underfoot, from abroad and against the 
will of the Persian nation. The Rapporteur's 
hurried and mealy-mouthed reference to this 
dramatic episode tells of unwillingness to make 
any attempt to understand. Consequently nothing 
can be done to appease that frightful groundwave 
of hatred now indiscriminately swamping the 
West and which rightly preoccupies and dismays 
us all. The only contribution capable of being 
given today to defuse the Iranian time-bomb and 
bring back to rational and political terms a 
struggle for independence that has assumed a 
bloody-minded, impassioned, irrational guise, is a 
merciless self-criticism by the West. 
The draft recommendation proposes abstention 
from sales of arms to Iran, a wise counsel that 
needs to be more universal, for we ought to 
prevent the supply of arms to any of the 
hotspots where there is a risk of a flare-up. But 
the problem is definitely not a military one and 
cannot be resolved in this manner. It is not the 
murderous weapons formerly supplied to the 
Shah that now threaten to plunge the world into 
tragedy : it is, I repeat, fanaticism, hatred 
xenophobia. ' 
So let us ask Iran, on behalf of all the nations 
of Europe, to renounce the illegal detention of 
hostages, and to free them immediately and 
unconditionally ; but let us not present ourselves 
as lamenting the overthrown tyrant and sneering 
at the greater freedom there may have been in 
the heyday of the Savak. Let us not joke about 
pain, bloodshed, the ordeal of a nation that has 
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lost its reason now precisely because it has been 
tried too far. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you. I should 
like to inform you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that 
we shall resume the debate later today and con-
tinue until noon. 
5. Address by Mr. Bemard-Reymond, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies 
and Gentlemen, the next Order of the Day is an 
address by Mr. Pierre Bernard-Reymond, Min-
ister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic. 
I bid you welcome, Mr. Bernard-Reymond. V-le 
are very happy that you have come to address 
our Assembly. May I also thank you on behalf 
of my colleagues and the members of the Assem-
bly for the most enjoyable reception you and 
Madame Bernard-Reymond gave last night. 
Would you please come to the speaker's 
rostrum. (Applause) 
Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, it is with renewed pleasure that I 
stand before your Assembly today. Last year I 
had occasion to assure you of the French 
Government's sustained and close interest in your 
institution and of course in your activities. May 
I repeat the importance that the French author-
ities attach to the work of this Assembly because 
of the distinction of its members and the specific 
nature of its powers. 
'rhis is a particularly solemn occasion. The year 
1979 marks a new stage in the life of Western 
European Union, its twenty-fifth anniversary. 
WEU is celebrating this year a quarter of a 
century of work, of concerted effort, of close 
co-operation among its members. 
As you know, the Council took this opportun-
ity to stress the outstanding contribution made 
by WEU towards developing such co-operation ; 
it reaffirmed the importance the member states 
attach to realising the objectives laid down in 
the treaty, in particular to that of ensuring 
legitimate collective defence in accordance with 
the commitments taken. It also welcomed the 
essential contribution made by the WEU Assem-
bly, the only parliamentary institution in which 
the representatives of the member states come 
together to discuss joint security matters. 
It is worth stressing this triple role played by 
WEU at the very time that your twenty-fifth 
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session is being held in a context influenced by 
the discussions broached by signature of the 
SALT II agreements and just before an impor-
tant meeting of the Atlantic Council. 
Security problems are constantly at the heart 
of the preoccupations of governments and 
peoples. The French Government takes the view 
that Western European Union is an ideal forum 
for discussing such matters. It has not aged and 
its role remains unchanged ; it is the forum for 
dealing with security problems in their double 
aspect of defence and co-operation in the equip-
ment area, and disarmament. We feel that, far 
from being contradictory, the two aspects are 
closely complementary. 
In this task, WEU has to avoid two pitfalls : 
that of being over-sensitive to passing events and 
seeking to give collective expression to concerns 
that might lead it to trespass on the competence 
of other bodies; and, conversely, that of abdicat-
ing or allowing to be questioned its powers in 
matters coming within its primary scope. In the 
specific field of armaments co-operation, certain 
statements made in the course of your proceed-
ings in 1979 prompt me to recall once again that 
your Assembly should remain the only forum in 
which European countries discuss with one 
another what should and can be done in this 
area, without prejudice to the responsibilities and 
activities of the IEPG. I would pay tribute in 
particular to WED's Standing Armaments Com-
mittee, which makes a most valuable contribution 
to these problems. 
Western European Union's twofold concern in 
the security area - co-operation for defence 
purposes and disarmament- also guides French 
policy. 
Our defence policy is clear and constant. 
Basically it relies on the independence of our 
forces and the sovereignty of our decisions. This 
explains why the French authorities are so 
attentive to the development of defence and 
devote such great resources to it. We intend to 
maintain our forces at the requisite level to 
ensure their credibility as a deterrent and we 
do not intend to enter into any machinery of 
discussion that might suggest our going back on 
the decision we took with regard to the integrated 
military organisation of NATO or the thought 
that we agree to let others decide how far we 
should modernise our national strategic force. 
It was in this spirit too that we have already 
announced that we would not be taking part in 
the SALT Ill negotiations. 
Such independence does not, of course, 
preclude solidarity with our allies ; rather it is 
the means of ensuring it. The value of our con-
tribution to the deterrent capability of the 
Alliance is certainly proportional to the volume 
of our own forces, but even more to their 
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independence and credibility. It is by carefully 
preserving both that France will do its allies the 
greatest service. 
The will to defend oneself is not one of aggres-
sion. On the contrary, France is able, because it 
is strong, to set at rest the misgivings nurtured 
by the piling up of armaments. What is impor-
tant is that in so doing, it also affirms, as well 
as its own, the right of every state to security, 
independence and sovereignty. 
This means, as I said last year, that there is 
not and ought not to be, in the world of today, 
for a country such as France, any contradiction 
between security and disarmament. At a time o.f 
multiplication of power centres, of the assertion 
of regional differences, of increasingly worrying 
threats which are not only confined to the super-
powers among themselves, there can be no pro-
gress in disarmament talks unless they eventually 
consolidate the security which is the legitimate 
aim of every state. In this respect, France must 
clearly play a major role. You will remember the 
words to that effect by the President of the 
Republic in his address to the United Nations 
in May 1978. 
But what I would like to say is that France 
has too much belief in the future of mankind to 
give way to resignation, and is also too 
experienced to regard disarmament as easy to 
achieve. Our endeavour is also to be realistic ; 
our objectives are those of a diplomacy alive to 
the tangible realities of our day and age. 
It can be measured, first of all, by the progress 
already made, thanks, inter alia, to action taken 
by France in the international institutions in 
which all the world's states foregather to discuss 
disarma:r;nent. New machinery has been installed, 
such as the Geneva Committee on Disarmament 
with refurbished procedures, composition and 
aims, or the Disarmament Commission in New 
York. The fact that China is also now con-
templating taking its seat at Geneva confirms 
that this was a necessary and important reform. 
France's most innovatory proposals also bear 
witness to its realism. The proposal for an inter-
national satellite control agency to provide a 
means of monitoring with certainty whether 
commitments are being honoured, an idea already 
being taken up by the international community, 
or the proposal for an international disarmament 
research institute to mobilise scientists for the 
cause, whose creation the United Nations' Con-
sultative Council has, as you know, recently 
approved in principle. 
But the best indication of France's realistic 
approach is in my view the efforts it is making 
to initiate an effective disarmament process at 
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regional level. I refer to the proposal put for-
ward in May 1978 for a European disarmament 
conference. 
This proposal, addressed to all the countries 
of Europe, covering the whole territory of 
Europe, founding its logic on an exact analysis 
of the specific threats impending over the con-
tinent but largely ignored in ongoing negotia-
tions, should in my view constitute a major 
element of your deliberations today. 
What are the specific threats that are causing 
Europe disquiet~ Not so much those of nuclear 
war, for such a war, if it did occur as a result 
of a failure of deterrence, would by its very 
existence prove that the stakes involved and the 
protective systems that had given way far 
exceeded the European dimension alone. Rather, 
it is the threats engendered by the one-sided 
increase in numbers and in strike capability of 
conventional weaponry. It is the threats that 
might spread by people panicking at the sudden 
multiplication or increase of military movements 
and exercises using major conventional weapons. 
Aside from a nuclear show-down against which 
the only effective safeguard is the nuclear deter-
rent, the risks to the security of our continent 
are those of potential surprise attacks or 
demonstrations designed to intimidate : un-
explained troop movements, exessively large-
scale military exercises, over-frequent manoeuvres, 
abnormal call-ups. 
Such threats are made perilously imaginable 
by two phenomena : first, European public 
opinion's becoming accustomed to the virtues of 
nuclear deterrence and putting its trust in the 
progress of political detente ; second, besides 
this lowering of its mental guard, the build-up of 
conventional weapons which political detente does 
nothing to retard, and the eastern bloc's com-
fortable lead in this area. 
There are two ways of countering these 
dangers : to regulate the use of conventional 
weaponry in peacetime, and scale it down in 
size and fire power. 
Regulating the use of conventional weaponry 
means attempting to draft a code for the political 
use of force and so prevent surprise attacks ; 
just as nuclear deterrence is couched in subtle 
semio1ogical terms, a plain language could be 
evolved among Europeans for reading the true 
significance, military as well as political, of 
large-scale manoeuvres, troop movements, etc. To 
dispel the uncertainties now surrounding such 
exercises, to prevent a show of ordinary 
manoeuvres from concealing a will to intimidate 
or even launch surprise attacks for which the 
warning would come too late, these are the 
objectives of confidence-building measures, 
simultaneously binding, militarily significant, 
verifiable and applicable on a continent-wide 
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scale, which France proposes as a first phase in 
its plan for a European disarmament conference. 
This gives some measure of their novelty and 
effectiveness compared with those put forward 
in other frameworks so far. 
But regulating the use of conventional weapons 
in peacetime is not enough to avert the threat : 
too much trust in the confidence-building 
measures for their own sake would carry the 
additional danger of anaesthetising public 
opinion. Even codified, the threat born of the 
imbalance in conventional weapons which Europe 
labours under today would still remain. 
What we have to change in the final resort is 
therefore the volume of actual forces confront-
ing one another : an effective reduction in major 
conventional armaments is essential if we want 
to ensure Europe's security at a lower and less 
dangerous balance of forces level. Hence, in its 
proposal for a disarmament conference, France 
sees the adoption of meaningful confidence-
building measures on the military plane as a 
preparatory step towards conventional disarma-
ment. Our view is that, while it is unrealistic to 
seek practical results in disarmament without 
first taking such confidence-building measures 
to modify the way in which the states perceive 
possible threats to their security, it would be 
equally unrealistic merely to boost confidence 
whereas the clash of arms was at our doors and 
we were stopping our ears to it. 
Because it takes a step-by-step approach, from 
the least to the most sensitive issues, while at 
the same time not losing sight of the final 
objective of limiting and reducing armaments, 
the European disarmament conference may today 
be seen as the best way of opening the door to 
that genuine dialogue on security to which all 
our nations aspire. Based on the political head-
way detente has already made, it is capable not 
only of consolidating but of extending it further 
by means of practical results that every citizen 
of Europe can appreciate. 
Such a dialogue and progress are to be 
accomplished by thirty-five partners - of this 
France is convinced. The question then is how 
to link the dialogue we propose with that of the 
CSCE. For us, the answer is clear: both must 
be closely interlinked while yet remaining 
separate. The links must be established at the 
vital points. First, at the point of departure : it 
is in our view at the coming meeting in Madrid 
that we should decide on the principle and define 
the terms of reference of the European disarma-
ment conference. Then, at the conclusion of the 
preliminary phase, we believe the next meeting 
thereafter would assess the results of the 
confidence-building measures and decide, on the 
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basis of such assessment, on the transition to 
the next stage, relating to disarmament. But 
while the linkage must be secured, we must also 
avoid confusion. 
Several reasons prohibit us from discussing 
these questions in depth inside the CSCE. First, 
France wishes an overall and balanced concept 
to be respected at that conference. What France 
proposes will avoid throwing the discussions in 
Madrid out of step with the procedures of the 
CSCE in general, to the detriment of other 
equally important sections of the final act, while 
thinking through, as everyone wishes, the prob-
lem of security. Success in this area will redound 
to the credit of the CSCE just as much as pro-
gress in other baskets. Another reason is precisely 
France's will to prevent atrophy of the CSCE 
by, on the contrary, opening up a longer-term 
prospect, both progressive and realistic. 
The will to defend ourselves but also precau-
tions to curb threats ; ambitious aims and 
realistic methods : these are the poles on which 
French policy on security turns. 
The reason I have gone into some detail about 
this policy is, first, that I know I shall find in 
this Assembly the audience most highly-qualified 
and therefore the most likely to understand it. 
But another reason is that in the present econo-
mic climate our preoccupations and aspirations 
are broadly shared, and the ideas of some of us 
make a useful contribution to those of others. 
What is at issue for our peoples who have suf-
fered so much from war is the security of their 
future and peace in our continent. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
Mr. Bernard-Reymond for his address. 
The Minister has kindly expressed his wil-
lingness to answer any questions which might be 
put to him by the members of the Assembly on 
the subjects with which he has just dealt. 
Mr. Minister, would you prefer to answer the 
questions collectively ? 
Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic) (Translation). - As you please, 
Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Then you 
shall give a collective answer. 
I call Mr. Jung. 
Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation). -Mr. Min-
ister, you have just rightly reminded us that 
the President of the French Republic has made 
three concrete proposals : the establishment of 
a world satellite control agency, the organisation 
of regional disarmament conferences and the 
funding of aid to developing countries through 
a contribution based on states' military budgets. 
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Could you let us know what world reactions 
there have been to these proposals, which I am 
sure our Assembly would be interested to hear 
about? 
The PRESIDENT (Transl~J,tion). - I call 
Mr. Boucheny. 
Mr. BOUCHENY (France) (Translation). -
Mr. Minister, in all the WEU texts the French 
forces are regarded as components of the allied 
nuclear deterrence capability. French nuclear 
weapons are of medium range. They are there-
fore, according to what has been declared, to be 
included in the calculation of overall NATO 
strength. 
What does this make of France's independent 
policy and all-round defence strategy 1 How are 
we to reconcile declarations by the French 
Government that French nuclear arms are central 
systems, with the reality of their siting, only 
pointed at the Soviet Union 1 In fact, any 
strategic system would seem by its very nature 
to be all-round, for otherwise it is only one com-
ponent in higher-level, longer-range system. 
What is the French concept of the balance of 
force Y 
My second question is this : the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of our Assem-
bly has adopted a serious text recommending the 
deployment of medium-range missiles on Euro-
pean soil. The WEU Assembly, meeting in Paris, 
is called upon to ratify this text. 
How can the French Government tolerate on 
French territory an act so damaging to peace ? 
Popular opposition to the missiles is so strong in 
Europe that Mr. van den Bergh's recommenda-
tion had to be accompanied by a proposed 
moratorium of eighteen months on deployment 
of the new weapons to allow the Soviet proposals 
to be discussed. The French Government, in 
accordance with the nation's will, is in duty 
bound to supplement these by concrete disarma-
ment proposa1s rebuffing those who, from out-
side, advocate rearmament and the cold war. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. Deschamps. 
Mr. DESCHAMPS (France) (Translation).-
Mr. Minister, at the Brussels symposium organ-
ised by our Assembly on standardisation of 
armaments, service officers, senior officials and 
members of the boards of national enterprises 
spoke in support of integrating armaments 
industries. In view of the discretion which 
French civil servants and military personnel are 
required to observe, may I ask whether these 
persons submitted their speeches to the ministers 
concerned and whether, in that event, they 
represent the views of the French Government ? 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. V alleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). -
Mr. Minister, I believe that our Assembly will 
have noted with great interest your confirmation 
that our organisation is the only one having 
exclusive responsibilities in defence matters and 
authentically European in this respect. 
You referred to the disarmament problem. We, 
who carry defence responsibilities, pay great 
attention to disarmament, but only provided the 
political will to defend ourselves we have in com-
mon is asserted first. 
My question was partly answered by the 
affirmation of the effort you are willing to make 
for disarmament in a European framework. Is 
there a contradiction here ? According to you, 
there is not. Are they in the French view parallel 
cases ? Doubtless, but there is also France's will 
to persevere in a spirit of complementarity with 
the international effort already embarked upon. 
I understood your remarks just now as following 
the lines of such complementarity. It is not 
simply a matter of giving a boost to an inter-
national effort that is flagging but, if I under-
stand aright, it is France's intention to make a 
very active contribution to such disarmament 
under the European aegis. 
My second question is this. Are we to see in 
the project you have announced of raising in 
Madrid the plan for a European disarmament 
conference a reflection of the fact that the 
USSR may have renounced or somewhat toned 
down its earlier position, which seemed highly 
negative, notably in that it may have agreed to 
demand that nuclear weaponry be included in 
such global thoughts on disarmament ? Thank 
you in advance for your replies. 
The PRESIDENT.- I now call Mr. Roper. 
He will be followed by Mr. Banks. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I would 
assure the Minister of State that those who 
have heard him, apart from his French col-
leagues, appreciate what he had to say. I thank 
him very much for his kind words about the 
work of our Assembly and in particular his kind 
words on the work of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. Coming from such a 
senior French source his remarks were particu-
larly appreciated. 
I wonder whether he could tell us, in view of 
the Ottawa declaration recognising the role of 
British and French strategic nuclear weapons, 
whether the partners of France in WEU can 
feel sure that French nuclear weapons have a 
role to play in their defence, or whether they 
should assume that these weapons have only a 
national function. 
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I caH Mr. Banks, who will be followed by 
Mr. van Waterschoot. 
Mr. BANKS (United Kingdom).- The Min-
ister has made a powerful speech for disarma-
ment. Would he like to comment on the position 
of the MBFR talks, which have been going on 
with the Soviet Union for year after year but 
which have failed to reach any kind of agreement 
on disarmament? Will he recognise that there is 
a point of view that believes that the West must 
rearm and negotiate from a position of strength 
and parity with the Soviet Union ? 
Would he finally explain whether it is the 
position of the French Government, as I under-
stand from what he has said today, that they 
would be prepared to reduce their forces as a 
means of strengthening detente, and whether it 
is the policy of the French Government to reduce 
their spending on defence Y 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Banks. 
I call Mr. van Waterschoot. 
Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (Belgium) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. Minister, the French Government 
has let it be known that it approved the SALT II 
agreement. The latter affirms the two parties' 
intention to open in the near future the SALT Ill 
negotiations which are to cover continental-range 
nuclear weapons. Does the approval of SALT II 
imply that the French Government may be 
prepared to act in concert with its allies to ensure 
the success of SALT Ill ? 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- Are there 
no more questions ?... 
I call the Minister of State. 
Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, if you will allow me, I shall first 
answer Mr. Boucheny's question, which will 
incidentally give me an opportunity of reaffirm-
ing the main guidelines of our defence and 
security policies. In doing so, I shall be replying 
in advance to other questions put by succeeding 
speakers. 
I repeat to Mr. Boucheny what I said a few 
moments ago from the rostrum, namely that the 
French concept is based on what is called "sanc-
tuarisation" and deterrence of the strong by the 
weak, and that we consequently regard our 
defence system as a central system quite obvi-
ously founded on national independence and 
sovereignty. Therefore we do not have any so-
called theatre forces in our system ; they corres-
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pond not to a defence concept of massive deter-
rence but to one of strategic flexibility. Now, we 
do not take part in such an analysis and 
accordingly consider our forces to be entirely 
independent. Consequently, we do not agree that 
they should be quantified with others. If other 
states wish to do so, that is their own affair but, 
as far as we are concerned, we shall not take part 
in that sort of negotiation, and, what is more, 
we do not agree that our capability should be 
regarded as supplementary to, or in any way 
reinforcements for, another system or other 
forces. 
I therefore reaffirm here the wholly 
independent character of our forces, founded on 
national sovereignty. This independence is, I 
repeat, itself founded on the concept of nuclear 
deterrence and consequently does not entail any 
modernisation of theatre forces. 
You have also expressed the hope that France 
should make concrete proposals on disarmament. 
This subject took up a good deal of my address, 
and I think I explained to you in detail our 
proposals for a European disarmament confer-
ence. 
You will remember that, speaking in the United 
Nations, the President of the French Republic 
formulated a whole series of proposals concerning 
disarmament, based on each state's right to 
security. One of the characteristics of these pro-
posals was to approach the problem in a regional 
context, and we are implementing that approach 
by proposing a disarmament conference in 
Europe. 
I believe therefore that both by the proposals 
it has made, to which Mr. Jung alluded just 
now, and this even more specific and more wide-
ranging proposal for a European disarmament 
conference, France has shown its determination 
and anxiety to participate in the disarmament 
effort. Needless to say, based as it is on every 
state's right to security, this effort is no incite-
ment to reduce our defence effort. 
In saying this, I am answering the question 
put to me just now as to whether we did not 
think it expedient to negotiate from a position 
of strength, and as to our intentions regarding 
the reduction of our own forces. Well, I assert 
that France has no intention of diminishing or 
slowing down its defence effort, and will modern-
ise its own forces in a manner commensurate 
with whatever threats it may consider to be 
impending. 
Since I have started to answer one of your 
questions, I will venture to answer the first, 
relating to MBFR. As you aware, we shall not 
be participating in the MBFR negotiations. The 
fact is, we consider they have little chance of 
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succeeding. I do not know whether I should say 
"alas", but - hitherto at all events -develop-
ments over several years have unfortunately 
proved us right, for the negotiations are marking 
time. Moreover, we consider that MBFR do not 
cover a sufficient area ; they are too restricted 
and, as you know, in our proposed European 
disarmament conference, we suggest that the area 
be considerably extended compared with the 
MBFR area, to take in all European countries 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
Mr. Jung mentioned the proposal made by the 
President of the French Republic at the United 
Nations. 
So far as a satellite control agency is con-
cerned, it will from now on, at the request of 
the United Nations General Assembly, be kept 
under review by a group of experts which has 
been meeting regularly. Hence, our initiative has 
reached the stage of contacts among experts, 
which we hope will be continued, since they have 
not yet come up with any satisfactory formal 
and concrete proposal. Nevertheless the contacts 
have been positive, and we are glad to note that 
the proposal is being taken very seriously by 
the nations which have been good enough to 
send their experts to attend the discussions. 
With regard to the establishment of a fund 
for development aid financed by contributions 
based on military outlays, my answer is that this 
question too is now the subject of talks among 
experts, more especially to see how it could be 
integrated or co-ordinated with other existing 
initiatives or organisations with similar or 
parallel aims. 
Consequently, if I had to cast a balance-sheet, 
I would say that France is pleased that the 
proposals made at the United Nations have been 
taken into account and that the experts are 
putting their heads together on all these issues. 
Admittedly, we should perhaps like to see faster 
progress ; but the talks are proceeding at the 
pace of international diplomacy, which insists on 
caution but also compels us to arrive at concrete 
results, which is no easy matter. 
Mr. Deschamps referred to the Brussels sym-
posium. I should like to reassure him that the 
persons taking part were invited in a personal 
capacity. Consequently, the positions they may 
have taken in no way commit the French Govern-
ment. 
Mr. Valleix spoke of our proposal for a Euro-
pean disarmament conference and asked about the 
position of the Soviet Union on such a confer-
ence and, more especially, whether the nuclear 
issue would be on the agenda. 
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As you know, we are not in favour of including 
nuclear problems at the conference. Indeed, as 
I reminded you just now, we consider that the 
imbalance of conventional weapons in Europe is 
such that it alone confronts us with a very 
important problem that must be studied and 
discussed with the Eastern European countries. 
For one thing, we hope this conference may be 
enlarged in area to cover all the countries of 
Europe ; and we also hope that it may form part 
of the CSCE process, because we do not want to 
see this wither away. We believe that the possibil-
ity of agreeing at Madrid terms of reference for 
convening a conference at which confidence-
building measures would be studied at an initial 
phase, but would then lead on - we attach great 
importance to this sequence - to measures for 
the limitation and reduction of armaments, is a 
good way of ensuring progress in CSCE without 
at the same time upsetting its balance. 
For that reason, we do not think Madrid a 
suitable venue for such a conference. What we 
hope is that terms of reference may be defined 
at Madrid for a later conference, for we do not 
want Madrid to be just the forum in which only 
security and disarmament problems would be 
discussed. 
We hope, as no doubt do most nations parti-
cipating in the conference, that the baskets will 
be evenly balanced in respect of both the time 
taken up by them and the results likely to be 
obtained. 
I was also asked a question about SALT 11 and 
SALT Ill. The French Government does not 
take a negative view of SALT 11 and trusts the 
agreement will be ratified. That does not automa-
tically mean it considers it should be a party to 
the SALT Ill negotiations, a position that follows 
quite naturally from the reply I gave Mr. 
Boucheny just now. We consider that France has 
a central defence system and consequently it does 
not need to intervene or take part in negotiations 
that mainly concern the two major powers, the 
Soviet Union and the United States. 
Therefore, we shall not be participating in 
these negotiations, nor, either directly or indi-
rectly, in any peripheral consultations in their 
respect. 
I believe, Mr. President, I have answered all 
the questions put to me. If not, I am at your 
disposal to answer a final question. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Minister, for replying to the questions 
put to you by the members of our Assembly. 
I also thank you for coming here and look for-
ward to the next occasion. (Applause) 
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6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee, Doe. 820 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT.- Ladies and Gentlemen, 
we shall now resume the debate on the report by 
Sir Frederic Bennett. 
I now call Mr. Miiller. He will be followed by 
Mr. Deschamps. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Sir Frederic 
Bennett has, in a comprehensive survey, presented 
a picture of the situation in the Middle East. 
It would be very tempting to touch upon all the 
problems he has mentioned. That is not possible, 
however, as time is short, so I shall confine myself 
to a few essential points and so leave out items 
such as the question of Israel, that of the Pales-
tinians, and the special problems in this area. 
When one looks at the Middle East, one thinks 
of a barrel. I am thinking in this connection not 
so much of a barrel full of oil - though this 
might well be the first picture to spring to mind 
- as of a barrel full of gunpowder, which can 
easily explode because strategic interests have 
clashed for centuries in the Middle East area and 
because developments in the area have heightened 
tensions instead of reducing them. 
Sir Frederic shows this very clearly by taking 
the example of Afghanistan and that of Iran. In 
Afghanistan for instance, the strategic interests 
of Russia and Britain have clashed - one might 
almost say for centuries, but at least for decades 
- in such a way that since 1826 Afghanistan 
has come to be a kind of buffer state between the 
two. The situation in Iran was similar. It is inter-
esting to note that at a difficult time during the 
second world war a joint intervention from north 
and south by the Soviet Union, Britain and the 
United States made it possible to solve one 
Iranian problem -this was in 1941. It was by 
no means a simple matter to reverse this interim 
solution, for the Soviet Union had as you know 
actually established in the north of Iran a people's 
republic of its own - Azerbaidjan. This is in 
fact the only example in history of the Soviet 
Union's having relinquished, under the pressure 
of circumstances after 1946, a people's republic, 
a Marxist-Leninist state, that it had established. 
That the situation in the area became so 
explosive in the last two decades is because there 
were signs that a cultural revolution was develop-
ing in the area as well. Here one has to wonder 
whether the wealth which countries such as Iran 
drew from their exports of oil has always been a 
blessing for them. The population of Iran has 
undoubtedly lost its cultural identity through 
the leap from the Middle Ages into the present. 
The response to this development has been a 
5' 
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reaction which has led in turn to a cultural 
counter-revolution such as we are seeing in the 
present ~ituation in Iran. But, I repeat, we must 
understand that the leap from the Middle Ages 
into the Coca-Cola and MacDonald culture of 
1978 is not something that can be coped with 
without problems. 
The special role of the Soviet Union in this area 
is glaringly evident. It is pursuing a policy which 
goes right back to the time of the Czars. I will 
merely recall that in the talks between Molotov 
and Ribbentrop after the conclusion of the Hitler-
Stalin pact it was expressly laid down that the 
Soviet Union's sphere of interest reached south-
wards into the area of the Persian Gulf and that 
the principle was indeed observed at the time by 
the national socialist regime. Here we can see the 
long-standing nature of the Soviet Union's inter-
ests in this area. It is fascinating to re-read the 
notes made by the German ambassador, von der 
Schulenburg, on his talks with Molotov in the 
years 1940-41 about Soviet policy in this area. 
One sees the Soviet Union behaving in the area 
as a typically imperialist power, making and 
breaking alliances to suit its own immediate 
interests. There is, for instance, no commitment 
to common ideological aims, but action is based 
on immediate interests ; if it is possible to replace 
an ally which proves to be not strong enough 
by another which is stronger, this is done with-
out batting an eyelid. The old ally is dropped. 
A notorious example is the relationships of the 
Soviet Union with Somalia then with Ethiopia. 
Somalia was of interest only so long as Ethiopia 
was not available as an ally. The Eritrean Libera-
tion Front, which the Soviet Union had pre-
viously been supporting, was dropped in Ethio-
pia as soon as the immediate leaders in the area 
had been won over. Even questions of ideology 
have no part to play here. 
The same thing is to be seen today in Iran, 
where the atheistic Tudeh party is fighting for 
the theocratic Islamic state in precisely the same 
way the French Communist Party defended 
Hitler's pact with Stalin in 1939 and 1940. It 
was also possible to form an opinion on this 
subject in the Israel-Palestine area, when the 
Soviet Union was one of the first countries to 
recognise the state of Israel immediately after 
its creation. The long-term build-up of a Soviet 
intervention force in the Middle East, especially 
in the South Yemen area, has a long tradition 
behind it, for the first agreement on trade and 
friendship between the Soviet Union and an Arab 
state was the 1928 treaty with Yemen. If there 
are now, as is surmised, 40,000 troops from the 
Soviet Union, East Germany and other eastern 
bloc states in South Yemen, this constitutes an 
av~ilable offensive potential- one, furthermore, 
whiCh corresponds precisely with the military 
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structure of the Warsaw Pact - which could be 
the fuse that will ignite this veritable powder-
keg in the Middle East. 
There are also a few remarks that might be 
made about the special role of the Soviet Union 
in Iran. If the Soviet Union regarded itself as 
a civilised country - and this is a matter for it 
to decide itself, not just a question of my view 
- then there would surely be a possibility of 
concerted action against cruelty and brutality in 
this area, without involving imperialistic inter-
ests from whatever side. Today I feel that the 
real role of the Soviet Union in this area is 
different. I would be inclined to describe it as 
a sort of master of ceremonies - if I may use 
that term - of the Iranian revolution, a kind of 
master of ceremonies cherishing ,the hope that he 
may some day become the successor of a theo-
cratic state in this area. 
And what do we, the western nations, want 
in this area ~ I do not think that our aim can 
be to acquire influence or allies or actual depen-
dencies. It must be in our interest to have in the 
area independent, free nations with which we can 
discuss trading conditions and exchange ideas on 
reciprocal transfers of information, of know-how 
and also of raw materials. We want co-operation 
with countries which are certainly of great 
importance for Western Europe and also for 
North A!Jlerica. But we want these states to be 
independent. We want them to be able to make 
their decisions freely, end to dispose freely of 
their resources. 
We in the West have conunon interests with 
regard to this area ; we ought, then, to pursue a 
common policy towards it, forgetting our past 
rivalries. It is scarcely credible that a mere ten 
years ago there were clashes of interest between 
America and Britain, the interests, in fact, of 
Esso and BP, about an oasis located between 
Oman and Saudi Arabia. That time is now past. 
Today there can be a common western policy in 
the Middle East, a common policy of the civilised 
world, aimed at preserving peace in this area for 
a long time to come. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
We now go on with Mr. Deschamps, who will 
be followed by Dr. Miller and then by Mr. 
Cavaliere. 
Mr. DESCHAMPS (France) (Translation).-
Ladies and Gentlemen, three problems are discus-
sed in the draft recommendation and the report 
by Sir Frederic Bennett, Document 820 : the 
situation in Afghanistan, Iran and the Camp 
David agreements. 
I shall not discuss Afghanistan except to say 
that Sir Frederic's report and draft recommend-
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ation are gross meddling in that country's internal 
affairs. On the other hand, I should like to say 
rather more about Iran and the Camp David 
agreements. 
It is not the situation in Iran which is aggra-
vating the world's tension, but the aggressive 
attitude of the United States. For, whatever 
one's views of the methods of fighting used by 
the Iranian people, what is essential is the vali-
dity of their struggle to free themselves from 
feudalism, exploitation and the plundering of 
their wealth. 
As we have said before, the French communists 
are certainly against the taking of hostages and 
for the respect of diplomatic immunity. The fact 
remains that the methods by which a people fights 
are always imposed on them by the conditions 
they have to contend with. 
Remember that the Shah was restored to power 
in 1954 by a coup d'etat which overthrew Mossa-
degh, the man who nationalised Iranian oil. That 
coup d'etat was planned and financed by the 
CIA and the United States ambassador at the 
time. It was also the CIA that recruited, trained 
and financed the political police, the Savak, 
which, for twenty-five years, under its control, 
arrested, tortured and murdered tens of thousands 
of patriots. 
Still under the direct control of the United 
States, in 1954 and until the end of the Shah's 
rule, the Iranian army became a powerful tool 
of the American Government. With American 
support the Shah systematically plundered the 
wealth of Iran. 
What wonder is it therefore that there should 
be widespread hostility in revolutionary Iran 
towards the United States and its official repre-
sentatives ~ As for the Shah, torturer of his own 
people, guilty of mass crimes, it is understandable 
that the Iranians should demand that he be 
extradited and put on trial. More than ever 
therefore we must show solidarity with the 
Iranian people and its fight for freedom. That 
is what guides us French communists in our 
action. 
As for the Camp David agreements, far from 
bringing peace to that part of the world they 
have aggravated the situation. As stated in the 
resolution recently adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, the agreements flout, ursurp, 
violate or deny the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people. Now, there can be no settle-
ment unless it takes account of the national 
rights of the Palestinians and recognises the PLO 
as its authentic representative. 
The draft recommendation in Document 820 
recognises that "the continuing establishment of 
Israeli settlements on the West Bank only makes 
more difficult a just and lasting solution to the 
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Palestinian problem". In fact, the Israeli Govern-
ment is continuing its colonisation of the terri-
tories occupied after the 1967 war. The Israeli 
occupation is not only military, it is primarily 
aimed at making life impossible for the popula-
tion and forcing it into exile. 
At the same time the domestic economy of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip is being increas-
ingly adapted to the specific requirements of the 
Israeli economy, so that some 50,000 more Pales-
tinians have left their native land over the last 
five years. 
The Israeli occupation is also repression. Five 
thousand Palestinians are rotting in Israeli jails. 
The latest of these repressive measures, the deci-
sion to expel the Mayor of Nablus, one of the 
most outstanding representatives of the Pales-
tinian resistance, has been unanimously con-
demned by the Security Council. 
That is why our Assembly would do well to 
condemn the expulsion of the Mayor of Nablus, 
to recognise the PLO and to support the United 
Nations resolution reaffirming that there can be 
no just and lasting peace in the Middle East 
until a just solution is found to the problem of 
the Palestinians, founded on the realisation of the 
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people inclu-
ding the right to return to their homeland and 
the right to national independence and sover-
eignty in Palestine. 
That is, in our view, the only policy likely to 
lead towards a settlement of current problems in 
the Middle East and to consolidate peace in 
Europe and world-wide. Since the draft recom-
mendation does not follow these lines, the French 
communist members of parliament will vote 
against it. Such is the policy we, French com-
munists, freely ordain, refusing all external inter-
ference. 
That is why I vehemently protest at the state-
ment just made by Mr. Muller who dares here in 
Paris to pass judgment on the policy of the 
French Communist Party. Do not count on us, 
Sir, to follow the injunctions of German impe-
rialism. 
The PRESIDENT.- I now call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom).- Mr. Presi-
dent, I confine my remarks to the Middle East. 
I say right away that I do not consider Sir 
Frederic's report at all objective. The whole tone 
of it was anti-Israel, with a very strong under-
lying implication that Israel really has no right 
to exist, but that if she cannot be eliminated, 
pressure must be brought to bear upon her to 
recognise the magnanimity of Sir Frederic and 
others who might, grudgingly, accept her exis-
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tence and for this wonderful gesture Israel must 
quietly agree - if it is in the interests of Sir 
Frederic and others - to commit suicide. 
Sir Frederic's speech was even worse than 
his report. Except for the fact that his words 
were devoid of emotion, they could have been 
delivered by Colonel Kadhafi himself. The report 
is highly selective and shot through with inac-
curacies. Since when, for example, did Jordan 
cease to be part of the original British mandate 
of Palestine ~ Jordan is part of Palestine. Jordan 
is two-thirds of Palestine. Jordan is, therefore, 
an independent Palestinian state, and the other 
independent Palestinian state, for the benefit of 
those who perhaps do not recognise it, is Israel. 
I shall not go over Sir Frederic's report or 
his brief. The brief went back to 1945. He might 
have gone back just a few years earlier and 
mentioned the horrible crimes committed against 
the Jewish people in Europe, going on to the 
holocaust between 1939 and 1945 which, according 
to some people, never happened - six million 
Jews did not die. 
I will just say this : those who believe in 
religion should be very pleased that the people 
of the Book are back in their ancient homeland ; 
those who believe in democracy should be happy 
that Israel is a genuine democratic state in the 
Middle East ; and those who admire effort should 
not be grudging in their praise of what the 
Israelis have achieved. 
Mr. Begin cannot count me amongst his sup-
porters; he is not a favourite of mine. Nor do I 
have any time for the religious extremists, the 
fanatics, who invoke the Bible to advocate and 
push for a greater Israel. However, they are 
a very small minority of the people of Israel and 
of the Jewish people in general. I may say now 
that I deplore the settlements on the West Bank. 
Although the number of settlers is small, it consti-
tutes a reason for fear on the part of the Arabs 
that Israel is bent on expansion. It would not be 
a difficult gesture for Israel to dismantle them. 
The Israelis, however, are very poor propagand-
ists. With the assurance - some people might 
miscall it arrogance - of individuals who are 
convinced that they are right, they do not feel 
it necessary to embellish or even to explain their 
case. 
I do not agree that the nub of the Middle East 
problem is the Palestinian Arabs' right to an 
independent state, because the problem began long 
before the pressure for such a state. The nub of 
the problem is that the Arabs simply refuse to 
accept Israel's right to exist as an independent 
state. I appreciate that there are other problems, 
but the greatest difficulty stems from the refusal 
from the very beginning of the Arabs to accept 
Israel's right to exist. The PLO's covenant has 
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not been repudiated. It states : no recognition of 
Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no peace with 
Israel. 
Far from belittling the Camp David agreements, 
I think they represent a major step on the way 
to overall peace in the area. I pay tribute to the 
courage of President Sadat in taking the step he 
took two years ago. Israel still has a large number 
of good friends, in spite of the vast amount of 
money spent by propagandists against Israel. 
I believe that that is looked upon as very largely 
propaganda. To those who are genuine friends 
of Israel, who genuinely admire her, I would say 
"Criticise,. of course, but be fair in your judg-
ments and do not judge her by the yardstick of 
perfection. No country is devoid of faults. Above 
all, do not be patronising by claiming to know 
better than the Israelis what is in their own best 
interests. After all, Israel has fought four wars 
for survival. She needs to lose only one and she 
is totally obliterated". 
I have spent the major part of my political 
life fighting for the rights of minorities, parti-
cularly the coloured minorities in the United 
Kingdom. I would never advocate policies meant 
to help them without first consulting the people 
offended. If you want to be a genuine friend of 
Israel, you ought to consult the Israelis before 
you pass motions of condemnation or severe cri-
ticism. I understand Arab grievances and have 
considerable sympathy with the Arab case. Of 
course, if they had not begun the war against 
Israel in the first instance, the problems would 
probably not have arisen. However, there is no 
point in denying their present case, and I believe 
that self-determination will come. Nevertheless, 
it must come slowly and must certainly not be 
achieved by means of the elimination of another 
state in the area, Israel. Israel's existence is not 
negotiable. 
I shall conclude with a quotation which is an 
appropriate comment on the present situation. It 
is a letter from the playwright, Alan Sillitoe, 
which appeared in this week's Sunday Times. 
"The assumption ... that the troubles in the 
Moslem world would go away if only Israel 
and the PLO settled their differences is so 
na'ive that one is led to suspect some deeper 
mischief. 
It is difficult to imagine that the book-burning 
mobs of Rawalpindi, and the hostage-takers of 
Tehran would be satisfied with Judaea and 
Samaria - or even with Samarkand and 
Sarajevo. 
In the 1930s the rantings of the deranged 
High Priest of national socialism... led to 
similar noises of appeasement, and the craven 
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sacrifice of one piece of territory after another 
in an attempt to satisfy his aggressive demands 
did not in the end placate him. Israel will 
never take on the role of scapegoat in order 
that the West may obtain a few more barrels 
of oil, and it seems obvious to me that con-
tinuing support for Israel in the face of the 
'resurgence of Islam' - no matter from what 
quarter it comes- means greater security in 
the long run for us all." (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you Dr. Miller. 
I now call Mr. Cavaliere, who will be followed 
by Mr. J essel. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, events in 
the Near and Middle East command our interest 
and concern. Our direct interest, I may say, 
because as they endanger world peace we obvi-
ously cannot be caught unarmed and they leave 
us no room for drifting into a partisan stance : 
if we in fact want to help towards a solution 
and the pacification of those countries and, by 
the same token, of European and world peace, we 
have to be extremely objective. Precisely because 
of this need for objectivity, I immediately draw 
attention to one first factor that ought to engage 
us: even though the Soviet Union is not directly, 
or not solely, responsible for what has happened 
and is still going on in those countries, the wind 
is certainly blowing from the East throughout 
the area. As I say, we ought to be perturbed. 
Soviet Russia, the communist bloc in general, 
are being quite unabashed about it. So long as 
the Shah was of some use to them, and they 
were wooing his friendship, they had no hesita-
tion in even heaping honorary degrees upon him. 
Let me remind our communist colleagues that 
none of the countries represented in our Assem-
bly ever dreamed of conferring an honorary 
degree, which is one of the highest marks of 
consideration and esteem, upon His Imperial 
Majesty. But it was left to the communists to do 
that, those same countries which are now trying 
to get their way by other means, adding a little 
fuel to the fires raging in that region, especially 
Iran, in the belief that substituting one dicta-
torship for another can serve the interests of the 
USSR's expansionist aims. This is why we are 
not defending what the Shah has done nor what 
the new regime is doing. Rather, we deplore what 
he did and, with a very real concern, deplore the 
blast of violence and derision for every standard 
of international law we now behold, the work 
of this new charismatic ruler who has possessed 
the souls of his fellow-countrymen and seeks to 
use them to the utmost in order to challenge not 
only the United States but the whole of the 
civilised world. 
And for the same reason we unreservedly 
condemn the latest act of real international piracy 
perpetrated against the employees of the United 
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States Embassy at Tehran, and have tabled two 
amendments inviting the Council to demand 
immediate release of the hostages. 
On the situation in the Arab countries and 
Israel, I share the Rapporteur's appraisals and 
political conclusions. However, le,t me tell him I 
am unable to share a certain partisan spirit he 
shows in respect of the PLO and the Palestinians, 
almost as if he wanted- perhaps I am mistaken, 
but there is certainly a hint of it - to condemn 
the Israelis who, as was said a while ago, have 
simply had the moral and material strength to 
defend themselves, who have never been the 
aggressors, who have fought for their nation and 
their lives, for had they been unable to defend 
themselves the state of Israel would certainly 
no longer exist. 
This is why I think that a precondition to any 
solution must be recognition by the Arab states 
and the PLO of the state of Israel. It is also why, 
as I shall show more clearly when we discuss the 
amendments, I have tabled an amendment to 
invert the order of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 
recommendation : otherwise it would look as if 
we were inclined to give precedence and greater 
priority to recognition of the PLO, a movement 
representing a nation that does not, legally or 
materially, exist, over the interests, existence and 
reality of a state like Israel. 
I should like to say just one last thing about 
the Camp David agreements. It is almost as if we 
wished to condemn them. Yet they ought to be 
extolled, for while as the Rapporteur notes, there 
has been a certain softening of the PLO's position 
as a direct consequence of Camp David, in fact 
the PLO, the Palestinians and the Arab countries 
did not want to take part in the negotiations, 
nor sit down at the negotiating table with Israel 
- let us remember they were invited to do so -
while they have become less unyielding, and 
evince some willingness to negotiate with Israel, 
the reason is that Egypt had the courage to break 
through the barrier of solidarity and intransi-
gence, creating a feeling that something was 
giving, or rather the certitude that Israel does 
exist and has to be reckoned with if the Pales-
tinian problem and that of peace in the Arab 
world are ever to be solved. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Cavaliere. 
I now call Mr. Jessel. He will be followed by 
Mr. Voogd. 
Mr. JESSEL (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
Cavaliere has said many interesting things. I 
shall not immediately follow him. I would like 
first to comment on a remark by Mr. Deschamps 
of the French Communist Party, who was highly 
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critical of the regime of the Shah of Iran. What-
ever one may say about the Shah, Iran under him 
was surely an immensely better-run country than 
we see today under a bunch of uncivilised barba-
rians who are now dragging Iran back into the 
Middle Ages. 
I turn now to the Middle East. Like other 
colleagues who have spoken, I shall speak with a 
somewhat different emphasis from my colleague, 
Sir Frederic Bennett, the Rapporteur. I am 
rather sad to be differing from him. This is not 
easy for me, as he is the leader of my delegation 
and we all greatly respect him, but I believe that 
Sir Frederic would be the last person who would 
want any member of his team to say anything 
other than what he believes. I turn to the title of 
the paper that has been put before us by the 
General Affairs Committee - the impact of the 
evolving situation in the Near and Middle East 
on Western European security - I repeat, West-
ern European security. 
Surely, the foremost interest of all our coun-
tries in Western Europe is to avoid the risk of a 
world war. We are all familiar with the risk 
that an outbreak of war in the Middle East 
between Israel and its neighbours could escalate 
into a situation into which the great world powers 
felt they had to enter, leading to a world war. 
It is almost too obvious to state that our main 
interest is to avoid that, and it is in that context 
that what was said by Mr. Grant about the 
importance of Camp David is surely highly 
significant. The Camp David agreement was 
between Israel and Egypt - the most powerful 
of the Arab states - countries that had been 
at loggerheads, and frequently at war, over the 
last twenty-five years. That was a great and 
historic achievement and we must endeavour to 
build on it. 
It has never been claimed by anyone that Camp 
David would solve all the historic problems but, 
as Mr. Cavaliere said, the Arab countries had a 
somewhat inflexible attitude to it because they 
argued that it did not relate to the Palestine 
problem. I should like to quote from a letter 
that was sent to President Carter from President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin of Israel on 
26th March 1979 : they wrote : 
"For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive 
peace settlement in accordance with the above-
mentioned frameworks, Egypt and Israel will 
proceed with the implementation of those pro-
visions relating to the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotia-
tions within a month after the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification of the peace treaty. 
In accordance with the 'framework for peace 
in the Middle East', the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The 
Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include 
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Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed." 
So, had the will been there, what could have 
emanated from the Camp David agreement and 
the situation that was there achieved was the 
promotion of peace for the Palestinians. Only 
the intransigent attitude of some of the inter-
ested parties prevented this from happening. 
I hope that in the remainder of the debate no 
one will play down, deride or disparage the 
importance of the Camp David agreement, which 
is crucial to the maintenance of the purpose that 
is embodied in the title of our report : the impact 
of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle 
East on Western European security. 
I turn to the question of the Palestinian state. 
The case for it has been very strongly put this 
morning. I believe that the case against it has 
been less strongly put. It has been said that there 
can be no peace without it. I fear that there can 
be no peace with it. It is not just that it is 
unlikely to be viable economically - that, in 
itself, would produce a new source of instability 
in the Middle East ; it is more a strategic matter. 
It would be dominated by the PLO, which is a 
terrorist organisation which has had close links 
with the murderous Irish Republican Army. The 
PLO is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. 
I shall quote from the Palestinian national 
covenant, which is its only official basic docu-
ment. That says : 
"The Arab Palestinian people ... reject all solu-
tions which are substitutes for the total liber-
ation of Palestine." 
It says: 
"The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the 
establishment of the state of Israel are entirely 
illegal." 
It says: 
"The liberation of Palestine... aims at the 
elimination of Zionism." 
In 1977 the PLO office in Oslo put out a state-
ment saying : 
"There is no new policy by the PLO to 
recognise Israel... The declared programme of 
the PLO is to bring about the destruction of 
the Zionist entity of Israel." 
Anyone who imagines that the declaration that 
has been put before us in the recommendations 
can change basic attitudes in a short space of 
time is asking too much, because he is asking the 
HO 
TENTH SITTING 
PLO, which would dominate a new Palestinian 
state that came into being, to go entirely against 
the historic motivation of all that it has been 
campaigning on hitherto. Anyone whose right to 
exist is questioned is bound to feel prickly about 
it. We would all feel prickly. Any of us in this 
chamber would feel prickly if his right to exist 
and to survive were questioned. Of course, the 
Jews are no exception to this, especially after 
their experience thirty or forty years ago. 
Let us look at the geography. If a Palestinian 
state were set up on the West Bank it would 
extend westward to within about twenty kilo-
metres of the Mediterranean, leaving a long thin 
neck of Israel, about fifteen to twenty kilometres 
wide which would be the link between the two 
parts of that country. Through that neck comes 
the water supply from north to south - as the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions saw on a visit to Israel two years 
ago. What the Israelis are being asked, by this 
recommendation, to accept is to have an enemy 
thumb on their windpipe. Like any people con-
cerned with their own survival - which all 
peoples must obviously be - they cannot realist-
ically accept a threat of that kind. 
Thank you for listening, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Jessel. 
I now call Mr. Voogd, who will be the last 
speaker in this morning's debate. 
Mr. VOOGD (Netherlands) (Translation). -
I want to begin Mr. President, by making my 
position as plain as possible. I am a sworn friend 
of the state of Israel and of the Jewish people. 
I am committed, and I admit the fact. One's 
sorrow at the fate of a people who have been 
persecuted over the centuries is deepened by the 
fate that six million of them had to suffer through 
what one Dutch writer has so strikingly called the 
"crushing of a people". Seeing the monument of 
Yad Vashem in Jerusalem entered deep into my 
soul, and was something I shall never forget. 
My colleagues in this Assembly have a right to 
know with what depths of feeling, and perhaps 
with what partiality, I am speaking here. My 
comments on the Middle East ought to be seen 
and considered in this light. 
Yet there is another side, too. One of the reasons 
why this subject is so com.Plicated is that anyone 
who does not declare himself unconditionally in 
favour of one side is almost automatically counted 
as being the most purblind supporter of the other. 
This gives a distorted picture on both sides. This 
hampers the finding of solutions. It is not true 
that those who feel a deep bond with Israel, as 
I do, ignore the existence of the Palestinians. 
In 1969, at a time when I had still not set foot 
in Israel, I attended an anti-Israel conference in 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Voogd (continued). 
the then very belligerent Egypt of Nasser, in 
order to compare my feelings with those of the 
Palestinians. In those days the Palestinians were 
not yet as popular in Europe as they are today ; 
there was of course - and I say this cynically 
but I think with justification - still no energy 
crisis. I have alas to say that for some people 
in Europe - and not least within the EEC -
the Palestinians only took on human form when 
the Europeans became afraid that their cars were 
going to have to stay in the garage. 
The talks I had in a hotel room in 1969, lasting 
many hours, with young members of El Fatah 
both impressed me and taught me a lot. These 
people were not really recognised by anyone ; not 
by Israel, nor by the Arab countries. Their bitter-
ness against the Arab countries was no less than 
their bitterness against Israel. They were the 
forgotten generation - young men torn between 
a little hope and deep despair. A fertile ground 
for anyone who wanted to make wrong and 
wicked use of it. There was someone who did : 
his name is Y asser Arafat. Yet in spite of him 
and of the deeds for which he is responsible -
deny them as he may - we must not lose sight 
of the fact that there are people, there are human 
beings called Palestinians. 
Then there is something else. The best friends 
of Israel are not those who nod their heads at 
anything and everything Israel does. As a for-
eigner, one is almost shocked in Israel itself at 
the harsh criticism of each other that is very 
clearly voiced. That for me is the marvellous 
thing about Israel; constantly in a war situation, 
constantly threatened, economically in desperate 
straits - but nevertheless having freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press, freedom of 
association, and a real parliament. How many 
European countries, even on this side of the iron 
curtain, would be willing or able to allow this 
under such circumstances 1 Even an outsider can 
dare to voice criticism, and I shall do so. The 
policy of establishing settlements, as this has 
developed, is a bad policy. The policy followed 
by the Begin government is a bad policy ; and I 
am not saying this from a party-political view-
point. One step towards peace will have to be 
putting a stop to the spread of the settlements. 
If the Israeli Government takes this step, and 
I fervently hope that it will, what will the next 
step have to be ~ Probably contact - direct or 
indirect - between Israel and the Palestinians. 
But this will be totally impossible and intolerable 
as long as the PLO sets itself up as the voice of 
the Palestinians, and keeps the PLO charter. The 
main step here will have to be withdrawal of the 
charter as it now stands, which in every one of 
its, I believe, thirty-two articles has only one 
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motif - Israel must disappear from the face of 
the earth, and by force. 
One cannot expect Israel to have any official 
contact with the PLO as long as this charter 
remains as a pistol aimed at Israel's heart. Any-
one here who has not read the PLO charter ought 
to do so; some of Israel's reactions would then 
be more readily understood and would seem more 
reasonable. 
All this does not however rule out talks between 
people on the two sides. Such informal contacts 
are perhaps the most fruitful way of ever getting 
out of the impasse. A long road, certainly, but 
perhaps the only road. 
There is of course infinitely more that could 
be said about this question. What I have been 
saying contributes nothing fresh, but I really had 
no pretentions that it would. I did however think 
that I was duty bound to show where I stand, 
because this is going to determine how I vote on 
the amendments and on the recommendation. The 
first version of Sir Frederic's report was a 
reasonably well-balanced document. Unfortun-
ately I had to miss the meeting at which the 
recommendation was discussed. The recommend-
ation as it now stands does not meet my views to 
the extent I had hoped it would. The fate of the 
amendments will determine what my final vote 
will be. I shall not be forgetting the Palestinians, 
either their human or their political problems. 
But what must be unassailable is the secure and 
continued existence of the country that I will call 
here by its name of Eretz Yisroel. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Voogd. 
We shall now adjourn the debate. 
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT.- I propose that the Assem-
bly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon 
at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day : 
1. Draft budget of the administrative expend-
iture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1980 (Document 815, Addendum and 
Amendment) ; Accounts of the administra-
tive expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1978 - The Auditor's Report 
and Motion to approve the final accounts 
(Document 814 and Addendum) (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration and Votes on the draft 
texts, Documents 815, Addendum and 
Amendment and 814 and Addendum). 
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2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration and Votes on the draft 
Opinion and draft Recommendation, Docu-
ment 824). 
3. Impact of the evolving situation in the 
Near and Middle East on Western Euro-
pean security (Resumed Debate on the 
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Report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Document 820 and Amendments). 
Are there any objections?... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.) 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
Tuesday, 4th December 1979 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Change in the membership of a Committee. 
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1980 (Doe. 815, Adden-
dum and Amendment); Accounts of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1978- The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve 
the final accounts (Doe. 814 and Addendum) (Pre-
sentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee 
on Budgetary Ajjairs and Administration and Votes on 
the draft texts, Does. 815, Addendum and Amendment 
and 814 and Addendum). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Alber (Chairman and 
Rapporteur), Mr. Roper, Mr. Alber (Chairman and 
Rapporteur). 
5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of 
WEU for the financial year 1979 (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Ajjairs and Administration and Votes on the draft 
Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doe. 824). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kershaw (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Warren, Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. Kershaw (Rapporteur). 
6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle 
East on Western European security (Resumed Debate 
on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 820andAmendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Beith, Mr. 
Valleix, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. McGuire, Sir 
Frederic Bennett (Rapporteur), Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman of the Committee), Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic 
Bennett, Dr. Miller, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cavaliere, 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Urwin, Dr. Miller, Mr. Roper, 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, Mr. Roper, Mr. 
Cavaliere, Mr. Corallo, Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, 
Mr. Cavaliere; (points of order): Mr. Corallo, Dr. Miller, 
Mr. Lewis, Mr. Roper, the President. 
7. The situation in Iran (Motion for a Recommendation 
with a request for urgent procedure, Doe. 829). 
Speakers: The President; (point of order): Mr. Roper, 
Mr. Urwin, Mr. Roper, the President, Mrs. vonBothmer, 
Mr. Grieve, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mr. Hanin, Mr. 
Valleix. 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the ABBembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with 
Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes 
of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments L. 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT.- The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the Min-
utes of Proceedings 1. 
3. Change in the membership of a Committee 
The PRESIDENT. - The Delegation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany has proposed a 
change in the membership of the Committee on 
1. See page 31. 
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Budgetary Affairs and Administration by 
appointing Mr. Kittelmann as an alternate 
member in place of Mr. Reddemann. 
Are there any objections L 
It is agreed to. 
4. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1980 
(Doe. 816, Addendum and Amendment) 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 
- The Auditor's Report and Motion to 
approve the final accounts 
(Doe. 814 and Addendum) 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and Votes on the draft texts, Does. 815, Addendum 
and Amendment and 814 and Addendum) 
The PRESIDENT.- The first Order of the 
Day is the presentation of the report tabled by 
Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budget-
ary Affairs and Administration on the draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the :financial year 1980, Document 
815, Addendum and Amendment. With this it 
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will be convenient to take the presentation of the 
auditor's report on the accounts of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1978 and the motion to approve the 
final accounts, Document 814 and Addendum. 
I call Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur of 
the Committee. 
Mr. ALBER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, the length of my speech will be in 
proportion to the volume of the budget, that is to 
say it will be very short. 
Today we are dealing with two documents, 
with the accounts for 1978 and with the draft 
budget for 1980. I shall discuss them together. 
As regards the accounts for 1978, the original 
amount provided for was 7,979,000 francs. In the 
end actual expenditure amounted to 7, 723,279 
francs, meaning an unexpended credit of 255,721 
francs for 1978. So we have underspent by 
255,000 francs. This is partly because receipts 
were 89,650 francs higher than expected. I do not 
want to discuss in detail the items which led to 
this underspending, but only to call attention 
to the fact. It shows that our accounting is really 
very sound. 
That is why we should also point out to the 
Council of Ministers that we consider it petty if 
small amounts are then lopped off. If we do not 
spend some of the money, we give it back ; our 
accounts show this. 
We are submitting a very reasonable budget, 
but instead of our frugality being respected, the 
amounts in the estimates for the future are to be 
reduced, partly on the grounds that we would 
not spend the money anyway. That is not quite 
fair. And here I should like to say immediately 
that in 1979 we will in fact spend the entire 
amount because costs have risen. 
And that brings us to the 1980 draft budget. I 
shall deal only with the four items where the 
Council's Budget Committee has made reductions, 
taking them in the same order as in the draft 
budget. 
Firstly, there is Head II, Sub-Head 3.5, miscel-
laneous expenditure during sessions. An amount 
of 51,000 francs was earmarked for this item. 
The Budget Committee felt it had to reduce the 
sum by 5,000 francs to 46,000 francs. In the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and the Presidential 
Committee it was argued that a question of prin-
ciple was involved. We do not see why a com-
mittee should concern itself with such ridiculously 
small sums, especially when the salaries of the 
people concerned are higher than the amounts 
that are saved. One really should concentrate on 
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items of importance. The 1978 accounts show that 
we give back money if we do not need it. So we 
cannot see why such ridiculously small reductions 
are made. As a matter of principle we reject 
this deletion. 
We now come to Head Ill, Sub-Head 4.2, 
work on this building. This amount is to be 
reduced by 28,000 francs. We agree to this 
because the work will be spread over two years. 
So it is justified to reduce this sub-head some-
what. 
As for Head V, Sub-Heads 17 and 18, expend-
iture on information and the expenses of political 
groups, the Presidential Committee feels that we 
must not and cannot accept the proposed reduc-
ti<>ns. That is why I have tabled an amend-
ment which provides for a return to the figure 
in the draft. 
May I briefly remind you that in 1978 we had 
practically nothing for these two items. In the 
past we had 36,000 francs for information and 
17,000 francs for the political groups. We then 
asked for these two amounts to be increased to a 
total of 500,000 francs. This was not accepted for 
the current year 1979, so that for this year the 
sum of 142,500 francs is available for each of 
these two items. We think - and that is why we 
are again making this request for 1980 - that 
the means made available should be increased to 
a total of 500,000 francs. The Budget Committee 
wants to approve an increase of only 18,500 
francs in both cases, bringing each sub-head up 
to 161,000 francs. We think this is too little. We 
are of course aware that in percentage terms, 
these represent major rates of increase. But if in 
the past I have spent one franc and now spend 
two francs, that is a 100 % increase. It would 
therefore be fair to look not at the percentages 
but at the absolute amounts. We must take into 
account the fact that so far we had provided 
little or nothing for these two items. If we now 
enter appropriate amounts, it is only in order to 
rectify what we failed to do before. These are 
political items, and so we should enter the means 
to do the job. 
For the sake of comparison I would like to 
quote the amounts spent by the European Parlia-
ment. The European Parliament spends 3.5 mil-
lion units of account for the political groups. One 
unit of account is about 5.60 francs. So it spends 
19.6 million francs, nearly 20 million, for the 
political groups. That is more than twice our 
entire budget. 
And then there are the 147 staff posts, which 
from 1st January 1980 are to be increased by 
another 123 posts to a total of 270 posts- for the 
political groups alone ! 
The European Parliament's expenditure on 
information is difficult to identify because it is 
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included under administrative and staff expend-
iture. But 150,000 units of account, or 840,000 
francs, are set aside for press conferences alone. 
And 250,000 units of account, about 1.34 million 
francs, are set aside for publications. In addition, 
1.41 million units of account, or some 7.89 million 
francs, are earmarked for visiting groups. We do 
not even have such an item in our budget ; you 
will not find a single franc for visiting groups. 
It is not that we want to catch up with the 
European Parliament. That would be ridiculous. 
I have simply given you these figures so that you 
can place the matter in perspective. Compared to 
the amounts I have just mentioned, our budget 
amounts are really no more than a drop in the 
ocean. Seen from this point of view, it is hardly 
surprising that no one knows what Western 
European Union is. If you ask someone in the 
street what Western European Union is, he will 
say it is a private association to promote the 
European ideal. We should consider our budget 
from that angle too. 
I believe that we owe it to our work, our repu-
tation and our importance to make adequate 
resources available. The importance of our task 
for such matters as the security of the citizens 
of Europe calls for a budget which enables us to 
work in the political field as well. That is why 
I ask you to adopt the amendment which I have 
tabled on behalf of the Presidential Committee. 
As I said, this amendment calls for re-establishing 
the original version of the draft budget, except 
for the amount of 28,000 francs which I men-
tioned above and to which we agree. 
As for the 1978 accounts, I ask you to accept 
my report and to discharge the President of our 
Assembly of his financial responsibility. (Ap-
plause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
Mr. Alber, Rapporteur and Chairman of the 
Committee, for his statement. 
(The President continued in English) 
The debate on Documents 814 and Addendum 
and 815, Addendum and Amendment is open. 
I call Mr. Roper. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I am glad 
that you are combining the debates, Mr. Presi-
dent, and that I can, therefore, say something 
about Document 814 as well as 815. 
I should like to express my thanks and I 
believe, the thanks of the Assembly to Mr. Alber 
for once again undertaking the difficult task 
not merely of presenting this report to the 
Assembly - that is the easiest part of his duty 
- but of carrying out the work throughout the 
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year of the Chairman of our Budgetary Commit-
tee. It may well be that if there are elections to 
the Bundestag in the coming year he will not be 
with us on the next occasion of our consideration 
of these matters. The Assembly owes him a very 
great debt of gratitude for all he has done over 
the years as Chairman of the Committee and 
indeed as Rapporteur on so many occasions. I 
was very glad to read in Document 814 the 
remarks of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
about the provident fund and pension scheme. 
Over the years, Mr. Alber has done a great deal 
to ensure that that has become a reality, and the 
staff of WEU in years to come will appreciate the 
work he undertook. 
Although it is not normal to refer to officers 
of the Clerk's Office, I should like, if I may, to 
express our appreciation of the work of Miss 
Cohen in this area. She is an extremely tough 
lady and she will not allow people to get anything 
past her without good argument. 
I do not think we really need an external 
auditor while we have Miss Cohen doing this 
job for the Assembly. However, once one has 
persuaded her that one has a case, she will move 
heaven and earth to find a way to provide the 
funds required. The Assembly owes her, too, a 
particular debt of gratitude for what she has done 
this year and in the past to make sure that the 
limited sums that we have available are spent 
as efficiently and as effectively as possible. 
I should like also to thank our external auditor, 
Sir Douglas Henley, the Comptroller and Auditor 
General in the United Kingdom, for the work 
he has done again in auditing our accounts. I am 
particularly pleased that he allowed us to deduct 
from our underspending the sum of 100,000 
francs in order to break through the door on the 
first floor between the Wilson building and the 
rest of the building. That was a very useful act 
and something which I am glad has been not 
only carried out but legitimised financially as 
well. 
Turning to the budget for the coming year, I 
should like to refer to the point made by Mr. 
Alber about our expenditure on information. It 
has, of course, increased fairly drastically -
36,000 francs in 1978, 142,500 francs in the 
current year and a proposal for 250,000 francs 
in the coming year. As with the European Parlia-
ment, this is not a very helpful figure because, 
together with the 250,000 francs shown under 
Sub-Head 17, one must also take the salary of 
the Press Counsellor, which appears as the salary 
of one of the counsellors under Sub-Head 1 (a) 
and, I suppose, amounts to a similar sum if one 
divides 1.3 million francs by five. We should 
also add the cost of the printing of brochures and 
other matters which appear under Sub-Head 8 
of the budget. One must, therefore, bring quite 
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a number of sub-heads together if one wants to 
get a correct figure for the total available for 
information. 
None the less, the Chairman of the Committee 
was quite right when he said that it was not an 
adequate sum. I am a little concerned, however, 
that the Assembly, unlike those of the European 
Parliament and the Council of Europe, has not 
devised a totally efficient method of discussing 
and considering how we can make the best use 
of the limited sums available. As an Assembly 
we are not, I suspect, very well informed -
and I have made some inquiries- about on what 
this 250,000 francs is to be spent. Nor are we 
terribly clear on what the 142,500 francs available 
this year has been spent. Of course, we shall not 
know until we get the auditor's report. \V e should 
find a mechanism whereby our Assembly or its 
Committees could discuss rather more satisfac-
torily the work of promoting Western European 
Union and this Assembly. 
It is a difficult task because, unlike the others, 
we are an Assembly without, as it were, a parti-
cularly active executive body. In the Council 
of Europe, the intergovernmental work is 
naturally promoted. In the European Community 
the work of the Commission is naturally promoted. 
With great respect, I am delighted to see so 
many members of the Council present this after-
noon. The work of the Council is not something 
which grips the headlines every day of the week. 
Therefore, if we are to bring our Assembly to 
the people of our countries it must be done by a 
fairly clearly worked out programme of public 
relations, fairly closed linked to the work of the 
Assembly. 
Mr. President, I may be running out of my 
time. As there are not a great many other 
speakers on the list, may I have another two 
minutes? 
The PRESIDENT. - If you are sure that it 
will not be more than a couple of minutes and 
you really need it for the debate and since you 
are the only speaker, I can give you that permis-
sion. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I am most 
grateful, Mr. President, for your co-operative 
attitude in responding to my request. I was about 
to make the point that in the Council of Europe 
the Committee on Parliamentary and Public 
Relations is charged with not merely the respons-
ibility of relations with national parliaments but 
with an overview of the promotion of the Council 
of Europe and particularly its Parliamentary 
Assembly in the member countries. Although our 
Rules of Procedure do not give such a mandate 
at present to our Committee for Relations with 
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Parliaments it would be very valuable if in the 
near future that mandate to the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments could be widened so 
that members of this Assembly could address 
themselves to what is a very important, difficult 
and serious problem - how with the limited 
resources provided for us can we best promote 
the work of our Assembly. 
It is not in any spirit of criticism of what has 
been done with these trifling sums or what may 
be done with slightly more substantial sums but 
because I believe that parliamentarians could 
contribute to the discussion and policy formation 
in this area that I hope that at an appropriate 
time ways will be fourid whereby our Assembly 
and its Committees can discuss much more ade-
quately than in the past the reasons this money 
is required and what we can do with the money 
for which we have asked 
I thank you very much, Mr. President, particu-
larly for the extension of time. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Roper. 
Does anyone else wish to speak ? ... 
Does Mr. Alber wish to reply ? 
Mr. ALBER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation).- I am very grateful to Mr. Roper 
for what he has had to say, and especially for 
his question on how the information funds are 
spent. As you know yourselves, this year is the 
first in which we have had available an amount 
which makes it possible to work in this sector. 
We now have 142,500 francs, against 36,000 francs 
last year. It would indeed be desirable if when 
resources are further increased - as is planned 
- the Presidential Committee of WEU could 
give at least our Committee an exact idea of how 
it is intended to spend this money. That would 
certainly make the voting easier on all sides, 
both for us and for the Budget Committee. I 
certainly agree. 
Mr. Roper will understand from my hesitant 
reply that I cannot answer his question fully 
because I do not yet know the details of this 
year's accounts. To the best of my knowledge, the 
money is spent, first, on temporary staff appoin-
ted for the duration of these sessions - three 
people for press work and one messenger -
secondly, for invitations to journalists and, 
thirdly, for press conferences and missions by 
our press officer here, for press receptions and 
the purchase of newspapers and journals. That is 
the situation in brief. I cannot at present say 
what amounts are allocated to each of these 
activities, for here too I must wait for this year's 
accounts. 
May I also join Mr. Roper in expressing special 
thanks to Miss Cohen and our colleagues in this 
Assembly who are responsible for these important 
budgetary matters. I think Miss Cohen could 
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equally well be head of a CID or president of 
a bank ; head of a CID because, when there is 
a problem over the quorum or over attendance 
at meetings, she works like a detective finding 
out where individual members are at that given 
moment, in what country, at what conference 
centre. She d<>es this in a matter of seconds, like 
a computer. Certainly she can find me much 
faster than my wife can; my wife says that if 
she is looking for me she need only telephone 
Miss Cohen, who always knows where we are to 
be found. She could be the president of a bank 
because she keeps as tight a rein on our money 
as if it were her own. But I think this is all to 
the good. We therefore owe Miss Cohen a debt 
of gratitude and we thank her sincerely. (Ap-
plause) 
The PRESIDENT.- The debate is closed. 
The Assembly has to vote on the draft budget 
for 1980 in Document 815 and Addendum. 
An Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Alber 
giving a summary of revised estimates for the 
financial year 1980. 
I call Mr. Alber. 
Mr. ALBBm (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - I have already said that this 
amendment is based on a decision by the Presi-
dential Committee which I am tabling in my 
name. Its purpose is to re-establish our draft 
budget, with the exception of the 28,000 francs 
which are deducted for building work, because 
this expenditure will only arise a year later. I 
therefore ask you to adopt this amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Alber. 
Does anyone else wish to speak to the amend-
ment? ... 
The Assembly will now vote on Mr. Alber's 
Amendment 1. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
The amendment is agreed to. 
The Assembly will now vote on the draft 
budget of the administrative expenditure of the 
Assembly for the financial year 1980 in Docu-
ment 815 and Addendum, as amended. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions ? .. . 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
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The draft budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial year 
1980, as amended, is adopted unanimously. 
The Assembly must now vote on the motion 
to approve the final accounts of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1978 in the Addendum to 
Document 814. 
Are there any objections to the motion 1 ... 
Are there any abstentions ? ... 
The motion is adopted unanimously. 
5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 824) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs 
of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1979 and votes on the draft opinion and the 
draft recommendation, Document 824. 
I call j\llr. Kershaw, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee, to present the report. 
Mr. KERSHAW (United Kingdom). - Last 
year I had the honour to present a report about 
these matters to the Assembly. This year I do 
not find it necessary to change greatly the subject 
matter of my speech, though I am happy to be 
able to report modest progress along the lines I 
then advocated. May I start by calling attention 
to the figures on the third page of the report, 
Document 824, which is before us. The Assembly 
will note that the Western European Union 
budget for 1979 is £786,660 plus 25,745,795 
francs. 
By the standards of government today those 
sums are small. Many small towns or districts 
in our countries spend much more. This compara-
tive smallness in our enterprise, on the one hand, 
must commend itself for its cost-effectiveness, 
but, on the other, it brings problems for those 
who work for us. Small may be beautiful but it 
cannot always provide the wider opportunities 
and benefits which the more lavish arrangements 
of a large organisation permit. These restrictions 
can arise in two ways : first, in regard to current 
employment conditions, and, secondly, in regard 
to pensions. 
Concerning current conditions the opportunities 
for promotion within "such a rigid, indeed 
virtually unchanging establishment", to use the 
Council's own words, are small. 
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Eighteen out of twenty-six officials who serve 
us have already reached the last step in their 
grade, some of them several years ago. The 
Assembly has twice in the past recommended 
that the Council should establish a committee 
of experts to review the possibility of action. It 
would surely be desirable to review the grading 
system, to study the types of contract, and to 
liaise with our co-ordinated organisations, such 
as OECD, the Council of Europe and so on, whose 
problems as larger organisations are not the same 
as those of WEU but which, nevertheless, may 
have lessons for each side. We ought also to 
discuss the possibilities of transfer from one co-
ordinated organisation to another. 
The problem of training new staff, or indeed, 
old staff for new posts, in a small and busy 
organisation is one of special difficulty. No doubt 
the Secretaries-General of the Council review 
these matters as closely as they can, but they 
should not lose sight - I am sure that they do 
not lose sight - of the need in personnel matters 
to carry staff with them in their work. If promo-
tions are few, for example, the Council must 
make sure that those which do occur are made 
known to staff so that they may apply, and due 
weight also should be paid to the experience that 
staff acquire during their years of work. The 
Council will realise that the existing staff some-
times become impatient with criteria based upon 
nationality and expertise which the staff feel 
are now largely out-dated. 
For these reasons I ask the Council to consider 
yet again whether scrutiny by an outside body 
might not be in the interests of all concerned. 
After all, Western European Union, after 
twenty-five years, though it is entitled to say 
that no new problem of staff can now present 
itself, by the same token must bear in mind that 
twenty-five years is a good anniversary to choose 
to take a fresh look at accepted practices. 
I turn to matters concerning pensions. I am 
happy to record that a start will be made next 
month by the appointment of the head for the 
joint section for the administration of pensions. 
For this, Sir, WEU can take the credit, because 
it was in this house that the urging of this 
proposal took place and the post was finally 
made. 
In our recommendation we say that this section, 
which is to be established next month, should be 
complemented by the creation of a single appeals 
board for the co-ordinated organisations. The 
reason for this will be obvious to those who have 
studied pension matters. Often the problems of 
pensions, which always have a particular poign-
ancy for the individual concerned, are complicated 
- sometimes extremely so. It would certainly be 
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a heavy blow to staff confidence if decisions in 
apparently comparable cases were to be different 
in different co-ordinated organisations and if 
there were to be no appeal against those decisions. 
I think that we are fully justified in asking for 
a system to be set up which would avoid this 
danger to morale and good order, and we do so 
in the recommendations before us. 
The sums involved in these pensions are not 
small. The Assembly will note that when WEU 
changes from a provident fund to a pension 
scheme, our governments receive back 24 million 
francs. This is in respect of 144 employees of 
WEU. The Assembly will note from Appendix 
VI of the report. that 5, 715 staff of oo-ordinated 
organisations are involved in the full arrange-
ments. For the time being, therefore, our govern-
ments will receive a substantial windfall, 
although, of course, the pensions to which the 
staff contribute 7 % of salary will amount to 
important expenditure in the long run. 
Last year I suggested that part of this wind-
fall should be devoted to making housing loans 
available for staff, but there was such a deafening 
silence from governments and the Council that 
I think it idle to persist. In any case, the money 
either has been or very shortly will be transferred 
to our governments and so is no longer available. 
Finally, the amount of money involved leads 
me to suppose that an independent joint manage-
ment fund would be a sensible way to proceed. 
I refer to this in paragraph 6 of the report. It is, 
perhaps, premature to put in a recommendation 
to this effect, but no doubt the Council will wish 
to study the proposition in the light of the events 
and in the light of the progress which has already 
been made organisationally. 
I beg to recommend the opinion in Document 
824 to the Assembly. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Kershaw, for that presentation. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Warren. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). -I con-
gratulate Mr. Kershaw on his very succinct pre-
sentation of the report. I should like to take up 
with him and the Budgetary Committee, however, 
a particular issue which concerns me. It was 
raised, very appropriately and correctly, by 
Mr. Kershaw in the course of his dissertation 
when he spoke of the need for us to make sure 
that the morale and good order of our staff were 
maintained. 
I heartily endorse the presentation given by 
Mr. Alber. I was one of those who, together with 
all the rest of us present, voted unanimously that 
the committee of experts should be told to accept 
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our total WEU budget as our commitment for 
the coming year. 
I want to question exactly what this committee 
gets up to, and to illustrate it by one specific 
instance in relation to the staff here at WEU. 
The committee of experts is, I understand, 
responsible for considerations relating to the 
salaries of the staff in relation to other organisa-
tions siml.lar to WEU, such as OECD, the Council 
of Europe, NATO and so on. 
As is well known to you, Mr. President, and 
to the Budgetary Committee, several times in the 
past it has been pointed out to the Assembly in 
discussion in this chamber and in written ques-
tions to the Council that the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee of Budget Experts in the national govern-
ments has never been able to decide a time for 
the necessary adjustments to the salaries of 
personnel which had been recommended by the 
Secretaries-General. It is quite normal that the 
recommendation of the Secretary-General should 
be acted upon at the appropriate time and in a 
proper manner, because at a time when inflation 
is soaring all across Europe it is wrong that our 
staff should suffer because this vast organisation 
of budgetary experts cannot organise itself. 
If one looks at the deliberations of that com-
mittee over the last year, one finds that although 
it has adopted new rules, it has still not been able 
to apply those rules itself and that the general 
review of remunerations to take effect from 1st 
July 1979 submitted to the committee by the 
Secretaries-General of the OECD, NATO, the 
Council of Europe, WEU and the European 
Space Agency has not yet been approved. 
One is given the impression from the way in 
which the members of this committee are acting 
that they are a law unto themselves. They are 
responsible to the national governments, and I 
hope that members of this Assembly will put 
some parliamentary questions to their national 
governments about what thils committee is up to 
and how much it is costing the national govern-
ments to operate the system. 
One is certainly given the impression from 
their antics and how they have been operating 
that they are trying to circumvent new rules that 
have been adopted by them. They appear to be 
using them against our staff maliciously. I illus-
trate how this strange committee acts. 
Into my possession have come a couple of 
examples of the minutes of this committee. It 
held its 199th meeting in sunny Frascati on 
18th October last. At that meeting 37 people 
were present from 11 nations plus nine organisa-
tions. They produced pages of minutes, 15 in all. 
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The meeting must have cost national governments 
many thousands of pounds to mount. If one reads 
through the minutes one finds no decisions on 
instructions they have been given by the 
Secretaries-General. They come from Norway, 
Sweden, the United States, NATO, our own WEU 
and even include an observer from the European 
Patent Office. 
The 200th meeting, three weeks later, finds 
them in Brussels. It is a little colder and the 
minutes are even longer. This time there are 
17 pages of minutes but still no decision. 
Thousands of pounds are spent and yet staff 
salaries of WEU are not agreed. The key 
matter they need to agree is that a 2 % adjust-
ment of salaries proposed by Secretaries-General 
as far back as July should be accepted. They 
have not accepted it. Endless meetings and discus-
sions are going on. The 201st meeting took place 
on 27th November. I expect that they will have 
a happy Christmas in a pleasant place spending 
thousands of pounds more but refusing to accept 
the 2 % increase required. 
This is happening at a time when our staff 
are having to meet increasing expenses and trying 
to accept that at some time their salaries will 
be put right. To have 30 or 40 officials romping 
around Europe meeting every three weeks at 
the taxpayers' expense and not accepting the 
instructions of the Secretaries-General must cause 
us to consider whether we have any confidence in 
this quango. I do not know, Mr. President, 
whether you are aware of quangos. We have 
hundreds in Britain. The good Conservative 
Government is getting rid of as many as possible 
as quickly as possible. You, Sir, as a good socia-
list, may not applaud that. But this quango is 
one to end all quangos. It is the best one romping 
the world. 
I have no confidence in the committee of 
experts. I ask the Budgetary Committee to make 
the strongest representations through their 
member governments and direct to the organisa-
tion itself to tell them to do their job, to get out 
of the way of our staff and to let our staff get on 
with the job, as Mr. Kershaw said, with good 
morale and in good order. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Warren. 
I call Mr. Adriaensens. 
Mr. ADRIAENSENS (Belgium) (Translation). 
-Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would 
like to thank Mr. Kershaw for the report he has 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budge-
tary Affairs and Administration. This gives us 
a number of facts about pension matters, career 
planning and ways of improving the position of 
the staff of WEU. 
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On the matter of pensions I would emphasise 
that the pension scheme has been adopted by the 
Councils of Ministers of each of the co-ordinated 
organisations - that is to say the Council of 
Europe, the European Space Agency, NATO 
and its twenty-seven subsidiary organisations, 
OECD and WEU. These Councils of Ministers 
usually consist of the Ministers for Foreign 
Mfairs, but also from time to time include the 
Ministers of Finance and, where staffing is 
concerned, the Ministers for Home Affairs or of 
other departments which deal with the affairs of 
government officials. 
The rules for implementing the pension scheme 
have been promulgated by the Secretaries-General 
of the organisations just mentioned. Now we are 
finding that the Committee of Budget Experts 
is trying to interfere with some of the provisions 
that have been enacted by these authorities. I 
believe that this Assembly must protest at this 
with the utmost vigour. When the highest poli-
tical and administrative authorities have laid 
down rules and arrangements for implementing 
them, these rules should not be brought into 
question again by budget experts who by 
doing so are encroaching on the legal security 
of the members of staff. I can see that it is some-
times difficult to apply general regulations and 
implementing provisions in individual cases, but 
what is going on now can to my mind only be 
described as malevolent interpretation of these 
rules. Very often it is really only a matter of 
dogmatic obduracy on the part of a few national 
civil servants. I find myself wondering, too, 
whether the time and trouble devoted to these 
futile exercises really justify the cost. 
Where improvements in the position of the 
staff are concerned I would comment that it has 
already been pointed out repeatedly in this 
Assembly - as a result in particular of the 
reports presented by Mr. Kershaw's predecessor 
Lord Selsdon - that improving the salaries of 
the staff takes far too long, and that it involves 
far, far too many experts and officials travelling 
to and fro all over Europe to meetings to examine 
the proposals put forward by the Secretaries-
General of the international organisations I have 
listed. 
Now there is another general review of staff 
salaries dated 1st July 1979, with proposals from 
the Secretaries-General which in my opinion are 
very balanced and are moreover based on rules 
laid down by the Co-ordinating Committee of 
Budget Experts itself. These new rules were 
adopted by this committee last year, and as a 
result of these rules the committee itself was 
enabled to work more speedily than in the past. 
But now we find that after almost six months 
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there have still been no decisions taken on these 
proposals for a review. 
The pay of the staff of our international 
organisations is based on two general criteria : on 
the one hand the average of salaries in the other 
international organisations, in particular the 
European Communities and UNESCO, and on 
the other an average of the salaries in the twenty-
three countries involved. The difficulty now 
seems to be that the officials of the European 
Community had a rise eighteen months ago, and 
that Italian and British civil servants too have 
had a substantial increase in salary. 
The conclusion reached by the Secretaries-
General was that because of this the staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations ought to have a 2 % 
increase, to prevent them falling too far behind 
on the one hand the average of national salaries 
and on the other the European Communities 
salaries. This fully justified proposal, based on 
rules adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee 
itself, is now not being honoured by that com-
mittee. 
It is obvious that the interests of the staff of 
the co-ordinated organisations are being dealt 
with in a very offhanded way. There is no reason 
at all why they should be looked upon as second-
class international civil servants, but one has to 
conclude that this is what is being done when 
one sees yet again the salary increases proposed 
by the Secretaries-General being left endlessly 
waiting on a decision. Apart from the 2 % I have 
just mentioned, the remaining percentage of the 
increase is no more than the inflation factor; this 
will mean for those working in France or Britain 
a matter of 12 or 15 %. Once again, seven or 
eight thousand officials are having to wait six 
or seven months for their rise in salary. I think 
this is extremely unfair, and the Assembly ought 
once again to call the attention of the Ministers 
to this fact. I would suggest therefore that you, 
Mr. President, should on behalf of the Assembly 
point out this state of affairs to the Ministers 
concerned, and ask them to do something about 
the continuing delay in reviewing the salaries 
of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations. I 
would also ask you, Mr. President, to call the 
attention of the Ministers concerned to the high 
costs that are being incurred by innumerable 
meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of 
Budget Experts, despite the fact of new and 
objective rules being adopted last year. Thank 
you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ~ 
Mr. KERSHAW (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, perhaps I may just say that I appre-
ciate very much the comments of both speakers. 
But perhaps it would be worth while for me to 
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point out that the proposals about the committee 
which examines salaries form no part of the 
recommendation now before us. The recommenda-
tion before us, the second paragraph of the draft 
recommendation in Document 824, is for the 
creation of a committee of senior experts to plan 
and promote a personnel policy. The Assembly 
will note that the responsibility for fixing salaries 
is nowhere mentioned there. Therefore, the pro-
posal which I have made for, perhaps, the 
appointment of three wise men is not the target 
at which the last two speakem have so eloquently 
been casting their darts. 
I think it very satisfactory, nevertheless, that 
we have such a full bench of the Council of 
Ministers here to hear what has been said, and 
no doubt when they take the opportunity to con-
sider these matters further they will consider the 
eloquence of my two honourable friends, who have 
put the matter so well. But for the moment we 
are dealing with another proposition, which is 
that we should concentrate rather more on the 
personnel policy as set out in paragraph 3 of 
the draft recommendation, which I again com-
mend to the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Ker-
shaw. 
I notice that the Chairman does not want to 
speak. 
The debate is closed. 
We shall now vote, first, on the draft opinion 
in Document 824. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections? ... 
Are there any abstentions? ... 
The draft opinion is agreed to 1 • 
We shall now vote on the draft recommenda-
tion in Document 824. 
No amendments have been tabled. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions ? .. . 
The draft recommendation is agreed to 2• 
1. See page 32. 
2. See page 33. 
121 
ELEVENTH SITTING 
6. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 820 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - We now resume our 
debate on the report tabled by Sir Frederic 
Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee on the impact of the evolving situation in 
the Near and Middle East on Western European 
security, Document 820 and Amendments. 
At the end of the debate there will be votes 
on the draft recommendation in Document 820 
and Amendments. 
I call Mr. Gessner. 
Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, up till a few years ago no one would 
have believed a peace treaty between Israel and 
Egypt was possible. Yet now it has been signed. 
I am very pleased that this peace treaty has been 
concluded, because I see this step as a chance 
to help bring peace to that part of the world. 
I believe that the road taken is the correct 
one, and I am convinced of the need to continue 
along that road. I realise, however, that it will 
not be possible to solve this problem unless other 
Arab states also take part in the dialogue and 
in its follow-up, namely the conclusion of treaties. 
I am also convinced that the western industrial 
countries must make it clear that they welcome 
the direction taken. A hesitant attitude would 
help to discourage those Arab states which are 
still standing aside from taking the same road. 
In my view the only principle that applies in 
conflicts is tha:t of non-violence. It is a principle 
which cannot be abandoned. It does not affect the 
right of individual or collective self-defence but 
is one of the recognised principles of international 
law, to be found, for instance, in the United 
Nations Charter. 
Assertion of the right to self-determination 
does not, however, imply a right to use force. 
What, for instance, would this Assembly say if 
someone were to hit upon the criminal idea of 
trying to reunify Germany by force ? If anyone 
put forward such an idea, he would have to be 
put promptly behind bars, because that would 
be the kind of policy which would not solve 
problems but lead to fresh problems against a 
background of human misery. 
The principle that political problems cannot 
be solved by the use of force is indivisible. It 
applies to every people, every state, every region 
of the world, wherever such problems arise. Even 
the motives for which a people is denied the right 
of self-determination, which may vary, do not 
justify the use of force. In this matter there can 
be no exception. 
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That is why I cannot accept the operations 
mounted by the Palestinians. True, there are 
many groups within the PLO, and it is certainly 
not easy to define what the PLO is ; but by now 
I have learned one thing : that terrorist attacks 
have been perpetrated from within this PLO. I 
do not believe that setting off a bomb on the 
market place in Jerusalem is a military act. Nor 
do I believe that it can be claimed that hijacking 
an aeroplane from some western country is a 
military act. The bloodbath we saw at the Olympic 
games in Munich a few years ago was certainly 
not a military act, but an act of terrorism. 
Another reason why I am concerned about this 
is that at trials in the Federal Republic the 
German terrorists always claim that they are in 
a state of war with the Federal Republic of 
Germany and that they are therefore prisoners 
of war and not terrorists. When I recall that 
German terrorists have been trained in Pales-
tinian camps and go to ground there when we 
are searching for them, then I see a connection 
between terrorism in our country and terrorist 
operations by the PI10. 
I am sure everyone here will agree with me 
that the bombardments in Lebanon are a 
terrible business. Many people are affected and 
innocent people die. We can only hope that this 
gruesome business in this small country will soon 
be over. But I am also aware that terrorists are 
operating from Lebanon and provoking counter-
attacks, with the result that the war is carried 
into that country. 
In considering the problem of the PLO there 
is an important point which some pwple may 
long since have forgotten. I well remember that 
there was a time when the Israelis did not reply 
to the PLO's acts of terrorism by acts of reprisal. 
But it very soon became apparent that this did 
not make the PLO cut down on its activities ; 
they continued apace. 
Many people say that the solution to the 
problem could lie in establishing a Palestinian 
state. If I myself believed that this was the root 
of the problem, and that it could defuse the 
situation, I would be in favour of founding such 
a state. Each time I think about it I come to the 
conclusion that such a state would certainly not 
contribute to pacification. Rather I fear that it 
would become a source of new military opera-
tions. So the problem cannot be solved by found-
ing a Palestinian state. It would simply lead to 
fresh demands. I think it would merely provide 
the embryo of a state that would generate further 
attacks. I do not believe that that road leads to 
peace. 
May I in this context add that I consider it 
most unfortunate that the Israeli Government is 
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continuing with its settlement policy. This is a 
bad business ; a policy like this is not going to 
help resolve the difficulties, but will only make 
matters more complicated. 
If ever there is to be a solution, it can lie only 
in negotiation. I think the Arab states and the 
PLO must - as Egypt has already done -
recognise Israel as a state. The Palestinians would 
be doing themselves a great favour if they worked 
on the basis of the realities of the situation a~ 
they actually are. Israel exists as a state. As we 
discuss this problem I am often reminded of the 
discussions we used to have in the Federal Repu-
blic about whether or not the German Democratic 
Republic existed as a state. I will not disguise 
the fact that for years we found it very hard 
to grasp that a state had come into being which 
we had to recognise if we were to make pacts 
and agreements. It is difficult to come to an 
agreement with someone whom one looks upon as 
not existing. It can't be done. 
Unfortunately, today the PLO still wants to 
eliminate the state of Israel. Recently, before 
visiting an Arab country, I read the PLO's char-
ter very carefully and realised that annihilation 
of the state of Israel is still one of the PLO's 
objectives. When I say "still" I am referring 
to the fact that even very recently the PLO and 
Arab states have been repeatedly confirming the 
principles of this charter. If we wish to make 
any progress, if we want to make it clear that 
there is some good will, this charter, this found-
ing document of the PLO, will have to be 
amended. 
Furthermore, I believe that the Palestinian 
problem would not be so threatening if in the 
past the camps had not been kept in existence 
artificially. There is not the slightest doubt that 
the reason why these camps were not dispersed 
was to have a source of young recruits for mili-
tary operations. These camps are like ulcers that 
have been fostered around Israel in the hope that 
dangerous matter would collect there to be used 
one day in the fight against Israel. People now 
complain that these camps still exist. I do not 
consider that logical or consistent. I myself have 
spent some time in a refugee camp. After the 
second world war I lived in one for some months. 
I know how people feel when they have to live 
in very cramped quarters and in extremely dif-
ficult conditiollB. I know it from personal expe-
rience. I can very well appreciate how people 
who live in these camps think, how they become 
charged with emotion. But it must be pointed 
out that these camps would no longer be necessary 
today if they had not been preserved artificially. 
I am absolutely convinced that over the years 
the western industrial nations would have made 
available large sums of money with which to 
help the people in these camps to be integrated 
in the Arab countries. 
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I am convinced that the Palestinian problem 
cannot be solved by rorce. As I see it, at least, 
there can no longer be any question of doing so 
now that there is a peace treaty between Egypt 
and Israel, :for everyone is aware of the role 
played by Egypt's military strength in the Arab 
world. 
That is why in my view there is but one answer. 
On all sides there must be a readiness to com-
promise, and that means an attempt to solve the 
problem by negotiation. I am certainly not one 
of the most pious people in my country. Yet I 
believe in a truth to be :found in the Bible, a 
truth which has been confirmed again and again 
over the centuries : "They who take the sword, 
shall perish by the sword": (Applause) 
(Mr. von H assel, President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. Beith and after him Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. BEITH (United Kingdom).- It is at least 
partly to the credit of the Rapporteur that we 
have had such an interesting debate on Middle 
East questions today. It has been a wide-ranging 
debate, although it has not yet touched on some 
of the issues included in the report which went 
even wider and is a very stimulating document. 
We should not let the occasion pass without 
some reference to the very interesting analysis of 
Soviet intentions in .Afghanistan, for example, 
and the involvement of the Soviet Union in prop-
ping up a very precarious and unsatisfactory 
regime there. I was also very struck by the 
Rapporteur's references to Pakistan and to the 
need, in the interests of Pakistan, of the West 
and of the democracies, to try to seek a stronger, 
more stable and rmore acceptable regime there. 
It is ironic and perhaps a little worrying that 
i£ it had not been for the recent experiences of 
Iran we should have thought that Pakistan had 
seen the worst of what could happen if fanaticism 
took off :from the better side of a Muslim revival. 
In Pakistan we saw some of the beginnings ; 
Iran has since demonstrated how much worse 
things can become. 
.As far as Iran is concerned, I have alwa.ys 
been surprised by the naivety of those who 
imagined that the removal of the Shah would 
bring about the installation of a liberal and 
democratic regime. I recall one of my parlia-
mentary colleagues saying in response to this 
kind of comment that if those who made it were 
in Iran they would probably be amongst the first 
to have their hands cut off when the kind of 
regime for which the Ayatollah stood was even-
tually installed. He was not altogether inaccurate 
in his prophecies about what that regime would 
involve. 
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It is a very depressing sight and leads one to 
wonder how long a country can run on :frenzy 
and the excitement of political passion and the 
paying off of ofd political scores. It is a parti-
cularly worrying prospect for us when we see 
innocent civilian employees still held as hostages 
in the United States Embassy. Has the time come 
when the nations, not ju.st of the West but of 
the world, must consider withdrawing all their 
diplomats from Tehran to make quite clear that 
diplomacy cannot be conducted between nations 
of however different views when this kind of 
treatment is meted out to those who are respons-
ible for the day-to-day work of missions abroad ? 
It must surely be considered, not as a unilateral 
step by one or two countries but as a measure 
of the world's inability to operate in this way. 
One hopes that over the pa$sage of time there 
can be some stabilisation in Iran and that those 
within that country who had hoped to see a better 
and freer way of life will not :finally be disap-
pointed, though their prospects at present look 
very grim. 
Much of the debate has been concerned as its 
main subject matter with the affairs of Israel and 
its neighbours, and in that debate it has become 
noticeable that Israel does not lack friends in this 
Assembly ; and I speak as one who would waut 
to be counted among them although I Shall have 
critical things to say, as the Rapporteur has been 
reminded, in these discussions. By the way in 
which he has phrased his report he seems to 
betray a certain unwillingness to accept a certain 
lack of enthusiasm :for the existence of the state 
of Israel, a certain feeling that the circumstances 
of the birth of the nation of Israel cast doubt 
upon its right to continued existence. We should 
dispel that feeling. That idea should not be pre-
sent in anything said by this Assembly. 
The Rapporteur a:$o failed to recognise the 
emotional :force and power behind the conclusion 
of the Camp David agreement, emotions that 
surround the achievement of peace in the minds 
of the Israelis and the Egyptians. Seeing such 
emotions brought into play to achieve positive 
results we must welcome them and not discourage 
or criticise them. It was a gratifying sight :for 
those who want peace all over the world to see 
the peoplEJ~S of two nations who had :fought now 
genuinely desirous of concluding a lasting peace 
with each other, and, whatever the shortcomings 
of the limited agreement and whatever we may 
feel it lacks. I do not think we should turn aside 
the :forces for peace which are clearly present in 
those countries and which have such emotional 
power and strength behind them. 
Who, after all, ever expected the conclusion 
of a separate peace between Israel and Egypt 
would do more than that ~ Whoever expected 
that it would bring many Arab nations into an 
acceptance of Israel's position? Whoever 
expected that it would lead Arab nations to turn 
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on Pal~tinians and deny cla'ims that they had 
hitherto supported 1 I did not entertain such 
unrealistic hopes about the agreement and I 
would not wish its merits to be questioned 
because it cannot bring about those results. There 
has, however, been a certain air of unreality in 
part of the debate about the nature of feelings 
in the Arab world, the importance of the Arab 
world and the difficulties confronting moderate 
leaders there in the face of extreme militant pres-
sure among others of that world. 
It is a very hard position to be in at the present 
time and one 'in which the claims of the Pales-
tinians and their rights have a very crucial and 
important place. Those who are friendly towards 
Israel ought to be the first to remind her that 
she, too, must recognise the facts. But having 
said favourable things about Israel and asserted 
her right to continued existence, beli€ving that 
the building up of that state has been a miracle 
of human achievement, I would still ~ay to her 
leaders that their policies are shortsighted in the 
extreme in their failure to recognise the aspira-
tions of the Palestinians and the lack of anv 
sense of urgency about those aspirations. • 
I criticise them for their territorial ambitions 
as a nation, for their indefensible policy of settle-
ment on the West Bank. The West must continue 
to be the friend of Israel and cannot desert a 
nation which, with the support of countries like 
the Soviet Union, we created in the first place ; 
but it is the right of friends to criticise. I do not 
believe that the present Israeli Government, its 
leaders or their policies, can last for ever. The 
resignation of General Dayan underlines the 
dissension existing within the state of Israel. The 
most recent public opinion poll showed that 
Mr. Begin has a 27.5 % rating, his lowest ever. 
I should like to believe that eventually better 
forces will come to responsibility there and that 
they will recognise what we in western democracy 
must see as vital - that surely it is in Israel's 
long-term interests to see Palestinian aspirations 
satisfied in some considerable degree ; because 
until the Palestinian people gain an opportunity 
for self-determination, an opportunity to have a 
place of their own, every Arab government 
except Egypt will feel it necessary to support and 
sustain the Palestinians. 
The presence of Palestinian pressure inside 
those countries will make the further develop-
ment of peace between Israel and her neighbours 
quite impossible, and if Israel cannot see that, 
her western friends must tell her. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. Valleix, who will be followed 
by Mr. Urwin. 
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Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). -May 
I first express my gratitude to our Rapporteur 
who, on these thorny topics, has, in his report 
and recommendation, presented the problem 
with the utmost clarity. 
Unfortunately, our debate on Sir Frederic's 
report is taking place against the dramatic 
backcloth of what may be called a barbaric threat, 
in contempt of the most elementary rules of the 
rights of man, by the Iranian state, or at any 
rate with its connivance, against a large part of 
the staff of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran. 
This event makes abundantly clear the extent 
of the hidden dangers in the current development 
of the political situation in the Middle East. 
While the Rapporteur carefully and very aptly 
analyses the historic, ethnic and cultural roots of 
the conflicts which are at present causing up-
heaval in this region, he does not perhaps suf-
ficiently question the nature of the dangers to 
which Europe is exposed by the situation he 
describes. 
First the economic dangers : I do not need 
to tell you that Iran supplies a significant pro-
portion of our oil. But we must also realise that 
the possible impact of the Iranian crisis on the 
political equilibrium of the Persian Gulf states 
is an even more direct threat to oil exports to 
Europe. It is very difficult to grasp today the 
scope of recent events in Saudi Arabia. At any 
rate they concern a country which is of consider-
able importance for Europe's oil supplies. More-
over, the continued smouldering of the Israel-
Arab conflict still holds out the threat of a fresh 
embargo. 
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There are also political and military dangers 
in the Middle East situation. Hitherto the inter-
vention of the great powers has been a factor 
both of moderation and of exacerbation in the 
conflicts, the former fortunately outweighing the 
latter. The October 1973 war was certainly 
encouraged by Soviet-American rivalry. But 
pressures from the USSR and the United States 
did also put a fairly rapid end to the fighting. 
Perhaps I should also speak of the role of the 
great powers in such varied crises as those caused 
by the internal problems of Iraq and Lebanon 
in 1958, the fall of the MOSI'ladegh government 
in 1954, or Egyptian intervention in the Yemen 
in the early 1960s. 
Today, however, we are faced with a new fact. 
We no longer have two states, or two factions 
within a state, confronting one another with the 
direct or indirect support of one great power. 
In the Iranian crisis, a significant proportion of 
the population is clashing with the United States 
head-on. Instead of being a major power involved 
by proxy, the United States has become a direct 
protagonist in the Iranian drama. Thus an 
extremely disquieting risk of direct conflict 
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between the West and the 1$lamic world is loom-
ing on the horizon. 
It is to be feared that, in future crises in the 
Middle East, confrontations will increasingly 
turn into trials of strength with the industrialised 
countries of Western Europe or America -
North America notably- although these do have 
many close ties of solidarity with the state of 
Israel and the Islamic developing countries, 
whether oil-producers or those having to grapple 
with grievous economic difficulties. In such a 
context the true problem is that of North-South 
relations. The question of Soviet intervention 
takes second place compared with the danger of 
the emergence of a global anti-western movement 
from Pakistan to the Maghreb. 
The recent flare-up of anti-American feeling 
in Libya and Pakistan can only cause misgiving. 
The political colouring of an dntegralist Islamism 
which rejects all western influence is a potential 
factor of crises and conflic~ that would have 
unforeseeable results. Faced with this danger, 
and perhaps also with the worst military scenario, 
it is up to Europe to adopt a prudent and reason-
able, but lucid and firm attitude. 
Above all care must be taken to prevent the 
fomenting of a new crusading spirit. The breach 
which threatens to open up between Europe and 
the Islamic countries must be filled. 
Respect for international law is an absolute 
precondition. So long as a solution has not been 
found to the problem posed by its violation in 
Iran, there can be no substantive negotiations 
with that country. Sooner or later, however, Iran 
will probably resume its place in the interna-
tional community, for no state can isolate itself 
for ever, as shown by the example of Indonesia. 
Hence, it will revert to being just another case 
in the overall problems of the region, to the solu-
tion of which Europe should actively contribute. 
A dialogue must be started between Europe 
and the Middle East countries, while there is yet 
time. It would fit into the framework of the 
general relations to be established between the 
industrialised and developing countries. Its pri-
mary aim will be to relieve the atmosphere and 
reduce mutual misunderstandings ; it should 
cover energy, raw materials and industrial and 
technical co-operation. It is essential that the 
West, more especially Europe, should no longer 
be seen by substantial proportions of the Arab, 
or, more generally, Islamic population as a 
hostile external force destructive of traditional 
social structures. 
The establishment of a new climate in relations 
between Europe and the Middle East also pre-
supposes extirpating once and for all the terrible 
canker of the Israel-Arab conflict. Unfortunately 
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the progress made to date is admittedly inade-
quate. The Camp David agreement is a partial 
one. Surely the plain objective, for an Egypt 
exhausted by warfare, is to win at long last 
a truce which it hopes will be a lasting one, 
and for Israel, whose situation is hardly any 
better, to contrive a future still often conceived 
as the accomplishment of a myth rather than a 
realistic and necessary adaptation to a hostile 
environment. 
The international community should aspire to 
another, wider settlement, an overall settlement, 
associating all the parties concerned, guarantee-
ing the integrity and unity of all the states of 
the region inside secure and recognised frontiers, 
while effectively recognising the right of every 
nation, and in particular the Palestinian people, 
to self-determination. 
WEU can play an unequalled part in warding 
off these threats and promoting the achievement 
of lasting solutions. And it can only be a matter 
for regret that the Council should have, yet 
once more, demonstrated an astonishing inertia. 
As the sole European organisation with specific 
responsibility for debating security matters and 
organising co-operation between governments in 
this area, with a view to reaching, where appro-
priate, joint decisions, WEU, whose Assembly 
has always, as you know, paid very great atten-
tion to the Eastern Mediterranean, cannot fail 
to recognise the grave dangers of the current 
political situation in the Middle East. Its duty 
should be to prepare a united response by 
Europe in the event of an emergency, such 
as an oil blockade. It should also encourage, by 
joint action with the other European institutions 
at the United Nations and other competent inter-
national organisations, the formulation of last-
ing solutions. The member states of WEU could 
also, individually or collectively, act as guaran-
tors of any satisfactory settlement that may 
be reached of the many conflicts by which the 
Middle East is torn. 
The policy I have just outlined undoubtedly 
goe8 farther than the report tabled, notably 
as regards the role which WEU can play in 
defining a European policy in respect of the 
Middle East. It is however guided by analyses 
analogous to, if not identical with, those of th-" 
Rapporteur, and implies no fundamental diver-
gence of opinion - quite the contrary - and 
in the end conveys a rea$0ned acceptance of. 
the Rapporteur's proposals. 
I am therefore happy that in the name of the 
Assembly at lelU'!t we may in a few moments 
have a very clear majority in favour of the 
recommendation before us. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. Urwin. He will be followed 
by Mr. Wilkinson. 
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Mr. President. I, too, want to congratulate Sir 
Frederic Bennett on having presented for us 
such an interesting report and, in addition, on 
the invaluable briefing material that accompanies 
the report. 
I want to deal first and briefly with the 
subject of Iran, merely to record that the regime 
of the Shah was not one that was unive:r;sally 
supported- certainly not in the western world. 
It represented a regressive and oppressive regime 
and there was an all-too-late awakening to the 
need to democratise the country. Sadly, perhaps, 
the democratisation progress gathered momentum 
much too quickly in what was clearly a rather 
desperate attempt to liberalise national laws on 
a western has~. 
I have convinced myself that this was one of 
the factors which led to the advent of the 
Khomeini regime, which, despite all the things 
that were expected of it, has turned out to be 
even more vicious than that of the Shah, leading 
to bloodbaths and the present situation in whieh 
the country is rapidly becoming ungovernable. 
The recent example of the seizure of hostages 
from the American embassy in itself causes a 
great deal of concern, allied with the threat 
to arraign the hostages before the so-called peo-
ples' court. This, clearly, would be a violation 
of international law, and the situation is fraught 
with very great danger. One must not exclude 
the possibility of armed conflict as a result 
of the sad events now taking place in that un-
happy country. This is essentially the reason 
why I have seen fit to table an amendment 
to the recommendations concerning the supply 
of arms. 
It is coincidental that the Bennett report is 
presented to us at a time when there are intense 
activities within the Council of Europe concern-
ing the affairs in the Middle East. There we 
have had in the plenary session the appearance 
of Mr. Bhutros-Ghali, the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, and Mo$he Dayan, the then Foreign 
Minister of Israel, making their presentations 
to the plenary session of the Assembly. We have 
a sub-committee which has visited Israel, Egypt 
and, latterly, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, on 
what can be described as fact-finding tours, 
in preparation for the major report and debates 
in the Council of Europe that will follow. I am 
sure that we shall have just as interesting and 
as absorbing debates there on the highly contro-
versial subject of the Middle East when those 
reports are completed. 
No one should seek to denigrate or under-
estimate the importance of the Camp David 
agreements. They are having and will have a 
highly influential effect on relationships between 
Israel and Egypt. At the time I accorded a 
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warm personal welcome to the progress that had 
been made. At the same time I expr$Sed the 
fervent hope that this accord would be che 
forerunner of future and wider agreement pos-
sibly including and involving not only Israel 
and Egypt but Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. 
We have realistically to face the fact that, 
helpful though Camp David undoubtedly was, 
it simply could not provide a solution to the 
deep-seated, long-standing disputes between 
Egypt and Israel, or between Israel and the 
Arab nations as a whole, because of the simple 
fact that the Palestinian problem always has 
been and always will be the basic cause of the 
Middle East dispute. 
Without a solution it is inevitable that the 
dispute will continue. In these circumstances 
lasting peace and stability in the Arab world 
cannot be assured. As a praiseworthy objective, 
it will remain as distant as ever. Th~ is a matter 
of history. The Middle East has for too long 
represented a seething cauldron of political 
unrest, all too frequently boiling over and 
spreading into active physical war between 
nations. 
We are entitled to say that the Rapporteur 
has genuinely addressed himself to the main 
argument, for provision for the future of the 
Palestinians is at the heart of this difficult 
problem. Here he has captured and recapitulated 
the opinion widely proclaimed by the inter-
national community that the Palestinians must 
be involved in any negotiations aimed at reach-
ing a settlement and that without their accept-
ance of the results of negotiations any prospe<lt 
of a lasting peace will recede further into the 
long and distant future. 
The report and recommendations are contrary 
to some expressed beliefs that the ex~tence of 
the state of Israel is under direct threat. Sir 
Frederic Bennett seeks to encourage the two 
factions to come together and to negotiate and 
sensibly and properly calls on the PLO to recog-
nise the sovereignty of Israel and on Israel to 
abandon a deeply entrenched position regarding 
the problems of the Palestinian$ and their right 
to national independence and their own soYe-
reignty. 
This has been a good debate. Understandably, 
some acrimony has been introduced. There are 
positions of deep intransigence which have 
become manifest during the debate. That is 
unde:rtstandable on such a highly emotive subject 
as the Middle East. 
New initiatives are being advocated in the 
paper before us and in the recommendations. 
I appeal to my colleagues in the Assembly to 
study the recommendations with the utmost 
objectivity. They are capable of some slight 
amendment and I hope to get the accord of the 
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Rapporteur to all the amendments that I have 
personally tabled in my name and those of 
two others. The report and the recommendations 
should not give offence to either side in this 
dispute when they recall the texts of United 
Nations Resolutio~ 242, 337, 338 and 3236. 
My one criticism of the report is based on 
the content of paragraph 152 on the last page. 
Sir Frederic has ventured on a wholly needless 
criticism of the United States of America and 
the presidency's present incumbent. This adds 
nothing to the report and makes no contribution 
4 towards a successful conclusion by this Assembly 
based on the recommendations and the report. 
Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - I now call Mr. Wil-
kinson. 
He will be followed by Mr. McGuire. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I 
welcome, Mr. President, this wide-ranging repo!'t 
so painstakingly prepared and so thoughtfully 
introduced by Sir Frederic Bennett. It draws 
attention not only to the shocking events in Iran, 
not only to the threat to peace inherent in the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, but to the situation in 
Afghanistan which, for all its calamito~ conse-
quences for human rights and the lives and 
liberties of the traditionally most responsible 
elements in Afghan society, has received far 
too little attention in the West. 
The vital strategic significance of Afghanistan 
has also been largely overlooked. This is perhaps 
due to the fact that Afghanistan, in spite of 
two British military expeditions in the last 
century, was not colonised by the European 
powers ana, perhaps since the demise of the 
Central Treaty Organisation, Middle East 
regional security matters have enjoyed too little 
consideration by "\Vest European military plan-
ners and statesmen. Afghani)'ltan has remained 
largely a forgotten land. 
However, its importance to the USSR has 
not been overlooked in Moscow, both to underpin 
the Islamic Soviet republics in the southern 
Soviet Union, especially at a time of Moslem 
fervour in neighbouring Iran, and to support 
the historic Russian objective of direct access 
to the Indian Ocean. That objective has become 
more significant in view of the Soviets' new-
found global naval capacity and in view of the 
Soviet Union's increasing dependence on imports 
of oil from overseas. 
Freddie Bennett was right to remind us of 
the dimensions of the human tragedy which the 
repressive policies of the Soviet-backed regime 
in Kabul have unleashed. The elimination of 
so-called class enemies, religious leaders, pro-
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fessional people, tribal chieftains and officers of 
the . armed forces loyal to the Afghan royal 
family has proceeded ruthlessly. Political pri-
soners in Afghan jails have multiplied. 
. The active in.volvement of Russian-flown jet 
fighters and helicopter gunships and the wide-
spread deployment of Soviet military personnel 
have characterised the punitive missions of the 
Revolutionary Council's forces in support of 
Hafizullah Amin's programme of Marxist-
Leninist social change. The suffering and depriv-
ation imposed on a people who already had one 
of the lowest living standards in the world have 
been appalling. They are a tragic advertisement 
to the world of what can be derived from a 
treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. 
The overspill of this calamity into Pakistan 
has been admirably documented in Sir Frederic's 
report. Although there has always been movement 
of Pathan tribesmen across the Durand Line 
the sudden irruption of 200,000 to 300 000 
refugees into the North-West Frontier Province 
and Baluchistan poses serious problems for 
the Pakistan Government. Pakistan affords sanc-
tuary to its persecuted Moslem brethren from 
Afghanistan but the North-West Frontier 
Province and Baluchistan are its poorest 
provinces in Pakistan and the national economv 
m already weak. Both the NWFP and Baluchistail 
have always been the provinces most prone to 
separatist sentiments. 
Following the execution of the foi'Illler Pakistan 
Prime Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and 
the regrettable post:rmnement last month of par-
liamentary elections by the martial law admin-
istration in Islamabad, the internal politics of 
Pakistan are potentially explosive. 
The Pakistan Government has rightly been 
careful not by any provocative action to give 
pretexts for hostile intervention by the USSR 
or its Afghan proxies in Pakistan's internal 
affairs. 
Following the dissolution of both the Central 
and the South East Asia Treaty Organisations, 
no other effective means of preserving western 
interests and the security of our friends in 
these areas have been found. CENTO provided 
a consultative machinery for the United King-
dom, the United States, Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan. At a time when the stability of 
Pakistan m jeopardised, we Western European 
allies cannot afford not to consult about these 
matters and our Rapporteur was quite right in 
the first recommendation to suggest that we 
initiate consultation 11rgently. 
If we do, I suggest that we launch three 
initiatives, the first of which is diplomatic. Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan imperils detente and 
is a flagrant breach of the principle of non-
intervention in neighbouring states which is 
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elll3hrined in the Helsinki final act, and that must 
be made clear. 
Secondly, we must ensure that Pakistan has 
an adequate conventional military capacity to 
contain any overspill of the conflict in Afghan-
istan and adequate economic assistance from the 
West to sustain the financial strains of looking 
after the many thousands of Afghan refugees. 
Indo-Pakistan relations are now, fortunately, 
good and there is even a Pakistan cricket 13ide 
touring India without riots ensuing. 
Thirdly, European nations, and particularly 
the United Kingdom, France and the Nether-
lands, should deploy a permanent naval presence, 
including, preferably, an aircraft carrier task 
force, in the northern Indian Ocean to secure 
the sea lanes from the Gulf and to assert politi~al 
influence on the littoral states. It would be a 
grave error if a combination of parochialism 
on the part of the Western European alEes 
and isolationism on the part of our American 
friends allowed our joint crucial economjc 
interests in the Gulf to be subverted and human 
rights in the Middle East to be flouted with 
impunity. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. McGuire. 
Mr. McGUIRE (United Kingdom).- Mr. Pre-
sident, I want to join with all my colleagues who 
have paid tribute to Sir Frederic Bennett for 
the comprehensive report which he has presented 
to us and, even more, for what I might call 
the index. It is considerably bigger than the 
report, but it is most helpful. 
I do not want to deal with some of the other 
matters in the report, such as the questiL'll 
of Pakistan, which my colleague has just 
developed to this Chamber, nor the question 
of Iran, except to say that I think we all con-
demn the conduct of the Iranian Government 
in taking innocent hostages to further their 
attempt to get the Shah to stand a trial the like 
of which I should not want to contemplate. 
I think we all condemn them and I am glad 
that everybody who has so far spoken has 
done so. 
I want to get to what I consider to be the 
heart of this report, that is, justice for the 
Palestinian people. This question is tempered by 
another which is whether helping to do justice 
to the Palestinians will injure the long-term 
existence of the state of Israel and its claim 
to what it considers to be world justice, 
especially in view of the tragic history of the 
Diaspora. 
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Tragically, but perhaps understandably, 
leaders of Jewish opinion inside and outside 
Israel argue that the claim of the Palestinians 
to a homeland of their own and the setting up 
of an independent state would be but a prelude 
to the destruction of the state of Israel. Because 
of that feeling, which is understandable, we 
cannot have a dialogue between the Israeli 
Government and whoever will represent the 
Palestinian people. 
We argued a little over "accredited", "valid" 
and so on, but in the report we have left the 
wording sufficiently vague. However, we under-
stand that some group will speak on behalf of 
the Palestinian people. It will be recognised 
as such and it will sit down, I hope, with the 
leaders of the state of Israel to discuss what 
should happen, that is, the creation of a Pales-
tinian homeland, a Palestinian state. But, as 
I have said, we cannot have that dialogue 
because of this understandable fear. 
How we were all uplifted when President 
Sadat in, I think, November 1977 said in a 
speech that he was ready to go to Israel and 
discuss their problems. We were also all uplifted 
by the outcome of those talks. But at the heart of 
those talks there was a commitment to justi~e 
for the Palestinian people and, because Sadat 
has been seen to give away if not an ace, one 
or two trump cards, he has almost entirely lost 
the good will of his Arab neighbours. His was 
a courageous act, but we must understand that 
the consequences for him personally have been 
very bad. 
The humiliation and the terrible injustices per-
petrated against the Jews in recent times will 
not be assuaged by continuing to deny justice 
to the Palestinians, for they can rightfully argue 
that they were not responsible for those events, 
and the guilt of the western nations cannot 
be expatiated at the expense of innocent people 
now dispossessed of their homes and their lands. 
This report states that as a prerequisite of any 
dialogue between the state of 113rael and whoever 
will represent the Palestinian people there has 
to be a recognition by the PLO - which, so far 
as we now know, is the only body internationally 
recognised as spokesman for the Palestinians -
and an unequivocal declaration by it that it 
recognises the right of the state of Israel to 
exist. It is in this report. Equally, there has 
to be that same commitment from the state of 
Israel that it, too, recognises that an injustice 
has been done to a people. 
As my colleague Sir Frederic Bennett said, 
no people on this earth should have more deeply 
burned into their souls the injustice and the 
longing for a homeland than the Jewish people. 
It is something which kept alive their faith and 
their hope over countless generations, so they 
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should feel much more clearly than any other 
group the burning injustice that must be felt by 
the Palestinians. 
While we are sometimes prone to exaggerate 
the importance of the Assembly of WEU, 
there is equally a tendency for us sometimes 
to depreciate what we say in th$ Chamber and 
how it will be taken outside. But we have taken 
a step today to discuss something which - and 
I speak as a labour politician - we have been 
reluctant to speak about because of the terrible 
injustice that the Jewish people suffered over 
many years, particularly in the recent past. 
That has clouded our judgment about another 
injustice to an innocent people to whom we have 
said : "We shall wipe the slate clean by not 
raising our voices." We have said that we shall 
act in a peaceful way and encourage their repre-
sentatives. We have told them that they have 
made their case, that it is recognised and that we 
shall help them. 
If this Assembly passes this report - my 
colleague has said that he has one or two textual 
amendments, but I do not think that they will 
rob the report of its message and viability --
we shall have taken a small step. The Chinese 
have a saying that the greatest journey in the 
world begins with but a single step. We shall 
have taken one of those steps and done some-
thing good. 
I must tell my Jewish colleagues and friends 
that it is not my wish, nor, I believe, the wish 
of any of my colleagues who support this report, 
to see the state of Israel wiped off the map, not 
even so as to give justice to the Palestinians. 
To use that argument, a very emotional and 
powerful one, to block any sensible dialogue on 
this question, however, is to do the Jewish people 
a very great disservice and does not demonstrate 
those qualities which I believe the Jewish people 
have shown over the years. 
I hope that this report is carried in all but 
one or two of the textual amendments, whi<>h 
will not rob it of any vitality. I hope, too, that 
we shall have done something positive and that 
the result, as this report demands, will be a 
just and a lasting settlement in a part of the 
world which, if we are not careful, could exploJe 
in our faces in the not too distant future. We 
should then regret that we had not taken what-
ever opportunity we had to discuss the matter 
sensibly and calmly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
McGuire. 
We are now at the end of the list of speakers. 
Before I ask the Rapporteur and Chairman 
whether they wish to speak, I should like to 
point out that we shall have a good many votes 
5 
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on at least eighteen amendments. In order to ease 
the situation for members, I have distributed 
a paper showing how the voting will be con-
ducted. 
In view of the time available, I cannot allow 
more than three minutes to anyone who wishes 
to move his amendment. A good many amend-
ments have already been discussed, so perhaps 
we can make do with a shorter time. 
I must, however, point out that after the 
votes on the amendments we have to deeide 
on a motion for a recommendation, which has 
been tabled and which will be distr1buted within 
the next ten minutes, with a demand that the 
Assembly meet urgently on the question of Iran. 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- Mr. President, I have already received your 
request that I be brief. You have given me a 
maximum time which I hope not even to use 
fully, let alone exceed. If I make a reply which 
is more than merely formal, it will, I think, 
shorten the debate, since I wish to devote the 
second half of my remarks to helping with the 
amendments. One useful feature of today's 
break was that I was able to discuss them with 
my Chairman and other members of the Com-
mittee. I shall, therefore, be able to say that 
on behalf of the Chairman and myself and, 
I believe, of other members of the Committee, 
we can accept a pretty wide range of the 
amendments as they stand. This might save time 
in the long run, because if I indicate support 
some amendments could be moved formally. 
Before that I should like to refer to two or 
three things which have emerged from the debate 
and whi~h are of major significance to my own 
attitude. I would say to my friend and col-
league, Mr. Beith, that I do not believe that 
there is any part of the report itself, for whi.Jh 
I am responsible, as opposed to the recommenJ-
ations, which are those of the Committee as a 
whole, which shows any grudge towards the state 
of Israel. In fact, I went to a great deal of 
trouble in my opening remarks this morning to 
say that the 1947 resolution which set up the 
state of Israel was a fact. The only other part 
of that resolution which has not been fulfilled 
concerned the setting up of an Arab state in 
Palestine. That is the only comment I would 
make in regard to that matter. 
One or two speakers have criticised the fact 
that in one report I have tried to cover Afghan-
istan, Iran and the Arab-Israeli dispute. I make 
no apology for that. I am the servant of my 
Committee and the mandate which it gave me 
was not to concentrate wholly on one aspect of 
the Middle East. 
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One or two of the communist speakers remar-
ked on the deep hatred of the western world and 
the xenophobia in Iran. There is a myth growing 
up that this xenophobia is directed solely toward8 
the Americans. That is something that the com-
munists are trying very hard to put across. I11 
fact there are just as many anti-Soviet and anti-
communist slogans in Iran at the moment as anti-
American ones and when the Shah was in office 
he was feted just as much in Moscow and East 
Berlin as he was in the western capitals. This 
myth must not be allowed to get off the ground. 
I have also been accused of interfering with 
the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Coming from 
a communist, that really is rich. I shall not make 
any further comment as to who is interfering in 
Afghanistan. 
I have not resented anything said in the course 
of this debate except for one personal attack. At 
the time it was made I almost rose. There is 
nothing either in this report or in my past which 
indicates that I have feelings of anti-semitism 
or have in any way sympathised with Colonel 
Kadhafi. I shall let my record in peace and war 
demonstrate that. 
I say straight away that those amendments 
that deplore the situation of the hostages in Iran 
and ask for their release are perfectly acceptab!e 
to me, but I do not know what your advice will 
be, Mr. President, if we are to have a special 
debate. It might not be appropriate to put them 
in. However, my Chairman has not and nor have 
I any objection. 
I accept now with qualification the amend-
ments by Mr. Urwin and Mr. Voogd. They 
improve the clarity of the report and we need 
not have one of the usual arguments over them. 
After consultation with the Chairman and 
others, I cannot accept either what I would call 
the pro-PLO amendments by the communists who 
have spoken nor Dr. Miller's amendments, any of 
which would entirely upset the balance of a 
report which, at least in the opinion of most 
people in this Chamber, is objectilve and tries to 
strike a balance between forces. 
I would oppose amendments from either 
extreme and I have my Chairman's support for 
saying that. 
There are one or two procedural amendments 
which Mr. Roper is to move. I am also happy to 
accept those. 
The report is my own as far as the actual text 
is concerned and I would not wish to change 
anything. I must point out that the recommenda-
tion already represents a consensus of people 
with widely differing views within the General 
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Affairs Committee. In the long time I have been 
a member of this Assembly and of the Council 
of Europe I can scarcely remember an occasion 
when the debate on a controversial subject in 
Committee has ended with a vote of 15 to nil 1n 
favour of the report, precisely because it was 
thought to strike a sensible and objective balance. 
As Mr. Urwin and Mr. McGuire have said, we 
should do nothing to upset the balance, because if 
we did so we could do more harm than good and 
make me regret that this subject was eve.c 
introduced into this Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
I call the Chairman of the Committee. 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, we 
are very glad indeed that the report covers not 
only the Levant but the whole of the Middle East, 
because developments in recent months show how 
necessary it is for us to concern ourselves with 
the Persian Gulf area. We are today, you might 
say, taking the first step. The question which 
we have so far not even touched on, namely how 
much of a political power Islam actually is and 
how far it is in a position to set a trend for the 
future, is still wide open. That Islam has played 
and is still playing a rOle in this region cannot be 
denied. I would guess that we shall be having to 
discuss this again in the future in connection 
with the questions of Afghanistan and Iran, 
which were of course included in their report by 
the General Affairs Committee. 
As regards the Middle East, may I say this 
on behalf of the Committee : the Committee 
reflects a variety of opinions and on political 
matters it certainly does not speak with a single 
voice. Yet we have managed to agree on the 
present draft recommendation. The approach 
repeatedly taken in the debate on the Middle 
East is astonishing. Those who are prepared to 
admit the injustice that has been done to the 
Palestinians, but who while doing so are certainly 
not saying that they want to minimise the 
injustice done to the Jews, are often represented 
as enemies of the Jews. Here a variety of concepts 
are being jumbled up together indiscriminately. 
Jews and Zionism are not quite the same thing. 
None of us has said that the state of Israel must 
be wiped off the map. This is not in the report 
or in the recommendation. No one wants this. 
I have already said that we must be prepared 
to recognise that we cannot improve the situation 
by introducing a further injustice. So we call for 
the involvement of the PLO and thereby of the 
Palestinians. 
Various speakers have said that the problem 
should be resolved by negotiation. I hope they 
agree with me that the Palestinians must he 
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allowed to take part in the negotiations. In the 
long term it will surely not be poEf!ible to nego-
tiate over the heads of adult human beings. 
It has been said that the PLO is a band of 
murderers, that they have blood on their hands, 
etc. Should we not be a little more reticent with 
such expressions, Mr. President~ I cannot heJp 
reminding you that Mr. Begin, too, has blood 
on his hands and that a great many liberation 
movements throughout the world have blood on 
their hands. I do not think it is very useful or 
very co~ructive to keep saying that one or other 
side has blood on its hands. Both sides have used 
force. If we are calling on one side 1Jo stop doing 
so, we must certainly say the same to the other 
side, which is also using force and which - it is 
a point that I do not propose to sweep under the 
carpet - has been doing so from the start. 
People complain about the charter of the 
Palestinians, saying it is aimed at destroying the 
Jews. That is not true. At best, or at worst, its 
attack is directed against the Zionist state. As I 
have said, Jews and Zionism are not quite the 
same thing. No one tells us that the records of 
Zionist meetings were saying decades ago : we 
Jews want Palestine, the whole of Palestine -
without the Arabs ; they must go. Here we have 
two conflicting statements, one from each people. 
I think it would become us Europeans better if 
we tried to build a bridge between them. There 
is no point in constantly harping on what divides 
them. It is the purpose of our report and of our 
recommendation to attempt to build a bridge. 
May I end with the following comment. It is 
a new experience for me in this Assembly to find 
people who do not agree with another speaker 
turning to personal invective. That is what we 
have had from one quarter. As a way of condut't-
ing political discussions, this is I believe unfair 
and ineffective. I hope that in future it will not 
be used again in this Assembly. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Madam 
Chairman. 
The debate is closed. 
Before we vote on the draft recommendation 
in Document 820 we must dispose of the amend-
ments which have been tabled. As I have told the 
Assembly, eighteen amendments have been tabled. 
They will be taken in the order in which they 
refer to paragraphs in the preamble and the 
recommendation. Therefore, I start with Amend-
ment 17 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere. It reads : 
17. After the third paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add a new para-
graph as follows: 
"Concerned that by taking and detaining 
employees of the United States Embassy, in 
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violation of all principles of international law, 
Iran may endanger world peace;". 
We have already spoken on this amendment. 
Need it be moved 1 May the Assembly proceed to 
a vote? 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
Just a very short remark. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think 
that if this Assembly did not pronounce upon 
what has been going on in Tehran it would be 
positively scandalous and downright equivocation. 
Therefore I insist on having a vote on my Amend-
ment 17 and the next one, 18, and hope if possible 
they will be adopted unanimously. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Rapporteur? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- I thought I had already indicated that Mr. 
Cavaliere's amendments on the Iran situation 
were acceptable both to the Chairman of the 
Committee and myself. 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall therefore vote 
on Amendment 17. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 17 is agreed to unanimously. 
We now turn to Dr. Miller's Amendment 1. 
Dr. Miller, do you wish to speak to it ? 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom).- Yes, Mr. 
President. 
The PRESIDENT. -Amendment 1 reads : 
1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation and insert : 
"Welcoming the Camp David agreements as a 
major step towards overall peace;". 
I call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - One 
should not underrate the peace which now exists 
and is developing between Israel and Egypt. 
Although it ought to lead to a much wider peace, 
one should not make the good the enemy of the 
perfect. In any case, I do not believe that the 
Palestine "question", as it is referred to in the 
report, is the cause of the problem. It is the 
result of non-acceptance by the Arabs of the 
right of Israel to exist. In my opinion it is Arab 
propaganda which maintains the idea that is the 
main cause of the problem. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Dr. Miller. 
Mr. Rapporteur? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
-Once again, after consultation with the Chair-
man I have indicated that this particular amend-
ment cannot be looked at, as Mr. McGuire has 
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said, from one paragraph to another. It is a 
very carefully balanced approach and it is our 
view that anything that upsets the very fine 
balance that has been drawn by a consensus vote 
within the Committee would not be helpful to 
the prospects of this report making any useful 
contribution to solving this difficult problem. 
For that reason, just as I propose to resist 
amendments from the other side,, it is the view of 
the Chairman and myself that we should resist 
this amendment, because we have to look at the 
balance which has been drawn throughout the 
whole recommendation and not seek to shift the 
balance from one sentence to another. 
The PRESIDENT. - As far as I can learn 
from your speech, you are against it. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
-Yes. 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall therefore vote 
on Amendment 1 by Dr. Miller. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 1 is negatived. 
We now come to Amendment 2: 
2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, leave out "and militate 
against the underlying causes of the conflict". 
Will you move it, please, Dr. Miller ? 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). -For the 
same reasons that I believe the words "and mili-
tate against the underlying causes of the conflict" 
actually do not explain the position - the reason 
that I gave before, that the underlying causes of 
the conflict are really the results of the initial 
activities of the Arabs against the Israelis -
I move the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- What is the opinion of 
the Rapporteur ? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- I shall try to convey my meaning more clearly. 
After consultation with the Chairman, I must 
ask that this amendment, too, be rejected on pre-
cisely the grounds that I put forward last time. 
The PRESIDENT. -We shall now vote on 
Amendment 2 by Dr. Miller. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 2 is negatived. 
We now come to Amendment 16 : 
16. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph 
as follows: 
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"Wishing the PLO to recognise Israel's right 
to the existence and security of a free and 
independent state and to stop its acts of terror-
ism, failing which it is not possible for it to 
take part in negotiations ;". 
I think, Mr. Rapporteur, that you have already 
said that you agree to this amendment. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
-No, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Cavaliere must move 
it. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
I think it is a sound amendment, and that it is 
to be approved. Whereas in the preamble of the 
draft recommendation there is some reference to 
the conduct of the Israelis on the West Bank 
and the establishment of settlements is deplored, 
whereas we do speak of the advisability, nay, 
necessity of Palestinian participation in the 
negotiations on their subject, no notice whatever 
is taken of the need, if the Palestinians and 
Israelis are to be brought together, for the PLO 
to recognise Israel's right to exist, for not only 
have they failed to do so hitherto but they have 
opposed it, saying that Israel should be abolished. 
So if the amendment is not included I believe we 
shall have laboured in vain. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call the Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- This is always the difficulty when one gets a 
large number of amendments. I am opposing Mr. 
Cavaliere and, indeed, have asked him not to 
move the amendment not because I did not agree 
with him but because of what I would call the 
Urwin-Voogd list of amendments, which come 
later and which make exactly the same point, 
leaving out such emotive words as "terrorism". 
If the amendment were carried, it would be a 
pity, because we have all agreed on two amend-
ments which spell out the right of Israel and 
everything else more strongly in the recom-
mendations part. Mr. Urwin is to move his 
amendment shortly, supported by a wide range 
of members. I should prefer Mr. Cavaliere not 
to move this amendment but to seek to make 
the point he wishes to make on the later amend-
ments. It is no wish of mine to say "no". It is 
because I think it better to handle the problem 
by supporting the Urwin amendments. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Urwin. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President. It is with some temerity 
that I rise to try to assist you in what appears to 
be something of a diLemma, if only because of the 
fact that in the summing-up it was said that 
Amendments 12 and 13 would be accepted. To 
a large extent they cover the points made by 
Mr. Cavaliere. Would it not assist the Assembly 
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and the speed of voting if you were allowed to 
put my amendments to the vote 1 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Cavaliere, are you 
content to withdraw your amendment, and then 
we vote in favour of Mr. Urwin's amendment Y 
(Mr. Cavaliere indicated assent) 
Mr. Cavaliere withdraws his amendment and 
we shall come in due course to the amendment 
by Mr. Urwin. 
Next we have Amendment 3 : 
3. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation. 
Dr. Miller to move the amendment, please. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom).- I honestly 
cannot see how the Rapporteur considers that the 
speech made by His Majesty King Hussein on 
25th September 1979 constitutes a positive step 
towards peace. I understand the King's probleins 
and I have read his speech thoroughly several 
times. However, reading it several times one finds, 
cLearly, that it is an anti-Israel diatribe, standing 
the truth on its head, the other way around 
exactly. I know that King Hussein would love 
to acknowledge the state of Israel and believes 
that it would be a great advantage to him if 
there were a rapport between Jordan and Israel. 
I think that Sir Frederic Bennett realises that as 
well. It is merely a question of how that comes 
about, but I cannot agree with the statements in 
the paragraph, and I move my amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. -I call the Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- I think that members must make up their own 
minds. We never had any argument within the 
whole of the General Affairs Committee about 
the useful role that one of the few remaining 
moderate and long-sighted members of the Arab 
world, the King, is playing. I think that it is 
totally untrue that he did other than recommend 
the only way forward, which was to renounce 
territorial claims in relation to the West Bank 
in order to give the people of Palestine the right 
to choose their own future. 
There was no argument about this in the Com-
mittee. I ask that the balance is not upset and 
that we pay a tribute to someone who will be a 
success in this part of the world and who must 
play an essential role. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
We shall now vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
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The next amendment is : 
4. Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation. 
I call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). -I would 
say as a preamble that I do not welcome the Nine 
speaking for me in any matter. Some of the 
spokesmen of the Nine, here in this Assembly, 
appear to be trying to square the circle. On the 
one hand, they appear to be indicating that the 
state of Israel has to be allowed to live and, on 
the other hand, to permit another state to develop 
its avowed intention to destroy the state of 
Israel. 
As a Jew, I do not want people to weep over 
the demise of the state of Israel and its people 
with whom I have a great deal in common. I do 
not want the western world to be put in a position 
of once again wailing over the deaths of many 
millions of Jews. I move the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Rapporteur please. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- That is a totally inaccurate interpretation. We 
should surely be pleased that nine European 
governments, including seven represented here, 
should have made a balanced appraisal of this 
subject. To claim that what they have said 
amounts virtually to asking Israel to commit 
suicide is standing reason on its head and is a 
gross reproach of the member governments who 
are members of this Assembly for what they did. 
With considerable force, I ask you not to accept 
the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall now vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 4 is negatived. 
We now come to Amendment 11 : 
11. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcom-
ing", and insert "Noting". 
I call Mr. Urwin. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom). - To some 
extent I endorse the sentiments expressed by my 
colleague, Dr. Miller, about the Nine. I strongly 
object to any prospect of the Nine speaking on 
my behalf. My amendment is simply to leave out 
the word "welcoming" and to insert "noting". 
There are essentially different meanings to these 
two words. It would meet with the wishes of 
many of our colleagues in this Assembly if we 
simply "noted" rather than "welcomed". 
The PRESIDENT. - The Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I do not feel as strongly about this amendment 
as I did about others. I think personally, and 
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I have also spoken to my Chairman, that we 
should welcome the fact that European govern-
ments have adopted the line that they have 
taken up. I do not wish to emphasise opposition 
too strongly over what we would call in England 
a free vote. I do not think that this is of great 
significance and although I shall vote against the 
amendment, because I consider that "welcoming" 
is more significant than "noting", I do not feel 
strongly about the matter. 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall now vote. 
(A vote WM then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 11 is negatived. 
Next we come to Amendment 8: 
8. At the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft 
recommendation proper, add : 
"Either directly or where more appropriate 
indirectly through the participation of its 
membership in European political co-operation 
among the Nine,". 
I call Mr. Roper. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I shall 
be brief, Mr. President, as Sir Frederic Bennett 
has indicated that he will accept the amendment. 
The amendment is to some extent consequential 
to the last paragraph of the preamble. I believe 
that some of the seven paragraphs that follow 
in the recommendation touch upon matters that 
go beyond the collective capacities of the wise 
people sitting in the front row before me who 
are the Council of Western European Union. 
In some matters it is better for our governments 
to act indirectly through European political 
co-operation of the Nine. I believe that this 
amendment is proposed in the spirit of asking 
the right body to handle the matter and that it 
will be accepted by the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call the Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I confirm that I accept Mr. Roper's amendment 
in the spirit in which it was moved. 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall now vote. 
(A vote WlM then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 8 is agreed to. 
We now come to Amendment 12 : 
12. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from "and" in line 2 to the end 
of the paragraph and insert "call upon all other 
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arms-supplying countries to impose a similar 
moratorium". 
I call Mr. Urwin. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom). - As the 
Rapporteur has expressed his willingness to 
accept this amendment, I do not need to address 
myself to it at length. It simply seeks to delete 
all the words after "country" in the draft recom-
mendation, and in view of the difficult situation 
in Iran to "call upon all other arms-supplying 
countries to impose a similar moratorium". 
The PRESIDENT. - The Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
Mr. Urwin was good enough to consult me and 
I was able to consult the Chairman. In view of 
the difficulties experienced, it would be wise 
to make this paragraph stronger. We accept 
unreservedly what Mr. Urwin says. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Rapporteur and 
the Chairman accept. 
We shall now vote. 
(A vote WM then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 12 is agreed to. 
I now call Amendment 18 : 
18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recom-
mendation proper, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages 
held in the United States Embassy ;". 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I hope that Mr. Cavaliere will not move the 
amendment. I think it is covered by other amend-
ments that are coming shortly. I oppose it, not 
in principle but because of what Mr. Cavaliere 
has already said. 
The PRESIDENT. -Mr. Cavaliere, do you 
maintain your amendment Y 
(Mr. Cavaliere indicated Msent) 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
There is a misunderstanding. I thought we had 
already dealt with that. Of course, I accept the 
amendment, but I think we have already had 
this same discussion. 
The PRESIDENT. -We were slower than 
you thought. The Rapporteur is in favour of 
Amendment 18. 
We shall now vote. 
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(A. vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 18 is agreed to. 
I now call Dr. Miller to move Amendment 5 : 
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recom-
mendation proper. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - I am 
afraid that the words "continue to co-ordinate 
the positions of its members in the United 
Nations" do not mean very much to me. I cannot 
understand what exactly is implied by that. But 
as regards calling for a clarification from the 
Security Council of the actual implications of 
Resolution 242, what the Rapporteur should have 
done was- to ask Arthur Goldberg and Lord 
George-Brown, who framed Resolution 242 in 
English, not in any other language. It was 
framed by an American and by an Englishman 
in the English language, and if Sir Frederic 
were to read some of the comments at the time, 
and even read some of the comments made later 
by Lord George-Brown and by Arthur Goldberg, 
he would see that Resolution 242 was deliberately 
drafted in such a manner that it could be 
acceptable to everyone. So that to call for its 
implications now, after twelve years, is doing 
what this report is doing - trying to put the 
clock back. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
The Rapporteur, please. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
Once again I must ask the Assembly to reject 
this amendment, whatever the language. This is 
one of the sterile arguments that has been hold-
ing up progress towards peace. There is no 
doubt that different parties, whatever language 
they are speaking, interpret Resolution 242 in a 
different manner and it is obviously essential, 
if we are to get any kind of understanding, that 
we all at least agree on what Resolution 242 
means. There is a need to redefine it. My Com-
mittee agreed with me unanimously on this, and 
I ask the Assembly to reject the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. -We shall now vote on 
Dr. Miller's amendment. 
(A. vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 5 is negatived. 
We now come to Amendment 13 : 
13. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft 
recommendation proper and insert : 
"5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately 
to accept the existence of the Palestinian people 
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and to renounce its policy of settlements on 
the West Bank and commence negotiations 
with valid Palestinian representatives to 
achieve self-determination, including the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip; 
6. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also 
immediately, to declare its acceptance of an 
independent Israeli state within internationally 
agreed and defined borders ; 
7. Ask its members to urge upon both sides 
a total abandonment of all acts of violence, 
which call into question the validity of any 
such declarations." 
This amendment is tabled by Mr. Urwin and 
others. I must point out that if we agree to 
this amendment, Amendments 9, 15, 6, 7 and 
10 fall, with the exception that I shall have one 
amendment if this is carried. 
I call Mr. Urwin. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom).- Again, the 
Rapporteur has indicated his willingness to 
accept this amendment. Briefly, it deals with 
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the recommendations 
proper and embodies almost all the terminology 
used in those two paragraphs. But at the same 
time it extends them to include a third para-
graph without very much interfering with the 
objectiveness of the recommendations in para-
graphs 5 and 6. 
As you say, Mr. President, this would have 
an effect on other amendments. Therefore, as 
there are several of us thinking along the same 
lines, I do not expect any difficulty in having 
the amendment accepted. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Rapporteur Y 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
Mr. Urwin has already consulted me over this 
amendment. I have indicated,. with the Chair-
man that we accept his amendment in full and 
the ~onsequences that follow, including the fact 
that I shall then withdraw my own Amendment 
4. So I should now like formally to advise the 
Assembly to accept Mr. Urwin's amendment, plus 
the consequences for the other amendments which 
you, Mr. President, have just listed. 
The PRESIDENT.- Ladies and Gentlemen, 
the situation is as follows : I have been informed 
that if Amendment 13 is carried, Mr. Corallo 
will ask to have his Amendment 9 voted upon. 
According to Rule 29, I must first ask for a 
vote on Amendment 13. There is a difference of 
opinion. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - May I 
put a point of order ? I have no objections to 
Amendment 13, but I wonder why my Amend-
ment 7 will fall. What I am concerned about 
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Dr. Miller (continued) 
is the word "internationally", which appears in 
the amendment tabled by Mr. Urwin. I wonder 
why my amendment is not acceptable and will 
fall. 
The PRESIDENT.- Amendment 13 differs 
most from the original text and replaces para-
graphs 5 and 6. Your amendment is concerned 
with one of the paragraphs which are amended. 
We cannot have another debate. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - If you 
look carefully at paragraph 6 to which Dr. Mil-
ler's amendment refers, and the new paragraph 
6 which Mr. Urwin introduces, the word "inter-
nationally" appears in exactly the same place 
in both texts. I hope, therefore, that if Mr. 
Urwin's amendment is carried, you will permit 
Dr. Miller subsequently to move his amendment 
to the amended text. 
The PRESIDENT. - I agree to vote first 
on Amendment 13, and then to call again Amend-
ment 9 and Amendment 7 which deals with para-
graph 6. 
I call Mr. Cavaliere. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
I crave indulgence for taking up a few moments 
more of our time. I have two reasons. First, my 
Amendment 15 attempts for the sake of fairness 
to invert the order of paragraphs 5 and 6. I trust 
my honourable friend Mr. Urwin, the mover of 
Amendment 13, will agree to this. 
I seize the opportunity of commenting on my 
vote on part of Amendment 13. May I draw your 
attention to paragraph 7. This places on the 
same footing acts of violence by the PLO -
or the Palestinians - and by the Israelis. It is 
right to make it clear that the Israelis have 
always reacted to violence by the other side, never 
the other way round. So, to say that both sides 
should abandon violence is putting the Israelis 
and the Palestinians on a par, which in my 
view is unjust, and even, if I may say so, 
unhistorical. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Corallo, please. 
Mr. CORALLO (Italy) (Translation). - I 
should like a clarification. I proposed leaving 
out "valid Palestinian representatives" and 
inserting "the PLO". The form of words recurs 
in the Urwin amendment and I therefore regard 
my amendment as a sub-amendment to his, to 
be voted on first. If Amendment 13 were to 
be adopted I cannot see how it could be sub-
sequently amended. Hence I think it proper to 
vote on Amendment 9 first, in which case, subject 
to your agreemeillt, Mr. President, I should like 
briefly to speak to the sub-amendment. 
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The PRESIDENT. - It might be that I was 
not clear enough. I said that the amendment 
which differed most was 13. We are to vote 
on Amendment 13, and afterwards we shall take 
up again your amendment and Dr. Miller's 
amendment. Later, after 13 has been voted on, 
Amendment 15 may be on the agenda again. 
Please look at the notes that I gave you. 
We now come to the vote on Amendment 13, 
which has also had the support of the Rapporteur 
and the Chairman of the Committee. Who is in 
favour of Amendment 13 by Mr. Urwin and 
others 1 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
I made a statement explaining why I am against 
Amendment 7, for the reasons stated. If there-
fore we put the whole of Amendment 13 to the 
vote, I shall have to vote either against 5 or 6. 
This is why I request a separate vote. 
The PRESIDENT. - There is a subsequent 
question, if I have it correctly. Mr. Cavaliere 
has asked for a separate vote on the three sec-
tions of Amendment 13. Is this correct 1 It is. 
Let us have separate votes then. 
We shall vote on the first paragraph of 
Amendment 13. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The first paragraph of the amendment is 
agreed to. 
We now turn to the next paragraph of the 
same amendment. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The second paragraph of the amendment is 
agreed to. 
We now come to the third paragraph of 
Amendment 13. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
That paragraph is agreed to. 
Amendment 13 is accordingly agreed to. 
As I told you, we now come to Amendment 9 : 
9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "valid Palestinian represent-
atives" and insert "the PLO". 
I call Mr. Corallo. 
Mr. CORALLO (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I should like to say, in a nutshell, 
that my amendment is intended to clear up a 
misunderstanding, to enable the Assembly to 
take a stand. If what is wanted is a negotiation 
with the representatives of the Palestinian 
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Mr. CoraUo (continued) 
peoples,, we should say "PLO". If what you 
want is to tangle with ghosts or puppets, then 
throw out my amendment. 
But in that case I shall be curious to know 
how you can "urge the PLO", having refused to 
recognise it as a spokesman. This, and this alone, 
is the intention of my amendment. 
Allow me, in conclusion, Mr. President, to 
protest to yourself in person. The Rapporteur 
stated his views on a number of amendments, 
in each case referring to the proposer by name. 
Whenever the Rapporteur referred to my speech 
and amendments he spoke of "amendments by a 
communist speaker" not otherwise identified. 
I should like to tell him that I am here on 
the same basis as the other parliamentarians 
and anyhow, if he wanted to disparage me, let 
him' know that I amply share and reciprocate 
such feelings. 
The PRESIDENT. - I must inform you, 
Mr. Corallo, that such remarks as you have just 
made must be made at the end of the sitting 
and not in the debate or during the voting. Please 
remember that. 
We shall now take the amendment by Mr. 
Corallo. 
I call the Rapporteur. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I shall not comment on the last remark because 
of what you have just said, Mr. President : that 
may come later. 
I do not wish this amendment to be carried. 
This was the unanimous view of the members of 
the General Affairs Committee. We were 
extremely careful not to prejudge who would 
be the proper representatives of the Palestinian 
people. The phraseology which we have used 
has been deliberately framed to express the fact 
that negotiations must be carried out with valid 
Palestinian representatives. It is not for our 
Assembly to say that we must accept one body 
or another : it is for the people concerned to 
say. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
We now vote on the amendment. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 9 is negatived. 
We now come to Amendment 7 : 
7. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "internationally". 
I call Dr. Miller. 
5" 
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Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom).- I do not 
wish to appear carping but it is the word 
"internationally" to which I take exception, as I 
believe it to be both superfluous and inexact. If 
an agreement is reached between two states, 
obviously it must be an international agreement. 
If the Rapporteur wished to give the word 
"internationally" a much wider connotation, he 
ought to have said so. 
Having made that point, however, I am quite 
prepared to withdraw the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- Am I correct in believ-
ing that you intend to withdraw this amend-
ment? 
Thank you, Dr. Miller. 
Amendment 7 is withdrawn. 
We now come to Amendment 15 : 
15. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "Ask its members to urge the 
PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to 
declare its acceptance of", and insert "Ask its 
members to insist that the PLO accept" ; renum-
ber paragraph 6 as paragraph 5; and renumber 
paragraph 5 as paragraph 6. 
I call Mr. Cavaliere. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, as Amendment 13 on paragraph 7 
has been adopted, I think my amendment can 
be confined to this single point : paragraph 5 of 
the preamble to the draft recommendation shall 
be renumbered paragraph 6. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Rapporteur, please? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
Mr. President, I cannot see the point of going 
back to this. We have had the vote on Amend-
ment 13. It was a package deal and was taken 
as a package deal by the Assembly. It was 
voted on in the order in which it stood. It had 
been thought out and it replaced some words 
in Mr. Cavaliere's amendment, such as "reci-
procally" by "immediately". We are really 
reopening Amendment 13 and as this has been 
agreed by an enormous majority, I ask the 
Assembly to stand by Mr. Urwin's amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. -We shall now vote on 
Amendment 15. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 15 is negatived. 
From the paper which has been distributed 
members will see that other amendments fall. 
I believe Amendment 14 was withdrawn. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
Yes, Mr. President. 
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The PRESIDENT. - As far as I can see, 
we have now covered all the amendments and 
must now take a final vote on the draft recom-
mendation as amended. 
Is it the wish of the Assembly that we take a 
roll-call vote Y 
Is there any objection ¥ 
Mr. CORALLO (Italy) (Translation). - I 
merely want to vote against. I wish, I repeat, to 
be allowed to vote against the motion. I do not 
insist on a vote by roll-call. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom).- I thought 
we were talking of something else. I do not 
intend to support this report. 
The PRESIDENT. - Is Dr. Miller asking 
for a roll-call vote? 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). -No. My 
attention was drawn to the fact that if I did not 
indicate that I intended to vote against this 
report it could have been voted for unanimously. 
I am not asking for a roll-call vote. 
The PRESIDENT.- Two votes against have 
been declared and that will be in the Minutes. 
Therefore, the Assembly can vote by sitting and 
standing. 
Does the Assembly agree to vote by sitting 
and standing or must we have a roll-call vote Y 
Is that agreed Y 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - I have 
made quite clear that I am voting against this. 
The PRESIDENT.- I am sorry but I must 
be absolutely clear and therefore we will take 
a roll-call vote. 
Mr. LEWIS (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. As I understand 
it, no one has called for a roll-call vote. The 
President keeps asking and everyone says he 
does not want a roll-call vote. Two members 
want to signify by sitting that they are against 
the report, as they are entitled to do ; but no 
one wants a roll-call vote. That is quite clear. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - Rule 34. 
The PRESIDENT. - I do not understand 
you, Mr. Roper. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- Doubtless 
your officials are now bringing the same point 
to your attention, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT. - I must read Rule 34, 
paragraph 3 : 
"The vote on the draft reply to the annual 
report, on a motion to disagree to the annual 
report, or to any part of it, and on a draft 
recommendation or opinion considered as a 
whole, shall be taken by roll-call." 
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These are the Rules of Procedure. While the 
Assembly is of the opinion that we can vote by 
sitting and standing, and we often do so, I will 
not have any trouble. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President. You have frequently 
said that you believe that the rules should be 
interpreted pragmatically. I understand that if 
it is the unanimous view of the Assembly that 
there should not be a roll-call vote, those who 
are opposed should be allowed to record their 
vote against in the Minutes. You might wish 
to give a ruling in that direction, Mr. Presi-
dent. 
The PRESIDENT. - I will ask the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure - though not today 
- to go through the whole of the rules and it 
may be found that we must amend some of them, 
including those on the roll-call. We have two 
members saying they are voting against but the 
rest want to vote by standing and sitting. My 
view is that in the next six or twelve months 
we must revise our Rules of Procedure so as to 
avoid such troubles as we could have had today, 
for instance. 
Therefore, I invite the Assembly to vote by 
sitting and standing. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The draft recommendation, as amended, is 
agreed to 1 • 
7. The situation in Iran 
(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for 
urgent procedure, Doe. 829) 
The PRESIDENT. - As I informed the 
Assembly, I have received from Mr. Valleix and 
others a request for the adoption of urgent 
procedure in respect of a motion for a recom-
mendation which those members have tabled. 
The Assembly must now decide on this request 
in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of 
Procedure. I would remind members that a debate 
on urgent procedure may not enter into the 
substance of the question. The only point at issue 
is the need for urgent procedure. I would also 
remind members that in such a debate the fol-
lowing only shall be heard : one speaker for 
the request, one speaker against, the Chairman 
of the Committee concerned - in this case the 
General Affairs Committee - and a represent-
ative of the Bureau speaking in its name. The 
request for urgent procedure refers to the motion 
for a recommendation on the situation in Iran, 
Document 829. 
1. See page 34. 
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Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President. It would help the 
Assembly if, before we start this discussion, you 
were to indicate whether you intend in this 
matter to operate the proceedings under Rule 43 
(6) or whether we shall follow the proceedings 
under Rule 43 (5). There is an important distinc.. 
tion. 
The PRESIDENT. - We shall follow Rule 
43 (5). 
Is there any problem about this ? Mr. Valleix, 
will you please move the motion, and then I 
shall call someone who wishes to speak against it. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President, 
The PRESIDENT. - I asked Mr. Valleix. 
He already has the microphone. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President. This is rather to seek 
information from you. Having decided that the 
request for urgent procedure will be determined 
under Rule 43 (5) ... 
The PRESIDENT.- It should be Rule 43 (6). 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom).- May I ask 
you, then, Mr. President, to inform members of 
just precisely what Rule 43 (6) says? 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - With 
great respect, Mr. President, and further to that 
point of order, I asked very clearly ... 
The PRESIDENT.- You have not yet been 
called, Mr. Roper. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - Further 
to that point of order, Mr. President. As I said 
to you, I was very concerned whether we were 
following the procedures under Rule 43 (5) or 
Rule 43 (6). The difference, as you will perhaps 
explain, is that under Rule 43 (5) the matter 
goes to the Committee and we have it at the 
next sitting as the first order of business. Under 
Rule 43 (6) we would have to proceed immedi-
ately to a debate. It is worth noting that in order 
to get Rule 43 (6) we need to have an absolute 
majority of the representatives to the Assembly 
present and voting in favour. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Roper, I think that 
this is not a difficult problem. We ask the 
Council to meet while they are here in Paris to 
debate this problem and to report to us before 
we close the session at noon on Thursday. It 
is a question of Iran, and I think there is no 
sense in postponing it until June, because it is 
now an urgent matter for today. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- On a point 
of order, Mr. President. I am very anxious that 
we come to a conclusion on this matter, but I 
believe that if we are taking important matters 
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calling into question the competence of the Coun-
cil, this should be done in proper form and 
with opportunity for debate and for amend-
ments to be tabled. If we follow Rule 43(5) and 
grant the urgent procedure - as I hope you will 
- it is possible for the Committee concerned to 
meet either at the end of this sitting or tomorrow 
morning before the sitting, and to present an oral 
report as the first business for tomorrow's sitting. 
It would then be possible for us to adopt it as 
our first business tomorrow morning. It would 
not inhibit the Council at all. With great respect, 
Mr. President, I do not believe that the Council 
are likely to meet between now and 10 o'clock 
tomorrow morning. Therefore, I think that the 
procedure under Rule 43(5)- which is what you 
said to me earlier - would be the appropriate 
procedure. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Mr. Presi-
dent ... 
The PRESIDENT. - Perhaps I may ask, 
beforehand, Mrs. von Bothmer, more especially, 
and then you will have the floor - first Mr. 
Grieve and then Mr. Valleix. 
There is one problem, Mr. Roper. The Council 
cannot sit from now to tomorrow morning because 
I have invited them for dinner - for part of 
the time. Mrs. von Bothmer, as Chairman, may I 
ask you whether you will be ready tomorrow 
morning at the meeting to deal with the matter 
and to table it at the beginning of the sitting at 
10 o'clock ? Would that be a compromise for all ? 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal, Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, we 
could meet equally well either this evening or 
<tomorrow morning. I think half an hour would 
be enough. That will still leave enough time for 
the Council to be informed of our decision. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mrs. von Bothmer is 
prepared to have her Committee sit tomorrow 
morning and discuss the matter which is now 
tabled. 
I call Mr. Grieve. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- I do not 
want to take up too much time of the Assembly 
this evening. There are objections to the wording 
of this resolution which merit the consideration 
of all those concerned overnight. I would strongly 
recommend that the suggestion of Mrs. von 
Bothmer be acceded to and that we have time to 
sleep on this matter and that tomorrow morning, 
possibly, if it is the desire of the Assembly that 
urgent procedure should be implemented, we 
consider the matter in terms which are within 
the powers of both this Assembly and our Coun-
cil. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Valleix. 
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Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first 
thank Mrs. von Bothmer for shouldering this 
extra work. 
But above all, Mr. President, I would remind 
you that, under Rule 43 of our Rules of Proce-
dure, and without wishing to emulate the talents 
of Mr. Roper,. we have first to decide on urgent 
procedure. 
The rule reads as follows : "At the request of 
the Council, of the Committee concerned, or of 
ten or more Representatives ... " - and we are 
in the third case - " ... the debate on a request 
for urgent procedure shall not enter into the 
substance of the question other than to justify 
the request or to reject the urgent procedure". 
Consequently, as things stand I move that the 
Assembly decide on the request for urgent pro-
cedure. 
Paragraph 6 of the same rule should also be 
applied. Let me read it to you : 
"Exceptionally, when urgent procedure is 
adopted by an absolute majority of represent-
atives to the Assembly, the motion may be 
debated without prior reference to a Com-
mittee". 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we have in fact to 
decide on the motion for urgent procedure, and 
that is what is at issue this evening. For, once 
we agree to urgent procedure by a large majority, 
we ask the Council to adopt a position on this 
matter. If that is physically impossible during 
the ensuing twenty-four hours, as we are at the 
end of the session, we then rely on the Council 
to inform us very promptly of its deliberation of 
the matter within a week. That will be the upshot 
of our vote. 
Our Assembly cannot remain indifferent to 
this dramatic Iranian problem which, by placing 
human lives and interests in jeopardy, will have 
consequences on which I need not dwell. 
So, when we have reached a decision, I should 
like the Council, speaking on behalf of WEU 
within the scope of our responsibility for security, 
to show our European countries that our atti-
tude is consistent. I believe we shall be serving 
a useful purpose. 
Certainly, if we did have to debate the sub-
stance of the matter in a moment, we should 
do so, but, I beg of you, let us confine ourselves 
to applying Rule 43 (1) of the Rules of Procedure 
for deciding on urgency. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Roper, please. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). -I do not 
want to delay the House but some of us, in voting 
on urgent procedure, will be anxious to know in 
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advance whether you intend to use the excep-
tional powers under paragraph 6. It is a matter 
on which the President should give some ruling 
before we vote on the question of urgency. As 
my colleague, Mr. Grieve, has said, a number of 
us are concerned about this matter and are also 
anxious that we should have the chance to amend 
this text. I strongly prefer the procedure under 
paragraph 5. 
The PRESIDENT.- Ladies and Gentlemen, I 
think, first, that there is unanimity in this House 
that we deal with this problem. Secondly, I think 
that we are glad that the Chairman of the Com-
mittee is ready to work on the whole matter 
tomorrow morning. Thirdly, I do not believe we 
need consider the matter of urgency now, because 
the Committee has to discuss this tomorrow mor-
ning. Mter its decision, we can table it at the 
beginning of tomorrow morning's sitting or 
during the session after they have prepared their 
proposals. 
I call Mr. Hanin. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). -Mr. 
President, it seeins to me that it is perfectly clear 
from the rules which have been read out that 
the Assembly should first decide on the urgency 
and, once the decision has been taken, one or 
other of the procedures envisaged in paragraphs 
5 and 6 of Rule 43 will be chosen. 
I therefore think we should decide on urgent 
procedure, because if we fail to do so we could 
do nothing subsequently. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Hanin asks us to 
decide whether we want to have it done this 
way. We shall now vote on urgent procedure, 
send the motion to the Committee and have it 
back tomorrow before noon. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The request for urgent procedure is agreed to 
unanimously. 
The problem will therefore be dealt with tomor-
row morning at 9.30 in the Committee. 
I call Mr. Valleix on this point. 
Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, I am not moving a point of order, but 
I feel entitled to refer to the use of these Rules 
of Procedure. 
Now that our Assembly has decided on urgent 
procedure, the situation arises that it - or the 
President - under paragraph 6 of Rule 43 which 
states that "the motion may be debated without 
prior reference to a Committee" has the option 
of choosing, from the moment urgent procedure 
was adopted by an absolute majority of the 
Assembly. 
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Mr. Valleix (continued) 
If this is so we have a choice, as I remind you, 
under paragraph 6, allowing the motion to be 
referred for implementation. 
But we are within thirty-six hours of the end 
of the session. Will the Council be able to meet 
at such short notice ? If the Committee, which 
has agreed, can usefully sit tomorrow, that will 
be a good job done. 
The PRESIDENT.- I think the situation is 
clear. We decided about the urgency. The Com-
mittee will work on the motion and, in due course, 
we will have a report back and deal with it 
tomorrow. 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow 
morning, Wednesday 5th December, at 10 a.m. 
with the following Orders of the Day : 
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1. The situation in Iran (Presentation of and 
Debate on the oral Report of the General 
Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Document 830). 
2. New weapons and defence strategy (Pre-
sentation of and Debate on the Report of 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and Votes on the draft Recom-
mendations, Document 827 and Amend-
ment). 
3. SALT 11 and its implications for European 
security (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, Document 816, 
Addendum and Amendment). 
Are there any objections L 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.) 
TWELFTH SITTING 
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1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
8. Changes in the membership of Committees. 
4. Change in the Orders of the Day. 
5. New weapons and defence strategy (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, Doe. 827 and Amendment). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roper (Chairman and 
Rapporteur), Mr. van den Bergh (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Pecchioli, Mr. Mulley, Mr. Cook, Mr. van den Bergh, 
Mr. Vattekar (Observer from Norway), Mrs. Eide 
(Observer from Norway); (point of order): Mr. Grieve, 
Mr. Roper, Mr. Deschamps, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. 
Lewis, Mr. Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer ; Mr. Roberti. 
6. The situation in Iran (PreBentation of and Debate on the 
oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 830). 
Speakers : The President, Mr. Grieve (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Valleix, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Grieve, Mr. 
Valleix, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Jung, Mr. Grieve, Mr. 
Calamandrei, Mr. Grieve, Mr. CoraJlo, Mr. Grieve, Mr. 
Stainton; (explanation of vote): Mr. Pecchioli. 
7. New weapons and defence strategy (Resumed Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, Doe. 827). 
Speakers: The President, Lord Reay, Mr. Boucheny, 
Mr. Gessner. 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT.- In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments t .. 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The nam~ of the 
Substitutes attending this Sitting which have 
been notified to the President will be published 
with the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees 
The PRESIDENT.- The Belgian Delegation 
proposes the following change in the membership 
of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Lagneau 
as an alternate member in place of Mr. Perin ; 
and in the membership of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges : Mr. Lagneau as 
a titular member in place of Mr. Perin. 
Is there any opposition to th~e changes L 
They are approved. 
I. See page 38. 
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4. Change in the Orders of the Day 
The PRESIDENT.- Ladies and Gentlemen, 
following the decision of the Assembly yesterday 
afternoon, we have as the first Order of the Day 
at this sitting a debate on the motion for a 
recommendation on the situation in Iran tabled 
by Mr. Valleix and others, Document 829. 
Members wil recall that the matter was sent to 
the General Affairs Committee for its con-
sideration. The Committee is still sitting. It is 
not yet ready. We go on to the next item on the 
agenda. We shall return to the situation in Iran 
later. 
5. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 821 and Amendment) 
The PRESIDENT.- The Orders of the Day 
now provide for the presentation of and debate 
on the report of the Committee on Defen•'e 
Questions and Armaments on new weapons and 
defence strategy and votes on the two draft 
recommendations, Document 827. 
There are two parU! to this report : the first, 
on modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons, has 
been submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman, and, 
in this case, Rapporteur of the Committee, and 
the second, on the impact of technology, has been 
submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur. I 
shall call them both to present their parts of the 
report. 
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I first call Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rappor-
teur. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- Mr. Presi-
dent, members of the Assembly. I think, 
Mr. President, that you have already explained 
that, as a result of the disclll!lsions in our Com-
mittee, as is pointed out in paragraph 4 of the 
introduction to the report, I find myself at a 
somewhat late date as one of the Rapporteurs 
on this subject. Part I of the report from the 
Committee which I am introducing to you this 
morning dealing with the modernisation of 
theatre nuclear forces has emerged finally from 
the Committee over my name. 
In some sense I am a reluctant Rapporteur on 
this occasion. I am not reluctant because I 
d:i$agree with Part I of the draft, or with the 
draft recommendation we are considering, which 
I believe is a reasonable compromise and which 
was supported in the Committee by eighteen 
votes to three with only one abstention, as can be 
seen from the front of the document. I am 
reluctant and somewhat nervous on this occasion 
because, inevitably, I was not personally respons-
ible for the detailed preparation of the report as 
a whole in its earlier drafting stages. I took over 
these responsibilities only when I was appointed 
formally as Rapporteur by the Committee at its 
meeting earlier this week. None the less, th:i$ is 
an extremely important debate. 
The subject we are considering is clearly a 
matter of active political debate in all our coun-
tries and in most of them of parliamentary 
debate as well. Our disc~ions today come at a 
particularly appropriate and topical time in vie'V 
of the decisions that will be taken a week today 
on 12th December in the North Atlantic Council. 
We are dealing here with what have come to 
be called long-range theatre nuclear forces. We 
attempt on the fifth page of the report to explain 
some of the technology and terminology. There 
has been a good deal of confusion in discussion 
about whether TNF stands for theatre or tactical 
nuclear forces and questions have arisen over the 
difference between theatre and battlefield nuclear 
forces and the difference between medium- and 
long-range thea~re nuclear forces. We are dealing 
broadly here with what have come to be known 
as long-range theatre nuclear forces. 
The matter is topical not merely because of 
next week's meeting of the North Atlantic Coun-
cil. It is topical also because of the interest and 
intervention shown by the Soviet Union and its 
allies in this matter. This began with the speech 
of Mr. Brezhnev on 6th October, the subsequent 
interventions of Mr. Gromyko and the fact that 
there is today, I understand, a meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact Council in Berlin at which Mr. 
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Gromyko is symbolically to lead Soviet tanks and 
2,000 Soviet men out of East Germany. 
The issue is, therefore, topical and of course 
controversial, and this controversy is reflected 
in the amount of time that we as a Committee 
have devoted to the preparation of this report 
which, as you can see from the introductory• 
note, has been discussed in draft at no fewt>r 
than five successive meetin~ of our Committee, 
while a further four meetJings were devoted to 
taking evidence from a variety of experts, 
Ministers and senior officials. They are listed at 
the beginning of the explanatory memorandum. 
In addition, our original Rapporteur, Mr. van 
den Bergh, has devoted a great deal of time, and 
has obtained a good deal of very useful inform;l-
tion which is now reflected in the report, to 
interviewing officials in many countries. I should 
like, on behalf of all my colleagues on the Com-
mittee, to take this opportunity of paying tribute 
to the very hard work which he has undertaken 
in gatheri11g a great deal of the information on 
which the part of the report which I am now 
introducing is based. I am basking in his reflected 
glory so far as that is concerned. 
It is, of course, because of the topical and 
controversial nature of the problem, and becau"le 
of some difficulties which, as I explained to the 
Assembly earlier, we had in obtaining a quorum 
in Paris earlier last month, owing to the strike 
of French air traffic controllers, that the Com-
mittee continued to discuss th:i$ matter up to 
its meeting on Monday of this week. 
But the Committee makes no apology for 
taking this subject so seriously and for debating 
it for so long. I believe that when this Assembly 
fulfils its proper and essential role of debating 
urgent and topical issues of allied defence, it is 
inevitable, if not necessarily totally desirable, that 
the politically most important reports emerge at 
the last minute, after a fairly controversial period 
of gestation. But I stress that, while fulfilling its 
political responsibility of investigating, reporting 
and then debatJing these key defence issues, the 
Committee has been scrupulous in respecting the 
Rules of Procedure. 
The report which the Assembly now has before 
it was distributed late on Monday night and the 
clear day referred to in Rule 26(5) duly elapsed 
before this debate began. Moreover, in order to 
enable members of the Assembly to have every 
opportunity to study the text, the Committee 
decided at our meeting of 21st November, in 
accordance with Rule 41(10), to make public the 
preliminary draft recommendation as amended 
by the Committee at that meeting. If you study 
that document, you will see that the differences 
between the draft recommendation which was 
adopted by the Committee on Monday night and 
the earlier text which we distributed about ten 
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days ago are very small and concern little mm·e 
than detai$ of drafting. 
I would add for the information of the Assem-
bly that the decision to make the earlier text 
p~blic on 21st November was taken by the Com-
mitt~e as a whole, without any objection, at a 
meetmg attended by fourteen members, including 
members from all four of the larger countries 
and, incidentally, two French members. I make 
this point in view of the remarks made in the 
Assembly on Monday by a French Representative 
who was not a member of our Committee to 
which, with your permission, Mr. President I 
wish to reply on behalf of the Committee in due 
course. 
I turn now to the substance of the draft 
recommendation which you have before you and 
which is the fii"St draft recommendation i~ the 
document. The preamble of the draft recom-
mendation deals, first, with the deterioration of 
the military balance arising, in particular, from 
the deployment by the Soviet Union of new long-
range nuclear weapons - the SS-20 missile and 
the Backfire bomber. In the view of the Com-
mittee, with the employment of these weapons the 
balance has tilted against NATO. But, of course, 
the truth about balance in a number of these 
fields is that it is asymmetrical in different 
weapons systems and the Committee in its 
discussions, has always leaned in f~vour of 
considering the balance, particularly the nuclear 
balance, as a whole, rather than try to single out 
individual elements. 
Of course it tis the case that going back in 
history, NATO was not unduly ~oncerned about 
the long-range theatre nuclear balance when th~ 
Thor and Jupiter systems were scrapped and the 
SS-4 and SS-5 missile systems were deployed 
by the Soviet Union, as you will see from para-
graph 7 of the explanatory memorandum. It is, o.f 
course, perfectly true that the SS-4 and SS-5 
systems were considerably more vulnerable than 
the SS-20 systems with which they have been 
replaced. 
It is also for consideration whether, even if 
long-range theatre nuclear forces are now 
considered in isolation, the balance is on one 
side or another. The Soviet Union has argued 
that the balance is in NATO's favour when it 
consider~ the figures given in the second part of 
A:r~pendiX II to the report and when including 
qmte a number of systems which are not 
generally considered part of the theatre nuclear 
force balance in the West, and, in particular the 
aircraft from five United States carriers ;hic~h 
are deployed in the Second and Sixth United 
Stat~ Fleets. Indeed, there are also some dif-
~iculties about doing this arithmetic in knowing 
JUst how many SS-20 missiles are tin fact deployed 
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at the moment. Our infol"'Ilation about 
deployment comes very largely from United 
States sources, which at the moment have a mono-
poly of western military observation satellites. 
The presentation of the data has varied from 
time to time to suit the audience being addressed 
and the purpose underlying its releaJre. The 
d!ifferent estimates of the numbers of SS-20s 
currently deployed have been stated at various 
times as ranging from 100 to 150, with 120 being 
the most frequently quoted figure. But it is not 
always made clear that of these 100, 150 or 120 
SS-20 missiles at present deployed, a significant 
proportion, estimated by different authorities as 
ranging from one-quarter up to nearly one-hall, 
are deployed against Far Eastern targets, 
presumably China, in positions where they are 
out of range of Europe. Therefore, for the pur-
poses of this report, if you look at paragraph 7 
you will see that we have assumed that there 
are, perhaps, some 80 SS-20 missiles currently 
deployed against Europe. 
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Similarly, estimates of the rate of additional 
SS-20 missiles being deployed vary from four to 
five. But this is a fairly significant build-up if 
one considers that four to five per month means 
between 50 and 60 additional SS-20 missiles 
every year. But the Committee, although it felt 
it important to bring before the Assembly some 
of the arithmetic which I have just outlined, 
doos not contest that there has been a deteriora-
tion of the balance so far as NATO is concerned 
. ' particularly because of the much greater 
reliability, the greater accuracy, the three 
warheads of the SS-20, the fact that the systems 
are reloadable and the fact that they are mobile 
and, therefore, very considerably less vulnerable 
than the systems which they replace. 
The Committee stresses the need for NATO 
both to maintain and to update where necessary 
a complete range of weapon systems in order to 
ensure a credible military balance. It is also 
important, we believe- and we make this clear 
in the recommendation now before the Assembly 
- for the political responsibility and the risks 
of this policy to be shared by all the countries 
of the Alliance. This is the point we make in 
paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the recom-
mendation. 
At the same time, the Committee points out 
very clearly in paragraph ( v) that the Alliance 
has always sought security through detente as 
well as through deterrence : they are the two 
pa~ of a common policy, a common goal, for 
achieving security. 
In paragraph (vi) we note that Mr. Brezhnev's 
speech in East Berlin on 6th October may well 
be a sign that the Soviet Union now understands 
that the NATO countries consider the deployment 
of the SS-20 missiles a serious threat and, indeed, 
that the Sovtiet Union is prepared for negotia-
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tions, although, of course, on this much of the 
Soviet position remains to be clarified. 
I turn now to the operative text of the recom-
mendation in the document before you. Here, 
of course, the Committee WIUI faced with a choice. 
This is the difference of opinion, which is 
reflected in some of the amendments which will 
come before the Assembly later, between the posi.-
tion put forward by the original Rapporteur, 
Mr. van den Bergh, and that of the majority of 
the Committee. Should NATO call for arms 
control negotiations, for a moratorium on the 
deployment of the SS-20, but defer, until after 
it has discovered whether those arms control 
negotiations are successful, the decision on pro-
duction or deployment of the long-range theatre 
nuclear forces, the Pershings and the ground-
launched cruise missiles ; or should it - the 
other extreme, I suppose - rearm without 
making any proposals to discuss disarmament 
further? 
Those were the two extreme positions. The 
Committee has attempted to come down in the 
mliddle, when we recommend in paragraph (a) 
that the North Atlantic Council should, at its 
meeting next week in Brussels, take the decisions 
necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance 
between Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range 
theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course. 
In paragraph (b) these are the two sides of the 
same decision, to use the phrase of Chancellor 
Schmidt yesterday in Berlin, the decision to 
deploy and procure and the declision also to make 
a firm offer to enter into arms control negotia-
tions with a view to limiting long-range theatre 
nuclear force deployment on both sides. The 
Comm:ittee recommends, therefore, negotiation 
but also decision on production and deployment. 
The meaning of the necessary decision ris made 
clear in paragraph 33 of the explanatory 
memorandum- that the North Atlantic Council 
should decide forthwith to procure and station 
long-range theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. 
A substantial majority of the Committee called 
for a decision next week on the deployment and 
production of these weapons, but, in calling at 
the same time and lin the same decision for the 
opening of negotiations with the Soviet Union to 
limit the numbers of these weapoll$, the Com-
mittee also points out in paragraph 34 that the 
production programmes for Pershing lis and 
for the ground-launched cruise missiles make it 
possible to adjust the numberls to be deployed, 
dependting on the progress of any of the negotia-
tions, once opened. 
Again, therefore, as was made clear in speecht>.~ 
yesterday, it is possible that if the arms control 
negotiations l!mcceed, one may not need to deploy 
a single one of these weapons. None the less, it is 
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considered by a majority of the Committee that 
it would have been a mistake not to be clear but 
to make a firm decision next week in the event 
that the arms control negotiations do not prove 
satisfactory and do not reach a successful 
conclusion. 
I should point out to the Assembly that in th2 
text you have before you these negotiations are 
not explicitly referred to as SALT Ill, the open-
ing of which may be delayed for many extraneous 
reasons, including the succession to leadership in 
both the superpowers. In any case, the Committee 
has not fully satisfied itself that the framework 
for those negotiations should necessarily be that 
of SALT Ill. We believe that this is a matter 
to which further consideration should be given 
-we trust, urgently - in the North Atlantic 
Council. 
Finally, in paragraph (d) and, indeed, in 
paragraph (iv) of the preamble, the Committee 
has stressed the seamless nature of NATO's 
deterrent forces and of NATO's response to 
aggression described in paragraph 30 of the 
explanatory memorandum, which again points 
out that NATO overall is still in a reasonably 
strong position both to deter and to negotiate, 
pl'ovided that the whole range of nuclear weapon 
systems is taken into account. The Committee is 
very strongly of the view that it would regret 
any attempt to try to establish partial balances 
at different particular levels. 
To try to establish a particular balance in long-
range theatre nuclear weapons by themselves 
would, I believe, serve only to isolate Europe 
from the much larger weapons capacity of the 
United States. Not only is that capacity far 
greater than Europe's in long-range strategic or 
central nuclear systems but a number of coun-
tries in Europe rely on the United States for the 
shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons and 
their essential modernisation, discussed in part 
in paragraph 61 of the report. 
I move the report as a Rapporteur who has 
come to this document somewhat late in the day. 
None the leSI3, having seen the recommendation 
through the Committee, I felt that, as Chairman, 
I had a responsibility to submit it to you on 
behalf of the overwhelming majority of the Com-
mittee who feel that the proposal to link a deci-
sion next week on deployment and procurement 
with a very clear proposal for arms control 
negotiations is the right way for the Alliance to 
go forward and to be commended by this Assem-
bly. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Roper. 
I now call Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - Mr. President, I must thank our col-
league Mr. Roper for his kind words on my 
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account. I felt it was right, when the majority 
of the Committee had removed the (ll'lsence of my 
ideas from the recommendation, to withdraw as 
Rapporteur where the first part of the report 
was concerned. 
The second part of the report has to do with 
the impact of new technology on weaponry and 
on NATO strategy. In NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact - though we really have to concern our-
selves only with our own responsibility for our 
democratic countries- there is a very substan-
tial reliance on the strategy of deterrence ; this 
is very fiercely discussed, and it com(ll'l down to 
the possible use of nuclear weapons serving to 
frighten potential adversaries off the idea or 
precipitating a conflict. That is the essence of 
what is known as flexible response. Thli.s does nut 
mean that we should not give thought to other 
important and even negative ~pects of this 
strategy. I believe that at the present moment 
we cannot dispense with nuclear weapons - we 
have to be realistic and say so ; but we must do 
all we can to cut back on these weapons, if not 
entirely do away with them. There are, we feel, 
real possibilities of scaling down the possible use 
of nuclear weapons in favour of using, or 
threatening to use, conventional weapons --
though of course we hope that that would not 
actually happen either. 
I sincerely believe that one of the shortcomings 
of members of parliament in the democratic 
countries is that they do too little to keep abreast 
of developments ~n modern weapons technology. 
An exception to this is the United States, where 
in both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives people are much more aware of develop-
ments in weapon technology than they are in the 
parliaments of Western Europe. In the American 
Congress people are much better equipped to keep 
track of developments of this kind. During our 
trip to the United States we noticed that in 
various laboratories in America developments are 
under way which make it possible for our present-
day nuclear weapons - and if these are used 
they are invariably extremely dangerous weapons; 
everyone will agree that this is so - to be 
replaced, not by "nicer" weapons - even 
conventional weapons are not that - but by 
weapons the dange~ of which are at least less 
than those of nuclear weapons. We as parlia-
mentarians do not know enough about these new 
technological developments, which make it pos-
sible to reduce nuclear weaponry in favour of 
conventional weapons. 
Some of us are aware that this is already 
playing a part in current NATO planning. It 
seems to me to be essential that, wherever 
possible, nuclear weapons should be replaced 
Wiith conventional weapons. I myself would go 
so far as to say that in my opinion there needs 
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to be a consistently pursued programme in 
NATO to examine how conventional weapons 
can be subatituted for nuclear weapons wherever 
this is feasible. At the present time I would not 
go so far as to say that we can do without nuclear 
weapons entirely. The basis for our thinking has 
to be that nuclear weapons entail very great 
risks, that we naturally have a duty to defend 
our democracies, but that it is certainly not our 
duty to do so with weapons that are more 
dangerous than they need be. 
A further point concerns the conflicting aspects 
of quantity and quality in weapons, looked at in 
the light of discussions on the control of arma-
ments. In recent years, one is sad to say, only 
very limited results have been achieved in this 
area. The talks have been between the Sovit>t 
Union and the United States, and the liimited 
success they have had relates mainly to control 
on the numbers of weapons. I am cert·ainly not 
seeking to belittle this success, and I would 
certainly emphasise its political significance ; 
but it still remains a lim~ted success. The 
discussions not only dragged on, but th('y 
concerned mainly control on the numbers oi 
weapons. 
At the same time, however, technological 
development of weapons forged ahead. Personally 
I think one could say that in a number of areas 
the successes acMeved in controlling the quantity 
of weapons have been overtaken by the enormous 
strides made in the quality of weapons - i•1 
other words any progress we may have been able 
to mark up in quantitative weapons control may 
well have been reduced to naught by the "falling 
behind" in the quality of weapons. 
If we can agree with each other on these two 
main points, then they lead us to a number or 
recommendations which the Committee, too, has 
accepted. The first recommendation is - this is 
difficult, but we have to give thought to it- that 
developments in modern technology should he 
taken into account during the negotiations on 
armaments control. We can no longer tolerate 
control over quantitative developments being 
totally negated by developmen11; in quality over 
which at the present we still have no control. If, 
for instance, we look at what the years ahead 
are going to bring in the field of laser technology 
and satellite technology, then we must wonder 
what meaning there is in what we have been 
able to achieve so far when this is set against 
everything that is still on the drawing boards. 
We are therefore urging tha;t in the negotiations 
already under way, and those still to come, there 
should be greater emphasis in the discussions 
than in the past on the fact that technology is 
on both sides an essential factor in making 
progress in armaments control. We must be 
prepared to exchange far more precise informa-
tion on these advances with each other than we 
have so far. I need not tell you that each side 
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knows very accurately what has been happening 
on the other in this field of technology, not only 
through using techniqu{li;J of all klinds that I do 
not have at my command but also through the 
fact that 80 % of scientific and technological 
development can be monitored via what are 
known as open sources. Given these circum-
stances, what is there against including qualita-
tive advances in technology in the discussions 1 
The second recommendation is about develop-
ing a programme for replacing nuclear weapons 
technology as far as possible with conventional 
weapons, while still of course maintaining the 
deterrent elements on which sadly we are at the 
moment still dependent. 
The third recommendation is about the posi-
tion of our parliaments, that i'S to say our own 
position. It would be going rather too far for 
a Dutch parliamentarian to offer any opinion 
about the procedures used in other countries. I 
will not presume to express such an opinion, but 
I would like to offer the ~sembly the comparison 
with what happens in the American Senate and 
House of Representatives. Over there, people are 
able to keep a far closer eye on what is happening 
in this area than we can in any of our Western 
European parliaments. I say this with great 
regret, because I believe that one of our prime 
tasks as parliamentarians ought in fact to be 
keeping a close eye on what is going on in this 
area, not j~t in the broad outlines - because 
we are told about those - but on points which 
are significant for the longer-term developments. 
I must say that in general we are not able to do 
this. This means not only that our parliaments 
need to equip themselves very much better, but 
also that our governments should have to give 
us a lot more information ,jn this area, as is the 
case in the United States; hence our final 
recommendation that there should be a system of 
"arms control impact statements", meaning that 
the governments would make annual reports to 
their parliaments. 
If this were to happen, I would consider it an 
extremely important step. The governments 
would have to tell their parliaments - not in 
detail but in broad outline - about both the 
short- and long-term significance of technological 
developments and of the introduction of new 
weapons systems, and about what prospects there 
are for armaments control. I do say this very 
sincerely, because I believe that we as members 
of parliament have to take on this task more than 
we have in the past ; in saying this I do not 
mean that nothing at all has been happening, but 
I am conv;inced that in Western Europe there is 
a great deal still to be done in this area. The 
parliaments will have to put far more emphasis 
than before on ensuring that members of parlia-
ment have far more oversight than in the past 
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on qualitative advances in weapons technology 
and on the significance of the introduction of 
new weapons systems. Thank you, Mr. Presiden~. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
The debate [s now open. 
I first call Mr. Pecchioli. 
Mr. PECCHIOLI (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will run 
over quickly, within the statutory time-limits, 
the aspects of modernisation of theatre nuclear 
forces. In a day or two the Atlantic Council will 
be deciding on the American proposal to site 572 
Pershing II and cruise missiles in certain Euro-
pean countries. There has been a great hubbub 
about this, as you know, throughout Europe, 
involving governments, parliaments, political, 
religious and social factions, and public opin.i.on 
as a whole. Because of all this, we have a hard, 
and a highly responsible, choice to make. 
The choice we have to make is, in substance, 
whether to take a decision that somehow per-
petuates the time-honoured logic of the arma-
ments race, the quest for an equilibrium, 
essential to be sure, but at steadily higher levels, 
or to strike an attitude which, albeit in different 
ways, aims to checkmate that evil logic and 
arrive at the necessary balance of military powers 
at decreasing levels. I was horror-stricken to find 
that one earlier proposition for a recommenda-
tion distributed by our Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on 29th October, and 
accomp'anying a valuable report under the sole 
authorship of Mr. van den Bergh which gave it 
to be understood that our Assembly wanted to 
prepare to explore the second path mentioned, 
had been literally hacked to pieces. This original 
draft proposed an attitude of encouragement for 
the impending negotiations, so it ran, after 
seeking and obtaining from the Soviet Union 
an immediate eighteen-month moratorium on 
deployment of the new SS-20 missiles, and decid-
ing in consequence upon an equivalent holding 
back in procuring the 572 weapons NATO 
proposed to deploy in Europe. Well, this draft 
recommendation was torn to tatters, in spirit 
and in form. I should like to say very plainly that 
we confirm our sincere appreciation of Mr. van 
den Bergh's original report. But the new one now 
tabled bears no relation to, and indeed flagrantly 
contradicts, it. The proposed moratorium was 
deleted. The Atlantic Council is now simply and 
crudely called upon to provide for an increase 
in theatre nuclear weapons. It [s a mystery to 
nobody that for this kind of proposal, which for 
us is a negative one, efforts and actions have 
been deployed in this Assembly by exponents of 
political groups operating from rigidly 
entrenched positions. In support of their stand, 
these people adduce the existing variance in 
theatre nuclear weapons to the benefit of the 
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Warsaw Pact countries. Now, aside from mo1•e 
general com~iderations, I think they fail to grasp 
certain truths I will venture to bring to their 
notice. 
First of all, then, they forget that NATO is 
by general admission, incidentally illustrated by 
the van den Bergh report, in a comparative 
situation of strength for both deterrence and 
negotiation by reason of the current superiority 
of its overall strategic systems. Secondly, they 
fail to observe that an immediate negotiation on 
theatre nuclear weapons on the basis of a 
suspemnon of any decision to manufacture and 
deploy new American missiles or SS-20 missiles 
would allow a balance to be reached at a lower 
ceiling, compelling the United States or Russia 
to accept a cutback. Thirdly, no account is taken 
of the fact that the latest proposals by the 
Soviet Government - as was also said in the 
original van den Bergh report - point to a 
genuine wish to negotiate, clear enough for it to 
be in NATO's interest to accept. 
Mr. Pre.<~ident, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have 
to face capital issues. When we talk of measurt>s 
for peace, disarmament, detente, we should make 
every endeavour to reject any partisan calcula-
tion, any prior conditions of a cold war character. 
Mankind needs peace, work, civilised progress. 
An annual $400 billion are spent on armaments 
instead of on purposes ~eful to human progress, 
to the solution of problems also confronting the 
developed countries because of the economic 
crisis, to the overcoming of the dramatic evHs 
that batten on the developing world : hunger, 
disease, failure even to provide the basic 
minimum for human survival. Obvliously in this 
historical pha!Se the balance of military forces 
between the two blocs is one of the factors 
governing security. No one can wish, or even 
tacitly accept, that inequalities or dangerous 
differences would arise. What matters, though, 
and is in my vliew the heart of the matter, is 
that we should work for greater detente in every 
field so as to fulfil the conditions for a mutual 
gradual reduction of the levels at which a balance 
is needed. 
Well, starting from these general premises the 
Italian Communist Party has, off its own bat, 
produced a proposal which may be summarised 
as : first, suspending or rejectiing, for a period 
of not less than six months, any decision on 
the fabrication and commissioning of Pershing 11 
and cruise missiles ; second, inviting the Soviet 
Union to suspend the fabrication and commission-
ing of SS-20 missiles ; third, opening an 
immediate negotiation between both parties for 
putting a ceiling on the military equilibria in 
Europe, at reduced levels and calculated to 
ensure mutual security. 
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This is our position, as currently tabled in the 
Italian Parliament and, through my inter-
mediary, brought to the notice of WEU. 
In conclusion, let me say a couple of words on 
other stances by European political factions 
sincerely concerned at the widespread arma-
ments race. We take a favourable view of the 
socialist and christian democrat parties' views 
in favour of detente, calling for the opening of 
negotiations and consequently deferment, on 
their conclusion, of any decision on the 
deployment of further missiles. We appreciate, I 
say, this stance but at the same time obs~rve its 
limitations. These lie in the fact that, m any 
event and in the immediate prospect, it allows 
production of such m!issiles, forgetful, I think, of 
what the United States administration has very 
firmly maintained through the pronouncements 
of the Secretary of State, namely, that the 
United States will not, at enormous cost, put in 
hand the manufacture of fresh missiles unless 
it has the immediate certitude of siting therr1• 
Nevertheless these stances by the European 
socialist and christian democrat parties are in 
equal measure signs of sincere preoccupation, 
alarm and anxiety in people's minds. 
In conclusion, Mr. President, I affirm that, 
for the reasons I have given, our group will be 
voting against the draft recommendation on 
the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons. 
(Appuwse) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
Mr. Mulley, please. He will be followed by 
Mr. Cook. 
Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom).- Together 
with the related question of SALT II, which we 
shall be discussing later on with the excellent 
report of Mr. Cook, the subject now under 
discussion is the most important we shall be 
debating this week. It is both complex and 
difficult. But we cannot avoid our responsibility 
to debate it as the only European assembly with 
special responsibilities for defence questions. 
It is probable, Mr. President, that no one 
in the Assembly finds the recommendation or 
the report exactly representing his own position. 
We should exprea; our debt to the Chairman of 
the Committee, Mr. Roper, and to the Rapporteur, 
initially Mr. van den Bergh, and to the Secretary 
of the Committee for the immense work -
obvious from reading the report - that has gone 
into their clear presentation of the issues. 
There are, and will be, divi$ions between 
political groups and national delegations and, 
1indeed, within them. That is no bad thing so long 
as we all recognise that those who differ from 
us hold their views with sincerity and often with 
passionate conviction. 
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Inevitably when we come to talk of nuclear 
weapons there is an emotive element. The horror 
that would occur if there were any form of 
nuclear war is beyond my comprehension. Those 
of us who have consistently accepted and 
advocated that NATO ~hould have nuclear 
weapons in its armoury have done so only 
because we believe that it is the best way of 
ensuring that there will be no nuclear war. It 
is essentially the element of deterrence. Just as 
NATO's strength derives a great deal from the 
indivisible character of the Alliance whereby a 
threat against one member is a threat against 
all, so it iJ;I the responsibility of all members to 
share the provision of the necessary deterrent 
forces. 
At the same time, I am bound to say that the 
division that is sometimes sought to be made 
between the use of so-called smaller or tactical 
nuclear weapons and the larger or strategic i'l 
a false dil!ltinction. I believe that the use of any 
form of nuclear weapons involves a decision of 
incomprehensible magnitude. I would not imagine 
that anyone would take that decision without at 
least being fairly sure that it would not stop at 
that level. That is a position I have held for over 
twenty years. It is a position J. presented for the 
first time in a report to th1s Assembly some 
twenty years ago. 
If we rely, as I believe we must, on the NATO 
deterrent made up of the three elements of the 
triad conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nucl~ar forces, we should believe that all three 
are necessary in existing circumstances. I also 
believe that they must be linked and that each 
must be credible. It seems logical, as we are 
modernising the other elements of the triad, that 
we should seek modernisation of the theatre 
nuclear element ~ well. I would not say 
necessarily that the particular package that I 
understand is to be proposed is the one that I 
would personally prefer. But we are concerned 
more with matters of principle than the actual 
details. 
There is no doubt that the increased threat and 
capability of the Warsaw Pact has been enhanced 
by the increased technology at its disposal, not 
only the SS-20 and the Backfire, but new 
weaponry right across the military spectrum. It 
is therefore necessary for NATO lninisters to 
take the necessary decisions for the future about 
theatre nuclear forces as they have already done 
for conventional forces. Two considerations have 
to be borne very much in mind. First, it would 
take at least three years, probably longer, before 
any of the new theatre nuclear weapons ~oul.d 
be available for deployment. Secondly, 1t 1s 
possible, and I believe certain, that th~ outcome 
will mean fewer nuclear warheads m NATO 
Europe. A lot of obsolescent weapons can be 
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taken away when the modernisation programme, 
if it comes to that, is undertaken. 
But the matter is necessarily and properly 
complicated by the linking of the issues with the 
whole question of arm;s control and, in particular, 
the speech of Mr. Brezhnev and the undertaking 
by the Soviet Union to reduce - not in large 
numbers, it is true - its forces in Central 
Europe. Some see this as a divisive move to 
divide us in Europe in some way, probabl.v 
because of its unfortunate presentation. The 
issue arose in connection with the so-called 
neutron bomb, the enhanced-radiation reduced-
blast weapon wh'ich was very much in our lninds 
a year ago. 
Whether or not it is propaganda, I do not 
believe that we should ignore this development. 
This may be a triumph of faith over expe~ie~?e. 
I believe that we should explore every poss1b1hty 
before any question arises of the weapons being 
in position. We have, as I say, three years. We 
should see whether we can produce some break-
through in the whole of the arms control negotia-
tiom;. I believe that at some time this has to come, 
if only to prevent the human race from c?m-
mitting suicide. We have to seek every poSSJ.ble 
means and it seems to me that it is possible to 
do thi~ and at the same time to take the necessary 
decisions to procure and, in principle, to deploy 
the modern weapons to replace those that are 
already there. 
Finally, I would just say - because I do not 
want to trespass on to a further debate - that 
SALT 11 is absolutely crucial to these matters. 
It is not only import·ant that it should be ratified 
on its own merits, putting a stop to the nuc~ear 
arms race and giving hope for real reductions 
in future negotiations, but ;it is absolutely 
essential to get the ratification of SALT 11 --
and I know that this is the profound conviction 
of Secretary Vance and Secretary of Defence 
Harold Brown - if we are to make the further 
progress that all of us wil!lh. 
I am sure that our American friends under-
stand the benefit of our expressing our views for 
Europe today. They should understand that, 
unless SALT 11 is ratified, we shall have no 
chance of going forward on further negotiations, 
whether on conventional or theatre nuclear arms 
reductions. I am sure also that if SALT 11 is not 
ratified, that i'l bound to influence views in 
Europe about these other matters that we are 
now discussing. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Mulley. 
I now call Mr. Cook and he will be followed 
by Mr. van den Bergh. 
Mr. COOK (United Kingdom).- Mr. Mulley 
began with what can only be described in 
military terms as a pre-emptive strike by offering 
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some kind of words of appreciation about my 
report which is next in the order of business. I 
am sure that he will not be offended or surprised 
that, despite such words, I find it imp()J>Sible to 
agree with his conclusion that we should proceed 
with modernisation of these theatre nuclear 
forces. 
In disagreeing with his conclusion I do not 
disagree with what has been said by Mr. Roper 
about the capactiy of Soviet weapons. Indeed, 
it is precisely because the SS-20 demonstrates 
the ability of nuclear weapon d~igners con-
tinually to produce new weapons that are more 
sophisticated, more accurate and more lethal than 
the systems that they replace that I and some of 
my colleagues feel that it would be more sensible 
to call a halt to this continual production of 
more sophisticated and more lethal weapons 
instead of responding to them with a similar 
development on our side. 
Of course, there ·are those in this hemicycle 
who di$agree with this. They cling to what might 
be termed the Newtonian theory of the arms 
race : that a development on the eastern side calls 
for an equal and apposite response from our side. 
But it does not appear to me that the SS-20 
represents a new threat. It is more sophisticated 
and more accurate, but it is not a new threat. 
The Soviet Union has for a long time maintained 
weapons which were explicitly targeted ut 
Western Europe. 
The position was summed up aptly but 
sombrely by Secretary of State Harold Brown 
who said: 
"The deployment of the SS-20 missile and 
Backfire bomber does not initiate - though 
it modernises and expands - the threat. That 
threat has been and remains a grim fact of 
international life." 
Nor do I believe that the SS-20 represents a new 
capability on the part of the Soviet Union. There 
have been some in the West who have talked of 
the SS-20 as a counter-force weapon, an accurate 
weapon which would be aimed at military 
targets. Those who talk in those terms do not 
understand the size of this weapon. I~ warhead 
is ten times the strength of the Hiroshima bomb. 
It is inconceivable that such a weapon could be 
aimed at military targets in Western Europe 
without causing an enormous number of 0'ivilian 
casualties and severe strategic destruction in 
Western Europe. To doubt that we would 
respond in those circulll$tances with a strategic 
strike is to doubt the theory of deterrence. There 
are grounds for doubting that theory, but those 
doubts will not be removed by merely deploying 
an additional weapons system. 
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There is a more fundamental question, which 
is whether it makes sense to rope off the SS-20 
and its sister systelll$ into a sepa:mte category. 
As Mr. Roper candidly said in his opening 
address, if you take the overall nuclear balanre 
there is still a significant - to put it no hligher 
than that - superiority in the West. If you 
break down that overall nuclear balanoo into 
stmtegic systems and into battlefield systelll$, 
whether you regard the SS-20 as a strategic 
system or as a battlefield system, you are still 
left with a significant western superiority in 
both categories. 
Only if you rope it off on its own into a 
separate cla&S of weapon is it possible to argue 
that there may be an eastern superiority, and 
even there, as the Rapporteur candidly admitted 
in his address, there is room for doubt. Indeed, 
as the independent International Institute for 
Strategic Studies - and it is worth emphasising 
that that institute is independent ; it depends on 
western intelligence sources for its information, 
but it does not have the same politJical axe to 
grind in interpreting that information - put 
it in a recent report, "it would certainly require 
some very major displacements of the figures to 
show any substantial imbalance" in theatre 
nuclear systems. 
The argument for the modernisation of the 
theatre nuclear forces has turned on a fear, which 
has not been spoken of l'!O far in this debate but 
which has been mentioned in other centres and in 
other forums - that the American nuclear 
guarantee can no longer be guaranteed. I believe 
that those fears are mistaken. I believe that the 
important question is not whether we can be sure 
that the Americans would respond with a nuclear 
strike in the event of Western Europe being 
attacked, but whether the Russians can be sure 
that they would not. Neverthele~, even if those 
fears are well grounded, even if they have a 
baSis, that basis will not be removed by deploying 
in Western Europe additional American systems 
which will be under complete American control 
and command and capable of being fired only on 
American orders. 
I unaerstand those who take the V!i.ew that we 
should modernise, who hold the position that the 
Russians might be less likely to attack the 
American homeland in response to a strategic 
strike from weapons situated in Western Europe 
and that because the Americans know that they 
might not be attacked in their homeland, in 
response to an attack by them from Western 
Europe, they might be more likely to use those 
weapons. I regard that argument as groundless. 
It seems to me manifest that if Russia were to 
see some of its cities or major military installa-
tions destroyed by attack by American weapons, 
it would not hesitate to destroy American targets 
simply because those weapons were based in 
Britain or elsewhere in Europe. 
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It also seems to me that, precisely because any 
American President is likely to know of the 
posSibility of the Russians responding thus to 
an attack, that same American President, if he 
is deterred from U$ing missiles from across the 
Atlantic, will be deterred from using mi!tiiles 
which are situated in E'ast Anglia. But if that 
theory is right, if it is indeed the case that the 
Americans would feel freer to use their missiles 
in Western Europe because they cannot be 
attacked in response by the Rulf!ians, I suggest 
that there is cause for us to consider carefully 
before we invite those missiles to be situated j~ 
Western Europe. 
After all, there are some in this Assembly who, 
particularly when we have discussed SALT, 
have taken the view that the America!$ and the 
Russians are seeking to protect their own home-
lands as sanctuaries against nuclear attack, while 
regarding Europe as a free-fire zone. I do not 
believe that that is what the Americans are doing, 
but, if it were, it would be egregious folly on 
our part to invite missiles on to our territory 
that would enable the Americans to make a 
strategic nuclear strike against the Soviet Union 
while leaving their own heartland a ~anctuary 
against attack. That would put Western Europe 
in the forefront of a nuclear war without 
necessarily giving us a veto on the waging of 
that war, because it has certainly been made plain 
to us in the British Parliament that not only 
will these missile's be under the complete com-
mand of the Americans, in that they and they 
alone will choose when to fire them, but the 
British Government will have no power to veto 
the firing if the Americans chose to use them. 
For all these reasons, therefore, the modernisa-
tion of our theatre nuclear forces is not neces-
sarily either a logical or a desirable response 
to the deployment of the SS-20, however much 
we deplore this. Furthermore, even if it were 
logical and desirable to deploy them, is it neces-
sary to deploy them now ? My answer is a very 
definite "No". 
As I understand the position, the Rapporteur 
and Mr. Mulley favour a decision to deploy them 
as ~oon as possible coupled with an offer to 
negotiate. I am bound to say that any offer to 
negotiate arms control which came in the wake 
of a decision to deploy the weapons would b~ 
meaningless. At the very best, it would be a 
cosmetic gesture designed to attract public 
opinion and support. 
The tragedy is that we have passed this way 
before. In the late 1960s, when the SALT talks 
began, we had the opportunity to include · the 
"grey area" systems, the theatre nuclear ~ystems. 
We passed that by because then we thought we 
were strong in the system and we did not want 
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to jeopardise that strength in exchange for 
equality. Now we are declining to negotiate 
because we believe we are weak. It is paradoxical 
that we cannot get arms control negotiations 
when we are in a position of strength because 
we fear they would end in equality and cannot 
get them when we are in a position of weakness 
becall$e we fear the arms control agreement 
would consolidate that position of weakness. 
The history of the arms race is littered with 
missed opportunities for arms control negotia-
tions. It is my fear that we are about to miss 
one more such opportunity and that we shall 
learn too late that we cannot escape the arms 
race by running faster. If we are seriOU$ in our 
offer of negotiations, we should make that offer 
before we rearm, rather than rearm first and 
then say that we are willing to talk about it. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I now call Mr. van den Bergh. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - Thank you, Mr. President, for giving 
me the opportunity to put forward my own 
views. 
I want to start by saying that I think that the 
Soviet Union's development, production and 
deployment of the SS-20 missile is a mistakP-. 
Just as the western countries ought in my 
opinion to take a risk so that the arms race 
between East and West can be slowed down, "10 
the Soviet Union ought a few years ago, when 
it was planning to put the SS-20 into production 
and deploy it, to have offered to talk this over 
with the West. 
The reactions of NATO are, as we see in thi.s 
Assembly, quite predictable. Where the arms race 
is concerned, we are caught in a pattern of action 
·and reaction, with one side reacting whenever 
the other does or says something. The Eli!!Sence of 
the viewpoint that I put over in the original 
recommendation is .that we must make an attempt 
to slow down this race, ·and to break this vicious 
circle of action and reaction. The question is 
whether this is in fact possible ; I say that it is. 
I share with Mr. Cook the view that militarilv 
we can afford, at least at the present time, t~ 
take some risk. I think that we must, where the 
various kinds of weapon we have are concerned, 
·avoid thinking lin watertight categories. We have 
always taken the view that the security of the 
West 18 guaranteed not by one single weapons 
~ystem, but by a whole range of weapons systems, 
from conventional to strategic nuclear. 
I am very worried indeed that up to now so 
many people have been too quickly- I will not 
say too easily - ready to introduce new systems 
on our side. This comes about, among other 
things, because of this thinking· in categories. I 
am afraid that one of the results of this will, 
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as Mr. Roper too has said, be that we shall start 
thinking about a Euro-strategic balance, if 
NATO now decides to introduce new weapons 
systems. I blame the Soviet Union for not 
properly recognising the political effects that 
introducing the SS-20 would have. Nevertheless 
I feel we ought, in the first place, to re'act poli-
tically to these developments. There are three 
reasons for this. 
First, I believe that there is both a quantitative 
and a qualitative balance between East and West. 
If the Federal Chancellor Mr. Schmidt- surely 
not one of the most radical among us - J;Jaid in 
a joint statement with the Russian President in 
Bonn last year that a general balance exists, whl) 
are we to say that there is a need to bring in 
fresh nuclear weapons systems ~ 
Second, why should we for political reasons 
sour the climate of detente that doeJ;J exist at the 
present time by developing new weapons systems~ 
Third, there is in my opinion an opportunity 
for taking some risk. Why ? Well, in the first 
place I think that the dependence on nuclear 
weapons has to be reversed. The catastrophe that 
would engulf us all if nuclear weapons systems 
were used - God forbid that they 10hould, I say, 
and I am an unbeliever - would go far beyond 
what happened in Hiroshima. This is why \Ve 
must take a risk. 
Furthermore, I believe that politically and 
tactically NATO is acting unwisely. We all 
know about the speech by Brezhnev in Berlin ; 
a speech, indeed, which has its doubtful aspects. 
Yet why has not there been a similar speech in 
reply :from the NATO side, a political reply to 
the challenge from the Soviet Union, saying that 
we are prepared to exercise restraint and to 
make a gesture similar to that of the Soviet 
Union ? This was why I made the suggestion -
one that has been taken up by Mr. Cook - of 
having a moratorium that might lead both sides 
towards a major political and diplomatic 
breakthrough. The Assembly will be making a 
great mistake if it does not issue this challenge to 
the Warsaw Pact, a challenge to achieve a 
political and diplomatic breakthrough. 
The PRESIDENT. - I now call an Observer 
from Norway, a member of the Starting, Mr. 
Vattekar. 
Mr. VATTEKAR (Observer from Norway). 
- First I should like to thank you, Mr. Presi-
dent, for having given me the floor in this 
important debate. An intensive public debate has 
taken place in Norway on what our attitude 
should be to the production and installation of 
medium-range atomic missiles in Europe. All 
political parties as well as other groups have 
taken part. Of course, some opposition has been 
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witn~d. This is one of the many aspects of 
life which distinguishes the western world from 
the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet Foreign 
Minister himself took advantage of the tradition 
of free and open debate in our societies when 
he spoke out recently against NATO's pla.nS. No 
statesman from the western world is given a 
similar opportunity in Eastern Europe. 
This is one of the reasons why there has been 
no public opposition in E'astern Europe to the 
Soviet nuclear rearmament which has been going 
on in Eastern Europe over the last decade. This 
lack of opposition to the Warsaw Paet rearma-
ment applies also to many of those in Western 
Europe who are now most outspoken in their 
opposition to our western attempt to reaeh a stage 
of approximate parity. 
Of course none of us favours nuclear weapons, 
but is it not rather strange that these western 
opposing forces have not raised stronger voices 
against USSR nuelear rearmament ~ They have 
had plenty of time to do so, because this rearma-
ment has been going on for ten years. I would 
also suggest to those same quarters that they 
ought to give some thought to the fact that as 
soon as the USSR learned that NATO had 
examined the pOSISibility of updating its nuclear 
defence, the Soviet Union accelerated the 
production and installation of its nuclear 
weapons. We are all in favour of a lessening of 
political tensions and a reduetion in armaments 
combined with effective control measures. 
In the opinion of Norway's Conservative 
Party, and to the best of my knowledge as of 
today, 'also in the opinion of a majority in the 
Christian People's Party, the Centre Party and 
the Labour Party - although I am aware that 
on this very day a severe discussion is taking 
place in the Labour Party - rthe choice of means 
is relatively simple if we base our decision on 
experience. This has so far made it abundantly 
clear that it is not only from a position of 
approximate parity that one can hope to move 
in the directian of a reduction in armaments, be 
they nuclear or conventional. This is why, with 
the majority that I have just mentioned, the 
Norwegian Parliament and Government, as f'ar 
as I ean judge it here and now, are in favour of 
a positive decision on 12th December 1979, 
combined with and based on an offer to open 
negotiations : I repeat, combined with and based 
on an offer to open negotiations. 
It should also be emphasised that it is a eondi-
tion of such a N orwegia,n !Otandpoint that the 
countries on whose territories the new weapons 
will be placed come out in favour of modernisa-
tion. It should also be stressed that since none of 
these weapons will be placed on Norwegian 
territory, we do not feel that we should moralise 
for others. 
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In the public debate in Norway two essential 
facts are, in my view, all too often forgotten : 
first, it ~ a question of replacing outdated with 
new weapons ; secondly, we are doing this to 
catch up with the USSR, which during the last 
decade has been installing new nuclear medium-
range weapons while disarmament negotiations 
in other areas have been going on. In so doing 
we aim at attaining approximate parity, which 
is a situation which has proved to be a pre-
requisite for meaningful, realistic and successful 
disarmament negotiations. 
Experience shows us that the mere western 
proposal to start production of new weapons has 
brought about a Soviet response. We must take 
advantage of this by offering to start negotiations 
during the period between the decision and actual 
deployment of new weapons. Only such an 
approach will make the USSR interested in 
reducing its already existing an:;enal of weapons. 
Since I am speaking as a representative of a 
non-member country of Western European 
Union, I should like to take this opportunity to 
show that the debate in my country does not mean 
that the Norwegian people do not fully appre-
ciate the importance of our membership in 
NATO. That the Norwegian nation is strongly 
in favour of NATO is evident from a recent 
opinion poll, according to which 65 % of the 
Norwegian population is of the opinion that 
Norwegian membership in NATO contributes to 
the safeguarding of peace. Only 9 % thought 
that NATO membership did not mean a thing 
in one way or the other, and 14% replied that 
they did not know. 
A comparison of this with earlier pol$ shows 
an interesting development. It shows that since 
these polls started, in 1966, NATO support in 
Norway has steadily increased. I trust that on 
12th December the NATO Council will take a 
positive decision in favour of modernisation of 
NATO's tactical nuclear forces in Europe. Such 
a decision will increase the pQilsibilities, as all 
experience shows so far, of the opening of a 
period of meaningful arms reduction negotia-
tions. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Vattekar. 
I now call Mrs. Eide, an Observer from 
Norway. 
Mrs. EIDE (Observer from Norway). - 1 
apologise, Mr. President, for not having asked 
to be allowed to speak in this forum. It is becauee 
I was totally unaware that my dear colleague and 
fellow parliamentarian from the Conservative 
Party would deliver so long and carefuJJy 
prepared a statement of that nature. I should not 
like to leave this audience with the notion that 
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there is this degree of certainty in the feelings 
of the Norwegian people on this matter. It would 
be unfair to have the Assembly believe that 
there is not a serious, increasing, knowledgeable 
and flophisticated opposition in our country on 
this matter. 
There is no need to repeat what has already 
been so well and logically presented by Mr. Cook 
this morning, but I should like to add that I 
thought it remarkable that statesmen with so 
much experience should have this degree of faitb. 
and trust in the willingness of our opponents on 
the other side to negotiate with us in a period 
when we have not been able to say that our chief 
ally, the United States, can ratify the SALT H 
agreement and when that same ally invites us 
all to violate part of the protocol of that very 
agreement by having us accept the productio!l 
and deployment of new weapons in Europe. 
The sincere hope of all of us, including, I 
realise, my dear colleague, is that we shall ha"e 
success not only in arms control but in disarma-
ment negotiations in our part of the world and 
that, as has been stated this morning, we shall 
be able to use our resources for the purposes of 
manlcind. At this moment it is our duty to make 
every effort first at having negotiations, then in 
negotiating over a long time in good faith, and 
then halting the arms race which we 'are now in 
the middle of accelerating. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. Last night the 
Assembly, under Rule 43, adopted the urgent 
procedure on the situation now prevailing in 
Iran, as a result of the invasion of the United 
States Embassy in Iran and the detention of the 
diplomats therein as hostages. That was moved 
at the instance of my colleague, Mr. Valleix. You 
will recollect that last night the matter was 
referred as a matter of urgency to the General 
Affairs Committee this morning. The Committee 
met at 9.30 and adopted unanimously, with one 
abstention, the text of a recommendation to the 
Assembly. I have the honour of being appointed 
Rapporteur to present that text to the Assembly 
as a matter of urgency as /SOOn as possible. 
The situation is that it has taken some time 
for the text to be printed. I did not think that 
it was right to bring H before the Assembly until 
a printed text was available. The text is now 
being circulated, and I think that it is before all 
of my colleagues. 
The Assembly will be aware that at the meeting 
of the heads of state or government in Dublin 
liU'lt week the action that has taken place in 
Tehran was most strongly condemned and a 
communique was issued following that. I think 
that it would be right for me to refer to the 
communique issued in Dublin because ... 
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The PRESIDENT. - I beg your pardon, 
Mr. Grieve, but you first asked for the floor in 
order to raise a point of order. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - Yes. 
The PRESIDENT.- That is to say, that you 
propose that we now go into this matter which 
we put on the agenda last night, for reasons of 
urgency. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - Yes. 
The PRESIDENT. - Well, you cannot go 
into detaih;; now. Are you the Rapporteur for 
the Committee Y 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - Yes, 
Mr. President. I would ask that the Assembly 
hear this matter and determine it straight away. 
The PRESIDENT. - First, the point of 
order is that we now discuss the matter and go 
into details of the text. Unfortunately, only the 
English language text has been distributed. The 
French version is not yet ready. Anyhow, is 
there any objection to our dealing with it 
immediately ~ We still have a long list of ~:Jpeakers 
on the subject which has been started this 
morning. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- As Chaie-
man of the Committee whose report is now under 
debate, I can understand Mr. Grieve's point, but I 
feel that in the interests of the .Assembly, if the 
French text were to be available within a short 
period, it would be only courteous for us to 
await the French text, Mr. President. Could your 
services adviliJe you when the French text will 
be available Y 
The PRESIDENT. - I would suggest that 
according to our Rules of Procedure we must 
have the text, Mr. Grieve, in order to hold a 
debate on it. Let us wait for thirty minutes. I 
hope that by then we shall have the French text. 
The machinery is going at full speed. 
We shall continue the debate on the present 
order of the day. As soon as the text is ready, 
is it agreed that we go into matters concerning 
Iran and then resume this debate after having 
decided on the Iran ~ue ? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Mr. Presi-
dent, of course I shall await the arrival of the 
French text before asking the Assembly to turn 
to this matter, because the whole purpose of the 
urgent procedure ... 
The PRESIDENT. - That is fully under-
stood, Mr. Grieve. I see that the .Assembly agrees. 
I call Mr. Deschamps. 
Mr. DESCHAMPS (France) (Translation).-
Mr. President, I asked for the floor on a point 
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of order concerning the very question that has 
just been raised. 
In fact, I was told on my arrival this morning 
that the General Affairs Committee, of which I 
am a member, had just been meeting to consider 
the motion for a recommendation on events in 
Iran tabled by Mr. Valleix, Mr. Berrier, Mr. 
Pecoraro and others. Well, I was not requested to 
attend the meeting. 
I have made inquh·ies, Mr. President, and 
found out that only those actually present yester-
day afternoon were warned about the meeting. I 
was sitting in the French Parliament at the time. 
I was therefore given no notice of the meeting of 
the General Affairs Committee. 
This is completely undemocratic and unaccept-
able. Yet it could have been arranged to send a 
message to me at the French National Assembly. 
It is all the more regrettable in that at yesterday 
morni!ng's sitting I had taken the floor to convey 
the French communists' opinion on the situation 
in Iran and to state that in our eyes, whatever 
forms the struggle of the Iranian people may take 
and whatever opinion we may have of them, that 
should not blind us to the justice of their cauSE'. 
I added that it was not the Iranian people whQ 
were aggravating the risk of war, but the 
aggressive attitude of the United States which is 
defending the Shah. 
Not having been given notice of the meeting, 
Mr. President, I was unable to defend this 
opinion in Committee. That is why - and it is 
my object in raising this point of order - the 
text to be tabled in a moment was approved by 
15 votes to none, whereas we French communist 
members of parliament condemn it in the 
strongest possible terms. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call the Chair:m..an of 
the Committee, Mrs. von Bothmer. 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation).- Mr. President, I am 
sorry that Mr. Deschamps feels that he has been 
undemocratically treated. That was not the inten-
tion 'at all. As you wiill ,all know, it was not until 
yesterday evening, very shortly before the sitting 
was closed, thllit it became necessary to convene 
the Committee for this morning. I am sorry, Mr. 
Deschamps, if you were no longer present at 
that time. I did not know you could be reoohed. 
Mr. DESCH.AMPS (France) (Translation).-
The French Parliamenrt is in session. 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I did not know that, 
nor was I to know that after the end of the 
sitting here you were still in your parliament. 
Mr. MENDE (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Written convocations were 
distributed, after all ! 
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:Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal RepU<blic of 
Germany) (Translation). - I was not to know 
that you are in session there in the evenings. 
That was when the convocations were given out. 
They were distributed at the President's evening 
reception, to which, to the best of my know-
ledge, everyone had been invited. 
Mr. MENDE (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Transl.ation). - Quite right ! 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Tra.nslation). - I am sorry that you 
d~d DJOt attend. You doubtless had your reasoDB ; 
you were perhaps rmable to come. But that is 
how it happened. So please do not take it as a 
deliibel'late iDBult. It is just that things happened 
tha.t way because ma;tters had to be dealt with 
v~ry quickly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Lewis, please. 
Mr. LEWIS (United Kingdom). - I think 
that this has been unfair to the chair. The Presi-
dent has a difficult job to do. Yesterday he had 
a difficult :problem. The full Assembly decided 
what should happen. If a delegate cannot be 
here, that is not the fault of the President or of 
the Assembly. If tha.t delegrute wants to be in 
the French Parliament, as some of my colleagues 
wanted to be in the British Parliament, he should 
make arrangements to see that he is notified. 
One of my colleagues had to return to Britain. 
He did not complain that Mr. President or 
Mrs. von Bothmer did not get in touch with 
London. He left it to his colleagues. 
It is taking advantage of the Assembly to 
make a point of order when it is the delegate's 
job to be here and, if he is not here, to make 
his own arrangements. Had that delega.te done 
that, he could have been properly notified. I 
thi:nk that it is an insuLt to the chair for anyone 
to raise this matter as a poilnt of order. 
The PRESIDEN'l'.- I think th81t the Assem-
bly is in agreement that I reject the suggestion 
that we a~;ted undemocratically. Last night who-
ever was present followed the debate on the 
problem of urgency. We decided that the matter 
would be handled as a matter of urgency and 
sent to Committee, and here in the chamber I 
gave notice that this morning, at 9.30 a.m., the 
Committee would sit, as the Chairman, who is 
present now, informed the whole Assembly. 
The11efore, if French members are absent, they 
must tell the secretary of the French Delegation 
to inform them. lt is not the fault of the Chair-
man of the Comm:irt-Jtoo or other membel'IS of the 
house, or the administration. 
We now go on with the debate pendilng the 
arrival of the French text. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I really 
believe that it would be in the interests of the 
155 
TWELFTH SITTING 
Assembly, Mr. President, if you could 1Jake one 
or two more speakers in my debate so that mem-
bers have a chance to read the text. 
The PRESIDENT. -I fully agree. I think 
that we ought to ·take one or two more speakers 
in this debate so that members may study the 
English and French vel'ISions of the text. 
Mrs. von BOTHMER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, I 
should like ro ask thrut Mr. Grieve be allowed to 
take the floor at 12 o'clock. As far as I know, 
Mr. Grieve will not be available to p!'leSent the 
report later. Can we arrange things this way ~ 
The PRESIDENT.- We will make a compro-
mise. We will hear Mr. Roberii and ,then take 
Mr. Grieve's report on the Iramian question. 
I call Mr. Roberti. 
Mr. ROBERTI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, after this interlude we resume our 
debrute on an im:Portant subject. Let me :f:iM 
stress that it is a good job oUII' Assembly has to 
pronounce upon a matter which, as authoritat-
iV'ely stated by our Committee Chairman Mr. 
Roper, is to be discussed on 12th December by 
the Atlantic Council, which will be required to 
take a decision on it, and in all the European 
countries public opillion is grea·tly engrossed by 
it. Consequently, if this Assembly, the only body 
iDBt:itutionally empowered to deal with EU!l'Opean 
defence and security, had been unable to pro-
nounce its views clmrly it would have been a 
sort of derelic'tion of duty, and a breach of trust. 
Coming to the matter which concerns us, let 
me begin by positing rthe theoretical stand the 
Assembly has aLways taken on security and the 
maintenance of peace in Europe. The SleCurity 
angle is governed by two main principles, deter-
rence and detente. We have ail.ways thought that 
complementarity in the observance of these prin-
ciples was essential, since deterrence without a 
search for detente may lead to an armaments 
race, while detente unaccompanied by an attempt 
at deterrence inevitably leads to hegemony of one 
or the other side, endangering security i1:8elf. 
For deterrence to oper8ite effectively it has to 
moot the essential requiremoot of cTedibiLity, and 
to be credible thel'le has tto be a military and 
pol~tical balance of forces between the two sides. 
Now, it is incontrovertible - and I think 
the reality of this is undenilable, as has been 
acknowledged in many unanimous d~cisioDB by 
the Assembly and by the representatives of those 
political gQ"oups that have more reasons than 
ourselves to trust the declaratioDB of the Warsaw 
Pact countries - it is, I say, incontrovertible 
that an imbalance of forces has developed to the 
detriment of the western line-up and the Atlantic 
Al1i:ance. There had already been such an imba-
lance in conventional armaments, and it has 
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been dangerously enhanced by the production, 
use an:d deployment of the two theatre nuclear 
weapollB SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. Some 
speeches have argued this case, and it is a 
conviction of certain political alignments more 
deeply attached to the aims of defence. But I 
must say such an opinion is widespread - I 
need only recall the strutemen:t made two days 
ago by no less an aUJthority thn the Minister 
of Defence of the Fedeml Republic of Germany, 
who said the emergence of an ultra-modern Soviet 
capability of medium-range missiles was a menace 
to the Al<Hance, to which the response should be 
the decisions talren on 12th December, on the 
basis of the propositions discussed in today's 
debate. 
I think therefore that we are not in our last 
baBtion or an extremist stwnce. The faot is 
conducive to the necessity of our restocking our-
selves in weapons capable in some manner of 
restoring the bal:anoo and making the western 
deterrent force credible. This has been the Com-
mittee's finding, !llnd we should give the Com-
mittee and its Chairman credit for the fact that 
it was 'arrived at by a reasonable compromise, fQII' 
at the same time as a recommendation to provide 
for the qualitative rearmament and refurbish-
ment of theatre nuclear weapons, there is a 
proffer of negotiations. And note that the axiom 
followed was not "reM'Illament firrst, talk later". 
No : we tried to follow the principle - precisely 
to ll!rrive at such a reasonable compromise ood 
prove our absolute good faith - of calling for 
modernisation and ll!t the same time initiating 
negotiations. 
Whrut was the opposing proposal raised in 
Committee, rejected there and upheld in the 
Assembly by Mr. Cook, and in different terms 
by Mr. Pecchioli, on the honesty of whose inten-
tions I have no doubts - bUJt in this political 
juncture it is not intentiollB that count but hard 
factB ~ A mol'latorium was asked for. But it would 
be a one-sided affair, gentlemen, because the 
West is asked not to produce modernised weapons 
while the other side already has them ood is 
only being asked to refrain from using them 
now. 
Should the negotiatiollB fall through, where 
would this leave us ? The Warsaw Pact would 
have the weapons already produced and be able 
to use them directly while the Atlantic Alliance 
would have to wait :the two or three years it 
would take to produce them. We should be 
consecrating a disproportion and imbalance. 
Furthermore, there is no doubting the West's 
good faith, in having proved its willingness not 
to strengthen armaments. Was the decision to 
suspend produc.tion of the neutron bomb maybe 
Illot taken to enoourage disarmament ~ Was not 
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deferment of the construction of the B-1 bomber 
to offset the Backfire ordered by the President 
of the United States to do just that? There is a 
real desire to make it impossible for us to 
negotiate. 
The other aspect thrut must be borne in mind 
is political. Should the West not so decide, it 
would see growing up throughout the world and 
within the Atlantic AlHance a lack of trust of 
its ability to defend iltself and conviction of the 
existence of a hegemony of the other side, whose 
consequences we should have to pay for. 
So, I deem it oessential that we proceed with 
modemisation of our weaponry, and beLieve the 
Assembly - with lrll due respect to opposing 
opinions - would be faiLing in duty unless it 
followed our Chairman Mr. Roper's proposal to 
approve the draft recommendation and report 
tabled by him. Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
We shall now adjourn the debate. 
6. The situation in Iran 
(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of 
the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 830) 
The PRESIDENT. -I call the Rapporteur 
for the General Affain; Committee, Mr. Grieve, 
to present the oral report on the situation in 
Iran, Document 830. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - I shall 
not repeat the few words which I uttered earlier, 
when I raised a point of order. The matter whieb 
now comes before the Assembly under the urgent 
procedure rule is, I should have thought, as 
appropriate to that rule as any matter which we 
have discussed in this Assembly. There is a mani-
fest danger to the peace of the Middle East 
and, who kno~, to the peace of the whole world 
which arises from the present events in Iran, 
the very root cause of which is something whicb 
strikes at the heart of international understand-
ing and the rules by whik.lh over centuries we 
have preserved the comity of nations. It is not 
for nothing that for centuries, ever since mankind 
became civilised and lived in cities and created 
states, the pen;ons of diplomats have been sacred 
to the states receiving them. 
·while in recent times we have seen the lives 
and the safety of many members of the diplo-
matic corps of the world put in jeopardy by 
chance terrorism, by criminals and by terrorists 
~cting on behalf of splinter groups in society, 
m one shape or another, I venture to suggest 
to this Assembly that the events in Iran which 
have arisen as a result of the invasion of the 
United States Embassy there and of the taking 
prisoner of those diplomats who were living 
within the enclosure and their detention under 
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the most appalling conditions as hostages are 
shocking. Whatever may be said, that decent 
human beings should be bound day and night, 
BJJ apparently they are, is a shocking thing to 
happen to anyone. But here it is plain that it is 
being done with the connivance of those in 
authority, and it behoves all the assemblies of 
the free world to express their horror at what 
is being done and their urgent desire that this 
situation should be brought to an end, because 
the longer it lasts, the more is peace endangered. 
As a politician, but speaking in an Aspsemblv 
where we are honoured by the presence of dis-
tinguished diplomats, I repeat - and it cannot 
sufficiently be repeated - that what is happen-
ing js an outrage. It is for those reasons that 
my colleague, Mr. Valleix, moved the urgent 
procedure yesterday. These are matters of great 
moment. These are matters on which we mUSJt 
weigh ou.r words with the llltmost care. We do not 
want at such a critical conjuncture to appear to 
put one foot wrong or to say one word that is 
inappropriate. 
It was in those circumstances that a number 
of us thought that it was not opportune that we 
should consider this matter last night, but that, if 
I may quote my own words, we should consider 
ilt with the llltmost care. You, Mr. President, had 
the happy idea that this matter should be refer-
red to the General Affairs Committee this morn-
ing, and overnight we all considered it. We met 
in the General Affairs CommiJttee this m()rning, 
and I have the honoUl' of having been appointed 
Rapporteur to briing the rmanim()US conciusion 
at which we arrived, with only one abstention, 
before the Assembly this morning. 
Before I draw the attention of the Assembly 
to what we decided and to the draft recom-
mendation, which I hope will meet with the 
unanimous approV'al of every()llle here - there 
may be room fur differences ; there always is 
11oom for differences in a m'll!trter of this kind 
- may I say thlllt I hope I am within. the sense 
of all my C()Heagues about the way in which we 
have put this matter. We have done so in the 
light of the :liact that other international assem-
blies, and the heads of all our states and the 
heads of governmenlt, have already considered 
this matter. 
It would not be right to say that our Council 
has been idle, when the Nirne - and we are 
seven of the Nine - met in Dublin last week 
and dealt in the strongest terms with the situa-
tion which has arisen in Iroo. I hope that the 
Assembly will bear wirth me if I read the com-
munique wMch was issued wirth regard to Iran 
after the meeting of the heads of st3Jte and heads 
of government in Dublin last week. It said : 
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"1. The heads of state or government and the 
Fol'eign Ministers of the Nine meeting in the 
European Council cOtllSidered the grnve situa-
tion created by the occupation of the Embassy 
of the United States in Tehran and the holding 
of members of its staff as hostages in flagrant 
breach of international law. 
2. The European Council strongly 1100ffirmed 
the statement which was issued by the Foooig'll 
Mi'llisters of the Nine at their meeting of 20th 
November in Brussels. It is fundamental that 
diplomatic missions should be protected. The 
failUil'e to uphold this principle and the taking 
of hostages to exert pressure on governments 
are totally unacceptable. It is the duty of all 
governments to oppose energetically such a 
breach of in.tern3Jtionallaw. 
3. The nin.e member sta.tes of the European 
Community fully respect the independence of 
Iran and the right of the Iranian people to 
determine their own future. They are con-
scious of the importance which the Irani'an 
people attach to the chooges which have taken 
place in their ooun.try, hurt in the same measure 
3JS they respect the rights of Iran they call ()n 
Iran to respect fully the rights of others and 
to observe the established principles that 
govern rel3Jtions between states. Re8peet for 
these principles is essential to the effort to 
secure order and justice in international 
relations which is in the interest of all states 
including Iran. 
4. The governments of the Nine, supported by 
public opinion in their caullltries, expressed in 
particular by the European Parliament, 
solemnly appeal to Iran to respect these funda-
mental rights and duties so long established 
in iruternation:al law. They urge most strong:ly 
that the hanian ·a.UJthotrities take action imme-
dirutely to release the hostages in complete 
safety and allow them to return to their own 
cormtry." 
That epiltomises the issue which we are facing. 
If diplomats' lives are to be endangered in this 
way, if their safety and security are to be 
invaded by rthe very states to which they are 
accrediJted, it is an ,end of the institution which 
has been responsible for the civilised conduct 
of business among states during the history of 
the modern world, and indeed of the ancient 
world, when the persons of diplomats in Greek 
city states were protected and when, in the 
Middle Ages, the heralds had the rights of 
diplom~ts ood their immunity was considered 
invioi1able. 
It is in those circumstances, and having regard 
to the communique issued last week, that we 
thought in our Committee this moming - and 
I submit most e3Jrll€Stly to this Assembly that 
this is the right way of deal!i:ng with the llUIItter 
- that we, too, should mark our disapprobation 
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of whrut is happening, our deep concern for the 
futu11e and appeal to Iram. at once to secure the 
release of these hostages. 
It is in those cirelllll8tances and with those 
ends in view that we in our Committee this 
morning ,adopted the following draft recom-
mendation. 
"The Assembly, 
Considering that the detention of members of 
the Unilted States Embassy in T,ehran consti-
tutes an unacceptable violation of inteJrnational 
law and a dangerous precedent for the main-
tenance of peace ; 
Expl"&'lSing its deep sympathy and solidarity 
wilth the government and: people of the United 
States in the emergency thus created ; " -
It is diffiooli to imagine the ·anguish whilch the 
relations and friends of these people must be 
suffering and the enormous anxiety which must 
weigh on the President of the United States in 
this critical matter -
"Considering the grave economic and strategic 
coosequenoos which :the events now occurring 
in Iram. could entaiL f()ll' European soou-
rilty ;"-
Indeed for world security, but we -are concerned 
here with the security of Europe -
"Noting that the heads of state and govern-
merut of the member strutes, meeting in Dublin 
<in the framework of the European COUil1Cil on 
29th and 30th November, issued a statement 
conoorning the srntuation in Iran, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CoUNCIL 
1. That it draw urgently to the attention of 
the governments of the member states the 
Assembly's support for the European Cormcil's 
declaration ; " -
By this 1'000mmendrution, therefore, we put our-
selves solidly behind what the European Council 
did last week -
"2. That consultations shouJld take place either 
within the framework of the WEU Council or, 
where more appropriate, indirectly" -
The word "indirootly" has boon put :im. there by 
:mistake ; it was in an earlier <kaft and I ask my 
colleagues to eliminate it -
"through the participation of iJts members in 
European political co-operation among the 
Nine to determine Mtion on this problem." 
It behoves me to make only one reference to 
the French text where the translation of the 
words "where more appropriate" is, I think, too 
weak. I would suggest thrut in the French text 
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where the words "le cas eckiant" occur we should 
substiturte the following words "si cela s'averait 
plus approprie". 
I do not think I can add anything to what I 
have already said or to the wording of this draft 
recommendation. 
I mUBt point out thrut no drafting of this kind, 
done in such a hUJN'Y, cam. be perfect, but I hope 
that we haw amV'ed ,at a wording that meets 
the necessities of the situation and shows how 
strongly we, united here, representatives of the 
Seven from the paroomenlts of the Seven, feel 
about this grave danger to the peace of the 
world 'and this appalling breach of all the rules 
on which intemrational comity is founded. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
The mrutter we have <liseussed was originally 
to be found in Document 829, tabled by :M:r. 
Vailileix. I see that Mr. Valleix was present at 
this morning's Commilttee meeting and that he 
voted fur the new recommendation when it was 
considered in the Committee. Is it his wish and 
that of his colleagues that the original recom-
mendrution, Document 829, be withdrawn? If not, 
we must debate the :two. 
I callJ Mr. VaHeix to open the debate. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
would like to make one remark, actually a 
reference to the Rules of Procedure, since, I 
believe, these put the French and English 
languages on an equal footing. 
While thanking Mr. Grieve for the quality of 
his report, in spite of having to draft it in such 
haste, and the Commi-ttee Chruirman for hav<ing 
expedited the matter, I wish it to be recorded 
that the French text is the one I spoke to this 
morn1ng. Things must be clear. Obviously the 
phrase "le cas echeant" is one thing and the 
t~anslation which you haw just proposed in 
French, "si cela s'averait plus approprie", in 
pamgraph 2 of the recommendation, is quite 
another. 
If the Rapporteur retains the French version 
he has j-ust proposed, then in spite of my desirre 
·to be associruted iin the debate in Committee, I 
shall ·ask for my "yes" vote to be declared void, 
for the following reason. 
I had proposed that we should adopt the 
French te~t in the following version : "de pro-
ceder a des consultations dans le cadre dtt Oon-
seil de l'U.E.O ... " and I tabled an amendme'Tht to 
replace "ou" by "et" : "et, le cas echeant," thus 
reveri:im.g to the original French. 
What is important in this matter, Mr. Rap-
porterur, is that the two organisations should 
speak each within their own sphere of aUJthority. 
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Mr. Valleix (continued) 
That is why I consider it quite im:possible to 
allow the expression: "si cela s'averait plus 
approprie''. On the C<IDJtrary, I hope the amend-
ment I just mentioned will be adopted by the 
.Assembly so that WEU on the one hand, and 
the European Communitia; on the other, can 
each take a stand wi·thi.n their own area of 
competence. 
Tha.t is what I wanted to make quite plwin, O!Il 
the Freneh version of the text, before going any 
:farther. 
The PRESIDENT. -The Rapporteur, pilease? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- I should 
like to consult the Chairman of my Committee. 
I shahl go and sit next to her. This is a dis-
aVIan1Jage of having the Rapporteur up here an.d 
the Cha.ill'DUI.D. down there. I think I could accept 
the proposed change. 
The PRESIDENT. - In the meanwhile, I 
call Mr. Lewis. 
Mr. LEWIS (United Kingdom). - While 
Mr. Grieve is consulting his Chairman, I thought 
it would be as well to put on record for members 
of the Assembly that only yesterday, after some 
fifteen days of backstair negotiations and 
diplomacy, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously passed a similar resolution to this. 
I want to emphasise the word "unanimously" 
because it is not often that one has a unanimous 
opinion from the Security Council. 
If, therefore, anyone here has any doubt about 
this recommendation because of a word or a 
comma, I ask him not to debate it, not to argue 
about it but to follow the good example o.f 
the Security Council and help us to pass this 
recommendation unanimously with acclamation 
and without any debate. 
I can see that some of my friendls are shaking 
their heads. I do not know what one could 
object to in this. After all, the Security Council 
does not often offer a unanimous opinion. To 
have some parliamentarian from some part of 
Europe trying to raise an objection to something 
like this would be setting the clock back. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you for your 
information, Mr. Lewis. In the meanwhile, the 
"Big Two" seem to have come to an agreement. 
Mr. Rapporteur, will you please tell us what 
conclusion you have reached ? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - I have 
consulted the Chairman of the Committee. We 
should be prepared to leave the French version 
~ iJt was settled in the Committee this morning, 
With the translation "ou le cas echeant", but we 
are not prepared to accept "et le cas echeant" 
because that would give a duplicate result. 
159 
TWELFTH SITTING 
I hope that we shall not allow ourselves to 
be bogged down here in what are really points 
of drafting. 
It is the principle of this document that 
really matters. As I said in rising to introduce 
my report, we could argue for hours about the 
precise wording in a matter of this kind. Surely, 
the principles on which we are seeking to act 
and to advise and to move our Council are 
luminously plain from what we have been able 
to achieve by way of wording this morning, and 
I very much hope that we shall not condescend 
to the minutiae of drafting points. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call 
Mr. V alleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Tmns'lation). -
After what Mrr. Grieve, our Rapporteur has said, 
and Mr. Roberti who made irt quite clear that we 
absolutely must come to a decision on this matter 
of sueh importance to the whole world an.d for 
the specific responsibilities of WEU, we must 
manage to adopt a text approved by a large 
majority in our Assembly, and if possible 
unanimously. 
I note with satisfac.tion tha.t the Rapporteur 
has taken accOfllllt of what I said on the transla-
tion of the draft recommendation, and thank him 
forr stricking ·to the French text. It raises once 
more the interpreta.tion of WED's exa0t role and 
I make no sooret of the fact that :iJn this parti-
cular respect I hope WEU will have a position 
of its own, parallel of course to that of the Euro-
pean CounciL 
So, having myself been merely an outsider in 
the Committee, invited by the Chail'Ill!an, I hope 
no account will be taken of my par-ticipation in 
the voting as wou1d be only proper under the 
Commi.Jttee's rules. Neverrthcl€SS, the essential 
being that our Assembly's decision is adopted, 
unanimously if possible, I will in my tu:rn make 
an dfol'lt, and even if the Rapporteur mamta;ins 
his text with the word "ou" in it I shall still 
V'Oite for it. 
The PRESIDENT. - That means that you 
wilthdraw your Document 829 and we ooncen-
tra.te on Document 830, the report of the Com-
mittee. Thank you very much, Mr. Vaireix. 
The debate is closed. 
I now open the deba.te on the three amend-
menta. I call first the m.anuscrip.t amendment 
which has been tabled by Mr. Boucheny. 
At the beginning of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, add a new paragraph a.s 
follows: 
"Undel'Sitanding the legitimate wish of the 
Iraniru:t people to punish the Shah's criminal 
activities ;". 
I call Mr. Boucheny. 
OFFIQ[AL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. BOUCHENY (France) (Translation). -
Mr. Pr€8ident, we have always condenmed the 
seizwre of hostages, but in this caBe the seizure 
of hoetages is being USied against the people of 
Iran, whose crime is attacking the privi!leges 
of big capital. 
We are, therefore, against this text, because it 
does not take into account the legitimate desire 
of the Iranian people to bring the Shah, who 
has blood on his hands, tJo justice for his crimes. 
Even in the United States - as repol'!ted in 
today's newspaper - the democratic candidate, 
Senator Kennedy, has spoken out to condenm the 
way in which this seizure of hostages is being 
exploited against the Iranian people. You here 
are helping to sustain the hysterical reaction· of 
some American circles against the Iranian people. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Jung. 
Mr. JUNG (France) (Tmns1ation). -I shall 
vote against the amendment moved by Mr. 
BoUJCheny. 
I am V'ery surprised at his change of ground, 
for if my infOII"'llJati<m is correct the Shah was 
made doctor honoris causa in three universities 
in the Soviet Union. So I fail to understand how 
the French Communist Party can now adopt 
such a position. 
The PRESIDENT. -We have one positive 
and one negative. "'hat is the view of the Com-
mittee? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - If the 
amendment is unacceptabLe we are not concerned 
either with what the Shah may or may not have 
done but with that is happening to United States 
citizens of that country's diplomatic corps who 
are prisoners in their embassy in Tehran. 
The PRESIDENT. - You do not wish to 
speak, Madam Chairman ? ... 
Then we shaH vote on the amendment tabled 
by Mr. Boucheny. 
(A. vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The manuscript amendment is negatived. 
I now call the second amendment. 
After the second paragraph of the preamble 
to the draft recommendation, add a new para-
graph as follows : 
"Recognising the right of the Iranian people 
to advance, in full independence and demo-
cracy, along the path opened by the overthrow 
of the tyranny of the Shah;". 
I call Mr. Calamandrei. 
Mr. CALAMANDREI (Italy) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, the amendment of which I 
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am the first signatory speaks for itself. The 
Rapporteur, Mr. Grieve, has recalled the tenor 
of the declaration by the nine EEC governments. 
Well, it embodied an appeal to the Iranian 
people's right, subject to the principles of demo-
cracy and rules of international conduct being 
observed, to advance along its chosen path 
without let or hindrance. All our amendment 
does is to add to the draft recommendation, to 
the other parts on which we are agreed, the call 
for a similar appeal to that of the Nine, in default 
of which a key element would be missing. 
The PRESIDENT.- Who wishes to speak? 
What is the view of the Chairman of the Com-
mittee or the Rapporteur ? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Mr. Pre-
sident, we have a good deal of sympathy with 
what is proposed in this amendment, in that 
obviously everyone here hopes that the Iranian 
people will advance in independence and demo-
cracy. But that has absolutely nothing to do with 
the essential point before us today. What we are 
seeing today is something which is as undemo-
cratic as it could be - the taking of hostages 
in an embassy of one of the three great powers 
of the world. In those circumstances we do not 
consider that it is appropriate to accept this 
amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. -Now we shall vote on 
the amendment tabled by Mr. Calamandrei, 
Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Corallo and Mr. Romano. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The manuscript amendment is negatived. 
I now call the third manuscript amendment. 
It reads as follows : 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after "determine" insert "political". 
Who is to move the amendment ? 
I call Mr. Corallo. 
Mr. CORALLO (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I do not know whether some mis-
translation has crept into the documentation, but 
I just want to say that our amendment is to 
insert "political" ~;tfter "determine". In short, it 
should be clear that "political" and not any 
other kind, e.g. military, action is being referred 
to. 
So that is what our amendment is about. But 
may I just add something else ? Many speeches 
have sung the praises of unanimity, emphasised 
the importance of having it. I am a1so sure that 
it carries its own profound significance in cases 
of this kind. But may I say that unanimity also 
results from efforts to secure it f I do not believe 
the United Nations Security Council achieved 
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Mr. Corallo (continued) 
unanimity in two minutes flat ! Actually it took 
an effort at mutual understanding, a bridging 
of gaps : in this respect, however, I think what 
we are up against here is an unwillingness to 
make such an effort. For instance, I think the 
previous Calamandrei amendment could have 
been quietly accepted in such a spirit to help 
reach a unanimous vote, which would have a 
great impact on the country we are referring to, 
on relations with the Iranian Government. I 
would like to hope that at any rate for my 
amendment which simply clears up the fact that 
political and not any other kind of action is 
being referred to, a comparable effort will be 
made to reach the unanimity we all say we want 
but are unwilling to do anything to achieve. 
The PRESIDENT.- May we hear the Rap-
porteur f 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Mr. Pre-
sident, this amendment is unacceptable to the 
Rapporteur and the Chairman. We cannot limit 
the fields of action. "Political" is a very narrow 
word. I hope very much that there will be a 
great deal of diplomatic action taking place. To 
put in the word "political" is shackling the 
freedom of the Ministers in their respective 
powers to do all that they can in this matter. 
Such a shackle is completely unacceptable. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
\V e come to vote on the manuscript amendment 
in the name of Mr. Corallo. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
The manuscript amendment is negatived. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommenda-
tion in Document 830, to which amendments have 
been proposed but not accepted. 
If the Assembly is unanimous and there are 
no objections to the draft recommendation and 
no abstentions, we can save the time needed for 
a vote by roll-call. 
Mr. Boucheny, do you want to have a roll-call 
vote? 
Mr. BOUCHENY and Mr. DESCHAMPS 
(France) (Translation).- We demand a roll-call 
vote, Mr. President. 
Mr. STAINTON (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President, I was wondering whether you would 
accept comments on this recommendation before 
you put it to the vote, anyway. 
The PRESIDENT.- We have dealt with all 
the amendments and there was no further 
demand by a member to speak. Are you taking 
6 
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the floor for your vote, or what is your inten-
tion? 
Mr. STAINTON (United Kingdom). -With 
respect, Mr. President, the comments so far have 
been confined to specific enumerated amend-
ments. As yet, no one has discussed the general 
theme underlying this recommendation, apart 
from the Rapporteur. 
The PRESIDENT. - Some have al,ready 
spoken to it. For instance, Mr. Lewis asked the 
Assembly to have a unanimous vote on this more 
or less very clear-cut situation and problem. 
However, if you would like to speak as in a 
general debate, plea8e take the floor for two or 
three minutes. 
Mr. STAINTON (United Kingdom).- Thank 
you very much, Mr. President. It is certainly 
my intention to vote in favour of this recom-
mendation. In fact, I was one of the signatories 
of the initial draft. However, that said, I should 
like to make four very brief observations. 
My first observation turns on the point that 
was so emphaticaHy made by my colleague, Mr. 
J.Jewis, earlier this morning. I think that para-
graph 1 would have been immeasurably strength-
ened had reference been made to the United 
Nations Security Council resolution and the fact 
that Russia and China have both assented to the 
condemnation of the invasion of the United 
States Embassy and the taking of the hostages. 
Secondly, paragraph 2 of the recommendation 
before us reads: "expressing its deep sympathy 
and solidarity with the government and people 
of the United States". With sympathy I agree 
unreservedly, Si.lr, but is not solidarity perhaps 
entirely open-ended in terms of whatever uni-
lateral, possibly military, action the United 
States Government might take ~ There is no gain-
saying that situation in the wording, as it is 
now presented. 
Thirdly, while I consider it is entirely outside 
the prerogative of this Assembly to pass any 
judgment whatever on the Shah or his conduct, 
I think that there should at least be some 
recognition, somewhere in the wording - alas, 
it is now too late - of the rights of self-
determination and democratisation among the 
Iranian people themselws for themselves. 
Finally, in terms of the recommendation and 
those to whom we, as an Assembly, address our-
selves, I am somewhat at a loss to know - per-
haps it is nai'vety on my part - why those 
responsible for the drafting did not recommend 
that the Iranian Government should have a copy 
of this resolution deposited directly with them 
instead of relying exclusively on the two chan-
nels enumerated here. With those reservations, 
I vote warmly in support of the recommendation. 
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The PRESIDENT. - Thrunk you. 
A vote by roll-eall has been requested. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of 
Mr. Beith. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to vote L 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is aa follows 1 : 
Number of votes cast . . . . 52 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
The draft recommendation is therefore 
adopted 2• 
Two members wish to explain their votes. 
I call Mr. Peoohioli. 
Mr. PECCHIOLI (Italy) (TTalil.Slation). 
Mr. President, we Italian communists would 
have preferred our Assembly to have reached 
unanimity on such a delicate issue. This has 
proved impossible because our reasonable amend-
ments have come up against a bl:ank wall. I 
would insist that we condemn the taking of 
hostages as an unacceptable breach of law : let 
there be no doubt on the matter. Nevertheless, 
as a majority has rejooted both our substam.tive 
amendments, for recognising the rights _of t~e 
Iranian people to independence and taking Its 
own decisions, and on the other hand for making 
it plain that any action taken would have to be 
political, we have abstained from voting on the 
draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Calamandrei. 
I understand that he does not wish to speak. 
7. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 821) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the NSUmed debate on the report of the 
Comnrirttee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments on new weapons and defence strategy, 
Document 827. 
I eall Lord Reay. He will be folil.owed by 
Mr. Boucheny if there is time. 
Lord REAY (United Kitngdom). - We are 
now discussing an exceptionally importam.t mat-
ter on which NATO will have to take a decision. 
1. See page 39. 
2. See page 40. 
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NATO has either to decide to modernise its 
forces iJn the face of growing military imbalance 
between .its theatre nuclear forces and those of 
the Soviet Union's equivalent systems or to post-
pone such a d~on in the hope that, in the 
meantime, military concess:ionB can be extracted 
from the Soviet Union. 
While I certainly believe that we should con-
tinue to seek further measures of arms control 
through negotiations with the Soviet Union, I 
also believe that we shall be more likely to make 
progress in this diireCtion if, at the same time, 
we set oUJt to establish equality in the militaey 
relationship, equality being, as Mrs. Hamm-
Briicher reminded us in this Assembly on 
Monday, the decisive principle on which our 
sarety depends. If we allow the pNSent slide 
into imbalance to continue, we shall be present-
ing the Soviet Union with a sitUJation which is 
developing satisfactorNy for them and, therefore, 
one in which, while they may have an interest 
in negotiation, they will not have an interest 
in making concesnons. But also, if we allow the 
imbalance to develop further, we shall. be con-
tributing to the dangers thrut we face, for it is 
a corollary of the principle of deterrence that 
weakness itself constitutes a provocation. There-
fore, it is to reduce the risks of war that we 
must set out to redress the imbalance as soon 
as possible, and the need to reduce those risks 
seems to be a more important consideration, from 
the moral poim.t of view, than whetller we rely 
on nuclear or conventional means o.f doing so. 
Soone have argued that the decision to produce 
new theatre nuclear weapons should be taken but 
that the decision to deploy them should be post-
poned. This woulld be wrong, for two reasons. 
First, such a deferml of the decision would 
appear to ind.ioote a weakening of will on 
NATO's part, which would undermine the 
credibility of the Alliance's deterrence, for the 
effectiveness of deterrence depends on credibility 
and credibility depends ultimately on will. 
Secondly - and perhaps in this context more 
importantly - it would Opeill up the risk of a 
divergence of interest and perhaps of policy 
betwoon ourselves and the United States. It 
would be dangerous for us to assume that the 
United States will maintain its commitment to 
manufacture these enormously expensdve systeiDB 
if we are not at the same time willing to commit 
om-selves to deploy them. It would be wrong for 
us to ask the United States to do so. We should 
seize and cement the opportunity that the United 
States offers us of weapons that are suitable 
for our defence, and the further commitment to 
our defence that this offer represents, for in 
doing so we shall strengthen the commitment of 
the United States to defend us. A Europe that 
is apparently losing the will to defend itself is 
a Europe that the United States itself wi1l lose 
the will to defend. 
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Lord Reay (continued) 
FilruaHy, I should like to say something about 
the solidarity of NATO. NATO is indivisible. 
It e:X'ists to defend the independence am.d the 
democratic freedoms of the member states that 
compooe it. It would surely be wrong fur 
members to 1expoot the defeMe that it offers and 
yet believe that they oon remove their share of 
the responsibilities and the risks associated vvith 
that defence. At the same time, it vvould surely 
be foolish to assume that NATO can be vvealrened 
with imp11Ility, without putting at peril the 
freedoms that a:lll of us in the West enjoy. 
For those re1l80111S, I hope that the NATO 
Ministers vvill be able to take a decision, vvith 
the u!l!Jacimous support of the NATO members, 
to moderruise NATO's deployed forces of theatre 
nuclear weapons, bUJt that if such a dooision 
cannot be taken unanimously it vvill, neverthe-
less, be taken and that NATO will go ahead 
vvith that decision. In re1lrospect, it may vvell 
turn out to be one of the most important deci-
sions in the political life of alJl of us. 
The PRESIDENT. - I novv oo:lll Mr. 
Boocheny, for only :ffive minurtes. 
Mr. BOUCHENY (France) (Translation). -
Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the 
Floor. Today voiC€8 are beirng :raised iin Atlantic-
mindled circiles concerning the need to develop 
armaments in quantity and quality. Just at a 
time vvhen extension of armaments limlitation 
and detenJte ought to be the order of the day 
after signature of the SALT II and preparetions 
for the Madrid conference in the framevvork of 
CSCE. 
What is crucial for us is disarmament. Novv, 
WEU is playing a particularly negative role in 
recommending - and I quote Mr. Roper's 
report - "that political responsibility for and 
the risks of this policy must be shared by a:ll 
oollltries of the Alliance". In plain l,angu:age this 
means that WEU reoommends aU European 
countries to ahlovv the stationing of Pershing II 
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on their 
territories. Such an attitude is utterly unaccept-
able to us. It smacks of esoolatioo, terror and 
over-armament. It applies pl"eSSure and Lends 
encouragement to the leaders of the Atlantic 
Alliance, vvho are to moot in Brussels from 12th 
to 15th December. 
In a pl'eSS statement yesterday the French 
communists protested strongly ,against the role 
that WEU is playing. The attitude of the French 
Government, which vvithout ·turnim.g a hair 
toleretes that this kind of recommendation 
shoulid be adopted at Paris by a supranational 
organisation, is quite unacceptable. 
We all know that if NATO installs nevv 
weapons, toppling a balance that is already 
6. 
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precarious, the W'lhl'Saw Treaty countries will 
take coUJnter-measures to re-establish the stra-
tegic parity recognised by President Carter on 
conclusion of the SALT II agreement, vvhich 
NATO is now going back on. 
We must stop the escalation, and omly negotia-
tion crun. get us out of the deadly spiral of a 
vain quest for military supremacy. 
Fortunately, the French communists are not 
alone in fighting for a poliq of vvisdom, dis-
armament and peace. We are optimistic, for the 
people's struggle finds echoes even m thls 
Assembly : .the Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, 
was forced to resign, doubhl€EIS because of the 
struggles im. vvhich the Dutch people are engaged. 
We are sorry, though, that a fellovv socialist 
should ta1re up a proposal that runs counter to 
the interests of pea;ce. The Soviet Union has put 
forward proposals of oodoubted inlterest for 
reduction of the armed forces in Europe. Why 
do we not dliscuss them ~ W'e have •asked the 
Fre:neh Government to urge all the signatory 
states of the Helsinki final ·act to support the 
idea of a negotiation on freezing armed forces 
and armaments iin Europe at theiT present level 
and. gradually reducing them vvhile respecting 
the equal security of each country concerned, 
and ~lso to abstain from any fruit accompli before 
detaJilM. negotiations are begun. 
Instead of launching from Paris by way of 
WEU an appeal to pursue the armaments race, 
vve adVOC'ai1Je convening a conference there, vvhose 
arrangements, level and aims could be defined 
among the interested states, that vvould revievv 
the vvhole range of disarmament problems. 
We protest agW.nst WEU's presumptions in 
pressuring national par'liaments into acceptilng 
the deployment of missiles on their territories, 
vvhich would. create a grave danger for vvorld 
peac,e. 
We shall not emulate the attempts by certain 
leading social democrats, vvho go through the 
motions of talks in Berlin, like Chancellor 
Schmidt, whereas i:n his speech to the SPD 
congress he in fact advocates the strengthening 
of armaments in Europe. 
However, vve make bold to place on record 
the fact that many social democrets, especiaUy 
in Northern Europe, are taking a more rea1istic 
attitude on these questions. 
Thls is why we advocate the bal!ance of force, 
the .establishment of world peace run.d new inJte.r-
national relations based oo trust and negotiation. 
The recommendations ,tabled to not contribute 
to these obj,ectilves. We sha;lll therefore vote 
against them. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
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The President (continued) 
I now c·all the liast speaker in this mmm.ing 
sitting. Mr. Gessner, please. 
Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gent1emen, I have in many Western Euro-
pean Union debates and in the CounciiJ. of Europe 
always pleaded the need for detente. My attitude 
on this question is beyond ·alll doubt. I am im. 
favour of the policy of detente, and shall coo-
tinue to take this line in the future. 
But in all the speeches I have made I have 
always been mindful of the fact that the link 
between the Alliance's defence capability and 
the possibility of taking concrete steps towards 
doetente is indissolubk This is also the back-
groUilld against which I view ;the proposal made 
by Mr. Brezhnev, the Chairman of his party and 
head of his government. I must say that I regard 
this proposal as a positive sign. We shoulid not 
rejoot out of hand everything that has been 
proposed. 
Similarly I regard it as quite remarkable that 
the United States has announced its readiness 
to wilthdraw a thousand nuclear warheads from 
Europe. This is a clear indication of our 
readin'ess to respond with commensurate 
measures to measures taken by the Soviet Union. 
If we wish to grasp the proMem properly, 
however, we must have a clear understanding 
of the following ~State of affairs. Soviet strategy, 
the teaching of the Soviet Union's military 
aeademies, is basted on the axiom that the Soviet 
Unioo must be capable of always fighting am 
offensive battle. But those who advocate this 
strategy must a1so draw the relevant conclusions 
with regard to •armament, since it is a .long-
established fact that .the sid~ which takes the 
offensive must always be stronger than its 
adveroo.ry. You will recall the rule of thumb of 
a ratio 3 to 1 in favour of the attacker. 
The Sovi,et Union has in the past aiways 
stressed that peace in Europe is safeguarded by 
the suP'eriority of the Warsaw Pact. The balance 
theory to which we subscribe was till recently 
always !"ejected by the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union drew from its diiffe:vent theory the cor-
responding conclusi<mS as regards the number, 
arm,ament and training of its troops. 
It is not long silnce Brezhnev changed this 
theory by saying that peace in Europe is based 
on the ba}ance of :force. This means he has ceased 
to afSert that peace is based on the superiortity 
of the Warsaw P~act forces. We do not find, 
however, that acceptance of this correct apprecia-
tion of the situation has led the Soviet Union 
to draw the conclusions it involJves for arma-
ments polricy. 
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We should bear in mi:nd that though there 
are many who do not wish to recognise this fact, 
a very considerable addition;a;l threat has been 
created by the SS-20 missiles. Missil.es of this 
type, unlike the earlier ones, have become mobile. 
The launchers can be reloaded thr:ee times. Each 
missile of this type cootJains three warheads. All 
things considel"ed, this makes them considerably 
more dangerous. This misSile has become less 
vulnerable and its added yield has made it more 
dangerous. Its increased accUTacy, too, should 
not be Ulllderestimated. 
Now a colleague, whom I hold in groot esteem, 
namely Mr. van den Bergh, has asked whether 
nuclear weapons might not be replaood by cor-
responding conventional weapons. I shall be 
pl'ain about this - if the possibility existed, I 
should be in favour of it. But I know of no such 
alternative offered by armaments technology. 
The ideal wouiJ.d be, of course, for there to be no 
nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. 
UnfortUillately, however, anyone who is a realist 
knows that creating such a state of affairs does 
not depend on us alone. 
I want to malre it clear beyond all doubt that 
we must not endeavour to engage in an arms 
race. "'"'hat we are doing is catching up in 
armaments, that is, we are closing a gap. I£ our 
intention had been to engage in an arms race, 
our measures would have had to be quite 
different. They would then have had to be aimed 
at getting ahead of the Soviet Union. But this 
is not what we want, and this must be said here 
with absolute clarity. What we are trying to do, 
rather, is to establish a link between tbe 
possibility of catching up in armaments on the 
one hand and the limitation of armaments 
through control measures on the other. In other 
words, the extent of the modernisation which is 
being discussed depends on the Soviet Union's 
willingness to place a corresponding limit on the 
production and deployment of SS-20 missiles. 
This means that it would be possible to abstain 
from modernising if a corresponding concession 
were made by the Soviet Union. Chancellor 
Schmidt made it clear that we are, at any rate, 
not rejecting this so-called zero solution out of 
hand. Now the Soviet Union is afraid that the 
link between modernisation on the one hand and 
armaments control negotiations on the other 
places it in something of a dilemma ; for it is 
no longer able to play for time as it has done 
in the past ; it has been deprived of this 
possibility. 
In other words, there will be no progress in 
negotiations unless the Soviet Union submits 
matching proposals acceptable to us. This 
explains why the Soviet Union is trying very 
hard to get rid of the link we have established 
and this in turn means that it is trying to 
prevent the forthcoming decision on the part of 
the Alliance. 
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This is one more reason why I am opposed to 
a moratorium. The prospects for armaments 
control measures would be made not better, but 
worse. We should merely lose valuable time, 
because the Soviet Union would doubtless play 
for time. I ask myself : where then is the progress 
in all this? 
It must unfortunately be said that the Soviet 
Union has not in the past been particularly good 
at matching our advance concessions. The 
Americans' B-1 bomber and the neutron weapon 
are eloquent examples of this. Although the 
Soviet Union was aware of the problem, it has 
nevertheless built the Backfire bomber. 
It would therefore be logical for those who 
advocate a moratorium to say straight away that 
they renounce this link and that the talks should 
be continued in the same way as before. 
Experience has however shown that it took us, 
for instance, eight years to arrive at a SALT 
agreement, and that negotiations on MBFR have 
gone on for years without showing any great 
results. From this, I think, we must draw our 
conclusions. 
All this leads me to conclude that the NATO 
decision will have to be taken. It is not just 
a matter of closing the missile gap. The Alliance 
also has to show that it is still able to take 
decisions when these have to be taken. We must 
now prove that we can. Failure to do so would 
be putting at risk major elements in our security. 
At the same time I do not wish to lose sight of 
the fact that the very earliest that deployment 
could take place would be in three years' time. 
I even assume that the period of three years 
will be exceeded. But during this period - and 
this can surely be accepted - there can be many 
rounds of negotiations, which will make it clear 
what the Soviet Union's real intentions are. 
I do not think - and I say this quite plainly 
- that the government of the Soviet Union 
wants a war. But we do not know, of course, 
what the ideas of the leadership in the post-
Brezhnev period will be. No one amongst us can 
foretell this. 
And there is a further point. The gap which 
now exists in the defence capability of the 
western states may one day make them vulnerable 
to political blackmail. I ask you all : can we 
possibly wish this to happen ¥ Of course not. But 
if we do not wish it, we must have the courage 
to draw the necessary conclusions. 
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The Soviet leaders have long been aware of 
our fears about the SS-20. We have talked with 
them about this, and they know our arguments. 
I wonder what it really was that led the Soviet 
Union not to draw the necessary conclusions from 
its knowledge of our positions and fears ¥ It has 
not done so. That being the case, we are forced 
to take the decision to modernise. 
I should like to express the hope here that 
it will not prove necessary to catch up in 
armaments. I wish also to state unambiguously 
that the necessary will exists on our part. The 
ball is now with the Soviet Union. We hope that 
its decision will be dictated by the courage to 
display political good sense. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- We shall now adjourn 
the debate on new weapons and defence strategy. 
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders 
of the Day: 
1. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and Votes on the draft Recom-
mendations, Document 827 and Amend-
ment). 
2. SALT II and its implications for European 
security (Presentation of and Debate on 
the Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and Vote on 
the draft Resolution, Document 816, 
Addendum and Amendment). 
3. Arctic technology (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions, Document 822 and Amend-
ments). 
4. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-
Office of the Council. 
Are there any objections L. 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.) 
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The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Sit-
ting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- In accord-
ance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, 
the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting have been distributed. 
Are there any comments ? ... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The names 
of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which 
have been notified to the President will be 
published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings 1 • 
1. See page 44. 
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3. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes 
on the draft Recommendations, Doe. 821 and 
Amendment) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- The first 
Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and votes on the draft recom-
mendations, Document 827 and Amendment. 
In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Tummers. 
Mr. TUMMERS (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- What is the background, Mr. President, 
against which Dutch socialists - for whom I am 
speaking for the first time here this afternoon 
- look at the recommendations in the report 
before us, a report based on highly complex 
developments ? First and foremost, that of the 
control of armaments. What do we need to 
achieve genuine arms control ? We need negotia-
tions to set out the criteria for arms control. 
In our view, we should not derive these criteria 
from, on the one hand, sophisticated opinions 
about modernisation and on the other the fictions 
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of military theorists. These parodies on progress 
conceal within them the germs of disaster. They 
have already led to our vying in weapons pro-
duction, and thus to a speeding up of the arms 
race and a sombre overkill potential that is not 
only more of a threat than the danger of war at 
the present moment, but is in itself quite insane. 
This insanity threatens to upset any rational 
approach to this question. It is a kind of insanity 
that also has risks because of the potential threat 
that already exists in the balance of arms. I 
shall not go into the need for giving priority to 
developments that have to do with people over 
the development of weapons ; the first speaker 
has already mentioned this, as did the Norwegian 
observers. 
The public has already seen through this 
insanity. The public whom, in whatever way, 
we represent here has by its overwhelming 
opposition shown how the dangers of the arms 
race are bringing fear and anxiety into people's 
everyday lives. How would you, Mr. President, 
give an answer to the question of why, if there 
is already the potential to destroy the world 
fifty times over, we need to do something to raise 
this to fifty-two times Y This is the question 
people ask us when we address meetings. It needs 
answering, but here and now we need to see io 
it that the question no longer needs to be asked. 
This can be done by ensuring that before any 
discussions on the production and/or deployment 
of the Pershing 11 and the cruise missile there 
are negotiations with the Soviet Union so as to 
arrive at yardsticks for the arms control I 
have mentioned. The first counter to the SS-20 
needs to be just such a consultation on arms con-
trol. Developing any other kind of counter-
weight is a way of hotting-up the arms race ; 
and so is a decision giving priority to produc-
tion and deployment. 
What ought our contribution to be to such a 
discussion Y First, in response to Brezhnev's 
statements in Berlin, 1,000 warheads should be 
withdrawn from the territory of WED, followed 
by a further 1,000. Second, the calling of a halt 
on the production and deployment of modernised 
weapons, because anyone undertaking production 
and deployment is ruling out any possibility of 
negotiation ; this is a very important point. 
Third, it must be made clear to the USSR that 
it must make a reduction, a very drastic reduc-
tion, in its menacing weapons potential includ-
ing in particular the SS-20. 
On the subject of the recommendation in the 
report before us, and against the background I 
have just sketched out, I would comment that 
all of this means for us that - apart from our 
support for the amendment from Mr. Cook -
there will need to be vast changes in the first 
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part of the draft recommendation if we are to 
be able to give it our support. Thank you, 
Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call Sir 
Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
In an interrupted and varied debate I want 
in the shorter than average time for which I have 
asked to concentrate on the basic essentials behind 
the report. 
We are facing another example of what I 
believe China has called Soviet creeping 
hegemony. One continues to go so far advancing 
one's imperialist interests, diplomatically, mili-
tarily, and in every other way, and when 
eventually the apprehensions and doubts of those 
one wishes to absorb are threatened and awak-
ened, one makes a series of gestures designed 
to alleviate their fears temporarily and a new 
groundswell of creeping hegemony takes over 
again. 
There exists in Britain a game, which I imagine 
takes place in France, perhaps under another 
name, called grandmother's steps. One child 
stands while the others seek to advance upon 
him. When the child turns, the other children 
freeze instantly until the child turns his back 
upon them again. 
The Russians, to use more down to earth terms 
than creeping hegemony, have been indulging 
for a long time in a game of grandmother's steps 
with the free world and with Europe in parti-
cular. We are seeing another example. When the 
first attempt was made to get WED on its 
feet through the Brussels Treaty and when an 
attempt was made later to set up NATO, the 
same voices were heard from Moscow asking us 
not to take such steps until a reasonable oppor-
tunity had been given to them to show that none 
of our suspicions was justified. We are now 
going through another exercise of deja vu. This 
was seen the other day in Brussels. We are seeing 
it in some quarters here again. 
The bid recently was small. It was the generous 
one that out of 21,000 stationed along the iron 
curtain, 1,000 obsolete or obsolescent tanks would 
be removed, leaving the Russians still with 
20,000 to our 6,000 or 7 ,000. Yet there were 
those in Europe who were saying that this showed 
that the Russians were interested in genuine 
disarmament and genuine detente. 
The offer was then made to withdraw 20,000 
out of a little over 900,000 men actively deployed 
against us along the whole European front. 
Again, there were those in Europe who said 
that serious attention must be paid to this pro-
posal. 
Since then, Russian ambassadors, ministers 
and plenipotentiaries have been rushing around 
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Western Europe like commercial travellers trying 
to sell the latest package, namely, that we should 
stop any efforts towards any form of modernisa-
tion of our tactical nuclear weaponry providing 
that in their turn the Russians agreed, out of 
their generosity, not to increase the number of 
SS-20s they have now deployed - 130 of them, 
many multiple-headed. The offer is that the 
Russians should keep those weapons, that we 
should do nothing during the next eighteen 
months, and that in return for their gesture they 
would not increase their overwhelming supe-
riority. 
It is a sorry fact that, whereas there are 130 
SS-20 weapons facing us that could destroy any 
part of Western Europe, we have not a single 
tactical nuclear weapon that could do other than 
inflict grievous damage on the satellite countries 
of Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary and the 
rest. This is the latest proposal that the com-
mercial travellers of the Soviet Union are trying 
to sell to what they hope will be the gullible 
West. 
I am proud to say that my own country and 
my own government with, I believe, the support 
of the official opposition have said that we are 
not prepared to be gullible and that we are 
prepared forthwith to take the earliest possible 
opportunity to play an active part in the modern-
isation of QUr tactical nuclear weaponry in 
Europe and the stationing of such modernised 
weapons on our own territory. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Sir Frederic. 
I call Mr. Pecoraro. 
Mr. PECORARO (Italy) (Translation). -
Mr. Presid_ent, Ladies and Gentlemen, even 
though our Assembly has no decision-making 
powers, the positions to be taken in this debate 
will have far-reaching repercussions at the bar 
of public opinion. Never, indeed, more than in 
a situation like the present are public institu-
tions, and in a very special way WEU, called 
upon to convey the peoples' feelings and require-
ments and translate them into consistent and 
responsible political action. 
I have tried to ascertain the underlying 
reasons, now as heretofore, of the majority 
opinion in the WEU Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, and on the other 
hand, the minority political stance, supported 
in each case by arguments that deserve an honest 
hearing from us and undeniable respect. The 
fact that I take the majority view by no means 
signifies that I spurn certain arguments, well 
deserving of our consideration and esteem, 
advanced by those who hold opposing views. 
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However, I am moved to rehearse, clinch and 
support some of the reasons adduced by the 
majority, or at all events some of its conclusions. 
Everybody postulated two requirements : first, 
for a necessary balance of forces, second, a 
gradual but effective and general disarmament. 
The practical difference dividing the majority 
from the rest of the Committee is that in its view 
the problem of an articulated balance of forces 
is on the necessary prerequisite of all-round 
disarmament, whereas for the minority the dis-
armament must be tackled without fail by ad hoc 
negotiations, freezing the current status o.f 
theatre nuclear weapons. 
Now, this situation seems to us obviously to 
be a paradox. Let me make an elementary com-
parison : the minority view suggests the case of 
two people, one armed with a revolver and the 
other weaponless, in which in order to ensure 
there is no imbalance between them the referee 
decides to leave the one with a revolver armed, 
and the other disarmed. Obviously any attempt 
at fair play would be upset and falsified by such 
material inequality. 
Let me add that, whereas in the case of the 
Warsaw Pact countries the decision-making 
machinery is largely controlled at the summit, 
with no provision for public debate or demo-
cratic institutional procedures, in the Western 
European countries and the West in general 
the procedure is for wide-ranging debate in par-
liament, and government decisions reproducing 
the deep-felt sentiments and demands of publi<' 
opinion in each country. 
Hence, while abstaining from any judgment 
on the procedure followed in the eastern bloc, 
we cannot think that the position of the demo-
cratic western world should be deemed reckless, 
strained or thoughtless, nor that the felt require-
ment of negotiating with the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries from a balanced stance can be termed 
disingenuous and arrogant. Consequently my 
colleague speaks my opinion too, and I also 
believe I am interpreting the views and feelings 
of Italian parliamentarians and public opinion. 
Mr. President, it may be the last time I have 
the honour of addressing the Assembly because 
in a few weeks time the Italian Delegation is to 
be replaced, and I shall no longer be included in 
it. I am glad that the last occasion of my attend-
ing the Assembly should have been used to make 
one last contribution to democracy and peace. 
Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In view 
of your final remark, Mr. Pecoraro, may I 
express on my own behalf and I think in the 
name of all our colleagues the hope that you 
will remain with us for a few more sessions 
and, if not, depending on what the Italian Dele-
gation decides, may I express the respect and 
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friendship our Assembly and each individual 
member has for you. 
I call Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - 1\Ir. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is difficult 
for a French parliamentarian to take part in 
a debate from which his own country has been 
deliberately, and as it were on principle, exclu-
ded. 
The report on new weapons and defence stra-
tegy, in particular the section dealing with the 
modernisation of theatre arms of the Atlantic 
military organisation, seems, paradoxically, to 
make France a blank on the map of Western 
Europe. 
Although Mr. Brezhnev's speech receives a 
most friendly echo in the report and Denmark, 
which is not even a member of WEU and lies 
in a denuclearised zone, is discussed with great 
attention, one may search in vain through the 
text put out by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments for any presentation, 
however brief, of the official French theses on 
nuclear balance and its military implications 
for Europe. A curious omission, unless it was 
intentional ! 
True, France does not belong to the integrated 
military bodies of NATO, but I must repeat 
that it is a member of the political organisation 
of the Alliance and that its governments have 
always and with constant emphasis expressed 
their profound solidarity with their allies in the 
free world. 
During the Berlin and Cuba crises, did not 
France display greater firmness than many 
distinguished Atlantists and Europeans who talk 
a great deal about the defence of Europe ? 
The French members of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments tried to put 
some of their views to their colleagues. Unfor-
tunately no trace of their statements can be 
found in the report that has been distributed. I 
need say no more on that subject. 
First I should point out that the French 
Government quite rightly refrains from any 
assessment of the decisions which the member 
countries of the integrated military organisation 
of NATO might take to correct potential imba-
lances. We all share the desire to maintain an 
overall balance between the Atlantic Alliance 
and the Warsaw Pact. Yet we must reach agree-
ment on the concepts, now disputed, of imbalance, 
parity and balance, for many of our colleagues 
are unaware of the rethinking which today is 
radically transforming our views on nuclear stra-
tegy problems. 
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Whatever the figures put forward by one or 
other of the two camps, one cannot regard as 
equivalent 300 rockets on one side and 300 
rockets on the other without also taking into 
account a number of scientific and technical 
aspects, relating in particular to the mobility of 
armaments and to the fact that the USSR could, 
by a kind of surgical operation which involves 
pinpointing selected targets, completely strip the 
western defence set-up without touching a single 
one of our towns. 
Today the West is like a mediaeval knight, 
helmeted and armed, who at a wave of the 
magic wand could be shorn of all his armour 
and stand naked. What would he do then ? Would 
he bow to this blackmail and accept it, or would 
he fight ? And in what conditions would he 
fight, faced with the very person who stripped 
him naked? 
These are entirely new ideas, which seem to 
be beyond the understanding of many of our 
colleagues. In any case France, for its part, 
considers that it is by establishing a national 
and independent deterrent force, whose credi-
bility is linked to the fact that it is both Euro-
pean and national in character, that it may best 
contribute to the precarious balance and, thereby, 
to the security of Europe ; it can do so much 
better than some of our partners who seek a 
chilly refuge under the tattered American 
umbrella in order to disguise, however poorly, 
their decision no longer to take an active part in 
defending Europe, thus producing a curious 
cocktail made up of a kind of exaggerated Atlan-
tism mixed with a snivelling neutralism. 
Yet France does understand the preoccupation 
of other countries and will not weaken the sense 
of solidarity by condemning such efforts as may 
be made by others. 
Our thinking should concentrate on the fol-
lowing point : one of the most worrying aspects 
of the installation of American theatre weapons 
in certain NATO member countries is undoubt-
edly the increased risk that the American nuclear 
forces in Europe may be dissociated from the 
American nuclear forces in the United States 
and, as a result, the risk of a battle which would 
be fought almost solely on European territory 
and not on the national territory of the two 
major adversaries, who would protect themselves 
by a mutual policy of "sanctuarisation". 
What we are seeing is a rather interesting 
reversal of the strategic theses propounded in 
turn by the United States and by the USSR. 
Originally, the United States was in favour 
of a counter-force policy in order to avoid an 
anti-city policy and this strategy was therefore 
imposed on the world. Today, by a strange 
reversal, the USSR is developing counter-force 
strategy, thanks to its SS-20s and the precision 
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with which they can attack, and it is thereby 
forcing the United States either to yield or to 
use an anti-city strategy. What a strange rever-
sal! 
The USSR has developed and is deploying 
two modern systems : the SS-20 and the Tupo-
lev 22. These weapons place it for years to come 
in a position to disarm by selective and limited 
attacks the allied forces in Europe without any 
chance of retaliation on a comparable scale. The 
strategic submarines capable of attacking the 
USSR cannot make a counter-force attack that 
is as precise as that of the SS-20 or the Tupo-
lev 22. The FB-lllA bombers have a limited 
penetration capability. The other theatre arms 
cannot reach Soviet territory. The conclusion to 
be drawn from this is that Europe must have new 
American arms which are of longer range, with 
a higher degree of precision and a greater pene-
tration capability. 
Yet there is one implicit premise that has not 
been stated. An American attack launched from 
Europe, even if it is directed against the Soviet 
Union, is never equivalent to an American attack 
from the United States. There is nothing to 
prevent the United States from assigning some 
of its intercontinental ballistic missiles to cover 
the European theatre in response to the new 
threats. This would be possible with the deploy-
ment of the MX missile. The reason why this idea 
is rejected without any real discussion is because 
it is considered preferable to strengthen a nuclear 
apparatus in Europe which increases the risk 
of a limited confrontation on our own territory, 
sparing the American territory and hitting only 
pinpointed military objectives in the Soviet 
Union. 
In this way, the possibility of Europe being 
transformed into a Soviet-American battlefield 
seems to be written into the programme for 
modernisation of NATO's theatre forces and the 
report submitted to us on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
which we have not accepted. 
Without wishing in any way to influence the 
choices which each of the countries concerned 
will make in complete independence, any repre-
sentative of France who respects the interests 
of his own country is bound to express his grave 
concern about the accumulation in Europe of 
weapons designed more for war than for deter-
rence. 
France's nuclear weapons cannot be assimilated 
to NATO theatre forces. They are central sys-
tems designed to protect France and therefore, 
though our colleagues do not find it easy to 
accept this, to a great extent designed also to 
protect Europe from armed confrontation, 
whatever the form it might take. Unlike Per-
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shing II and cruise missiles, these are not arms 
that one includes for possible use in an actual 
plan of campaign which, if implemented, would 
mean the total destruction of Europe. 
Strengthening a nuclear potential the use of 
which would be determined on the basis of non-
European interests does not seem a satisfactory 
solution to the problem of security in Europe. 
Better solutions could perhaps be found if the 
states of Western Europe took more autonomous 
concerted action and co-operated more closely 
without rejecting a priori any policy of inde-
pendence vis-a-vis the United States. 
As for France, the reason why the develop-
ment of its deterrent force does not give rise to 
the same difficulties as those encountered by 
other countries as regards the modernisation of 
the nuclear arms situated on their territory is, 
perhaps, that it is easier for a European state 
to defend European interests by means of a 
national military policy than to rely for its 
security on protection from outside. 
The report submitted by Mr. Roper does not 
try to evolve a genuine European approach to 
the problems arising from the deployment of 
new weapons in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately 
it confuses the WEU Assembly, as do other col-
leagues and other responsible members of our 
Assembly, either with the North Atlantic 
Assembly or with the Assembly of the European 
Communities. This attitude seems unlikely to 
further that rapprochement between the defence 
policies of our European states to which we 
are committed under the charter of our Assem-
bly. 
I think our Assembly should give priority to 
the objectives of European security rather than 
adopting this or that position too favourable to 
an Atlantic Alliance which makes it possible to 
justify the absence of any real efforts on the 
part of some of our European partners. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- There are 
no more speakers on the list. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - Mr. van 
den Bergh has one point to make in reply to 
something raised on his recommendation. I 
should like him to reply as Rapporteur for that 
part. I shall then reply to -the first part as 
Chairman of the Committee. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the 
Rapporteur. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). -As you know, Mr. President, I have 
remained Rapporteur for only the second part 
of the report. Mr. Gessner has commented on 
this second part of the report, and in particular 
on the second paragraph of the recommendation. 
If I understood him properly, he said that 
replacing nuclear weapons systems with conven-
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tional systems, as called for in the report, could 
lead to the strategy of the West towards a 
potentia1 enemy being jeopardised. I can only 
assume that this comment is based on a mis-
understanding. It certainly runs counter to the 
views I have put forward in my report, and it 
also runs counter to the facts. Mr. Gessner said 
that he could see no developments that would 
lend support to my views on this point. 
I would like very briefly to set out once again 
the essence of our standpoint. While still admit-
ting the need for nuclear deterrence, we ought 
so far as possible to try in a planned way to 
replace nuclear weapons systems with conven-
tional systems, for the very simple reason that 
this gives us greater security. I surely cannot 
take it that any one here would be in favour, 
where it is possible to be satisfied with conven-
tional weapons systems, to keep nuclear systems 
instead. Developments along these lines are in 
fact under way. I will offer three examples, 
which are also mentioned in the report. 
First of all, I must point out that it is today 
no longer necessary to use nuclear weapons in 
anti-submarine warfare. There has been so much 
progress in target acquisition techniques that 
there is now no need to use nuclear weapons, 
and this is a development we ought to support. 
Second, there is the field of surface-to-air 
missiles. Up to now we have had the Nike 
system, which so far has been nuclear because 
we did not have any conventional weapons in 
this sphere ; but here too we are gradually, in 
target acquisition, changing over to conventional 
systems. Although this still keeps the option of 
fitting a nuclear warhead, everyone in NATO is 
now convinced that it is very definitely reason-
able, if not desirable, to rely from now on solely 
on conventional systems. 
The third example is that of anti-tank 
weapons. We all remember the discussion about 
the neutron bomb. People will also remember 
that in the Federal Republic in particular the 
point was made that introducing the neutron 
bomb would bring about a lowering of the 
nuclear threshold, something that none of us 
would want. 
Because of these technical reasons - the poli-
tical reasons must of course continue to tip the 
balance - there is the possibility of not using 
nuclear weapons alone, because at the present 
time we have access to conventional weapons 
such that we could, in the future, rely on these 
entirely even though they are not yet completely 
ready and would involve higher costs. 
The gist of my contention is thus as follows. 
We must accept that at the moment we unfor-
tunately still need the factor of nuclear deter-
6•• 
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rence. This does not however mean that wherever 
it is possible nuclear weapons systems should 
not be cut back - because of the dangers they 
entail - in favour of conventional systems. In 
other words I believe that the democratic coun-
tries should use their fund of technical !mow-
ledge to this end, so as to follow a programme 
of reducing the number of nuclear weapons as 
far as possible in favour of conventional systems. 
It seems to me that the political ideal that 
should unite us all in this is that however much 
weapons are to be deplored, however much it is 
to be deplored that we still have to possess 
weapons, we should never make the dangers 
greater than they need be. And I consider the 
dangers of nuclear weapons to be very substan-
tially greater than those of conventional weapons. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- I call the 
Chairman of the Committee. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I would 
like to reply to the debate on the first of the 
recommendations, as Rapporteur for that part 
and as Chairman of the Committee. 
We have had a very useful debate on what 
is obviously one of the major subjects of con-
cern not merely in our Assembly but in our 
countries and in the countries of the Alliance 
and of Western Europe. We have seen quite 
clearly differences of view in the Assembly today. 
On the one hand, there are those who are extre-
mely sceptical of any proposals for arms con-
trol and feel that the proposals of Mr. Brezhnev 
should be totally disregarded. On the other hand, 
there are those who feel that we should make 
immediate efforts for arms control and postpone 
decisions on the deployment and production of 
modernised thermonuclear weapons. In the 
middle there are those who believe that we should 
be confined to a decision in principle on the 
modernisation of our weapons, in view of a 
disturbing trend in the balance, but link this 
with firm and clear proposals for arms control 
with the Warsaw Pact. 
Mr. Pecchioli, the first speaker this morning, 
brought to our debate a very lively picture of 
a recent parliamentary debate in the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies, and we were glad to know 
of that debate only in the last few days in the 
Italian assembly. I believe that there will be 
general agreement with him on the need for 
disarmament. Where perhaps we would disagree 
is on the exact process by which we reach dis-
armament. 
In passing, may I say that one of the things 
I would have said, had I spoken as an individual 
and not as a Rapporteur, is that I very much 
regret that in the United Kingdom the British 
Government have not found time for the House 
of Commons to debate this important matter 
before decisions are taken in Brussels next week. 
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- Mr. Mulley was the second speaker and I 
believe that the Assembly gained a great deal 
from his wisdom and experience in what he 
had to say on this subject. My colleague, Mr. 
Cook, then intervened and I should like now 
to deal with one or two points he made. He 
said that the SS-20 was not a new threat but 
merely a replacement of an existing threat. 
The difficulty we have here is when a quali-
tative change becomes a quantitative change in 
the threat. Clearly, there is a difference in per-
ception among members of the Assembly as to 
the impact of the SS-20 in terms of the balance 
of forces in these fields. As a member of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies I 
was glad that he quoted so widely, if somewhat 
selectively, from the most recent IISS Military 
Balance. By including some of the Poseidon 
submarines which are assigned to SACEUR, the 
rrss managed to show on a rather complicated 
assessment that the Warsaw Pact has only a 
13% advantage in these weapons over NATO, 
which is the figure that Mr. Cook was quoting. 
If the Poseidons are left out, there is a 58-59 % 
advantage to the Warsaw Pact over NATO. 
The IISS goes on to say that while it con-
cludes that something close to parity now exists, 
including the Poseidons on the NATO side, 
between the thermonuclear forces of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact, it is moving in favour of 
the Warsaw Pact. One must acknowledge that 
the introduction of new and more capable sys-
tems on the Soviet side, if unconstrained, could 
begin to produce a thermonuclear advantage 
which would legitimate a NATO response. It is 
not really right to take the report of the rrss 
as proving that there is no case for modernisa-
tion. The trends are pointing to an improvement 
of the Warsaw Pact forces in this area. 
Mr. Cook suggested that if a decision were 
made next week, arms control proposals would 
be merely a cosmetic. I am afraid I do not agree 
with him. I do not share his belief. I am quite 
convinced that the determination of the Federal 
German Chancellor to go to the Soviet Union 
next year and start serious discussions on these 
matters shows how he takes this. Although it 
may be more difficult to be convinced of the 
enthusiasm of some NATO governments, both the 
United States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many as well as a number of smaller members 
of the Alliance are very concerned. The decision 
next week should be one in two parts, one on 
deployment and procurement linked with a clear 
firm decision for arms control. No one is re-
arming first because, as Mr. MuHey has said, 
these weapons would not become available for 
three or four years at the earliest. 
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We were particularly interested to have inter-
ventions from our colleagues from Norway and 
we saw from the different interventions of Mr. 
Vattekar and Mrs. Eide that there is a livelier 
debate in Norway than in other parts of the 
Alliance. I must draw Mrs. Eide's attention to 
the fact that we are not altogether convinced 
of her view that the introduction in two years' 
time of ground-launched cruise missiles by the 
United States and Europe would be an infringe-
ment of the protocol to the SALT treaty, because 
we understand that the protocol would have 
expired at that time, and therefore such intro-
duction would not be a violation. 
Mr. Roberti and Lord Reay supported the view 
of the Committee, while Mr. Boucheny took the 
view that we ought to consider much more 
seriously the proposals of Mr. Brezhnev. I have 
already explained why I believe that they should 
be taken seriously, and here I disagree with 
some remar~ by Sir Frederic Bennett. In para-
graphs 17 and 18 of the explanatory memo-
randum we discuss the Brezhnev proposals and 
say the West needs to explore them to see what 
can be done to extend and develop what has 
been put forward by Mr. Brezhnev. 
We are not sure that there will be a suc-
cessful outcome of these negotiations, but we 
plainly have an obligation to our people and the 
people of the world to explore any proposals 
for disarmament as seriously as we can. No 
one should write off any disarmament proposal 
without considering it. 
Mr. Pecoraro, in his final contribution to 
our debates in the Assembly, produced an inter-
esting analysis, though I was not altogether 
sure that I followed every detail. 
I was glad to hear the contribution of Mr. 
Baumel and his interesting development of 
French philosophy in this field. Although he 
was present in the debates of our Committee, 
I am sorry that he did not at that time ask for 
the inclusion in our explanatory memorandum 
of a statement of the French view. In the memo-
randum we have attempted to include the views 
of the minority, and we would have been glad 
to include in the memorandum the views of 
France on this matter. 
Mr. Baumel went on to discuss the question 
of both the United States' and the French 
nuclear forces. I was tempted to repeat to him 
the question that I asked yesterday - whether 
one could consider that there was a French 
nuclear umbrella available for the rest of the 
signatories of the Brussels Treaty. When Mr. 
Baumel went on to discuss strategic theory, I 
felt that one had to be a little careful in making 
these ready distinctions between counter-force 
and counter-value weapons. 
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I know that at one time it was fashionable 
to make this distinction and, as Mr. Cook said 
in one of his interventions, the size of even the 
smallest nuclear weapons about which we are 
talking is considerably larger than that used at 
Hiroshima, and as well as dealing with military 
targets they would certainly cause a great deal 
of devastation and a great deal of what is 
known in the trade as collateral damage to the 
surrounding civilian areas. Therefore, a lot of 
the theory based upon an academic distinction 
between counter-force and counter-value weapons 
has to be examined again. 
Certainly, if I am right, the theory that Mr. 
Baumel put forward, of the United States anu 
the Soviet Union being able to make Europe a 
nuclear battlefield, would not hold water, because 
one would not have the degree of precision 
which Mr. Baumel suggested existed. The Soviet 
Union would clearly be seriously attacked and 
would not in those situations leave the United 
States in a sanctuary. 
There is, of course - and this was clear in 
the remarks of Mr. Baumel towards the end of 
his important contribution - a difference 
between how he sees the problems of defence 
and how many of his compatriots see them and 
how they are seen by the majority of this 
Assembly. But it is worth recalling that we are 
working under the modified Brussels Treaty 
which, under Article IV, makes it clear that : 
"In the execution of the treaty, the high 
contracting parties and any organs established 
by them under the treaty shall work in close 
co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation." 
It goes on: 
"Recognising the undesirability of duplicat-
ing the military staffs of NATO, the Council 
and its Agency will rely on the appropriate 
military authorities of NATO for information 
and advice on military matters." 
That is still the treaty as it stands and it is 
therefore not at all inappropriate for us as 
an Assembly that discusses the work of the 
Council of WED also to base our discussions 
on plans going on within the Atlantic Alliance. 
I do not feel that we are in any way failing 
in our tasks in doing this. 
This has been a valuable and useful debate on 
one of the major subjects of our day. It has 
shown the value of our Assembly in being able 
to hold within a week of the critical debates in 
Brussels a discussion here among parliamen-
tarians from seven European countries. It has 
been a good debate. We have a clear difference 
of opinion in the Assembly, but I trust that at 
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the end of the day the majority will support 
the Committee's recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate is closed. 
We shall now proceed to vote on the draft 
recommendations on new weapons and defence 
strategy, Document 827 and Amendment. 
We shaH consider in succession the two draft 
recommendations corresponding to part one of 
the report on the modernisation of theatre 
nuclear forces and to part two on the impact 
of technology. 
Amendment 1 to the first draft recommenda-
tion has been tabled by Mr. Cook. It reads as 
follows: 
1. In draft recommendation I, leave out sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of 
the draft recommendation proper and insert : 
"(a) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree 
to an immediate eighteen months' 
moratorium on the deployment of fur-
ther SS-20 missiles ; 
(b) in the event of the Soviet Union agreeing 
to such a moratorium, by postponing 
for its duration the decision on procure-
ment of the 572 medium-range weapons 
which NATO plans to deploy in Eur-
ope; 
(c) by seeking within that period agreement 
on significant reductions in present 
numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear 
weapons; 
(d) by deciding forthwith to investigate 
seriousl~, on the expiry of the eighteen-
month moratorium and in the light of 
the military and political situation which 
will then prevail, the need to procure 
and station a number of medium-range 
nuclear weapons which NATO intends 
to deploy in Europe ;". 
I call Mr. Cook. 
Mr. COOK (United Kingdom). - Mr. Presi-
dent, I shall be brief. I would not have spoken 
to my amendment at all but would have rested 
on my speech had it not been that our debate 
has been interrupted, first, by another debate 
on Iran and then by lunch. It is now five hours 
since I made my initial speech, and whilst I am 
sure that members of the Assembly listened with 
care to what I said, I hope that they will for-
give me if I make a few remarks in explanation 
of my amendment at this stage, now that we 
have reached the vote. 
The effect of my amendment is to restore the 
text of the recommendation to the original text 
submitted by the Rapporteur to the Committee. 
It gives the Assembly the flexibility to make a 
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choice. The choice facing the Assembly is 
between the text as submitted by the Committee 
and a text which in effect supports the consensus 
within NATO- that we should take a decision 
now to modernise and couple that decision with 
an offer to negotiate on arms control. 
Despite the remarks of Mr. Roper, I do not 
find that a credible arms control position. It 
seems to me inevitable, and, in the light of all 
the evidence we have of the history of arms 
control, most likely, that if we first take a 
decision tomorrow to modernise and then nego-
tiate on it, any subsequent agreement will 
incorporate and legitimise that decision to 
modernise. We shall end up with more nuclear 
weapons on the western side. We shall also end 
up with more nuclear weapons on the eastern 
side, because it is implicit in any negotiation on 
that western position that it cannot take effect 
until after 1983 when our own weapons are 
deployed. Between now and 1983 the number 
of SS-20s deployed in the Soviet Union will 
treble. 
The proposal that we make as an alternative 
to that is that we start arms control negotiations 
now. That would have the effect, if we are suc-
cessful, that the nuclear weapons on the western 
side will be smaller, because we shall not have 
embarked on a programme of expansion, and if 
we can succeed in a short space of time, the 
number of nuclear weapons on the eastern side 
will also be smaller. 
I do not underrate the difficulty of obtaining 
such an agreement. I do not underrate the prob-
lems that we face in such negotiations. But the 
fact is that we have not even tried to negotiate 
an arms control settlement for this class of 
weapon. We are being asked to embark on a 
decision now to deploy a weapons system that 
does not exist, for which there are no troops 
trained to operate it and for which there has 
never at any time been an arms control proposal 
put for negotiation between East and West. 
It would appear from the statement of Presi-
dent Brezhnev that the Russians are interested in 
negotiations. I entirely accept the point made 
by Sir Frederic Bennett that the offer made by 
President Brezhnev is not, in itself, satisfactory. 
If Sir Frederic were here, I would say to him 
that it would be amazing if President Brezhnev's 
offer, the first offer in the course of negotiations, 
was satisfactory. I think that I might add that 
it would be amazing if any offer that President 
Brezhnev made was satisfactory to Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
But this is, nevertheless, an earnest which is 
worth pursuing in negotiations to see whether 
we can push further and achieve the resolution 
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of the issues to which Sir Frederic Bennett 
pointed. It would appear most unfortunate in 
terms of international public opinion if the West 
were now to proceed with its development 
without at least making a gesture for arms con-
trol similar to that of President Brezhnev. 
Finally, members of this Assembly, both in the 
Assembly and in our domestic parliaments, have 
often committed themselves to supporting 
disarmament negotiations and disarmament 
measures. We are now faced with an important 
choice. We are faced with the choice of solving 
the imbalance that members of the Assembly 
perceive either through expanding our forces or 
trying to seek an arms control SOilution to that 
perceived imbalance. 
That is the nature of the choice before us. I 
have no doubt - I do not think that anyone in 
this Assembly should have any doubts - that 
if we pass beyond this choice and if we accept 
the approach of rearmament rather than arms 
control, we shall find that once we have gone 
down that path to rearmament there will be no 
room on it for turning back and that we ought, 
for that reason, therefore, to begin by exploring 
the path to disarmament before committing 
ourselves to rearmament. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). -Mr. Pec-
chioli has tabled a manuscript amendment to 
Amendment 1 by Mr. Cook as follows : 
In paragraph (a) of Amendment 1, before 
"deployment", add "construction and". 
In paragraph (b) of Amendment 1, line 3, 
after "on" insert "construction and". 
I call Mr. Pecchioli. 
Mr. PECCHIOLI (Italy) (Translation). - I 
want to add two phrases, one in sub-paragraph 
(a) and the other in sub-paragraph (b) of the 
draft recommendation. The former would read : 
"an immediate eighteen months' moratorium on 
the construction and deployment ... " which would 
mean adding the reference to construction. 
Similarly, in sub-paragraph (b), I would insert 
after "decision on" the phrase, "construction 
and", to read "decision on construction and 
procurement". In short, I would insert "construc-
tion" at both pl]:aces. 
(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT. -Does Mr. Roper wish 
to speak Y 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I wonder 
whether Mr. Cook should have a ehance to say 
whether he accepts the manuscript amendment 
before I have a chance to speak. It is a manu-
script amendment to Mr. Cook's amendment. 
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script amendment is acceptable to me and I am 
willing to co-operate in the amendment. It has 
the effect of strengthening the demand by the 
western side of any arms control agreement. It 
extends the moratorium from mere deployment 
of missiles to procurement and construction of 
missiles. 
Those who drafted the amendment had always 
intended to include construction and procure-
ment within the term "deployment". I am sorry 
that there is ambiguity. We are happy to accept 
the manuscript amendment if it helps to clarify 
the intention of the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - Does the Rapporteur 
agree Y 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I shall be 
opposing Mr. Cook's amendment as a whole but 
I advise the Assembly that there are some defects 
in this manuscript amendment. While it is pos-
sible to monitor fairly well by satellite whether 
deployment is taking place and a moratorium 
followed, it is much more difficult by the 
technical means that have been used in SALT I 
and SALT II to be able to ensure that a mora-
torium on the production of weapons is followed 
for eighteen months. 
I have to advise that on technical grounds this 
would not be a particularly helpful amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. van den 
Bergh. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - On this point I am only speaking as 
the ex-Rapporteur, Mr. President, yet I need to 
say something about this manuscript amendment 
so that there shall be no misunderstanding. From 
the outset my view, like that of the minority on 
the Committee, was that where the idea of a 
moratorium is concerned this implicitly covers 
both the decision on production and the decision 
on deployment. I am making this point because 
I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. 
The PRESIDENT.- We must first vote on 
Mr. Pecchioli's manuscript amendment to 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cook : 
In paragraph (a) of Amendment 1, before 
"deployment", add "construction and". 
In paragraph (b) of Amendment 1, line 3, after 
"on" insert "construction and". 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The manuscript amendment to Amendment 1 
is negatived. 
We now come to the vote on Amendment 1 
tabled by Mr. Cook. 
175 
THIRTEENTH SITTING 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is negatived. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands). - I 
should like to raise a point of order. Would you 
be so kind as to make clear to members of the 
Assembly the exact result of the vote and which 
members were in favour and which against. 
The PRESIDENT.- It is not usual, Mr. van 
den Bergh, to give that information. You must 
rely on the President and those sitting beside 
him. It is unusual to do it. 
We continue with the first draft recommenda-
tion in Document 827 which is not amended. 
This is a draft recommendation on the modern-
isation of theatre nuclear weapons. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-cahl. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Many 
members of the Assembly will vote against the 
recommendation, but we do not ask for a roll-
call. It is up to you, Mr. President, to interpret 
the rules but there are some votes against. 
Mr. BOUCHENY (France) (Translation). -
For reasons we have repeatedly expressed, we 
shall vote against the recommendations. 
If you, Mr. President, think that it would 
expedite matters, we agree that our vote against 
the recommendations be recorded and no roll-call 
vote be taken. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - Unfortunately, Mr. President, we lost 
a lot of time this morning discussing another 
matter, which to my mind we need not have 
done. Everyone looks on the present question as 
a very important one, perhaps the most impor-
tant topic of this week and one of the most 
important political decisions that our countries 
have to make. I must therefore press for a roll-
call vote, so that it is made plain exactly what 
the proportion of support in this Assembly is. 
The PRESIDENT.- We have more than one 
who asks for a roll-call vote or who hopes to have 
one. Therefore, we shall take a vote by roll-call. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of 
Mr. Lewis. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to vote L 
The voting is closed. 
Rule 36 of our Rules of Procedure states : 
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"A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances 
be valid, nor the result be made public, if the 
vote shows that a majority of Representatives 
was not present." 
We had no quorum. Therefore, the vote will 
be postponed until the next sitting, which is 
tomorrow morning. 
We have voted only on the first draft recom-
mendation and we must now vote on the second 
draft recommendation in Document 827, to which 
no amendments have been tabled. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call on the 
second draft recommendation. 
Does anyone wish to take the floor ~ 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- This is a dual report and, so far as I am 
concerned, the report is a whole. If we had a 
roll-call on one part, I shaH certainly require a 
roll-call vote on this. 
The PRESIDENT. - A roll-call vote has 
been demanded by Sir Frederic Bennett. As there 
was no quorum for the first draft recommenda-
tion, there wiH be no quorum now and we shall 
therefore also postpone the vote on the second 
draft recommendation until tomorrow morning 
at 10 o'clock. 
4. SALT 11 and its implications for European 
security 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doe. 816, Addendum 
and Amendment) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments on SALT II and its implications 
for European security and vote on the draft 
resolution, Document 816, Addendum and 
Amendment. 
I call Mr. Cook, Rapporteur, to present the 
report. 
Mr. COOK (United Kingdom).- The report 
and resolution which are before the Assembly 
today were originally adopted by tlie Defence 
Committee last September and transmitted to 
the Presidential Committee for urgent action by 
that Committee, with the request that this urgent 
action should take the form of transmission to 
the United States Senate. As you will be aware, 
Mr. President, the Presidential Committee took 
the view that this matter ought to be debated in 
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the full Assembly at this part-session. I can 
understand why the Presidential Committee took 
that view, and, as the Rapporteur, I certainly 
agree that this is an important issue which ought 
to be debated by the full Assembly. 
However, I regret the consequence of the delay 
since last September, which is that we are now 
debating a resolution which we propose to send 
to the United States Senate long after the United 
States Foreign Relations Committee has reported 
to the Senate and long after its debate on that 
report has commenced. Indeed, it is worth recal-
ling that the North Atlantic Council was repre-
sented before the United States Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to give a European view on 
the SALT treaty. 
This Assembly is frequently jealous of its own 
role as a unique interpreter of the opinion of 
Western Europe on defence matters. In the very 
first paragraph of our resolution before the 
Assembly we state: 
"(i) Conscious of its authority under the 
Brussels Treaty as the only European par-
liamentary assembly with statutory respons-
ibility in matters of defence ;" 
One of the unfortunate effects of the delay in 
our discussion of this and in reaching a decision 
on the resolution is that we have allowed that 
unique responsibility of interpreting Western 
European opinion to pass to the North Atlantic 
Council. I hope that today we shahl at least be 
able to remedy the problems caused by that delay 
by reaching a clear and unequivocal decision on 
the SALT treaty. 
I hope that that will be the most controversial 
remark that I have to make to the Assembly, 
because my recommendation contained in the 
resolution before the Assembly is that the SALT 
treaty be ratified. 
That should not prove a particularly con-
troversial recommendation since every member 
state of Western European Union li.as formed 
the view that the SALT treaty should be ratified 
by the United States Senate. I quote in the 
addendum which I presented in support of the 
report the statements by Giscard d'Estaing and 
Chancellor Schmidt in which they both emphasise 
the importance of SALT as a contribution to 
detente and disarmament. I am happy to say 
that it is also the policy even of Her Majesty's 
Government of Great Britain that the treaty be 
ratified, and in these days, which are difficult 
ones for some of us in the British Parliament, 
we are, of course, very anxious to seize whatever 
limited opportunities come our way of support-
ing the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment. 
The fact that the Western European states 
have found unanimity in urging ratification of 
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SALT demonstrates that over the few months 
since the treaty was initially signed in June of 
this year the two major areas of anxiety to 
Western Europe have been substantially resolved. 
The first of these related to the protocol on 
ground-launched cruise missiles in which the 
United States gave an undertaki~g that it would 
not deploy such missiles until after 1981. It was 
feared at the time by some Western European 
observers that the United States would sub-
sequently find it difficult to deploy weapons on 
which it had accepted a temporary prohibition. 
As members of the Assembly wHl be aware 
from my contribution to the last debate, I am 
not at all sure that I want to see these missiles 
deployed at all, but there can be no doubt in 
the light of the movement of opinion in 'the 
debate in the last few months, that the Americans 
are willing to deploy such missiles if the Western 
European states request it and do not feel in any 
way constrained by the temporary prohibition 
contained in the protocol. 
The other area of anxiety of Western Euro-
pean countries was the article on non-circumven-
tion, which provided that the United States or 
the Soviet Union would not seek to circumvent 
the terms of the treaty through any other state. 
It was suggested that this might inhibit the 
transfer of technology that has taken place in 
the past between the United States and parti-
cularly Great Britain over the joint production 
of nuclear weapons. Again, in the course of 
the past four or five months those fears have 
proved groundless. 
In paragraph 25 of my report I quote at 
great length from what was said by Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance, when he made it plain 
that the United St·ates did not accept any inter-
pretation of the non-circumvention agreement 
that would inhibit assisting Britain with nuclear 
weapon systems. Again, I quote in the addendum 
a statement of the United States Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, giving its view that such an 
interpretation should not be placed on the 
article on non-circumvention. 
Once more, actions speak louder than words 
and it would appear that already there ar~ 
negotiations between the Government of Great 
Britain and the administration of the United 
States aimed at the replacement of our present 
nuclear weapons systems, and again it would 
appear plain that the United States does not 
feel constrained by the non-circumvention article 
from entering into these negotiations with Great 
Britain. 
Having said that, and having made the point 
that the particular areas of concern to Western 
Europe appear to have been resolved in the last 
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few months, I would not wish to suggest that 
the SALT treaty is perfect. Far from it ! I 
myself am greatly disappointed that it makes 
such little progress towards disarmament. In 
paragraph 9 of the report I mention the dis-
armament - such as it is - that is contained 
in the treaty, and I point out that on the Soviet 
side it will mean the dismantling of 254 war-
heads, mostly obsolete intercontinental missiles ; 
on the American side it will mean the dismantling 
of 46 heavy bombers, mostly mothbaHed in the 
south of America. That is a totally negligible 
proportion of the arsenal on both sides and, as 
a step towards disarmament, very disapppoint-
ing indeed. 
The reason why I believe that we must sup-
port SALT and why I believe that it is important 
that we achieve its ratification is that it has been 
influential not in obtaining disarmament but in 
making progress in the building up of confidence 
between East and West. We can see this if we 
look beyond the actual agreement to some of the 
more detailed agreements in respect of veri-
fication. 
It is a fact that the United States has offered 
not to encrypt the telemetry from the test mis-
siles, so the Soviet Union can listen to the trans-
missions from those missiles and assure itself 
about their capability. On the other side, it is 
also the case that the Soviet Union has given an 
undertaking that it will give notice of any 
occasion when it carries out test firing of a 
missile in order that the United States can get 
a plane up to monitor that firing. 
Agreements of that detail and frankness ten 
years ago would have been unthinkable. However 
. . ' 1t IS exactly because the SALT process has been 
so successful in building confidence between East 
and West on these matters that it is vital that 
it be ratified. If we were to regard SALT merely 
as a substantial measure towards disarmament 
the failure to ratify is something we could liv~ 
with, because we could afford to forego the very 
small amount of disarmament contained within it. 
As we have come so far in building up con-
fidence, I do not believe, however, that we can 
afford to inflict on that confidence the trauma 
that would follow from a failure on the part of 
the West to obtain ratification of the SALT 
treaty. Sadly, there are some who, minority 
though they are, nevertheless appear to argue 
that it would be in western interests not to ratify 
SALT II. I say to them, almost in a mood of 
despair, "If you will not accept disarmament in 
this limited form, what form of disarmament 
what agreement, will you accept other tha~ 
unconditional surrender by the other side ~" I 
ask them also to consider the awesome capacity 
for destruction represented by the nuclear arsenal 
on both sides. Unless we can contain that capacity 
for destruction within the diplomatic and poli-
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tical framework, we risk the very serious danger 
that we shall be unable to contain that destructive 
force, with an effect that will undoubtedly end 
civilisation in Europe as we now understand it. 
When we were at the Council of Europe last 
May some of us attended a meeting organised hy 
the Stockholm Institute at which a speech was 
delivered by Lord Mountbatten. Sadly, as it 
turned out, it was to be his last major public 
speech. I understand that afterwards he indicated 
to a number of press people that he was disap-
pointed that so little attention had been paid 
to what he said in Strasbourg on that occasion. 
I should like to read the conclusion he reached 
in that speech on the nuclear arms race. He said 
in Strasbourg : 
".As a military man who has given half a 
century of active service I say in all sincerity 
that the nuclear arms race has no military 
purpose. Wars cannot be fought with nuclear 
weapons. Their existence only adds to our 
perils because of the iHusions which they have 
generated. There are powerful voices around 
the world who still give credence to the old 
Roman precept : If you desire peace, prepare 
for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense ... 
the world now stands on the brink of the final 
abyss. Let us all resolve to take all possible 
practical steps to ensure that we do not, 
through our own folly, go over the edge." 
It is against that sombre background that we 
must reach a decision on whether SALT II should 
be ratified, a decision on whether we decline 
to ratify and risk a break in the traditional 
pattern of the relationship that has been 
painstakingly built up over the past two decades ; 
or accept ratification, accept the SALT treaty 
as an inadequate, faltering, hesitant step towards 
disarmament, but nevertheless an important basic 
further step. 
I do not believe we should honourably dis-
charge our responsibility to our electors, and the 
children of our electors, if, given that choice, we 
were to fail to adopt a policy of ratification. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Cook. 
The debate is open. 
I call first Mr. Calamandrei. He will be fol-
lowed by Mr. Gessner. 
Mr. CALAMANDREI (Italy) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, Mr. Cook's report and the 
draft resolution based on it are, in the Italian 
communists' view, a positive formulation of the 
.Assembly's function deriving from its status 
as sole European parliamentary body with 
statutory responsibility in matters of defence : 
the function and responsibility referred to in 
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paragraph (i) of the preamble to this resolution 
on SALT II. Wherein does the pol·itical clout 
of such statutory responsibility of our Assembly 
l!eside ? It lies in the function of assessing, within 
the scope of the Atlantic Alliance to which every 
one of our countries is attached for its defence, 
the incidence that choices having strategic 
implications for the Alliance as a whole are likely 
to have, through Europe's security, precisely 
upon the overa:1l defence of Western Europe as 
an inseparable but nonetheless specific aspect of 
the defence strategy to be safeguarded by the 
Alliance. Today, in view of the new importance 
attached to problems of Eurostrategic equilibria 
in the balance of forces between the two blocs, 
the growing weight which, as I was saying, is 
likely to be carried by the appraisals and actions 
of a body like WEU becomes glaringly obvious. 
Unfortunately, as my honourable friend 
Mr. Pecchioli has mentioned and as we saw in 
the way the voting went, the proposals concern-
ing new weapons arising out of the original van 
den Bergh report have been weakened and 
obstructed at the hands of those increasingly 
riled by the powers of our Assembly as expres-
sed in this kind of proposal. Nevertheless, the 
appreciations in the Cook report stiH stand, as 
do the conclusions and requests embodied in his 
resolution on SALT II concerning the general 
strategic context in which the Eurostrategic 
problems created by the new weapons are to be 
seen, in all their specific nature. 
I do not, indeed, believe it can be denied that 
a solution of Eurostrategic problems calculated 
to maintain or, if need be, refurbish at the lowest 
level the balance of forces by giving priority to 
negotiation will be any less hard to find, even 
if in point of fact ratification and enforcement 
of SALT II ensure in a general context a 
substantial support for a balance, if not yet a 
freezing, still less a reduction, of nuclear forces 
between the blocs, and even if they open the way 
to a SALT Ill agreement, i.e. a much more 
organic negotiating link between the level of an 
Atlantic AlliancejW arsaw Pact strategic balance 
and that of a Eurostrategic balance between them 
in the continental theatre. 
On the contrary, it happens that the terms of 
the problem, of the relation between SALT 
developments and Western European defence, 
have been turned upside down by the crisis 
reached in ratification by the United States of 
SALT II. 
Opponents of United States ratification have 
argued that SALT II would detract from 
America's overall strategic capability, but have 
attributed to the question of Russian intermediate 
weaponry, SS-20 and Backfire, an incidence not 
originally recognised, and above •all - hence the 
reversal - have posed, and still do so, more and 
more outspokenly and intransigently, as one of 
the preconditions for ratification of SALT II, 
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the Eurostrategic decisions demanded of its 
allies by the United States in respect of Pershing 
II and cruise missiles. 
The Cook report has the merit of keeping the 
whole process, so to say, with its feet on the 
ground, by challenging the overall strategic 
objections by the opponents of ratification of 
SALT II with arguments drawn from actual 
statements by the Atlantic Council, asserting that 
at the level of Eurostrategic equilibria there is 
in the immediate prospect no lack of an Atlantic 
counterpart of Russia's intermediate weapons, 
and concluding, as is a:lso done in the draft 
resolution, that ratification without amendment 
by the United States Senate of SALT II 
remains a qualifying condition whose fulfilment 
our countries are bound to regard with legitimate 
expectation among the circumstances to be 
appraised for any new decision to be discussed 
by the Atlantic Council in Brussels next week. 
We Italian communist representatives will 
therefore be voting in favour of the resolution, 
against which, let me say by-the-by, it would not 
be surprising if there were last-minute man-
oeuvres, including objections on points of order, 
to block in yet another instance any initiative 
by our Assembly. We shall vote for the resolu-
tion, in which, as I said at the start, we see a 
sign of how, notwithstanding delaying action and 
obstacles, the interests of democracy and the 
peace of our countries in such a critical inter-
national phase are able to bring to fruition, in 
the functioning of WEU, opportunities for inde-
pendent initiative in opposing another arma-
ments race and lending support to negotiation. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
Does anyone wish to speak L 
Does the Rapporteur wish to speak 1 
Mr. COOK (United Kingdom).- I should like 
to respond briefly to Mr. Calamandrei. I am 
grateful to him for indicating that he supports 
the report. If he will forgive me, I shall not 
pursue him down the path of debating again the 
previous report, although I am gLad that he finds 
the conclusion :that he has come to is that the 
report should be supported and should be pre-
sented from the Assembly. 
I would simply emphasise one of the points 
that Mr. Calamandrei made. That is that it is 
very important that the Assembly reach a view 
on this matter. We cannot claim adequately to 
represent Western European belief and Western 
European thought on defence matters if we can-
not reach a decision capable of being transmit-
ted to our coHeagues in the United States on 
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this vital issue, an issue that will not recur for 
another three or four years until a SALT Ill 
treaty comes :forward for ratification. 
I therefore very much hope, as Mr. Calaman-
drei does, that we shall not find procedural dif-
ficulties placed in the way of this Assembly 
coming to a decision when we end this debate. 
The PRESIDENT.- Does the Chairman wish 
to speak~ 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).-
"SALT II is an important step in the con-
tinuing process of arms control which aims to 
stabilise the strategic balance while safeguard-
ing the essential security interests of the North 
Atlantic Alliance ; its non-ratification would 
represent a serious check to this process. 
Western defence planning would, therefore, 
have to be undertaken against a background 
of greater unpredictability in East-West 
relations." 
I quote the remarks of Mr. Francis Pym, the 
Secretary of State :for Defence in the United 
Kingdom. I believe that that view is absolutely 
right and that therefore the Assembly should give 
this report unanimous approval. 
The PRESIDENT. -Thank you. 
The debate is closed. 
Before voting we come to Amendment 1 by 
Lord McNair. 
Will you please move Amendment 1 1 
Lord McNAIR (United Kingdom).- I beg to 
move, 
1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out 
"CALLS UPON THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STA'J.'ES 
To" and insert "EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Will". 
I think that it is more or less self-explanatory. 
One can look at this question on two levels -
either that of legality or simply that of courtesy. 
The legality I would rather leave to others who 
are more versed in international law and know 
their Brussels Treaty better than I do. But I 
somewhat doubt whether we have any right to 
"call upon" the United States Senate to do any-
thing. I prefer to base the case :for my amend-
ment on the level of courtesy. 
As I understand things, in the USSR if a 
treaty has the approval of Mr. Brezhnev its 
ratification does not present any grave problems. 
But in the United States the position is very 
different. As I understand it, the ratification of 
treaties is one of the most prized prerogatives of 
the United States Senate. One could almost call 
it one of its most sacred duties enshrined in its 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Lord MeN air (continued) 
constitution. Therefore, when we ask it to do 
this, we should do it politely and practicalLy. 
Therefore, I hope that the Assembly will agree 
with me that it is better that we should "express 
the hope" that it will approve the ratification, 
rather than, in this somewhat peremptory way, 
"call upon" it. 
The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to 
speak on this amendment L 
What is the opinion of the Committee ? 
Mr. COOK (United Kingdom). -I am quite 
happy to accept this amendment. The Committee 
discussed it on Monday. We are willing to accept 
the amendment if it removes any misconception 
about the peremptory caJJ. on the United States 
Senate. If it appears more courteous done in this 
way, we are willing to accept the amendment -
althOugh I understand that the use of the term 
"call upon" is not only conventional but is one 
that we have frequently used in addressing mes-
sages to people other than those contained within 
the Council of WEU. Indeed, I am advised 
that on one occasion we even addressed a resolu-
tion to the King of Spain which "called upon" 
him to do something. 
Nevertheless, if there are members of the 
Assembly who are unhappy with the term and 
prefer the term put forward by Lord McNair, we 
are perfectly willing to accommodate them. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Rapporteur agrees 
to this amendment. 
We can vote on Amendment 1 tabled by Lord 
McNair. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The amendment is agreed to unanimously. 
We come now to vote on the draft resolution 
in Document 816 as amended. I shall request 
members to vote by sitting and standing. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom). 
- On a point of order, Mr. President. I have 
taken advice, and in the context of developments 
during the last hour, when two reports, one of 
which was the report of the Rapporteur, 
Mr. Roper, which I fully supported, were 
defeated by the lack of a quorum, I believe that 
I am entit•led, even though this is a draft resolu-
tion, to ask you whether you would now ascertain 
whether in fact the necessary attendance 
is now present in this chamber. If I have been 
wrongly advised, I do not press my point, but I 
have been advised that this is my right, and I 
think that if we are to have votes tomorrow 
morning on reports, we should not be selective 
and that all votes should be tomorrow morning. 
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Therefore, I formally ask you to ascertain 
whether half of those entitled to be in this Assem-
bly are present to enable the vote to proceed. 
The PRESIDENT. - Sir Frederic Bennett 
asks whether there is a quorum- that is, forty-
five members must be present. I must state that 
there are not forty-five members in the house, 
and we shall have to vote on this draft resolution 
tomorrow morning, with the others. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I do not 
want to prolong the matter but I wonder whether 
the bells have been rung in order to bring mem-
bers into the hall since Sir Frederic requested 
that the quorum be counted, because I think it 
is important that those in the building should 
have the chance to be here before this decision 
is made by you. 
The PRESIDENT. - The bell was ringing 
when Mr. Cook, as Rapporteur, took the floor --
that is to say, within three or four minutes the 
bell was ringing. We can wait a moment or two, 
and get a deep breath of fresh air here in the 
house, waiting until someone arrives. But we are 
still a long way from a quorum. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - In that 
case, I shall not bother. There is no point. I 
would not wish to delay the proceedings of the 
Assembly if we are a long way from a quorum. 
The PRESIDENT.- It is a long way away. 
We shall postpone the vote until tomorrow morn-
ing with the other votes that we have to take. 
Mr. COOK (United Kingdom). - I do not 
propose to delay the Assembly. We have other 
business to complete but I hope that tomorrow 
it will be possible to have a quorum or to reach 
a decision~ if necessary, without a quorum. We 
are not deciding policy on this occasion for our-
selves. We are taking a decision that affeets our 
relationship with another body to which we are 
expressing an opinion. If we are unable to 
express such advice to another body, there is little 
point in meeting twice a year to express any 
Western European belief. 
The PRESIDENT. - I fully agree. I can 
only ask aJlJ. those present to inform their col-
leagues and to ask their secretaries to see that 
delegations are informed that tomorrow morning 
at 10 o'clock we are to have a couple of votes. 
I cannot do more than ask as many of the 
Assembly members as possible to be present. 
5. Arctic technology 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
Doe. 822 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
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logical and Aerospace Questions on Arctic tech-
nology, Document 822 and Amendments. 
I call Mr. Spies von Biillesheim, Rapporteur, 
to present the report. 
Mr. SPIES von ROLLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation).- Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, the polar regions 
have always been a subject of general interest, 
and of particular interest to explorers. The polar 
regions were mysterious. From our childhood 
days we all remember the adventures of the great 
polar explorers, Amundsen and Scott. Man 
simply wanted to get to know the whole of his 
world, including these mysterious polar regions. 
As the only remaining unallocated parts of the 
world, these regions naturally also aroused the 
interest of various nations. Moreover they have 
always been a challenge to man, to his endurance, 
his strength, his intelligence, his inventive spirit 
and to his psychological capacity to put up with 
the privations faced in a polar region. 
No secrets were in fact found during the many 
voyages of discovery, nor indeed anything of 
real value. People began to realise the enormous 
technical obstacles to developing and exploring 
the polar regions. That is why, compared to 
other regions and especially other land masses, 
exploration of the polar regions proceeded very 
slowly. 
The international geophysical year 1957-58 
gave a special impetus to the interest shown in 
these regions. Countries which had been weak-
ened by the second world war were once again 
in a position to pay greater attention to prob-
lems beyond their frontiers. Enormous technical 
advances had been made during the second world 
war. The aeroplane, the helicopter, wireless, 
nuclear propulsion for ships had all been 
developed or were on the horizon. The opposition 
between East and West also brought military 
questions to the fore again. 
The early sixties brought a dawning awareness 
that whHe man in the modern world may today 
live very well, he needs a vast amount of raw 
materials and energy to do so, and that in the 
long term it might be possible to draw materials, 
energy and even food - proteins - from the 
polar regions. That is what has finally aroused 
the interest of all countries. 
When I was asked to take on the report on 
Arctic technology for the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I 
knew that the Arctic is in the north and the 
Antarctic in the south, and I had heard of 
Amundsen and Scott. I had a rough geographical 
picture, but knew nothing else. I assume that 
you are all more cultured than I am. Neverthe-
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less, I should perhaps give a brief sketch of the 
situation and the basic facts. 
The Arctic, that is the northern polar regions, 
can be described roughly as follows : it is a 
floating mass of ice which is reduced by half 
in the summer. It is surrounded by the large 
continents of America and Eurasia. It has areas 
of tundra where no trees grow. There are fairly 
clear national frontiers in the Arctic, but these 
normally run through the sea. There are only 
two land frontiers, between America and Canada 
and between Finland and the Soviet Union. 
The United States owns the province of 
Alaska, which until only a few decades ago had 
a mere 50,000 inhabitants. It has enormous oil 
and gas resources, other raw materials and the 
famous trans-Alaska pipeline. 
In Canada, the North West Territories and 
Yukon, which form part of the Arctic, have only 
22,000 inhabitants. Here too, substantial raw 
material and energy resources still lie untouched 
or are only beginning to be exploited. 
Greenland has 39,000 inhabitants, and achieved 
autonomy in 1979, under Danish sovereignty. 
Norway has 450,000 inhabitants in its three 
Arctic provinces. The Norwegian territory of 
Spitsbergen has a special status ; by the treaty 
of 1920, signed by thirty-one states, it remained 
under Norwegian rule but all military activity 
was prohibited. Otherwise the thirty-one signa-
tory states may undertake any activity they wish, 
from mining to exploration. For example, the 
Soviet Union operates a large coal mine in 
Barentsburg. No oil has yet been found there. 
Then there is the enormous Arctic area of 
the Soviet Union, with 700,000 inhabitants. It is 
presumed that oil and gas are to be found there 
too. The Soviet Union is attempting to exploit 
these resources and is also trying to interest 
the Japanese and Americans in the project. 
Lastly there is Iceland, which is geographically 
a part of the Arctic but which does not really 
belong to it. 
The situation in the Antarctic is different. 
Instead of floating ice masses we have a large 
land mass, covered by a sheet of ice between 
2,000 and 4,500 metres thick. This land mass 
also has large, very precipitous mountains with 
deep valleys. Antarctica has no permanent 
inhabitants. A number of states have claimed 
areas of Antarctica, but these areas have never 
been inhabited, at least not permanently. Thus 
the Antarctic is an enormous uninhabited con-
tinent, remote from other continents; the nearest 
land mass is Cape Horn, 950 kms away. 
It is a territory on which the states, with their 
national interests, have still managed to reach 
OFFIOIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Spies von Bullesheim (continued) 
agreement. The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 
1959 for a period of thirty years. A distinction 
is made between two kinds of member, the 
signatory states and the consultative members. 
The smaller group of consultative members con-
sists only of states with a permanent scientific 
station in Antarctica. These states are Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, South Africa, 
Poland, the USSR and the United States. On 
5th February 1979 the Federal Republic of 
Germany acceded to the treaty as a consultative 
member, and it will invest DM 100 million -
which shows the magnitude of the sums involved 
- in establishing an Antarctic research station 
and building a research ship. 
The Antarctic Treaty is unique in that even 
the superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, have submitted their activities in 
the Antarctic to overall inspection. Checks are 
made to ensure respect for the ban on all military 
activity or the building of military instaHations 
in Antarctica. There are also controls - and 
any state can carry out an inspection - to 
check that no nuclear tests are being made and 
no radioactive materials stored there. 
For the rest, the Antarctic Treaty does not 
affect any of the rights that have been claimed 
by states. The treaty formaUy states that it 
neither denies nor supports such claims, and that 
no new claims can be founded on it. 
Today it would probably no longer be possible 
to sign the Antarctic Treaty which was concluded 
twenty years ago, because today we know, or at 
least assume, that Antarctica has vast raw 
material deposits, which according to estimates 
by the United States amount to no less than 
45,000 million barrels of oil, although they will 
de difficult to extract. 
The famous krill, this 4 cm long shrimp weigh-
ing only 1.2 g, has become important as a possible 
major source of protein. 
The Antarctic could be of interest to industries 
which require clean water and an unpolluted 
environment. 
It is also an area of great interest in that it is 
the only large ecosystem in the world that is 
totally intact. That is why all states have an 
intere~ in preserving this major ecosystem - not 
least because of the fear of climatic changes. 
It is impossible to foresee what might happen if 
this ecosystem were destroyed. 
But like everywhere else in the world, there 
are of course problems in the Antarctic. True, 
we can today expect that as a result of the vast 
scale of the activities undertaken by the indus-
trialised countries, the Antarctic will have been 
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fully explored by the year 2000. But the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty contains no offshore provisions, 
for example, so the states are not sure who then 
is entitled to drill offshore or even to extract oil, 
or even whether such a right exists at all. 
As for the krill, there is a danger that this 
small crustacean will be overfished in spite of 
its countltess numbers. It forms an essential basis 
for the food chain which extends through many 
species of fish as far as the whale. What would 
happen to the ecosystem if the krill were over-
fished ? At the Antarctic Conference in 1978, 
the signatory states unfortunately did not reach 
agreement on a provision to regulate the fishing 
of krill. Even if agreement is reached, the 
question arises of who is to supervise the 
observance of this agreement. The signatory 
states, and in particular the smaller group of 
consultative states, will not accept without 
further ado that nations which have not acceded 
to the treaty should wield a decisive influence 
through the United Nations. 
For we all know - and this is the most 
important fact - that the International Law of 
the Sea Conference, which has been going on for 
years, is encountering great difficulties. We have 
cause to fear that this Law of the Sea Conference 
could undermine the Antarctic Treaty by 
establishing general regulations. 
I will not discuss the military aspects of the 
Arctic and Antarctic here, because the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
will submit a special rep.ort on this. And since 
it is getting rather late I will make no further 
comments except to say the following : the 
Antarctic Treaty is a civil treaty, but it is also 
a military treaty, in fact an anti-military treaty, 
an anti-armaments treaty, a "peace treaty". If 
the Antarctic Treaty were undermined at the 
Law of the Sea Conference because of the various 
nations' economic interests, then its military 
section would not be effective either, and that 
cannot be in our interest. 
As I have said, the Antarctic is a great chal-
lenge to man, to his body, to his intellect, one 
might almost say to his soul. One need only read 
books by the people who had to live there for 
months in the snow, in solitude, in the terrible 
cold. But there are more practical, technological 
aspects too, such as the difficulties of transport 
and the problems facing the modern ice-breakers 
which have been developed specially for the 
Arctic. Work is being carried out on a number 
of projects on entirely new systems for the build-
ing of ice-breakers. 
New materials are being tested in the Antarctic 
and it is a centre of oceanographic exploration, 
research into climatic conditions and deep-sea 
currents. 
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The most important project is of course the 
one on which a1l the states are working : to dis-
cover a new drillirng technique which wi1l make it 
possible to drill bore-holes through floating ice 
or ice which is moving above a 1aill.d mass down 
to the oil deposits at a depth of 2,000 or 3,000 
metres. This is a problem which seems almost 
insoluble. But when we look at the progress 
made it is astonishing how advanced this techno-
logy already is. Think of the problems involved. 
For instance, there is ice which no power on 
earth can halt, there are enormous icebergs which 
float about at random and are difficult to divert. 
Moreover, even if one drilled down to the oH 
deposits, there would be incredible transport 
difficulties, as we saw during the construction 
of the Alaska pipeline, which after all is above 
ground and runs across tundra areas. So both 
the human and the technological aspects of 
Antarctic exploration are a challenge to mankind. 
1\Ir. President, I have nearly finished. Looking 
at the two polar regions, one fh1cds that the 
Arctic is divided up into territories, and to some 
extent settled, while the Antarctic remains a 
relatively untouched continent. The Antarctic 
is not as much involved in any power-play. It 
is remote from the superpowers. It has no human 
history. The Antarctic is covered by this Antarc-
tic Treaty which we should maintain, promote 
and develop. As stated in the treaty, the aim 
should be an area free of military activity, a vast 
continent on which states can collaborate in 
science and research, in which man may perhaps 
find food, raw materials and energy, and where 
the ecosystem as a whole should be preserved. We 
European states must collaborate because we have 
common interests here. The signatory states, that 
is, most of the states represented in this Assem-
bly, are in agreement with the consultative states 
on this point. So we should adopt a joint Euro-
pean position here. 
I therefore ask the Assembly to adopt the draft 
recommendation which we have submitted in 
Document 822. Its ultimate objective is that the 
European states should col1ahorate more closely 
in this area than hitherto, that they should adopt 
a common position in the Antarctic conferences, 
and that they should work together to ensure 
that at least the main substance of this Antarctic 
Treaty, which is unique in modern history, shall 
be preserved. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
As members know, we are to hear an address 
by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
and I am sorry that we have caused him to wait 
for a few minutes. I am sure that the Assembly 
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will agree to the postponement of the business 
now under discussion in order that we may hear 
Mr. Thorn. 
6. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council 
The PRESIDENT. - We are extremely 
pleased, Mr. Minister, to welcome you here again 
to our proceedings. Will you please come to the 
rostrum to address the Assembly? 
Mr. THORN (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of tke Council) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I am particulady happy that it 
should fa1l to my lot to address you as Chairman-
in-Office of the Council in a year when we are 
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Paris Agreements modifying and completing the 
1948 Brussels Treaty. 
The event was duly commemorated by the 
symposium on a Eurgpean armaments policy 
arranged by your Assembly in Brussels last 
October. 
I said on that occasion, and reiterate now, how 
pleased I was that the symposium, thanks to the 
excellence of its participants and the guidelines 
you set for it, should have made a positive and 
important contribution towards European co-
operation in armaments. 
At a time when our countries are once again 
beset with all manner of uncertainties, the choice 
of topic for discussion at Brussels was particu-
larly judicious. 
Aside from the conclusions, at times perhaps 
unduly pessimistic, of your proceedings, the most 
important thing in my opinion is that members 
of parliament as well as diplomats, but also those 
responsible for defence and industry, were able 
to meet to discuss the matter together. Once these 
men, directly or indirectly involved in arma-
ments and defence questions, get into the habit 
of consultation and co-operation, an important 
step forward will have been taken. 
During the twenty-five years it has been in 
existence, WEU has encouraged efforts towards 
a European union, the ultimate objective which 
the authors of the modified Brussels Treaty had 
assigned to themselves. It has done so by action 
deployed throughout the various fields within its 
sphere of competence, according to the circum-
stances and requirements of the moment, and by 
constantly guarding against any duplication of 
effort. 
The Council has watched over the full imple-
mentation of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
has kept the Assembly constantly informed. 
Throughout these years the dialogue between 
the Council and your Assembly has been kept 
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in being and developed by way of replies made 
to your recommendations and written questions, 
the report on its activities presented to you each 
year by the CQuncil and the joint meetings 
organised at the request of your Committees. 
May I also take this opportunity to emphasise 
the importance of the role played by the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee, especially in recent 
years, when under its remit from the Council 
it undertook the protracted and intricate task 
of the study Qn the situation in the armaments 
sector Qf industry in the member countries. To 
date, only the legal portion has been forwarded 
to the Council. At the ministerial meeting in 
Rome last May, the Council confirmed the 
mandate of the Standing Armaments Committee 
and hoped that the first part of the second, 
"economic" portion of the study would be com-
pleted with all dispatch and under optimum 
conditions with the co-operation of the adminis-
trations concerned. 
It decided not to disseminate the study chapter 
by chapter ; hQwever, as I have already had 
occasion to tell you, when the SAC's final report 
is to hand, the Council will not fail to examine 
the substance and form of an adequate com-
munication for the Assembly's information. 
Speaking only as Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Luxembourg and member of the Council, I 
will now pass on to you a few thoughts on topical 
questions. Your Assembly is of course interested 
in the major debate Qn theatre nuclear weapons 
in Western Europe. As you know, decisions on 
the production and deployment of such modern 
weapons have been taken in readiness fQr the 
Atlantic Council of 12th, 13th and 14th 
December ; parallel proposals on arms limitatiQn 
are being finalised so that negotiation on the 
subject can be initiated with the Warsaw Pact 
countries at the earliest opportunity. 
You are similarly fully apprised Qf the formal 
speech by Chairman Leonid Brezhnev in Berlin 
on 6th October. He declared he was fully disposed 
to negotiate, and even announced unilateral dis-
armament measures, but he warned us against 
the proposed reinforcement of theatre nuclear 
arms, arguing that they would destroy the 
existing balance and thus render any East-West 
disarmament negotiations more difficult if not 
impossible. 
Now, what do we find when we examine the 
current ratio of forces between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, to take only the two most 
interesting examples ? Quite simply, that the 
balance which had existed until fairly recently 
has been upset following the manufacture of 
new Soviet theatre weapons and their stationing 
within range of the territory of Western Europe. 
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These are essentially the SS-20 missiles each with 
three independent nuclear warheads, additionally 
highly mobile and with twice the range of the 
systems they replace, so that they are able to 
reach their targets anywhere in our countries 
with substantially greater accuracy. Moreover 
the USSR has developed the new Backfire 
bomber, more sophisticated than its predecessors 
in both range and penetration capability. 
Mr. Leonid Brezhnev states that there has been 
no change in the number of medium-range 
nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union in the last 
ten years, and this may be true in purely 
numerical terms, but appears in a different light 
if the operational quality of the new SS-20 and 
Backfire systems is considered. And the Alliance 
has no missile comparable to those recently 
deployed by the USSR and the currently avail-
able systems are, into the bargain, more vulner-
able and even, it has been said, in some cases 
obsolete. 
For these reasons the leaders of the member 
states of the Atlantic Alliance decided to com-
mission studies on the modernisation of theatre 
nuclear forces in Europe. These studies, which 
are right up to date, led to the conclusions and 
proposals that you know of, the production and 
deployment of two new nuclear weapon systems, 
the Pershing II and cruise missiles. 
The discussions to be held in a few days' time 
between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and 
Defence of the member states of the Alliance will 
be based on these such widely canvassed pro-
posals. In my opinion, clear decisions will have 
to be taken now and leave no doubt about the 
twofold objective of, as a first phase, production 
by the United States of the Pershing II and 
cruise missiles and, in phase two, towards 1983, 
the deployment of these weapons in some Euro-
pean countries of the AlLiance. The two measures 
are being taken under the basic NATO policy 
founded mainly on deterrence as the basis of 
detente. 
They will be supplemented by equally 
important proposals for limitation of nuclear 
systems in the European theatre which we pro-
pose to discuss with the Soviet Union. Depending 
on the outcome of these discussions, which shQuld 
begin as soon as Washington has ratified the 
SALT II treaty, a consummation which is 
proving difficult but devoutly to be desired, the 
existing or planned number of European theatre 
nuclear weapons could be curtailed, I hope subs-
tantially, by both sides. What is essential for the 
West is that the balance which formerly existed 
in this area between the United States and the 
Soviet Union before the stationing of the SS-20s 
be restored. Fruitful negotiations can be con-
ducted only from a position of equilibrium, for 
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to negotiate balanced reductions while starting 
out from an original imbalance would seem to 
me to be pretty difficult. 
In his speech of 6th October last Mr. Brezhnev 
also announced the withdrawal of 20,000 men 
and 1,000 tanks at present stationed on the 
territory of the German Democratic Republic. 
This announcement is without any doubt a laud-
able, if limited, step, since it is in the right 
direction. The Vienna negotiations on forces 
reduction in Central Europe, which have been 
for too long bogged down in controversy over 
numerical data, may be given fresh impetus ; 
it is a hope I share with many of our partners 
in Vienna. 
As for the Soviet leader's proposals about new 
confidence-building measures in the military 
area, they show the increased interest Russia 
and its allies are currently taking in such 
specific matters, an interest shared by nearly 
all the signatory states of the Helsinki final 
act. The meeting to be held in Madrid, starting 
in November 1980, as part of the follow-up to 
the CSCE will provide an appropriate forum 
for discussing these Soviet proposals and any 
which the western states have already presented, 
or will present in Madrid. In this context I am 
thinking in particular of the more than interest-
ing, indeed highly important, proposal by 
France for convening a European disarmament 
conference which should in its initial phase 
discuss significant confidence-building measures 
on the military plane. 
May I repeat the two principles underlying 
this proposal. Both sets of measures could be 
capable of being monitored and be made appli-
cable to the whole territory of Europe. That is 
why they merit all our attention. 
I pass now to a few more general remarks. 
The reactions of European public opinion, the 
press and many members of parliament to 
Mr. Brezhnev's speech of 6th October clearly 
showed that we are still easily hoodwinked by 
a little smooth patter or a magic spell. To take 
only our own newspapers, what caught our 
attention most if it did not close our eyes entirely 
in the speech of 6th October was the announce-
ment of the withdrawal - which has apparently 
begun today - of Soviet troops and tanks, and 
the proposal to negotiate a limitation of missiles 
with nuclear warheads. These ideas happily 
figure in that speech but, I repeat, they have 
to be treated with the utmost seriousness. 
However, they must not be taken in isolation 
but carefully placed in the general context in 
which they were spoken. They then take on quite 
a different meaning. You realise that at no point 
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in the proposals is there any question of giving 
up the unilateral advantage which the SS-20 
missiles confer on the Soviet Union, and therefore 
of giving up the idea of entering into the negotia-
tions on the limitation of theatre nuclear forces. 
In addition there is even the threat of a new 
arms race if we do not accept the discussion in 
the chosen terms, within the chosen framework, 
and therefore if we speak of redressing the 
balance of forces. 
That is what I want to underline and oppose 
to some of our critics who want quite simply, 
and, shall we say, too simply, to allow the other 
side to have the exclusive choice of the area of 
negotiation and its framework. As soon as it is 
a question of disarmament and negotiations, we 
let ourselves be cornered too easily and think we 
have to apologise for our refusal to comply 
entirely with the adversary's wishes although in 
fact the attitude of most if not all of us is in 
positive terms exceedingly firm. 
For what could be more logical or more con-
sistent than categorically to affirm our deter-
mination to restore the balance and, in parallel, 
enter into negotiations with a view to the limita-
tion of nuclear weapons, or even a balanced 
reduction at the lowest possible level ~ This 
should and must be said. 
'l'he only conclusion I personally have reached 
is the one I hope will be accepted at the Atlantic 
Council meeting on 12th, 13th and 14th 
December, namely a go-ahead for production of 
the Pershing II and cruise missiles and the offer 
to negotiate. I am weighing my words : such 
decisions should be taken in parallel and as soon 
as possible. To wait six months, a year or two 
years would, I feel, be bound to be construed as 
an admission of weakness, and exploited as such. 
Now,, it has been known from time immemorial 
that it is useless to try to obtain the right results 
if compelled to negotiate from a position of 
weakness. 
The second remark I would like to make is 
more wide-ranging and goes beyond the subject 
of armament and disarmament. I am speaking 
of the instinctive hostility which is aroused 
among many people by anything closely or 
remotely associated with the term nuclear. Far 
be it from me to want to minimise the gravity 
with which both nuclear weapons and nuclear 
energy must be handled. Indeed, I w.ould almost 
be tempted to think that we all too often forget 
the destructive power of nuclear weapons. When 
people mention without batting an eyelid devices 
whose power is expressed in kilotons or megatons 
we seldom remember that a small tactical atomic 
weapon is the equivalent today of the Hiroshima 
bomb. 
Similarly, I personally am far from happy 
about the current jargon referring to theatre 
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nuclear weapons. Such a term testifies to what 
I dare call an all too military insensitivity 
towards the concerns of ordinary mortals for 
whom the theatre is a place of relaxation, escape 
or edification, but assuredly not of destruction. 
It is but a detail, but I would above all put you 
on your guard against going to the other extreme 
and waving the red flag as soon as the word 
nuclear is uttered. 
So, as far as the military aspect is concerned 
- and I have now spoken about it enough -
what is to be done above all is not to let ourselves 
be forced back into a situation of nuclear im-
balance to the detriment of the Atlantic Pact. 
That would run us straight into the catastrophe 
that we want to avoid at all costs. 
As for the civil aspect of nuclear energy I 
fully appreciate that the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy involves risks. But each day that passes, 
events in the Middle East show us what un-
certainties loom over our oil supplies. Surely, 
not many of us would find it easy to accept a 
reduction in our economic wealth, and therefore 
in our personal wellbeing, due to a shortage of 
energy ~ So, I think that the problem of energy 
from nuclear sources must be looked at in a 
general context, as the heads of state and of 
government have just done in the Community 
framework, in Dublin, petroleum being regarded 
as one among other components of our energy 
supply and consequently a big factor in our 
countries' economic policy. It is not to be viewed 
with the eyes of the exorcist, and banished in 
whatever form or manifestation it takes. 
Conversely, what is of the highest importance, 
and is the other facet of a truly realistic 
approach, is that any questions relating to civil 
nuclear plants should be given the attention they 
deserve. It seems to me to be sel,£-evident that 
security measures must satisfy the highest 
requirements of modern technology. Equally, it 
seems self-evident that the sites must be selected 
in such a way as to minimise the potential risk 
to the local populations. In an international 
assembly of members of parliament, I shall put 
special emphasis on the international respon-
sibility incumbent on alJ our states in regions -
of which there are many in our diminutive 
Europe - in which countries adjoin one another. 
Wherever the risks and potential damage are 
international, the various sovereignties are 
involved, and, above all, any genuine European 
concerted action for the choice of sites, plant 
conditions and protective measures would be a 
big contribution to a rational treatment of what-
ever has a bearing on nuclear engineering as 
well as industry in general ; it would be a step 
on the road to the independence of Europe. 
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The third point, which I would like to touch 
upon briefly, concerns relations with all the 
countries which do not form part of the two 
major political and military groupings. We 
consider the nuclear non-proliferation treaty a 
benefit to mankind and that everything must 
be done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
throughout the world. It is by-the-by a point of 
view common to the Atlantic Alliance and even 
the Warsaw Pact, a fact which is worth empha-
sising. 
I will try to add a few more debating points 
not unrelated to the discussion on theatre nu~lear 
weaponry. 
The atomic arsenal has never been used since 
the two bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 which 
hastened the end of the second world war. Since 
then, although there have been many oppor-
tunities and temptations to do so, none of the 
big powers has resorted to its nuclear strike 
force. The approximate balance in existing means 
of destruction, together with the leaders' sense 
of responsibility, has invariably inspired them 
to consider that in the final analysis, using 
nuclear weapons would in any case pay off less 
than refraining from doing so. While this 
approximate balance subsists, I am convinced 
that none of the superpowers will use its nuclear 
weapons. 
In that case why should other countries go 
to the considerable expense of acquiring a weapon 
which in the end they will not be able to use, 
especially with the aggravating circumstance that 
the more countries possess a nuclear weapon the 
greater is the risk of its being rashly used, with 
all the catastrophic consequences this would not 
fail to have. And the more chances there are that 
the person with his finger on the button will 
be a crank, a fanatic or a lunatic. 
However, there are three corollaries to this 
theorem. 
In my view, countries which have nuclear 
weapons must in no circumstances wield them as 
a threat or a means of exerting pressure on 
countries which do not have any. The inevitable 
result of such a policy would be to impel the 
latter to try and acquire the means of escaping 
the threat or the blackmail, whether or not their 
attempts could be crowned with success. A 
responsible attitude by the atomic powers is 
therefore an essential prerequisite of any attempt 
to prevent excessive proliferation. 
Secondly, the non-nuclear countries should not 
be denied access to the purely peaceful benefits 
of nuclear technology. It is in this area, no doubt, 
that the stipulations of the non-proliferation 
treaty have been implemented the least effec-
tively. Only fairly recently have serious 
attempts been made to differentiate properly 
/ 
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between civil and military applications of 
nuclear energy. Rapid progress must be made 
in this direction, for it is obviously hard to 
convince anyone that an advanced civil techno-
logy should be reserved to those who are already 
the strongest militarily. 
Thirdly, I deem very important the attempts 
being made to improve our relations with the 
developing countries. We should do even more 
to speed up development throughout the world, 
even, or rather especially, in times of crisis like 
those we are living in now and will certainly have 
to put up with for several years to come. 
The world has entered into a dangerous phase. 
And the debate on nuclear balance in Europe, 
important as it is, should not let us :Wse sight 
of the wider objectives of world equilibrium. 
What good would it do us, Mr. President, to win 
a battle on our continent if it meant losing the 
war world-wide ? (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Minis-
ter, for your address to the Assembly. 
You were kind enough to agree to answer 
questions. Are you prepared to reply to them 
separately, or to all the questions at the end ? 
Mr. THORN (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council). 
-At the end. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I call first Mr. Stoffelen. He will be followed 
by Mr. Konings. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Mr. Pre-
sident, I shall speak in my own language, Dutch. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I would like 
to ask Mr. Thorn, as Chairman of the Council, 
whether he shares the view that co-operation in 
Western Europe is based on mutual trust, trust 
in the readiness of countries to look further 
than what might be seen as narrow national 
interests, trust in the possibility of making agree-
ments with other countries ? If his answer is in 
the affirmative, is he aware that the French 
Government's decision not to put to the French 
Parliament for ratification the treaty on salt 
pollution of the Rhine - signed in 1976 by the 
Governments of France, West Germany, Switzer-
land, Luxembourg and the Netherlands - is 
dealing a serious blow at the credibility and 
future of Western European co-operation, 
including co-operation in Western European 
Union? 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I call Mr. Konings. 
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Mr. KONINGS (Netherlands) {Translation). 
- Does the Minister share the view that the 
concluding of treaties between free and indepen-
dent states, treaties under which in particular 
freedom and independence are to be guaranteed 
and defended jointly and in association, repre-
sents an institution and a way of thinking and 
acting within which the deliberate inflicting of 
damage of whatever kind by one contracting 
party upon the others is an inadmissible breach 
of the trust on which the WEU treaty, among 
others, is based ? And how does the Minister 
judge, from this viewpoint, the French Govern-
ment's going-back on the 1976 treaty on salt 
pollution of the Rhine? 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I call Mr. Roper now. He will be followed by 
Mr. Lambiotte. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I con-
gratulate the Minister on his speech. WUl he 
accept that I was most grateful to the Council 
for the answer to Written Question 199 on the 
appointment of different substitutes to serve in 
the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and 
Western European Union, which I received just 
at the beginning of this Assembly? The Minister 
will note that in that reply the Council say : 
"Like the Assembly, they [the Council] con-
sider it desirable that an adequate number of 
parliamentarians with special interest in 
defence questions should take part in the 
activities of the Assembly." 
Is the Chairman-in-Office aware that this after-
noon fewer than forty-five members were present 
in order to take decisions on the modernisation 
of theatre nuclear forces and on SALT II, and 
that there are perhaps not a1l members present 
to listen to the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers ? Does he believe - as I do, as one 
who has worked in the Assembly of this organisa-
tion and of the Council of Europe - that the 
Council and the Assembly should look again at 
the problem of the umbilical cord linking the 
members of the Council of Europe and WEU 
Assemblies 1 Will he give me an assurance that 
the Council will look again at the question in 
view of the very disappointing events of this 
afternoon? 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
I call Mr. Lambiotte. He will be followed by 
Mr. Treu. 
Mr. LAlVIBIOTTE (Belgium) (Translation).-
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
alluded during his address to the Brussels 
symposium. 
The question I would like to ask is the follow-
ing : can the Assembly take it that the paper 
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read at the symposium by Mr. Plantey constitutes 
information by the Council to the Assembly on 
the results of the inquiry undertaken by the 
Standing Armaments Committee ~ 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Treu. 
Mr. TREU (Ita.ly) (Translation).- Mr. Min-
ister, one simple general question reflecting the 
recurrent waverings, doubts and self-questioning 
by which our .N!sembly has for some time past 
been beset. In its latest annual report the WETJ 
Council confirmed that it regards this Assembly 
as the only, repeat : only, European assembly 
having statutory responsibility in matters of 
defence. The message issued on the occasion of 
WEU's twenty-fifth anniversary ~imply states 
that it is "the European parliamentary body in 
which the representatives of the peoples of the 
member states discuss their common security 
problems". This change of formula, which may 
at first sight appear purely terminological or 
stylistic, is I think a good deal more important 
and significant. Let me explain : doos it imply 
that the Council queri~ the principle of the 
Assembly's being the only European assembly 
with statutory responsibility in matters of 
defence 1 Thank you in advance for an answer 
on this. 
The PRESIDENT.- Do any more members 
wish to put questions to the Minister L 
Mr. Minister, will you reply, please ~ 
Mr. THORN (Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation). - I am sorry, Mr. President, if 
I may have allowed my attention to wander, it 
was partly due to technical difficulties. 
The two first speakers, Mr. Stoffelen and 
Mr. Konings, spoke of difficulties about pollu-
tion of the Rhine. 
It will not come as a surprise to anybody 
that this is an area in which I do not feel 
myself particularly competent either in my per-
sonal capacity or as Chairman-in-Office of the 
WEU Council. ·we know it concerns five coun-
tries, one of which is not even a member of 
WEU. How, then, could I have the slightest 
authority, I who have the further advantage or 
disadvantage of coming from a country that 
does not border on the Rhine, to give any answer 
on the subject Y 
I believe that all the governments concerned 
will consider this problem with the greatest con-
cern. Dare I say - but in a strictly personal 
capacity - that I hope the French decision, 
of which I was informed like everyone else 
and with whose ins and outs I am unfamiliar, 
will not put an end to a dream dating, I believe, 
back to 1950, and that this decision will still 
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leave room for finding an appropriate solution. 
But I cannot go further than that and take up 
any other position, Mr. President. 
Then I was questioned about the problems 
which all assemblies run into as regards regular 
attendance. 
You understand, Mr. President, that a member 
of government, who is no longer a member of 
parliament, would not venture to meddle in such 
a delicate question as this. Believe me, this 
anxiety of yours is not confined to the WEU 
Assembly : it crops up in nearly every country. 
My feeling is that trying to cope with the prob-
lem by the solution proposed by our honourable 
friend would be tantamount to modifying the 
treaties. Now, you know what that means and 
what a hornet's nest it would stir up. 
I think - and it is also an answer I am 
giving without having officially consulted the 
other governments - no government would, for 
the time being be inclined to contemplate a 
change in the treaties, even on such a pragmatic 
and useful point as was mentioned just now. 
Mr. Lambiotte asked me whether the ~mbly 
thought that Mr. Plantey's paper at the Brussels 
symposium was to be regarded as information 
provided by the Council to the Assembly on the 
results of an inquiry undertaken by the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee. 
It is certainly a very interesting paper, ema-
nating from a particularly able senior inter-
national official, who has all our esteem, for 
it is he who heads the ~ecretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee. That Committee is con-
tinuing its work on the study assigned to it by 
the Council. As soon as it has been completed, 
our Council will certainly ensure that yom 
Assembly is formally and duly apprised of iV3 
conclusions, which has not been the case as yet. 
With regard to the last question, I am glad 
to be able- at any rate, I hope so, Mr. Treu-
to dispel a misunderstanding. 
I did not know all the texts and statements 
emanating from the Council were subjected to 
such elaborate exegesis. 
Believe me, this is all solely attributable to 
the fact that on occasion terms have to be slightly 
modulated and changed. The spirit, attitude and 
substance of our thinking remain unchanged ; 
pray accept whatever apology may be called for. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - I should like to thank 
you again, Mr. Minister, for yO'Ilr readiness to 
reply to the questions that members have put to 
you. Thank you so much. We hope to see you 
in due course again in this Assembly. 
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Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council) 
(Translation).- Allow me, in my turn, to thank 
you, Mr. President, for I am always plea$ed 
to come back before your Assembly. I will also 
take advantage of these concluding remarks to 
thank your Assembly for the interest it has taken 
in the positions adopted and decisions taken 
by the European Council in one particular aren. 
I shall not fail to see to it that the WEU Council 
takes note of your Assembly's recommendation. 
But we very much appreciate the attention your 
~bly has devoted to this problem. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Min-
ister. 
7. Arctic technology 
(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on 
the draft Recommendation, Doe. 822 and 
Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the debate on the report of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions on Arctic technology and vote on the 
draft recommendation, Document 822 and Amend-
ments. 
The debate is open. 
I first call Mr. Vattekar, a member of the 
Norwegian Storting. As you will recall, we invi-
ted members from the Norwegian Storting and 
the Danish Parliament. We are looking forward, 
Mr. Vattekar, to what you will have to say on 
the issue reported to us by Mr. Spies von 
Biillesheim. 
Mr. VATTEKAR (Observer from Norway). -
Thank you very much, Mr. President. You will 
understand that discussion of the subject of 
Arctic technology at this meeting is of particular 
interest to me as an observer from Norway. I 
am, therefore, grateful to you, Mr. President, 
for having given me the floor once more. 
As presented in the report and in the particu-
lar recommendation that has been proposed for 
consideration, the subject is not limited to the 
northern Arctic region but includes the situation 
in the southern Antarctic region as we1l. Develop-
ment in both polar regions is a matter of concern 
to my government and to my people. Norway 
is one of the two Western European countries 
with national territories in the Arctic. The other 
is Denmark, with Greenland. Norway is also one 
of the three Western European countries with 
national territories in the Antarctic, the others 
being Great Britain and Fraooe. 
We are the only nation holding jurisdiction 
over territories in both polar regions and prob-
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lems relating to the Arctic as well as the 
Antarctic regions touch directly upon Norwegian 
national interests. I should therefore like to make 
a brief comment. 
Our direct involvement over a long period of 
time in the exploration of Arctic and Antarctic 
areas and in the exploitation of natural resources 
in those regions, in fishing and whaling and in 
mining on Spitsbergen, as well as our more recent 
experience with continental shelf development, 
has given us a clear understanding of the poten-
tial that the polar regions hold for economic 
development. 
Our experience has also given us a fair under-
standing of the technical and economic problems 
that are involved in such development. In parti-
cular, Mr. President, we have become aware of 
the risks that development and exploitation of 
resources under the difficult conditions of the 
Arctic and the Antarctic may involve for the 
vulnerable environment in polar regions. Conse-
quently, we understand the need for developing 
technologies that will cause a minimum of 
disturbance and ecological damage. 
There cannot be any doubt that closer inter-
national co-operation should help us solve many 
of the problems involved, and I regard the report 
and the discussion today as an encouraging sign 
of growing interest in such co-operation. At the 
same time, however, it must be clear that such 
co-operation can be effective only if it is carried 
out within the existing legal framework of the 
polar regions. 
In the Arctic, all land areas are recognised as 
part of the national domain of the five Arctic 
states - the United States, Canada, Denmark, 
Norway and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, 
under the continental shelf convention of 1958, 
and according to the new concept of national 
economic zones, the continental shelf and the 
waters of the north are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Arctic states in regard to 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 
In these circumstances, it is difficult to see 
how countries other than the Arctic states 
themselves can develop any wide-ranging ·pro~ 
gramme for co-operation, or adopt administrative 
and industrial guidelines to ensure that Europe 
will play a part in developing the Arctic. Col-
laboration for Arctic development must and can 
only be carried out with the active participation 
of the Arctic states themselves. The terms and 
conditions will and must be negotiated in each 
case with each country. 
Non-Arctic states may encourage their com-
panies and agencies to show an active interest 
in participating in the development of Arctic 
resources. Such participation will no doubt be 
welcomed by Arctic states, but I doubt whether 
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a basis for a common Western European develop-
ment programme can be found. So far as I can 
see, the pattern that has emerged from the 
offshore oil development in the North Sea will 
probably offer the best model for future co-
operation in the development of resources in the 
far north. 
As for Antarctic development, the situation is 
both similar to and different from the situation 
in the Arctic. The situation is similar in the 
sense that some European countries - Great 
Britain, France and Norway- as well as non-
European- Australia, New Zealand, Chile and 
Argentina - assert sovereignty over the major 
part of Antarctica. 
They claim exclusive jurisdiction and rights 
of resource exploitation. The situation in Antarc-
tica is different from that in the Arctic because 
these rights have not been generally r~cognised 
by other states. On the other hand, under the 
Antarctic Treaty a delicate balance has been 
established and claimant states and non-claimant 
states work closely together towards the solution 
of the many problems of the region, including 
the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources. 
At the present time, the parties to the Antarc-
tic Treaty are negotiating a convention that will 
regulate the exploitation of marine living 
resources, other than whale, in Antarctic waters. 
The parties are also actively negotiating to set 
up a regime to regulate the exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica, 
if and when such operations become economi-
cally and technically feasible. 
Co-operation under the Antarctic Treaty has 
so far proved quite effective. However, dif-
ficulties have also arisen. Consequently, any 
major effort or programme that is not developed 
within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty 
will involve a risk of upsetting the delicate 
balance and should, I think, be avoided. 
To sum up, Mr. President, allow me to say 
that while we should encourage co-operation for 
a solution of technical and other problems in 
the Arctic, ~ well as in the Antarctic, the 
recommendatiOn of any broad programme or of 
any specific guidelines seems premature. 
At the present time, the area in which the 
Western European countries might indeed demon-
strate an interest is scientific investigation. There 
is a great need for further research and study 
of the polar regions, and here non-polar states 
could make a major contribution that no doubt 
would be welcomed by the polar states themselves 
and would eventually contribute to the rational 
and safe use of thCI!!e areas. 
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In this connection, I find it appropriate to 
mention that an International Arctic Committee 
has recently been established. This coonmittee has 
the broad participation of specialists from several 
European countries, as well as from Canada and 
the United States, and it is hoped that the Soviet 
Union will also soon have representatives in the 
group. The committee is privately organised and 
has its formal legal base in the Principality of 
Monaco. Its major purpose is to contribute to a 
broader understanding of the Arctic region, its 
problems and its promises and, in particular, 
to ensure that the new development is carried out 
with methods that involve minimum risks to the 
environment. In it~;; work, the committee will 
organise conferences and encourage research in 
close co-operation with existing institutions and 
agencies. I hope that an initiative of this nature 
will contribute to fruitful and mutually beneficial 
co-operation and collaboration in Arctic develop-
ment. Thank you, Mr. President. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. Thank you, Mr. 
Vattekar. 
I now call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). -Mr. Pre-
sident, this is an interesting report, and I believe 
that the subject is a very important one. I feel it 
necessary to propose amendments, as colleagues 
will have seen, even though I accept that there 
is a great deal with which one can agree in the 
report and that it contains a good deal of 
information which is to be welcomed. However, 
while I welcome the report and, certainly, 
Mr. Spies von Biillesheim's comments, particu-
larly the final comments in his speech, I am not 
sure that the report should contain quite such 
substantial concern for Antarctic matters nor 
that it should do so in ways that the treaty ~ates 
might resent. 
In the preamble, it is regrettable that all the 
Arctic states have not been mentioned, because all 
of them have been involved in the effort for 
progress, not only Russia and the United States. 
In that regard, we welcome the presence here 
of a member of the Storting. It is quite right 
for him to remind us of Norway's interest, con-
cern and contribution tin this matter. 
Also, in the preamble and in the recommend-
ations there is reference to the Law of the Sea 
Con~erence. I understand that there is no attempt 
to d$tort, change or prematurely terminate the 
Antarctic Treaty at the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, and it may be regrettable that this is 
suggested, since ~t might induce suspicion, which 
could be quite harmful. Indeed, it might have 
been better to stress the fact that France, Bel-
gium and the United Kingdom are to be corn-
mended for their favourable views in regard to 
Antarctic marine living resources. 
I believe that this is an important step forward 
-a step that has not yet been properly acknow-
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
ilfr. Hardy (continued) 
I edged - in the protection of the entire ecological 
system, which is worthy of fuller reference in 
the report, though I certainly welcome the fact 
that in his peroration Mr. Spies von Biillesheim 
demanded that that ecosystem be proper]y 
conserved. 
The question of minerals is, I recognise, rather 
different and is perhaps a more difficult question. 
However, this Assembly should recognise that 
sovereign rights are involved in these matters and 
that these are too complex to allow any tran-
sition of responsibility to this Assembly or to 
any other European forum. Certainly, I do not 
believe that a swift and not fully prepared 
demand for such a transition could be helpful. 
I should like to offer one or two corrections 
to the main body of the report. In regard to 
paragraph 35, the Antarctic Treaty is not merely 
in force for a period of thirty years ; it is 
renewable after that period and not limited 
to it. Similarly, in stressing the need for caution 
in any international consideration of these mat-
ters, we ought to be equally prudent in our 
assessments of the economic potential. It seems 
to me that there is some excessive optimism in 
the report, as with the reference in paragraph 
68 to the oil resources i.n Antarctica. I believe 
that this estimate may be slightly larger than 
it should be, although I share the optimism and 
determination expressed by Mr. Spies von Biilles-
heim in believing that man will conquer the 
intemperate climate and rugged conditions of our 
polar regions. 
lrt is appropriate for a British politician to 
comment on the Antarctic, for while par:t-
graph 42 contains information about the history 
of German interest, there is only pa;ssing refer-
ence to British involvement, which has been 
substantial since Captain Cook reached Antarc-
tica in 1820. It is right for us to remind thi~ 
Assembly that with the exception of a four-year 
period between 1939 and 1945 British presence 
and research activity in the Antarctic has been 
continuous for the last fifty-four years. 
I was also alarmed by paragraph 45, on the 
potential of marine resources. The last sentence 
refers to the possibility of the commercial exploi-
tation of fish, whales and krill. Unfortunately, 
as the world is increasingly aware, the commercial 
exploitation of whales has already been carried 
beyond reasonable limits and on a very extensive 
scale, to the point where some whale populations 
may not survive. There is no recognition in the 
report of the massive concern and anger felt 
by millions of people in Western Europe about 
the exploitation - almost annihilation - of the 
whale population. It is therefore essential tha.t 
we do not regard the remaining population as 
a potential source of further exploitation. 
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Mr. President, I am t·aking a little longer than 
I should because I do not wish to speak at length 
to the four amendments in my name. I am per-
fectly prepared to finish now, but this will require 
me to make longer speeches when I move the 
amendments. So, with your permission, I will 
finish my remarks as quickly as p~ble. 
The PRESIDENT.- Yes, I agree to that. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- I believe, 
therefore, that paragraph 46 should refer to 
maximum limits rather than quotas in terms 
of our future exploitation of these resources. 
As for paragraph 62, it seems to me that the 
very important questions posed in the report are 
already being considered in a responsible way 
by the l'!tates concerned. For this reason, there 
ought not to be an over-emphasis on the urgency 
of Western European involvement. I do not 
believe that we can justify our rather peremptory 
demand for an involvement by the WEU states 
in the development of ice-breaker constructi0n 
consortia. Since most of our states have no terri-
torial responsibility for the Arctic, it is surely 
for the Arctic states themselves to decide to 
take, or to appear to take, the appropriate ini-
tiatives. I suggest, therefore, that we need to 
amend recommendation 1 along the lines that I 
have suggested. 
The report also concerns itself with what it 
sees as a parallel between Antarctica and the 
international seabed. Since over 80% of Antarc-
tica has a land surface, this parallel is perhaps 
a little over-stretched. To press it further might 
increase strain and suspicion at the very time 
when unity of purpose could be achieved. It 
means that the report could be seen as somewhat 
self-defeating. 
One thing that might have been included, 
and that I feel is relevant, is that before further 
development, especially of oil and mineral 
resources, takes place in the polar regions, the 
design and structure of our ships ought to be 
improved. Many of the world's vessels, particu-
larly the large tankers, are too thinly constructed. 
There really is a case for the more robust 
construction of ships and this seems as relevant 
as the construction of ice-breakers where such 
vessels sail towards the permafrost. Moreover, to 
suggest that ship construction be developed is 
perhaps more useful for our countries and par-
ticularly for our steel industries. 
Clearly there is a great deal to be done, and, 
insofar as this report urges progress, it is to 
be welcomed ; but we should not underrate the 
actual attainments so far achieved. Inamnuch 
as the report recognises both what has been 
attained and what is possible, therefore, it deser-
ves approval, but, since I believe it to be imper-
fect, the amendments that I have proposed are 
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necessary and justified in the interests of reality 
and factual accuracy. 
At the same time, I believe that we could 
perhaps more properly appreciate and more fully 
commend the worlcing of the existing institutions 
inside Western Europe concerned with polar 
study, and insofar as the report endorses their 
work and commends their attitude, I believe 
that it requires our congratulation and support. 
I hope that the amendments that I have proposed 
will be accepted. (.Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- I now call Mr. Enders. 
Mr. ENDERS (Ilederal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Spies von Biilles-
heim on his excellent report, which will induce 
not only European parliamentarians but also 
European scientists and economists to turn their 
attention once more to the two polar regions 
of our globe. The fundamental difference between 
the two regions, namely that the Antarctic is a 
land mass, a continent, and the Arctic an ice-
bound sea where the ice is six to ten metres 
thick, points to their different possible wres. 
Apart from the natural resources to be exploited, 
there are lines of communication which offer 
great advantages in view of the shorter distance 
between the continents, but which are also 
exposed to considerable difficulties. I should like 
to draw particular attention to the latter, and 
to include them in the debate. 
It is about a hundred years since the Norwe-
gian Nordenskjold, in the course of a three-year 
voyage of exploration, sailed round the north 
of Siberia for the first time, thus demonstrating 
the possibility of using the West-to-East passage. 
The employment of modern ice-breakers is mak-
ing this sea route - usable only in the summer 
months - into a link which, apart from its 
value for the internal traffric of the Soviet Union, 
has become a major transport route and is still 
gaining in importance. Goods - both merchan-
dise from Siberia and com;Jignments on their 
way into the interior - are conveyed by this 
route. 
The counterpart to this northern route round 
the old world is the East-to-W est passage t~ 
the north of Canada and Alaska. This, too, has 
been shown to be navigable, though with greater 
difficulty. Nevertheless plans have already been 
put forward for transporting Alaskan oil by 
this route in containers floating below the surfare 
of the sea. The$e containers would be towed 
by submarines, which have already been tested 
to see if they can be used for this purpose 
beneath the polar ice. 
For airlines the shortest route from central 
and northern Emope to eastern Asia ris over the 
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pole. The technical difficulties have been over-
come, so that the use of this route is now a 
matter of routine. But what applies to civil 
aviation also appli~ in the military sphere. Here 
the frontiers of the power blocs virtually meet, 
and consequently their weapons systems, too, are 
face to face. The Soviet Union is known to have 
carried out nuclear testing in Novaya Zemlya. 
And this is doubtless not the only place where 
missile bases have been established. 
I should also like to talk about the climatic 
effects of the polar ice-caps. These, the earth's 
cryogenic plants, are sources not only of sub-zero 
temperatures but also of ocean currents, anti 
influence the atmospheric humidity. Plans for 
using icebergs as reservoirs of fresh water or 
for the irrigation of arid reglionB open up pros-
pects which are not entirely utopian. That is why 
I appeal to the countries of Europe, too, to 
work towards better co-operation in research 
into and development of the resources of the 
polar areas and the establishment of commu-
nications providing access to them. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you. 
We are at the end of the list of speakers. 
There is now a problem on which I should like 
to have the advice of the Rapporteur amd Chair-
man of the Committee. We have four amendments 
tabled by Mr. Hardy. He ~ already spoken 
to them, but we have them on the agenda for 
tomorrow. I do not see any problems, but I 
should like to have advice on the question whether 
we could deal with the amendments today, so 
as to ease the situation for tomorrow. If there 
are some who are against doing so, we must 
deal with them tomorrow. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to speak 1 
Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank Mr. 
Vattekar from Norway, Mr. Hardy and 1\fr. 
Enders for the supplementary points they have 
made. 
The observer from Norway drew attention in 
particular to the fact that in the Arctic the 
co-operation called for is p()I'!Sible only if the 
state that exercises sovereignty over the area 
concerned, that is, one of the Arctic states, agrees 
to such co-operation. This is a matter of course, 
and the point is also made in my report. 
Mr. Hardy wants the reference to ice-breaker 
technology to be deleted from the draft recom-
mendation. This was speci£ically intended as a 
reminder of the fact that there are a number of 
Arctic technologies that can be jointly developed 
and applied in both the Antarctic and the Arctjc 
without any infringement of sovereign rights. I 
should like, however, to say straight away that 
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I am fully in agreement with Mr. Hardy's pro-
posal that the reference to ice-breaker technology 
in paragraph 1 should nevertheless be deleted. 
I wanted to explain, however, that the reason 
for its inclusion was in fact exactly what came 
out in the position taken up by the Norwegian 
representative. The object was to show that there 
.are a number of possibilities for co-operation 
which do not affect sovereign rights. Our col-
league from Norway has in fact told us - and 
this 'is also clear from a study of the documents 
- that the Arctic states in particular are 
interested in co-operation with other countries 
and in widening the basis of this co-operntion. 
The Norwegian observer felt it was premature 
for the WEU states to collaborate in this matter. 
I do not share this op1nion. It was pointed out 
that a committee of the Arctic stat~ is currently 
being set up with the object of bringing together 
the parties concerned. This fact in itself shows 
that here the~re is a need for things to be 
organised. We know from other fields of activity 
that when there is no formal framework for sueh 
collaboration a problem can very easily be 
investigated simultaneously by several countries. 
We shall make much faster progress lif we 
collaborate in the field of polar technology as in 
others. That is why I should like to keep this 
pa~rt of the draft recommendation. 
Mr. Hardy was sorry that the Law of the Sea 
Conference has been mentioned in the recommen-
dation. He believes that the Law of the Sea 
Conference has so far made no reference at all 
to the Antarctic Treaty ; he said that the 
conference did not impinge upon it, and had no 
wish to do so. At least that is what I understood 
him to say. If this is Mr. Hardy's opinion, then 
I am afraid that I must put him right on this 
point. I have studied the problems and delibera-
tions of the Law of the Sea Conference. 
True, the Antarctic Treaty was not in itself a 
subject of discussion at the Law of the Sea 
Conference, but it was in fact mentioned, and 
put to one side. The view was taken that agree-
ment must first be reached on the acute -
offshore - problems. It was felt that discussion 
of the Antarctic Treaty should be deferred until 
such time as a preliminary draft of the agree-
ments was available. That would be the time to 
examine how the agreements and the treaty fitted 
in with each other. It was also possible, for 
instance, that the offshore provisions - a prob-
lem not covered by the Antarctic Treaty -
would then be taken over from the general prov1-
sions of the Law of the Sea Conference and 
appli~d to the Antarctic. But if this were tQ 
happen the Antarctic Treaty might be under-
mined by the general provisions of the Law of 
the Sea Conference. I therefore consider that the 
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reference to the Law of the Sea Conference is 
necessary. It is the WEU states in particular 
which should have a special interest in ell)Suring 
that the Antarctic Treaty remains intact. 
Mr. Hardy has pointed out that nothing is said 
in the report on the particular concern which is 
felt about the whale population. Perhaps his eye 
skipped the relevant passage in the report ; but 
I also said in my speech that krill were of special 
importance for the entire food chain, whi<'h 
means that they are also of special importance 
for the survival of the whale. 
Mr. Hardy expressed doubt as to whether it 
was proper to deal wrrth the Arctic and the 
Antarctic together in one report. He rightly 
pointed out that the Arctic is a floating iceberg, 
while the Antarctic is a land mass. But the two 
regions have much in common. They are both 
composed of moving ice. They are both polar 
regions. They are the world's two cryogenic 
plants. They both present the same technological 
and scientific problems. I therefore feel strongly 
that a report on the technological aspects must 
cover both regions. The experience gained in the 
two regions is the same. 
I should like to express my thanks to Mr. 
Endens for the additional points he made, many 
of which I too found interesting. But a Rappor-
teur is always faced with the problem of having 
to try to avoid making his report too bulky; he 
always has to think what he can leave out. 
Mr. President, may I also briefly express my 
views on the proposed B~mendments ; I have 
already touched on some of them. 
In Amendment 1 Mr. Hardy suggests that in 
paragraph 1 the words "for a wide-ranging 
programme of collaboration in Western Europe" 
should be left out. I think these words should 
stay in. They do mean something, and I cannot 
understand why they should be deleted. 
I have already said what I think about 
Amendment 2. This suggests that the special 
reference to ice-breakers should be omitted. I 
agree with Mr. Hardy that this is quite a small 
subsidiary problem in the immense field of Arctic 
technology. I would recommend that Amendment 
2 be accepted. 
Amendment 3 propose~> that in paragraph 2 (a) 
the reference to collaboration in the drawing up 
of common guidelines be deleted. I have already 
talked ~about this in connection with Amendment 1. 
Amendment 3 is virtually a rider to Amend-
ment 1, and I would recommend that this, too, be 
rejected. I consider it essential that guidelines 
for collaboration be drawn up. 
Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Hardy is a useful 
addition. It returns to the subject of paragraph 
46 of the report, in which it is pointed out that 
the consultative states were unable to reach 
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agreement on a convention on the conservation of 
Antarctic marine living resources. I think it 
would be a W'!eful addition if his wording were 
incorporated in the recommendation as para-
graph 2 (b). On the other hand, I think the 
content of the present paragraph 2 (b) - the 
reference to the Law of the Sea Conference -
should also be retained. I regard this as particu-
larly important. I would suggest, therefore, that 
the version proposed by Mr. Hardy be incorpor-
ated in the recommendation as paragraph 2 (b). 
The present 2 (b) would then become 2 (c) and 
the present 2 (c) would become 2 (d). 
The PRESIDENT. -Does the Chairman oi' 
the Committee wish to speak ? 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - Mr. 
President. I should like to pay tribute to the 
work of Dr. Colin Phipps, who ~ no longer a 
member of the British Parliament, who was the 
previous Rapporteur for this report, and to Mr. 
Spies voon Biillesheim, for that which he took over 
as his report. 
This, Sir, is my very last speech to you as a 
member of Western European Union. It i'l 
probably appropriate that we should end part of 
this session on something which is far removed 
from the immediate cause of our deliberations. 
The Arctic is a long way from us. It is not the 
prerogative of any one of the states of WEU, 
nor is it the prerogative of any Arctic state. I 
say that with great respect to our Norwegian 
colleagues - my sister-in-law is married to a 
Norwegian. However, we must recognise that 
across the Arctic will come the intercontinental 
ballistic missiles of tomorrow which could destroy 
the whole of our world. The Arctic is the open 
door of the North. It was right for our Committee 
to look at that door and to observe that it was 
open and bare of defence. 
In the balcony, Mr. President - which I am 
probably not allowed to observe for parliamen-
tary reasons - is your son. I should like to say 
that I think that we in this chamber through 
this one report are trying to defend th~ world 
today and to make sure that his world will live 
tomorrow. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Chai::.·-
man. I think that you paid a tribute to the 
following generation when you said that what 
we are doing here is for them. The tribute to 
you as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, 
;rechnological and Aerospace Questions must be 
outstanding, because you have done great work 
and you supplied us with a lot of documents on 
this tremendoW'! field of today and tomorrow. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the service that 
you have done this Assembly. (Applause) 
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The debate is closed. I told the Assemblv 
previously that the final vote on the recommend~­
tion is on the agenda for tomorrow, but in order 
to ease the situation tomorrow I have proposed 
that we vote on the amendments today. 
The Rapporteur has given the Committee's 
views on the four amendments. If I am correct, 
the Committee is against Amendment 1, in favour 
of Amendment 2, against Amendment 3, and in 
favour of Amendment 4. 
I must now call the amendments. 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Hardy reads : 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "for a wide-ranging programme 
of collaboration in Western Europe". 
Mr. Hardy, do you wish to speak? 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- I am sorry 
that the Rapporteur cannot accept Amendment 1. 
What I am suggesting is merely that we do not 
overstate our demand for involvement or assume 
that there is a right of involvement, since this 
Assembly was not created to appear disdainful 
of sovereign rights. But yet the amendment 
would leave our interests very clear, and it would 
therefore be an acceptable ve1')9ion for recom-
mendation 1 to read : "to draw the attention of 
member governments to the need for the develop-
ment of Arctic technology". 
I accept that it would be simpler, but it would 
not be in any way presumptuous, and I am sorry 
that the Rapporteur opposes it. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Rapporteur. 
Mr. SPIES von BOLLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, may I first suggest- and you have in 
fact put the matter correctly - that Amend-
ments 1 and 3 be dealt with together, as they 
are on the same subject. 
To turn now to Mr. Hardy's proposal. If his 
amendment were carried, that would mean that 
we are calling on governments to bear in mind 
the need for the development of Arctic tech-
nology. That ~ not the decisive point. What we 
want, and what we as WEU must demand, is 
collaboration in Arctic research. I cannot give 
my agreement to the call for greater collaboration 
contained in the version before us being deleted 
from the recommendation. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I shall 
not press the amendment, Ml'. President, in view 
of the Rapporteur's reluctance, although I may 
wish to press a further amendment. I withdraw 
Amendment 1. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you. 
Amendment 1 is withdrawn. 
I now call Amendment 2. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- I formally 
move Amendment 2 : 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendatioa 
proper, leave out "for example in the building of 
ice-breakers". 
The PRESIDENT. - The Committee has 
agreed to this amendment. 
We shall now vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to unanimously. 
I call Amendment 3. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I beg to 
move Amendment 3 : 
3. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft reeommenda-
tion proper, leave out "to draw up mutually-
acceptable administrative and industrial guide-
lines for such collaboration in order". 
I move the amendment very briefly because I 
believe that it would be far better for a very 
simple resolution to appear, which simply read: 
"to ensure that Europe plays its part in 
developing the polar regions". We already have 
a great deal of mutually-acceptable arrangements. 
We already have four important polar institu-
tions in Western Europe. But I believe that this 
insistence on mutual collaboration among Western 
European nations can cause a great deal of 
resentment on the part of the Arctic states. I 
regret that we have this apparent insistence 
upon such involvement. I hope that this amend-
ment will be accepted, too. 
Mr. SPIES von BtJLLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Now 
that Mr. Hardy has withdrawn his Amendment 1, 
Amendment 3 takes on a different aspect. We 
agree to this proposed amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Committee agrees. 
We shall now vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 3 is agreed to unanimously. 
I now call Amendment 4 : 
4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) of the draft recom. 
mendation proper and linsert : 
"(b) to welcome and support the draft con-
vention on the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources ;". 
The problem, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Rappor-
teur, is that you can agree to the new text but 
cannot agree to leave out paragraph 2 (b). What 
does Mr. Hardy want to say ? 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I firmly 
believe that paragraph 2 (b) should not be in 
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the report. It is dangerous, it is not neceasarily 
accurate and it could be extremely prejudicial to 
the future of the Antarctic and current negotia-
tions. It would be appropriate for us to welcome 
that which is good and not to incur the risk of 
that which is already present. While I am 
delighted that the Rapporteur is prepared to 
accept my proposed additional sub-paragraph, I 
am not happy that sub-pa:ragraph 2 (b) as it 
stands should remain in the report. I must !insist 
on pressing this amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. -Mr. Rapporteur, please. 
Mr. SPIES von BtJLLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - First, 
Mr. President, I should like to repeat that we 
agree to the addition. The point proposed by 
Mr. Hardy as paragraph 2 (b) is acceptable in 
the opinion of both the Rapporteur and the 
Chairman of the Committee. On the other hand, 
the deletion of the present paragraph 2 (b) can 
on no account be accepted. Nor has its subject 
matter anything to do with this. I would there-
fore ask that the two be voted on separately. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Roper, please. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). -I do not 
wish to raise unnecessary points of order, but 
before you proceed to the first contested vote -
all the others have been unanimous- I think you 
should perhaps reconsider your earlier announce-
ment. Members of the Assembly were told earlier 
this afternoon that votes on this matter would be 
taken tomorrow. Some members may not be pre-
sent. They may have left the hemicycle. Would 
you say that it is fair to proceed to a contested 
vote when some members may have left on the 
assumption that votes would not take place? 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Chairman, please. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom).- I under-
stand what Mr. Hardy is trying to put forward. 
He has perhaps not appreciated the paragraph 
that he is seeking to delete is in no way related 
to the amendment he has put forward. I under-
stand fully what he is getting at, but it would 
be ridiculous to take out that which we have 
proposed and replace it by something else that 
we might be willing to add to the whole report. 
Will he be kind enough to accept that it could be 
added1 He has raised an important issue but it 
is also an important point that we wish to sustain 
and the Committee unanimously endorsed it in its 
consideration. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- Although 
I deeply regret this injudicious clause, I am pre-
pared to accept, in view of the time, that the 
words shall remain in. I am delighted that the 
new sub-paragraph is acceptable. I shall not 
oppose it. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
The PRESIDENT.- That is to say that Mr. 
Hardy only moves the second half of the amend-
ment. 
Mr. Rapporteur, please. 
Mr. SPIES von BtJLLESHEIM (Federal 
Republic of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, may I suggest that Mr. Hardy's 
re-formulation as proposed in Amendment 4 
should become the new paragraph 2 (b), and 
that the present paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c) 
become paragraphs 2 (c) and 2 (d), that is, that 
they be moved down and that the addition be 
inserted above them, as by virtue of their subject 
matter the former paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c) 
belong together. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Hardy's manuscript 
amendment reads as follows: 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, insert a new paragraph as fo1lows: 
"(b) to welcome and support the draft con-
vention on the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources;". 
We shall now vote on this manuscript amend-
ment. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing) 
The manuscript amendment is agreed to 
unanimously. 
The vote on the draft recommendation as a 
whole will be taken tomorrow morning. 
We are now practically at the end of the sitting 
and before I close with my remarks about tomor-
row, Mr. Roper, according to our Rules of Pro-
cedure, asks for the floor to make a personal 
statement. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order. I sound like Mr. Roper because I 
would hate my swansong to be a point of order. 
Can we have the vote on our report now? 
The PRESIDENT.- I must ask the Assem-
bly. I have no objection. There is more or less 
unanimity. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). -Would 
you be kind enough to ask whether there is 
unanimity on the report in order to save time in 
the morning? 
The PRESIDENT.- You are extremely kind 
in endeavouring to save time tomorrow. 
We shall therefore vote on the draft recom-
mendation in Document 822 as amended. 
Are there any objections?... 
Are there any abstentions?... 
The amended draft recommendation is adopted 
unanimously 1 . 
1. See page 45 
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8. Personal statement 
The PRESIDENT. - I now call Mr. Roper 
to make his personal statement. Will members 
please remain for a couple of minutesT 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- As Chair-
man of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments ... 
(iJ-lr. Roper then read a statement too quickly 
for the members of the Assembly, the interpreters 
and the verbatim reporters to be able to grasp the 
meaning) 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, I cannot understand this English. 
The PRESIDENT. - I could not follow it. 
Will you please hand in your remarks, Mr. 
Roper, so that I can read them carefully T No 
interpreter was able to follow ; nor could the 
shorthand reporters. You will have to let us have 
the script of your remarks. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I under-
stand that that would not be in order. I gave 
notice to the interpreters and the shorthand 
writers of the speed at which I was going to 
speak. They are both prepared to cope with this 
situation, and I will hand in the full text so that 
the record can be complete, but in terms of the 
Rules of Procedure I have to continue. 
The PRESIDENT.- Please go on. You have 
five minutes in which to contain a twenty-
minute speech, perhaps. 
(Mr. Roper continued his statement which 
remained unintelligible) 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order. 
The PRESIDENT. - No, wait a moment 
please. I should inform the Assembly that the 
Presidential Committee decided at noon to revise 
the Rules of Procedure, and what we have just 
witnessed might cause the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure to go into details about personal 
remarks. I shall look carefully at the text of your 
speech, Mr. Roper, which I did not follow and 
could not understand. If there is something in it 
on which to remark, I shall refer to it at the next 
sitting. 
Mr. WARREN (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. I regret rising 011 
this matter. I am sure that Mr. Roper would not 
wish to give offence to the Assembly. I am sure 
that he meant to be humorous and would not 
wish to cast any aspersions on either the Presi-
dency or members of any of the Committees of 
this Assembly. I hope that in due course it will 
be possible for us to examine what he said, for 
which there was no translation in any language. 
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Mr. Warren (continued) 
I am sure that he would not wish to leave behind 
what was a very odious impression of the way 
in which he, as Chairman of an important Com-
mittee in this Assembly, wished to contribute to 
the Assembly. He may wish to discuss that with 
you, Sir. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- I would not 
wish to worry Mr. Warren in this respect. A 
most insulting attack was made upon my Com-
mittee on Monday by a member of the Assembly. 
I wanted to have a chaooe to put on the record 
my reply. If I had spoken at the length or at the 
speed at which I normally speak, it would have 
detained the Assembly for a considerable period 
this evening. I thought, therefore, that it was 
better to fulfil the letter of the rules. What I 
said is on the record, and Mr. Warren, Mr. Talon 
and you, Sir, will have a chance to read and 
study it. 
The PRESIDENT.- No doubt we shall care-
fully study the remarks that you made. 
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow 
7 
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morning, 'l'hursday 6th December, at 10 a.m. with 
the following Orders of the Day: 
1. New weapons and defence strategy; SALT 
II and its implications for European secur-
ity (Votes on the draft Recommendations 
and amended draft Resolution, Documents 
827 and 816). 
2. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Document 817 and 
Amendments). 
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments, 
Document 818). 
Are there any objections?... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speakL 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.) 
FOURTEENTH SITTING 
Thursday, 6th December 1979 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. New weapons and defence strategy (Votes on the draft 
Recommendations, Doe. 827). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Deschamps. 
4. SALT Il and its implications for European security 
(Vote on the amended draft Resolution, Doe. 816). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Deschamps. 
5. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the 
consequences for Europe (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recom-
mendation, Doe. 817 and Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Lewis (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Adriaensens (Rapporteur), Mr. Fll!.mig (for Mr. Scheffler, 
Rapporteur), Mr. Cornelissen (Rapporteur), Mr. Valleix 
(Chairman of the Committee), Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. 
Valleix, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Valleix. 
6. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments, Doe. 818). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. De Poi (Rapporteur), 
Mr. Roper, Mr. De Poi (Rapporteur); (point of order): 
Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper. 
7, Close of the Session. 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, PreBident of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with 
Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes 
of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments L .. 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the 
Substitutes attending this Sitting which have 
been notified to the President will be published 
with the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings 1, 
3. New weapons and defence strategy 
(Votes on the draft Recommendations, Doe. 827) 
The PRESIDENT.- The first Order of the 
Day is to vote on the texts on which we were 
not able to vote yesterday for lack of a quorum. 
First, the draft recommendation on the moder-
nisation of theatre nuclear weapons, Document 
827. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
1. See page 48. 
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Mr. DESCHAMPS (France) (Translation).-
Mr. President, I request a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Deschamps asks for 
a roll-call vote. We shall therefore hold a vote 
by roll-call in the hope that some members will 
be coming in from outside so that we may have 
a quorum. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to vote L. 
The voting is closed. 
Gentlemen, there is not a quorum. We should 
also hold a vote on the draft recommendation 
on the impact of technology, Document 827, but 
since there is not a quorum this vote will also 
have to be postponed until the next session. 
4. SALT 11 and its implications for European 
security 
(Vote on the amended draft Resolution, Doe. 816) 
The PRESIDENT. - We now turn to the 
vote on the amended draft resolution on SALT II 
and its implications for European security, Docu-
ment 816, which was postponed from yesterday 
since there was not a quorum when the chair 
was asked to count the numbers present under 
Rule 36. 
If anyone asks for a roll-call vote now, we 
must have one, yet there is no quorum. If no one 
asks for such a vote, we can decide it by sitting 
and standing. 
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Mr. DESCHAMPS (France) (Translation).-
Mr. President, I request a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Is your 
request supported by ten members of the Assem-
bly' 
Mr. DESCHAMPS (France) (Translation).-
I venture to invite you to take a vote on this 
question, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation).- For your 
request to be admissible it must be supported 
by ten members of the Assembly. Who are these 
ten members Y 
(The President continued in English) 
May I read the paragraph ~ 
"All votes other than votes by roll-call shall 
be valid, whatever the number of representa-
tives present, unless, before the voting has 
begun, the President has been requested to 
ascertain the number of those present." 
If you are asking me to ascertain whether we 
have a quorum, I must tell you that we have 
not. If you are asking for a roll-call vote, you 
must have a sufficient number. I think we could 
proceed by sitting and standing. We shall do so. 
The Assembly will now vote on the draft 
resolution. This is not a draft recommendation 
but a draft resolution, which is slightly different. 
I shall therefore put the question by sitting and 
standing. 
(A vote was taken by sitting and standing) 
The amended draft resolution is adopted 1 • 
As members who were present last night will 
know, we have already voted on .the draft recom-
mendation on Arctic technology. 
5. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 817 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions on Brazilian-
European collaborative ventures and the con-
sequences for Europe and vote on the draft 
recommendation, Document 817 and Amend-
ments. 
The report is presented by Mr. Lewis, Mr. 
Adriaensens, Mr. Scheffler and Mr. Cornelissen 
as Rapporteurs. 
I call Mr. Lewis. 
1. See page 49. 
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Mr. LEWIS (United Kingdom).- This report, 
the joint work of four Rapporteurs, has the 
unanimous support of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
The Committee is unanimously recommending it 
to the full Assembly in the hope that members 
will unanimously accept it. I keep emphasising 
that word "unanimously" because we do not seem 
to act scientifically or technologically in this 
Assembly. We seem to waste so much time on 
questions of roll-call votes and so on, but I think 
our Committee ought to investigate a better 
method of going about it. We hope, therefore, 
that this non-political but most important report 
will be accepted. 
I shall begin by referring to what is said in 
the first four paragraphs of the introduction 
to the report, where we have paid tribute to the 
various persons and organisations involved. I 
must pay particular thanks to you, Mr. Presi-
dent, and your Presidential Committee, because 
we know that, had it not been for your own 
efforts and those of the Committee, this visit 
could not have taken place. We are very grateful 
to you for facilitating it. 
It is very difficult to think of Brazil as a 
developing or backward country, because in so 
many respects, and certainly in industrial and 
economic progress, it is doing even better than 
the so-called "advanced countries" of the western 
world. Whilst it is, of course, a backward coun-
try with still a great deal of leeway to make up, 
it has made rapid progress economically - and, 
to a lesser extent, scientifically and technolo-
gically - in a relatively short time. 
Most of us in the West, especially if we are 
men, tend to think of the Brazilian football team 
and to regard the country as small as well as 
backward, but it has a rapidly growing popu-
lation of some 115 million people and a land 
mass of some 8.5 million square kilometres. I 
know from long experience that when figures 
are quoted they mean very little ; they tend to 
go in one ear and out of the other. However, 
when we consider that the whole of Europe, 
including the Russian portion as far as the Ural 
Mountains, covers only 10.25 million square kilo-
metres, we realise that the two areas are almost 
the same but, in the case of Europe, there are 
some 628 million people. 
It can be seen, therefore, that there are great 
possibilities for exploiting the land and mineral 
wealth. People can be encouraged to go and 
settle there. The land is there, the mineral wealth 
is there, almost everything else is there, with 
one great exception : this exception presents a 
problem similar to that of Europe, only worse : 
energy or, rather, the lack of it. That lack is 
probably hitting Brazil harder than it is any 
other country, because 85 % of the whole of its 
economy is dependent upon imported oil. 
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Mr. Lewis (continued) 
The cost last year, before the recent increases, 
was seven billion United States dollars. That was 
the cost of imports of oil to keep the country's 
economy going, and I am not talking of the situa-
tion we see in places like Paris and London 
where people are driving round in cars unneces-
sarily, just for pleasure - that is happening 
in every capital city. That was simply the cost 
of keeping Brazil's economy going. Therefore, 
we can understand and appreciate what an 
increase of a few dollars on a barrel of oil means 
to such an economy. 
Notwithstanding these great difficulties, from 
1974 to 1979 Brazil's economy was such that 
the gross national product of the country was 
raised from $65 billion to more than $100 bil-
lion. When one realises that that was done in 
the relatively short period of five years, and 
that the per capita income of each Brazilian was 
raised to $1,000 per annum, not high by our 
standards, one sees that that was proportionately 
a big step forward. It has increased its rate of 
growth by 12 % a year over the past five years. 
I only wish that we in Britain and the rest of 
Western Europe could have increased our pro-
duction along those lines. 
As can be imagined, that has meant an 
enormous increase in Brazil's capital plant and 
equipment and has brought terrific attacks upon 
her balance of payments so that the country 
is now in great economic difficulty. We are 
hoping that the International Monetary Fund 
and the western world will come forward to help 
the Brazilians economically. This report, however, 
deals with the possibility of Western Europe 
trying to help the Brazilian economy forward 
and at the same time helping ourselves. 
There is the possibility for every country in 
Europe to produce the capital equipment and 
plant that is so necessary to that country. 
I have said that Brazil is short of oil and fuel. 
.Amazingly, the Brazilians have successfully 
developed a pure alcohol fuel, made from cane 
sugar, on which their vehicles are driving. Cane 
sugar grows almost wild in that country, vir-
tually anywhere, and internally costs virtually 
nothing to produce. Mr. Warren, the Chairman 
of our Committee, who is not present at the 
moment, was fortunate enough to be able to drive 
round in a car driven wholly on pure alcohol-
not whisky or vodka - and the amazing thing 
was that there were no exhaust fumes or deterio-
ration in power. The speed and getaway were 
better than with petroleum. This is a develop-
ment that we might follow up. 
I would not suggest that we should try to 
do it with cane sugar, for we cannot grow that, 
but potatoes can be produced almost everywhere 
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in the western world and I am told that the 
Russians are able to produce vodka from pota-
toes so perhaps we could solve our energy 
problem to some extent by producing potatoes 
on every piece of waste land. Whisky is not pure 
enough : one has to use pure alcohol - I am 
not talking about de-natured whisky. 
Our report makes five recommendations for 
developing the science, technology, trade and 
economy of Brazil with the rest of Western 
Europe. We are proposing this because we believe 
that there should be a great development of 
trade between Brazil and the countries of 
Western Europe. We see a lot of competition 
between Britain, France, Germany and the rest 
of Europe all trying to sell one another the 
kinds of goods that the other country produces, 
with one or two exceptions, better and cheaper. 
Of course, no one else can produce whisky, 
not even the English. Only Scotland can do 
that. If any of our Irish friends are present, 
I would tell them that they make a good imita-
tion but it is not as good as the original. How-
ever, this is a serious matter. 
Here we are at each other's throats trying to 
compete, for example, in selling to the Germans 
things which they can produce as well if not 
better and the Germans trying to sell things to 
Britain. In Brazil we have a country that is 
crying out for our commodities and manufac-
tured goods which they urgently need and which 
we ought to try to develop, both for our own 
sakes and certainly for the sake of the Brazi-
lians. If we do not do that, someone else will 
and that someone else may not be among the 
democratic countries of Western Europe. 
Therefore, from a military and western defence 
point of view it would be wise for us to 
try to encourage the development of the economy 
of Brazil and its scientific and technological 
development. I am sure that no one can object 
to these five recommendations. They are all posi-
tive and proposals to which everyone could sub-
scribe . 
On behalf of the Committee, I move the report 
and would ask the Assembly to give some help 
to the chair by accepting this proposal with accla-
mation, without any need for sitting and stand-
ing. 
The PRESIDENT. -Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
I now call Mr. Adriaensens, if he wishes to 
supplement your remarks. 
Mr. ADRIAENSENS (Belgium) (Transla-
tion). - The part of the report I am going to 
deal with, Mr. President, is connected with 
energy probleins in Brazil. Since this is a pressing 
problem throughout the world, I would advise 
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Mr. Adriaensens (continued) 
those who have not yet read the report to do so 
straight away. 
I shall not be talking today about alternative 
sources of energy such as solar energy, bitumi-
nous shale, subterranean coal gasification and 
tests with eucalyptus wood. Where :these are 
concerned, I would refer members to the report. 
The two major problems with which Brazil 
has to grapple are those of petroleum and of 
electricity. While we were in Brazil, the Pre-
sident declared a "war economy", and with this 
in mind I would like to call members' attention 
to a few figures. Brazil's total import of oil in 
1979 will be costing around$ 7,000 million, about 
half the total value of its exports. 85 % of the 
total consumption of oil has to be imported, and 
consumption is running at 1.1 million barrels 
a day. Only 15% of this consumption can be 
covered by domestic production. During the next 
five to si.'{ years oil requirements are expected 
to increase by about 10% a year. The govern-
ment has now decided to peg oil imports at their 
present level, that is to say around one million 
barrels a day. Unless one wants to put a brake on 
the normal growth in the number of vehicles 
and consumption of oil, this will mean finding a 
substitute. 
Brazil is looking for a way of making up the 
deficit, first by increasing its own oil produc-
tion, a task being dealt with by Petrobras, and 
second by using alcohol as an alternative fuel. 
At the present moment this involves alcohol 
obtained from sugar cane ; thought is being 
given to other raw materials as well, but the 
main raw material is sugar cane. The first 
experiments began in 197 4, and today there are 
some 200 distilleries with a total production of 
3,800 million litres of alcohol a year. Petrol is 
already being mixed with 18 % alcohol. During 
our visit to Brazil we had the opportunity of 
travelling in a car fuelled with pure alcohol, 
and experiments are going on using about 
1,500 cars. The programme for the next six 
years is costing some $ 5,000 million. Production 
will have to be increased by a factor of 2.5 by 
the year 1985, meaning an annual production of 
10,000 million litres, equivalent to the consump-
tion of 1,700,000 cars; by that time the number 
of vehicles in use is expected to be between 
eight and nine million. But there are still in-
numerable probleins to be ·solved before this is 
achieved. First and foremost there will have 
to be new sugar cane plantations, and ways will 
have to be found of simplifying production, with 
an eye particularly to the air pollution the distil-
leries cause. Smell, in particular, is a problem. 
Furthermore, engines that can be fuelled with 
alcohol will have to be manufactured on an 
industrial scale, and the smell of the burnt 
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alcohol still presents a problem ; it is less poison-
ous than carbon monoxide, but the smell is a 
great deal more unpleasant. 
Now I come to the problem of electricity. 
If the Brazilian Government is on the one hand 
to raise living standards and on the other to 
allow industrial development to progress further, 
it is obviously going to need more electricity. 
At present a great part of the electricity comes 
from hydroelectric power stations, and the 
number of these will have to be substantially 
expanded in the near future. Major work is 
currently under way on this, particularly at 
Itaipu. The Amazon region has infinite resources 
for running these power stations, but one problem 
is still transporting this over long distances to 
the triangle between Brasilia, Rio and Sao Paolo, 
where industry is concentrated. No solution has 
yet been found to this problem, which is why 
thought is being given to generating electricity 
in nuclear power stations. 
The intention is to have the eight nuclear 
power stations currently planned ready for use 
by 1990, when they will be able to supply a 
total of 15 % of electricity production. Members 
will know that the first nuclear power station 
was designed by W estinghouse, and will be ready 
in 1982, while the other power stations will be 
built in co-operation with West Germany on the 
basis of the famous agreement of 1975. In this 
connection I want to make the point that it was 
impressed upon us in Brazil that they want 
to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful pur-
poses. I will not go here into the problems that 
arose in 1975 over this agreement. 
The Brazilian Government has two major 
organisations for expanding the use of industrial 
nuclear power. First, there is the National 
Nuclear Energy Commission, which takes care 
of the planning side ; this commission includes 
experts, and looks after rules on the plants, 
the raw materials and the treatment of nuclear 
waste, which is a very important problem. The 
commission also encourages scientific research 
and acts as a go-between. On the operational side 
the government relies on Nuclebras, which is 
responsible for implementing the government's 
plans and nuclear energy policy in the industrial 
sector. This body deals in particular with the 
production and enrichment of uranium, con-
tracts for which have been signed with a French 
firm. Until these plans come to fruition, the 
enriched uranium will come from Europe. 
Nuclebras is also concerned with the construction 
of the power stations, and although it is a govern-
ment body it has contracts with many private 
undertakings for building the "Angra", the name 
given to the various power stations. When I 
add that Nuclebras at present employs 4,000 
people, of whom one-third are university gra-
duates, you will see at once what an important 
organisation it is. 
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Since I assume that everyone will have read 
our report, at least in its broad outlines, I have 
been very brief. I would refer anyone who 
wants to learn more about the subject to the 
report. Thank you. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Adriaensens. 
I now call Mr. FHimig to speak in place of 
the Rapporteur, Mr. Scheffler. 
Mr. FLAMIG (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). -Mr. President, I should like, if 
you will allow me, to begin by making a minor 
personal observation. I am very glad to have 
an opportunity once again, ten years almost 
to the day since I last presented a report to this 
Assembly, of speaking here once again in place 
of my colleague Mr. Scheffler, who apologises 
for his absence. 
I am dealing with Parts Ill and V of Docu-
ment 817, which you have before you. 
Part Ill discusses the development of space 
activities in Brazil, and here Mr. Scheffler wishes 
to express his thanks to all the persons with 
whom he talked in Brazil for the readiness and 
openness with which they supplied him with 
information. 
Space activities have been going on in Brazil 
for fifteen years, with sounding rockets and 
launching facilities at Natal. It is proposed to 
launch a first small meteorological satellite in 
1985. Owing to its agriculture and because of 
its structure and size, as well as its geogra-
phical position, B:vazil of necessity attaches par-
ticular importance to high-grade weather fore-
casting. 
Furthermore, the Brazilians are endeavouring 
to combat environmental pollution in their own 
country. They therefore attach particular impor-
tance to reconnaissance by aerial photography. 
Accurate monitoring of such an immense country 
as Brazil is hardly possible otherwise than by 
satellite observation. Until 1985 information of 
this kind will be obtained from NASA's Landsat 
satellite. It is intended that at a later stage 
the French Spot satellite shall be used for the 
exploration of earth resources. Arrangements to 
this end have already been made with France. 
The technical organisation of Brazilian space 
activities is clearly illustrated by the charts in 
Part Ill of the document before you. 
Today, Mr. President, a staff which already 
numbers about 1,000, including 400 graduates 
and 200 with doctorates, is engaged in the deve-
lopment of a Brazilian satellite system. The 
relatively high budget appropriations of $ 30 to 
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40 million per year show the outstanding 
importance which the Brazilian Government 
attaches to this development work. 
One gains the impression that the organisa-
tion covering all the institutions concerned with 
space activities is fully capable of carrying out 
the tasks involved. Furthermore, these institu-
tions are taking steps to familiarise a body of 
scientists belonging to the rising generation with 
questions of space technology. 
As you all know, Brazil has special problems 
in the energy sector. Mr. Adriaensens has 
reported, in the section dealing with energy 
questions, on the ways in which the Brazilians 
are endeavouring to overcome the bottleneck in 
oil supplies. Extensive experiments, some of 
which have produced very favourable results, 
are being carried out with a view to the use of 
sugar cane and manioc for the production of 
fuel. The Brazilian Government is therefore 
calling for the development of engines which 
can be converted to run on ethanol and other 
fuels. 
The report presented in Part V about the 
Ariane launch base was of particular interest 
to the members of the Committee. Many of us 
still recall the development and building of the 
rocket launching base in Kourou in 1966. I then 
had the opportunity, Mr. President, of belonging 
to the WEU delegation which went to Kourou. 
At that time the equatorial launch base for 
ELDO was built on land belonging to the French 
space centre in Guiana. The base was provided 
with all the plant and equipment required for 
implementation of the project. After develop-
ment of the European launchers had been dis-
continued, the installations at the Kourou launch 
base were transferred to ESA. The facilities 
which were later adapted for the development 
of Ariane also became the property of ESA. 
The Rapporteur does not wish to go into the 
details of the financing of the project. It should 
be pointed out, however, that while the Agency 
is responsible for this programme, over 60 % of 
the 700 million units of account which it costs 
has been borne by France. 
The Committee was able to satisfy itself on 
the spot as to the excellent siting of the space 
centre and the launch base. The ideal siting of 
the launch base in the vicinity of the equator 
and the utilisation of the sling effect of the 
earth's rotation ensure optimum technical con-
ditions :for each launch, in that larger satellites 
can be put into orbit with less :fuel. 
In French Guiana there are no great dif-
ferences between high and low tide. The weather 
is relatively stable and the population is small. 
There is not very much air traffic, and :few 
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shipping lanes pass near by. The area available 
to the space centre is 55 km long and 25 km 
wide. 
Three main requirements had to be met there. 
Firstly, the necessary logistic support for the 
launch had to be ensured. As already stated, all 
the necessary ground installations already exist. 
Secondly, all the technical, electronic and optical 
equipment for the launches and for flight track-
ing had to be prepared and made operational. 
Thirdly, preparations were made to enable the 
risk, in the event of accidents, to be minimised 
or completely excluded. 
The first launch, planned for November but 
now to take place on 15th December, has 
naturally aroused great public interest. Around 
600 persons from France and from French 
Guiana itself are employed at the launch base. 
Over 50 firms from the ESA member countries 
are involved in one aspect or another of the 
building of the launcher. The facilities provided 
for observation of the launch consist of tele-
metry stations in Salinopolis, radar stations in 
Natal (Brazil) and on Ascension Island, plus the 
equipment of NASA and the United States 
Defence Department, so as to enable the thit>d 
stage of Ariane, too, to be properly observed. 
The fact that the world's confidence in the 
soundness of the project is now sufficiently 
well-established for the contract for putting 
Intelsat V into space with the Ariane launcher 
to have been placed has given a great boost to 
the morale of the team engaged in the project. 
Although mistakes can never be completely 
ruled out, the members of the Committee had the 
impression that with care and precision and with 
the positively fanatical zeal and the good will of 
all concerned, the conditions for the success of 
the project are as good as they could possibly 
be. I need hardly stress to you all again the 
great political and economic importance of suc-
cess with this project. Allow me to conclude by 
expressing the hope that the efforts of everyone 
concerned may this time, for the first time, be 
crowned with success. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I also ask you to accept 
the recommendation and the report. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank 
Mr. Fliimig for presenting Mr. Scheffler's report. 
(The President continued in English) 
I now call Mr. Cornelissen. 
Mr. CORNELISSEN (N etkerlands) (Transla-
tion).- Mr. President, after the comments from 
my co-Rapporteurs I want to say just one or 
two things about Part IV of the report. In the 
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relatively short time - in my opinion too short 
a time - we spent in Brazil, we were able to 
gather a great deal of information thanks to the 
willingness of the Brazilian authorities. 
A good transport system is obviously very 
important for developing an enormous country 
like Brazil : roads are needed and waterways, · 
railways and an air network. We had the pleasure 
of visiting a factory belonging to the Brazilian 
aircraft manufacturers Embraer. This factory, 
which recently celebrated its twentieth anni-
versary, now has a workforce of 5,000 producing 
a large number of different aircraft types. 
Virtually all the staff have been trained in the 
factory itself ; their average age is under thirty. 
Productivity is, certainly for a developing coun-
try, extremely high, because of modern machinery 
and of course because of the keenness of those 
working in the factory. The output from ,the 
factory makes a sizeable contribution to the 
exports that Brazil needs so much. The 
Bandeirante transport aircraft in particular sells 
well abroad. Our visit demonstrated to us how 
quickly a developing country becomes capable of 
manufacturing high-technology products. I felt 
that the production is destined mainly for the 
home market, partly because Brazil has not all 
that highly developed a railway network. There 
are now besides, because of the energy shortage, 
plans for a major expansion and modernisation 
of the rail network. It is obvious, however, that 
air transport must continue to play a major 
role. 
The second point I would like to touch on is 
the developments in the Amazon region. Here 
too particularly interesting work is being done, 
even though on a modest scale, using modern 
methods. For many centuries the Amazon was 
a mysterious and inaccessible part of South 
America, which no doubt all of us still remember 
from the books we used to read as children. 
During the last century the harvesting of 
rubber undoubtedly made some contribution to 
opening up the Amazon region, yet it is only 
over recent decades that economic development 
has really got under way. The famous Trans-
America Highway has only very recently been 
completed. The Brazilian Government is now 
devoting a great deal of attention to developing 
this enormously large area. 
It is obvious, however, that extreme care is 
called for in dealing with five million 
square kilometres of forest, and the institute in 
Manaus, which we visited, told us about this. I 
got the impression that this was a very well 
managed scientific centre. It has already put 
forward a great many proposals to the govern-
ment, including some on the setting up of 
national parks and forests. It will be obvious 
however than an institute of 200 workers is not 
really able to cope adequately with the develop-
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ments including those in the scientific sphere 
going on in this vast underdeveloped area. 
I think therefore that it would be extremely 
interesting if the Western European countries, 
with their great experience in tropical forestry, 
were to make a number of people available to 
this fascinating scientific centre in Manaus. The 
people we met there were without exception 
extremely enthusiastic about the work they arc 
doing. We in Western Europe increasingly 
have to face the problem of young graduates who 
cannot find work, so it seems to me obvious for 
our governments and the organisations involved 
to look at the possibilities there are in this very 
exciting part of the world. 
The third point I want to mention is the 
development of nuclear power in Brazil. You 
will all know that nuclear reactors, processing 
plants and the supplying of enriched uranium 
by the German/British/Dutch consortium Urenco 
are on the agenda. There is great concern in the 
Netherlands that supplying nuclear reactors, 
processing plants, enriched uranium and the 
associated know-how creates a danger of more 
and more countries in the world being in a 
position to manufacture their own nuclear 
weapons. Our concern is all the greater since this 
involves countries which, like Brazil, have not 
signed the non-proliferation treaty. There are 
of course a number of arguments for this, but 
this does not get away from the fact that these 
countries have unfortunately felt no need to 
sign the non-proliferation treaty. In this con-
nection I might point to recent developments in 
such countries as Pakistan, India and South 
Mrica. We must surely all agree that these are 
cause for great concern. 
I would just ask you to think what might have 
happened, or might still be going to happen, if 
the American Government had a number of years 
ago supplied nuclear know-how, factories, pro-
cessing plant and uranium to the "friendly 
government" of the Shah of Iran! I think we 
should try to look a little further than the 
morrow. Certainly, the countries that have this 
nuclear know-how carry an enormous respon-
sibility for the whole of mankind. 
As my colleagues have already pointed out, the 
problem of energy is extremely important for 
Brazil currently exports - totalling some $12 
of this there is the fact that Brazil has the largest 
foreign debt of any of the developing countries 
- about $50 thousand million. Everything that 
Brazil currently exports - totalling some $12 
thousand million - is needed to buy oil and 
to pay off the country's foreign debts. Brazil 
will therefore certainly try more and more to 
increase its exports. If we realise that three 
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quarters of the oil imported by Brazil comes 
from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran and if one 
also realises that technology in Brazil is, far 
more than in the wealthy countries, matched to 
the level of countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, then there is I believe every reason 
to pursue a very cautious policy. 
Certainly countries like Iraq and Iran will 
show a great deal of interest in the nuclear 
know-how of their Brazilian "customer", a 
customer who would find it very difficult indeed 
to go without their oil. I think that we must 
recognise that this situation contains very real 
dangers. I think it is well, therefore, for this 
to be reflected in the recommendation. I 
shall however have great difficulty with the 
recommendation if the European countries 
are to co-operate with Brazil unrestrictedly in 
the nuclear field and in the development of 
military aircraft, as the recommendation urges. 
For these reasons I have felt the need to put 
before this Assembly a few amendments to the 
draft recommendation. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. -Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
This concludes the presentation of the report 
and the debate is now open. 
I have no one on the list of speakers. 
Do the Rapporteurs wish to say anything 
further or shall we listen to what the Chairman 
of the Committee has to say ~ 
I see that the Rapporteurs do not wish to say 
anything further. 
I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
should first like to inform the Assembly - for 
you yourself, Mr. President, have already been 
informed - that I am speaking in place of 
Mr. Warren, who was unt!l this morning Chair-
man of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions. I do so not 
without some emotion, since it is the first time 
that I am speaking as Chairman of that Com-
mittee, following the voluntary withdrawal of 
Mr. Warren under that tacit understanding 
which we have undertaken to respect : the expiry 
of a three-year spell as Chairman of the Com-
mittee. 
I should like to pay a tribute to the example 
Mr. Warren has set in this matter, but even 
more to make our Assembly appreciate the 
qualities he has displayed in carrying out his 
mandate during those three years. I was the 
first to be conscious of them, the first to see 
them at work, for he has mapped out for me 
the wisest courses to follow in the endeavour to 
maintain the activities undertaken by our Com-
mittee. I am accordingly speaking this morning 
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after the three Rapporteurs, whilst apologising 
for the absence of Mr. Scheffler. 
Mr. President, may I say that you and the 
Committee were right to agree to the project 
for a visit by your Committee to Brazil and 
French Guiana, despite all the expenses and 
difficulties involved in such a mission. 
The quality of the reports you have been able 
to read- and the quality of the reports is noth-
ing, for it is the quality of the Rapporteurs that 
I want to stress - bears witness to the impor-
tance of this official visit. 
Brazil is a country which, because of its 
natural characteristics, is already the foremost 
country, and by the end of the century it will 
be even further in the lead, because it will con-
tinue to be the pace-setter for the whole of 
South America : 115 million inhabitants, demo-
graphic growth of 3 % - just reckon that out 
- a population in full expansion, a very dynamic 
economy- with 12% growth, as Mr. Lewis has 
reminded us, in the industrial and economic 
fields in the last few years. What we must also 
know, however, is that the country has sources 
of dynamism such that these figures, revealing 
as they are in themselves, contain a coefficient 
of drive that makes of Brazil the very model for 
countries in full development, being less hit 
than others by the energy crisis. The reason for 
this lies precisely in the possibilities of substitu-
tion brought out by your Rapporteurs. 
In these circumstances the report which has 
been presented to you this morning deserves, to 
my mind, some sort of follow-up action, since its 
conclusions, in particular as reflected in the 
recommendation, place the emphasis squarely on 
those essential points which inspire the delibera-
tions of our Committee, as the report ranges 
over space, nuclear, energy and aeronautical 
questions. 
As an example of what we ourselves discovered 
in Brazil, I should like to add an anecdote to 
the mass of facts crammed into the reports. In a 
Brazilian aeroplane I met a Frenchman who was 
a representative of the CNRS - the Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique - on an 
official visit to Brazil. He had been sent by the 
Brazilian Institute of Agronomy, of which he 
is a foreign member, to represent it at Manaus in 
Amazonia in connection with work being done at 
Brazilian national level on the study of soils. 
This testifies to the open-mindedness of the 
Brazilians in welcoming European technicians 
- I say "European" advisedly, in the broad 
sense of the term - but with a predilection for 
Europe rather than for North America. This 
shows clearly the great value Brazil attaches to 
European technology as found in such men. 
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For that reason, having for my part already 
drawn a conclusion in respect of my own coun-
try, I have invited my government to re-examine 
its choices, so clearly does it appear to me that 
Brazil is the privileged partner in South America 
with whom we can dialogue and with whom we 
must promote trade. 
In other words, if the conclusions presented by 
Mr. Lewis, Mr. Adriaensens, Mr. Scheffler -
represented today by Mr. FHimig, whom we 
would thank for a contribution as spontaneous 
as it was effective - and Mr. Cornelissen are 
adopted by the Assembly, I should like it to be 
not just en ephemeral exercise in fact-finding, 
but suggest that a meeting be fixed to ensure 
that the findings are followed up by develop-
ments in the future. For I am convinced that it 
is the whole of that Europe which is modern in 
its intentions, and the whole of that Europe 
which is loved by South America for its history 
and its culture, that must pursue, deepen, 
improve and breathe life into a close co-operation 
along the lines mapped out in the recom-
mendation. 
How can I refrain from saying a few words 
to you about the impressions we gathered in 
French Guiana Y I was able to appreciate them 
more than others. But the Rapporteurs provide 
an admirable outline of the lessons learnt from 
our stay in Kourou. What is of paramount 
importance is that Kourou has become Euro-
pean and that, by its becoming European, 
Europe is being given a chance in eight days' 
time - I am counting the days exactly, and it 
will be on Saturday week - to gain its 
independence in the realm of space launchers. 
You know that the programme for which ESA 
is at present responsible is a source of envy. 
You even know that NASA intends to call for 
help of this kind from Europe in carrying out 
some of its programmes, which have been suffer-
ing from delays that have occurred, especially 
with the shuttle. 
It is for all these reasons that, from the tech-
nical standpoint, we place our faith in the experi-
mental launching on 15th December next and 
in the ESA team. From that day onwards, and 
with developments which will come about later, 
I believe that Europe will really have reached a 
milestone on the road to complete success in 
space achievement at world level. 
In this connection, I should like to draw a 
simple technical lesson. Just now, Mr. Flamig 
was good enough to stress this point. It is pos-
sible that so far as this project is concerned the 
burden borne by France has been greater than 
that of our partners in the European Space 
Agency. This is not the point I wish to stress. 
What I want to bring out is the lesson which 
we must remember, namely that co-operation is 
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all the more effective where it includes firm 
leadership by one partner. I believe that this is 
a concrete lesson which we should draw : co-
operation is all the better for being broadly 
based, but nevertheless all the more effective 
when one partner is responsible for seeing the 
work through. And once again this observation 
is only of general validity on the basis of this 
concrete example. 
I do not want to hold the floor any longer. 
I shall merely venture, with regard to Amend-
ment 2, to suggest to its author, Mr. Cornelissen, 
that in the interest of that co-operation which 
he desires - and that is the reason for his sub-
mission - this amendment may perhaps be 
untimely. Would Mr. Cornelissen agree to with-
draw it or, alternatively, to propose deletion 
of the words "civil and military" ? If I say this, 
it is because I know of the co-operation that 
already exists, especially with Aermacchi, an 
Italian industry, and Embraer ; and I am 
inclined to fear that this amendment, owing to 
its conciseness, might upset arrangements which 
are already functioning and must not be brought 
to a halt. If Mr. Cornelissen would agree to take 
these remarks into consideration, I should be 
grateful to him. 
Once again I would like to thank the President 
and the Presidential Committee for having taken 
the risk involved in this mission. It was a con-
siderable expense for WEU, but I believe that 
the Rapporteurs- and you will have been con-
vinced of this by now - have derived the 
greatest possible intellectual benefit from the 
journey, and there are even greater benefits for 
Europe, for the extremely promising prospect 
of co-operation with South America and with 
Brazil in particular - and why not, in space 
activities, with Kourou ? Benefits too for South 
America, which needs to develop its resources, 
and for Europe, which must remain a beacon of 
civilisation, through its development and through 
the upsurge of its technical, scientific and, why 
not, space achievements. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add, on 
behalf of the whole Assembly, that we con-
gratulate you on your election as Chairman of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions. 
(The President continued in English) 
Your predecessor in the Chair in your Com-
mittee, Mr. Warren, has already left, or I would 
have thanked him on behalf of the Assembly for 
the work he has done for us in this Assembly 
for years as Chairman of your Committee. \V e 
fully agree with what has been said about the 
results of this voyage to Brazil and Guiana, 
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which has been disputed in the Presidential Com-
mittee. I beg to thank all who have participated 
in preparing these extremely valuable reports for 
us. 
The debate is closed. 
Before we can vote on the draft recommenda-
tion in Document 817 we must dispose of the 
two amendments which have been tabled to it. 
Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Corne-
lissen. Will you please move it, Mr. Cornelissen. 
Mr. CORNELISSEN (Netherlands) ( Transla-
tion). - Mr. President, I want only to speak to 
my Amendment 2. Here I will very gladly go 
along with the suggestion from Mr. V alleix, 
Chairman of our Committee, to add the word 
"civil". 
The PRESIDENT. - Then will you please 
speak to that amendment now. 
Mr. CORNELISSEN (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - To make things quite clear, Mr. Presi-
dent, I would point out that the modified text 
of my Amendment 2 should read in English as 
follows: 
In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "civil and military". 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
would thank the Rapporteur for his open-
mindedness. I believe we are proceeding along 
the right lines in avoiding any action that would 
conflict with, and thereby perhaps prejudice, an 
existing form of co-operation on the pretext of 
encouraging co-operation tomorrow. 
I therefore thank Mr. Cornelissen for his 
understanding, and I of course accept his 
amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Assembly must 
first vote on Amendment 1 : 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after "emphasis" add "on safeguards 
against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and". 
There have been no remarks upon it. 
What is the view of the Committee ? 
We shall vote on Amendment 1. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously. 
We now have problems with Amendment 2 
tabled by Mr. Cornelissen. It reads: 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "and military". 
I do not quite understand the situation between 
Mr. Cornelissen and his Chairman. 
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tion). - To make things quite clear, Mr. Presi-
dent, I would once again point out that the 
modified text of my Amendment 2 should read 
in English as follows : 
In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "civil and military". 
The PRESIDENT.- I fully realise that the 
original proposal was to leave out the words 
"and military" but now you agree to have the 
words "civil and military" left 'Out. 
The Assembly must vote on the altered amend-
ment, which is to leave out "civil and military" 
and which is supported by the Committee. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The manuscript amendment is agreed to. 
The Assembly will now vote on the draft 
recommendation in Document 817, as amended. 
If there are no objections t'O it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections L 
Are there any abstentions L. 
Mr. DES CHAMPS (France) (Translation). -
I am voting against the draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT.- The draft recommenda-
tion is adopted 1 • 
I congratulate the Committee. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). 
Mr. President, having complimented the Rap-
porteurs, allow me to associate the Secretary of 
the Committee with these compliments, since 
without his contribution we should have been 
unable to achieve such good results. 
6. Relations with Parliaments 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doe. 818) 
The PRESIDENT.- The next Order of the 
Day is the presentati'On of and debate on the 
information report of .the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments, Document 818. 
I call Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur, to present the 
report. 
Mr. DE POI (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I have 
the honour to present to you on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments does 
not claim to be an exhaustive report on relations 
1. See page 50. 
207 
FOURTEENTH SITTING 
between our Assembly, the Council of Europe 
and the new parliamentary assembly of the Euro-
pean Economic Community. 
It is simply an information report that will 
enable us to broach a complex subject, to be 
expatiated on during the summer session and 
studied in greater detail by our Committee within 
the strict scope of its terms of reference. 
It is a response to the desire for a more clearly 
defined continuing dialogue between these 
assemblies that will not be confined to meetings 
between senior officials or to the exchange, how-
ever invaluable, of documents and information, 
or even to the all-too-infrequent meetings between 
the bureaux of these assemblies. 
I will, if I may, come back to the contacts our 
Committee very recently had with the national 
parliaments concerning cemain activities, such 
as the replies to the questions put by the Chair-
man of our Committee on Recommendation 329 
on the industrial bases of European security, 
Recommendation 333 on parliaments and defence 
procurement and Recommendation 335 on the 
political conditions for European armaments 
co-operation. 
I note that he has received replies from 
Belgium, France and - here I make a small 
correction - the United Kingd'Om. 
To mention positive events in our relations, it 
should be said, as regards my own country, that 
this is the first time that a committee has, after 
due consideration, taken a stand on a text 
adopted by the Assembly. The Committee for 
Foreign Affairs of the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies not only discussed Resolution 63 but 
also accepted a text endorsing the ideas contained 
in that resolution. Incidentally, a short summary 
of the meeting and the text adopted will be 
reaching you very shortly in the usual languages. 
I would like to add a few words to bring out 
the spirit in which this report was drafted. 
The election by direct suffrage of the Euro-
pean Parliament is an outstanding political event 
which will encourage that parliament to take 
upon itself a more decisive image and role com-
pared with the other Community institutions, 
and convince the electorate that they have not 
been performing an empty charade of no real 
significance. It is at the same time a call that 
should be heeded for a better definition of the 
role of our own Assembly. 
Vis-a-vis the European Parliament and at a 
time of growing misgivings about the prospects 
of the defence of freedom and independence in 
Western Europe, reflected even in the debates 
now being held in our national parliaments -
one such debate is now under way in the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies - the Assembly of WEU 
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must not have any inferiority complex. On the 
contrary it should make people realise the 
specific role which the treaty has conferred 
upon it and which must be safeguarded. 
Meetings between the Bureau of our Assem-
bly and that of the European Parliament and 
also of the Council of Europe Assembly, as well 
as meetings between the three Clerks, are already 
seen as a useful way of maintaining contact and 
rendering yeoman service in each of the three 
organisations, with no duplication of effort, for 
the unification of Europe. 
Further details will be given to this Assembly 
during the summer session after completion of 
the Committee's work on the subject. 
But it must be made clear here and now 
that these contacts must not only bring about a 
wider and more regular exchange of informa-
tion ; they must also produce a deeper mutual 
respect, with the eventual object of conferring 
the most appropriate institutions in every respe<,1; 
upon a European union worthy of the name, 
which is the ultimate aim of our political efforts 
and our hopes as free men. 
We do not want to tread on the preserves of 
the other committees, but we cannot avoid under-
scoring the fact that reports and information 
that could in the past be given to the European 
parliamentarians through rthe national parlia-
ments in which they sat as dual mandate mem-
bers, should be more directly channelled now that 
the new European Parliament has many members 
who are not members of national parliaments. 
We say to these newcomers that such a dialogue 
ought not to be regarded as any kind of encroach-
ment but as a proper and authorised distribution 
of responsibilities. 
In pressing its just demands upon the Council 
of Ministers, the European Parliament should 
not,. in its hurry to consolidate its powers, exceed 
its own competence by laying claim to an area 
which belongs to our Assembly. 
Rather, what we have to do is exercise our 
imagination as politicians to provide a general 
framework in which these reciprocal respons-
ibilities run parallel to one another and are 
harmonised. Nothing is immutable in the treaties 
or in the will of men, but we must also bear in 
mind that politics is the art of the possible, and 
not of the impossible. So let us not run before 
we can walk, but begin by taking short steps in 
respect of information, close liaison and a clear 
definition of respective roles. 
The interesting speech by the Belgian Senator, 
Mr. Lahaye - which is printed in the document 
tabled - and the reply by the French Prime 
Minister, Mr. Barre, on 29th September 1979 to a 
question put by Mr. Odru throw a clear light 
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on parliament and government opm10n in the 
member states on the responsibilities of the 
various assemblies. 
These are the facts we really have to face. 
And, Mr. President, if the work of our Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments can con-
tribute to such an effort of imagination and 
good neighbourliness, starting out from practical 
facts and situations, we can say that we have 
not wasted our own time or trespassed on yours. 
(Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. 
The debate is open. 
I call Mr. Roper. 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). - I begin 
by congratulating Mr. De Poi on his report. I 
think that we have all been particularly 
interested in the way in which he has elaborated 
the political level on which there should be con-
tacts between our Assembly and the European 
Parliament. I shall have more to say about that 
in a few moments. 
I was also particularly glad that Mr. De Poi 
recognised that time has progressed since the 
preparation of this report and that he said that 
the question mentioned in paragraph 10 has also 
been posed in the United Kingdom Parliament. 
Mr. President, the question of our growing 
relationship with the European Parliament is 
a matter that you raised in your opening speech 
to our Assembly this week. It is a matter that 
we should watch and follow with great interest. 
I hope that our Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments can find an opportunity to meet in 
Strasbourg at a time when the European Par-
liament is meeting there. It will then be possible 
for us to follow more closely its work, to be 
introduced to its members, and to explain to 
some of them the complementary work of our 
Assembly, with its unique responsibilities in the 
sphere of defence. This would be of interest and 
value and might provide a basis for further 
co-operation in the future. 
The Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
sees its task not merely in relation to contact 
with national parliaments but also with the 
directly-elected European Parliament. In the 
absence of our Chairman, Senator J eambrun, I 
should like to pay my respect to him for the 
work that he has done in the past six months 
in directing our Committee. I pay particular 
tribute to the remarkable meeting that he organ-
ised in Besan<;on earlier this year, a meeting 
marked by a lively debate with parliamentary 
and journalist representatives of that region, in 
which some of the misconceptions about Western 
European Union were, I hope, corrected. It was 
a very lively debate. 
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It shows the value of our Committees, parti-
cularly the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments, meeting in places away from national 
capitals. This applies also to the Committees of 
the Council of Europe. When we go to towns that 
are not national capitals, more notice is taken 
of our Committees. When we go to a national 
capital, we are regarded as yet another parlia-
mentary committee. When we go to a smaller 
place, like Besan~on, more local interest is 
created and we fulfil a useful function in inform-
ing the local population about the role of our 
Assembly and organisation. 
I am also glad, Mr. President, that our Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments is to study, 
in the coming six months, the methods used in 
each of our national parliaments to inform the 
parliaments of the work of Western European 
Union. We have always assumed that our 
arrangements were perfect. I do not think that 
this is the case. The synthetic comparative 
analysis to be undertaken with the co-operation 
of the secretaries of national delegations and the 
Secretary of our Committee will permit the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments to consider 
what improvements could be made. 
Clearly, one cannot have a single model of the 
way in which national parliaments should study 
and follow the work of Western European 
Union. That will vary from place to place. But 
we would benefit from the drawing up of a 
balance sheet showing what is done in each 
national parliament. A number of us will be able 
to learn from the example of some who do things 
better than us. 
This will be valuable. It will continue the 
work that you, Sir, have attempted during the 
three years of your presidency to ensure that 
we are more effective in making known in 
national parliaments the work that is done here. 
I come now to the penultimate part of my 
remarks. It is by making our work better known 
in national parliaments that we might persuade 
more of our colleagues to attend and take part 
in these debates. The Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments, or somebody, clearly has an 
important task to ensure that parliamentarians 
who are appointed to this Assembly take part 
in its activities. 
You will not be surprised, Mr. President, that 
having spent a long time in my Committee on 
the preparation of a report on theatre nuclear 
forces I was very disappointed, yesterday and 
today, to discover that we could not find a 
quorum of membel'IS of this Assembly to vote on 
what is perhaps the most active currently discus-
sed issue in our national parliaments. These 
matters are being discussed in national parlia-
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ments. We have here the sole Assembly in 
Western Europe competent to discuss matters 
of national defence, and not half of its members 
can attend to vote on a resolution. That is not 
a particularly good reflection on us. 
I should like to draw attention to paragraph 
11 of the report of Mr. De Poi and a long extract 
from Senator Lahaye, a Belgian Senator, who is 
not a member of our Assembly. At the suggestion 
of one of my colleagues, the speech by Senator 
Lahaye is incorporated in Appendix IV of the 
document. Much of it is a very objective analysis 
of our work, but the final paragraphs, referring 
to the dialogue that goes on between the Assem-
bly and the Ministers, could be found rather 
insulting by the Ministers and their permanent 
representatives, who have been rather better in 
attending this Assembly than members of the 
Assembly this week. There has usually been a 
quorum of them present, if not a quorum of us. 
I believe that a useful dialogue takes place at 
the regular meetings with the Ministerial Coun-
cil at the level of Ambassadors or Ministers. It 
is not shadow boxing. 
I would not want it to be thought that, because 
Senator Lahaye's speech has been incorporated 
in a document by this Assembly and that the 
Committee has said that it feels it deserves wider 
circulation, we, as an Assembly, consider that we 
are chasing shadows when we engage in discus-
sions with the members of the Ministerial Coun-
cil or their deputies. This could be misconstrued. 
We must obviously try to improve our working 
relations with Ministers, but this can be done in 
a constructive spirit and not in a slightly nega-
tive spirit. I hope that my Belgian colleagues 
will excuse me when I say that a slightly nega-
tive approach occurs in Senator Lahaye's speech. 
Mr. President, I have exhausted my time. I 
hope that you will excuse me if my speech was 
slightly longer than I intended, but I felt that 
these remarks should be made. Thank you, 
Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Roper. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ? 
Mr. DE POI (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. Pre-
sident, I thank our eminent colleague, Mr. Roper, 
for his most interesting comments and I also 
want to thank you in particular since you have 
during your term of office precisely tried to 
define more clearly our Assembly's role com-
pared with the others. This will prove invalu-
able to the action we have in prospect and to the 
spirit imbuing my report. 
I think some of Mr. Roper's suggestions are 
very useful, and I also think that if in future 
we improve our exchanges of information with 
the national parliaments, there will no longer 
be any reason for misunderstandings even such 
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as have been commented on in Senator Lahaye's 
concluding remarks - in a speech excellent in 
other respects - to be pointed out from the 
floor of the Assembly. 
With specific reference to our relations with 
the European Parliament, certain procedures 
will of course have to be worked out and I wonder 
if it would not be useful to propose a hearing of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, in 
whatever forms and organisational arrangements 
the European parliamentary assembly may con-
sider the most appropriate for such contacts. 
The new European Parliament has barely 
begun its activities. We know full well that it is 
now engrossed with budget problems, but once 
these have been solved, one way or another, it 
would no doubt also be able to turn to other 
matters which it has wanted to raise in the past. 
I am referring to the Gladwyn report which 
could be re-tabled more properly in respect of 
our Assembly. 
To avoid friction, we should right from the 
start establish a form of contact which, just as 
in the case of our relations with the national 
parliaments, would not in future create any 
misunderstandings with the European Parlia-
ment. 
These are the remarks I wanted to make, 
Mr. President. I also thank the officials of our 
Committee for their admirable assistance and 
hope that the corresponding report to be made 
by the Committee during the summer session 
will be fuller than the one I have presented to 
you today. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. De Poi. 
I think the whole Assembly agrees that we 
must look carefully ahead, with close co-operation 
between this Assembly and the national parlia-
ments of the countries of Western European 
Union. We fully agree that this is one of the 
most important things for the future in order 
to have a clear-cut situation on all sides, both 
here and in the national parliaments. I fully 
agree with what you have said. 
The debate is now closed and the Assembly 
takes note of the information report of the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments, Docu-
ment 818. 
We are now near the end. I thought that 
there would be a point of order. Mr. Roper ~ 
Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom). I 
am reluctant, athough perhaps it is not 
uncharacteristic, that what is probably my last 
intervention in the Assembly should be on a point 
of order. There was, unfortunately, an error 
made in the transcription of my original amend-
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ment to the report submitted by Sir Frederic 
Bennett. I failed to verify that this was the case 
in the printed version, assuming that mistakes 
of this kind could not occur. I think, however, 
that I made clear in my speech in the debate on 
the amendment the intention of my amendment, 
and I know that Sir Frederic Bennett agrees 
with my proposal that in the printed text of the 
resolution it should be incorporated in the form 
in which it was submitted and which he accepts. 
I hope, Mr. President, that you will agree with 
this change being made. It has been discussed 
with your advisers. 
The PRESIDENT. - Indeed, Mr. Roper. It 
has been discussed with those responsible for 
the administration, but I must inform you that 
there is a problem of principle, and I shall tell 
you the story. On Tuesday afternoon, we con-
sidered the report on the impact of the evolving 
situation in the Near and Middle East on Western 
European security. An amendment, No. 8, was 
tabled in the handwriting of Mr. Roper. It was 
signed not only by Mr. Roper but by others, and 
was adopted. It had been intended to be added 
after the words "Recommends that the Council" 
and so to refer to the whole draft recommenda-
tion, which was adopted by the Assembly. As a 
resllit of an error, the amendment was circulated 
in a form that referred only to paragraph 1. 
When such a mistake occurs, attention must 
be drawn to it before the Assembly deals with 
the amendment, because no one knows whether 
he will support the amendment or vote against 
it. This was not done, and no comment was made 
yesterday morning on the Minutes of Proceed-
ings. When I asked whether there were any 
remarks, no comments were made about those 
proceedings that contained the text of the amend-
ment as circulated, so that if I stuck to the rules 
I should not be ready to rectify the error. If you 
carefully read the proposal, you find the words 
"Recommends that the Council" and in 
Mr. Roper's writing : 
" ... either directly or where more appropriate 
indirectly through the participation of its 
membership in European political co-operation 
among the Nine." 
Then there is paragraph 1, "Ensure that con-
sultation." That is Mr. Roper's intention and it 
makes more sense. There is no doubt about that. 
I want to say only that if something happens 
here, those responsible must look carefully into 
the minutes and say "There is a mistake. Please 
rectify it." As I do not want to finish my three-
year term with a dispute, I take note of 
Mr. Roper's request. 
I now have a final demand for a personal 
remark. I call Mr. Valleix. 
Mr. V ALLEIX (France) (Translation). - I 
would not like us to conclude this session on a 
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note of controversy, but I take advantage of 
Mr. Roper's presence in the hall - had he not 
been present I would not have mentioned it -
to remind him that it was only this morning that 
I personally was able to take cognisance, through 
the English official report, of the speech he 
made yesterday afternoon. 
I do not wish in any case to engage in any kind 
of polemics, and we all - he and I, and you, 
Mr. President - have better things to do. 
Mr. Talon's speech made sound sense. He expres-
sed surprise at the repeated upsetting of the 
orders of the day of the session, occasioned, we 
note, by our common difficulties. And he 
wondered whether it was proper for a report 
distributed a few minutes beforehand to be 
immediately adopted by a Committee. It is a 
procedural matter and I raise it as a point of 
order. I want everyone to rest assured that it 
was in no way a personal attack, and I am sorry 
that Mr. Roper should have taken it as such, if 
indeed he did. May I add that I dispute any 
such interpretation, which is quite unfounded. 
You proposed that we should undertake an over-
all review of our Rules of Procedure : it is an 
important and serious matter, and I hope that 
account can be taken, in so doing, of any reason-
able comments designed to improve our Rules 
of Procedure, and I think some of Mr. Talon's 
remarks are to be considered. I think we may 
thank him in advance. 
I thank Mr. Roper for having had the kindness 
to hear and understand me. 
The PRESIDENT.- Well, Mr. Roped Only 
one minute. 
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Mr. ROPER (United Kingdom).- Mr. Presi-
dent, I would not want Mr. Valleix or my good 
friend, Mr. Talon,, to think that my remarks 
yesterday were in any way personally directed 
or that I assumed that the criticism was personal 
to me. I have re-read this morning what is said 
in the Official Report and I want to make sure 
that in the final version it will read, "A most 
insulting attack was made on my Committee on 
Monday ... ". I did not regard it as a matter for 
myself ; I was concerned because I felt that the 
procedure in my Committee had been questioned. 
I would, however, like to point out that I did 
notify the French Delegation office yesterday 
morning that I was going to make these remarks 
yesterday afternoon, in order that, if Mr. Talon 
and Mr. Valleix wanted to be present, they would 
be informed that I was going to speak on this 
matter. If they had been present, I would have 
ensured that the remarks were made in a way 
which they would have been able to follow. 
Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President. 
7. Close of the Session 
The PRESIDENT.- We are about to bring 
our proceedings to an end in complete harmony. 
The Assembly has now come to the end of the 
business for the second part of this session. 
I declare closed the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Western European 
Union. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 11.50 a.rn.) 
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